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Preface
I
Considering the progress made in the sciences themselves over 
the past three centuries, it is remarkable how little consensus has 
developed on how the scientific imagination functions. Specula­
tions concerning the processes by which the mind gathers truths 
about nature are among the oldest and still most prolific and 
controversial cognitive productions. Unless the inevitable distor­
tion of near perspective is misleading me, it appears that only in 
the relatively recent period have proposals been made that have 
long-range promise.
The chief aim of this book is to contribute concepts and 
methods that will increase our understanding of the imagination 
of scientists engaged in the act of doing science. These chapters 
are therefore a continuation of the series of case studies which I 
published a few years ago in T^wMtic Ongmr of .Scientific 
T/jongAr.' Xcpicr to Einrteind As was the case there, my ap­
proach may be characterized by four aspects.
First, I try to make a detailed examination of the nascent 
phase of the scientist's work, and to juxtapose his published 
results, on the one hand, with firsthand documentation (corres­
pondence, interviews, notebooks, etc.), on the other. In such a 
pursuit, one must be ready for the unexpected. Thus, in the 
studies on Einstein in my earlier book, the documents forced a 
reevaluation of the supposed genetic role of the Michelson ex­
periment in Einstein's original formulation of relativity theory, 
and revealed that this role was small and indirect -  contrary to 
the standard accounts and to the sequence given in practically 
all physics texts dealing with the matter (including a text I 
myself had published).
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Similarly, in the new case studies presented here, the docu­
ments help us to account for the motivation of Fermi and his 
collaborators as we follow the historical development of the 
processes that led to another major scientific discovery, in this 
case, induced radioactivity by neutron bombardment. Both the 
study of how Robert A. Millikan dealt with the experimental 
data on which he based the published value of the electronic 
charge, and the comparison of his actual laboratory notebooks 
with his publications, require us to introduce a notion familiar 
from literary analysis but new to the analysis of scientific works. 
In my view, it is in the fine structure, in the detail of docu­
mented case studies, that one may hope to find the material with 
which to shape and test a theory of the scientific imagination -  
even if that task will not be completed easily or soon.
Second, I tend to look on any product of scientific work, 
whether published or not, as an "event" that stands at the inter­
section of certain historical trajectories, such as of the largely 
private or personal scientific activity; of the shared, "public" 
scientific knowledge of the larger community; of the sociologi­
cal setting in which a science is being developed; and indeed of 
the cultural context of the time. In the previous book, I have 
described Niels Bohr's debt to works in philosophy and litera­
ture, and Einstein's interaction with epistemological currents. 
In this volume, I examined the effects of national resources and 
national styles on the organization and achievement of a labora­
tory team (Chapter y).
Third, a particular concern in my studies is to find the extent 
to which, on certain crucial occasions, the imagination of a 
scientist may be guided by his, perhaps implicit, fidelity to one 
or more Adherence to such preconceptions may help
or impede the scientist; as Einstein once wrote to de Sitter, 
"Conviction is a good mainspring, but a bad regulator." The 
thematic structure of scientific work, one that can be thought 
of as largely independent of the empirical and analytical con­
tent, emerges from the study of the options that were in prin­
ciple open to a scientist. It can play a dominant role in the 
initiation and acceptance of, or controversy over, scientific in­
sights. Function and types of themata were discussed in detail
viii
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in the case studies given in 7Te77Mric (Tiyb/y and are developed 
further here, in the cases to which the first half or so of these 
pages are explicitly devoted.
Last but not least, I am drawn to consider the practical conse­
quences of such findings, for the development of scholarship in 
the history and philosophy of science, for the better under­
standing of the place of science in our culture, and for educa­
tional programs. This is the function of the last set of chapters.
II
Of these four related areas of chief interest, the topic of thematic 
analysis, although still an unfinished research subject, has per­
haps the largest share of any claim to novelty. Judging from the 
commentaries on this work published in the past few years/ 
there may be several reasons for the interest that has been shown 
so far:
1. Thematic analysis allows discernment of some constancies 
or continuities in the development of science, of relatively stable 
structures that extend across supposed revolutions and among 
apparently incommensurable rival theories. Further, in this 
period of reactions against the philosophy that views science as 
a suprahistorical and culturally transcendent method of investi­
gation, some scholars are attracted to the finding that a basic 
feature of the work of many seminal scientists is their accep­
tance of only a small number of themata, and that their debates 
frequently involve antithetical dyads or triplets of themata -  for 
example, atomicity/continuum, simplicity/complexity, analysis/ 
synthesis, constancy/evolution/catastrophic change. Such posits 
help to explain the formation of traditions or schools, and the 
course of controversies.
2. Although practically all my case studies so far have been 
concerned with the physical sciences, some results will be found 
to be applicable to the other sciences. There is evidence of this 
possibility, for example, with respect to recent studies in the 
history of biology/ in early biochemistry/ in sociology/ and in 
psychology, s
3. Techniques analogous to the thematic analysis that I have
Xapplied to science have worked well before in other fields, for 
example, in content analysis, linguistic analysis, and cultural 
anthropology. It appears therefore that the work of mapping 
and classifying themata can lay bare basic commonalities be­
tween scientific and humanistic concerns that are not equally 
likely to become evident through other means. Thus in Harry 
Wolfson's PM/o? the eloquent passage about the purpose of 
studying the work of the philosopher illuminates also the pur­
pose of studying the work of the scientist in the mode here 
proposed. Wolfson wrote:
No philosopher has ever given expression to the full 
content of his mind. Some of them tell us only part of it; 
some of them veil their thought underneath some arti­
ficial literary form; some of them philosophize as birds 
sing, without being aware that they are repeating ancient 
tunes. Words, in general, by the very limitation of their 
nature, conceal one's thought as much as they reveal it; 
and the uttered words of philosophers, at their best and 
fullest, are nothing but floating buoys which signal the 
presence of submerged, unuttered thoughts. The purpose 
of historical research and philosophy, therefore, is to un­
cover these unuttered thoughts, to reconstruct the latent 
processes of reasoning that always lie behind uttered 
words, and to try to determine the true meaning of what 
is said by tracing back the story of how it came to be 
said, and why it is said in the manner in which it is said.
4. The investigation of preconceptions in and concerning 
science connects rather directly with a number of other modern 
studies, including that of human cognition and perception, learn­
ing, motivation, and even career selection (as discussed in 
Chapter 7). Moreover, one may hope that a more sophisticated 
idea of the working rationality of scientists -  with its full set of 
antithetical components, including preconceptions on the one 
hand and objective techniques on the other-will help to deflate 
foolish and dangerous ideas about science that, as noted in 
Chapter 3, have characterized some of the popular conceptions 
of science. As we are entering a period of an increasing number 
of externally imposed restrictions on and directions of scientific 
research, it is well for scientists and other scholars to ensure that
xi
the conditions under which scientific originality can flourish are 
studied, more widely understood, and protected.
Ill
The deep attachment of some scientists to certain overarching 
themata may well be one of the chief sources of innovative 
energy (parallel to that of the instrumentalist or utilitarian 
thrust in science). It seems to me otherwise difhcult to under­
stand a key fact about the sciences, namely, that again and 
again they have been regarded as verging on a charismatic ac­
tivity rather than being thought of as, say, merely one of the 
more successful but fundamentally pedestrian activities of man­
kind.
To underline, and at least briefly emphasize this sometimes 
neglected point, we cannot do better than reflect on a work 
standing at the very beginning of modern science. Copernicus, 
like any other good astronomer, relied of course on observation 
and calculation, and he greatly advanced mathematical astron­
omy in the technical sense. But one must look deeper to find the 
chief reason why he came to write the work for which he has 
been honored, or to explain its power. Nature, he held, is God's 
temple, and he implied that human beings can, through the 
study of nature, discern directly both the reality and the design 
of the creator. This was a daring and dangerous idea, and it 
is significant that when Copernicus's book was put on the 
of "Books to be Corrected," this implication was one of the 
relatively few deletions which were insisted upon as necessary; 
for it was clear both to Copernicus and to his opponents that 
when the purpose of science is perceived large enough, it can 
rival the claims of all other reality systems.
From the first sentence of De one senses the
source of energy of a major scientific idea. It is not some pedes­
trian piecing together of a corner of the puzzle. Nor does the 
work give us merely better astrometry and applications such as 
calendar corrections, valuable though these are. Rather, his dis­
covery is on a scale that produces an expansion of human con­
sciousness, a change in cultural evolution -  and it was so per­
ceived by those who were converted to Copernicus's idea.
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In his work, two themata predominate, and the mutual ac­
commodation of theory and data that they produce seem to me 
to account for the quasi-aesthetic conviction in his followers that 
the system must be right. These themata are those of simplicity 
and necessity. They appear in a stern manner that became basic 
to all science since. In a weil-known passage, Copernicus 
proudiy writes that the heliocentric scheme he has found for the 
system of planets has the property that "not only their phenom­
ena follow therefrom, but also the order and size of all the 
planets and spheres and heaven itself are so linked together that 
in no portion of it can anything be shifted without disrupting 
the remaining parts and the universe as a whole."
The power of this solution was precisely its restrictiveness. 
There is nothing arbitrary, no room for the smallest ad hoc 
rearrangement of any orbit, as had been quite possible in pre- 
Copernican work. Copernicus's system, as a whole, revealed a 
sparse rationale, a necessity that binds each detail to the whole 
design. Hence it carries the conviction that we understand why 
the planets are disposed as they are, and not otherwise. One is 
reminded here again of Einstein's remark to his assistant Ernst 
Straus: "What I'm really interested in is whether God could 
have made the world in a different way; that is, whether the 
necessity of logical simplicity leaves any freedom at all."
This kind of terminology, and the attitude behind it, are now 
rare and even somewhat embarrassing to most scientists. There 
are good sociological, psychological, and even political reasons 
why this should be so, why our usual list of motivations for 
scientific work tends to stress the Baconian side of the heritage 
of modern science -  the discovery of cures, the perfection of 
machinery, the strengthening of the state's security, or simply 
the provision of a decent way to spend one's days on this earth. 
But while the Baconian ethos has become a necessary component 
of the total scientific and engineering enterprise, it would not 
be sufficient to sustain science, and by itself does not help us 
understand the nature of high discovery.
No one would argue that personal testimonies such as those 
referred to should be introduced into our current scientific 
papers. However, a quiet underground current of this cosmolog­
ical tradition still exists. It comes in a somewhat disguised form,
but the thematic content of simplicity and necessity as warrants 
of deeper truths are stiii among the most prized.  ^Steven Wein­
berg, on receiving the Robert Oppenheimer Memorial Prize, 
said:
Different physicists have different motivations, and I 
can oniy speak with certainty about my own. To me, the 
reason for spending so much effort and money on ele­
mentary particie research is not that particies are so inter­
esting in themselves -  if I wanted a perfect image of 
tedium, one million bubble chamber photographs would 
do very well -  but rather that as far as we can tell, it is in 
the area of elementary particles and fields (and perhaps 
also of cosmology) that we will find the ultimate laws of 
nature, the few simple general principles which determine 
why all of nature is the way it is . . .
The reason I take such an optimistic view of where we 
are now is that relativity and quantum mechanics, taken 
together but without any additional assumptions, are ex­
traordinarily restrictive principles. Quantum mechanics 
without relativity would allow us to conceive of a great 
many possible physical systems. Open any textbook on 
non-relativistic quantum mechanics and you will find a 
rich variety of made-up examples -  particles in rigid 
boxes, particles on springs, and so on -  which do not 
exist in the real world but are perfectly consistent with 
the principles of quantum mechanics. However, when you 
put quantum mechanics together with relativity, you find 
that it is nearly impossible to conceive of any possible 
physical systems at all. Nature somehow manages to be 
both relativistic and quantum mechanical; but those two 
requirements restrict it so much that it has only a limited 
choice of how to be -  hopefully a very limited choice."
All scientists since Copernicus have understood the attractive­
ness of a system having such qualities. And although any indi­
vidual attempt of this sort is an act of intellectual and profes­
sional risk taking -  for the thematic choices themselves are 
neither verifiable nor falsifiable, and the antithetical thema of 
complexity, for example, deserves a more detailed analysis than 
it has been given so far-no other, less cosmological, approach
xiii
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is likely to lead to the truth, least of all to a truth having the 
exalting sweep that historically has helped give the scientific 
enterprise its intellectual mandate.
IV
In pointing to these uses to which themata have been put, I do 
not mean to imply that they are the only ones of significance. 
On the contrary, themata have been and, I expect, ever will be 
used by scientists of the most opposing attitudes and interests. 
Moreover, I do not believe that giving attention to thematic 
analysis requires one to adopt a label (certainly neither "posi­
tivistic" nor "antipositivistic"), or otherwise forces one to take 
sides in the battles currently preoccupying some sectors in the 
history and philosophy of science -  the more so as many of the 
divisions are themselves along thematically opposing conceptions 
about the history or philosophy of science. The campaign dags, 
or accusations, read "objectivity" versus "subjectivity" versus 
"anything goes"; "logical" versus "empirical" versus "psycholo­
gists" studies; "rules of reason" versus "mystical conversion"; 
"rational" versus "irrational"; "relativism" versus "absolutism"; 
"analytical-reductionistic" versus "holistic"; and even "reason" 
versus "imagination." But to paraphrase a seminal paper that 
changed the state of physics in the early years of this century, 
the understanding of the process of scientific innovation that is 
implied in these antagonistic schemes is characterized by polari­
ties which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena, that 
is, in the actual work of the scientists as it reveals itself to us in 
archival material, oral histories, and of course in the actual par­
ticipation in research.
At the very least, the present, opposing positions seem to me 
to lack the dexibility and the ability to accommodate themselves 
to the human activities -  with all their natural ambiguities -  that 
we are trying to map and study. The heat and ideological 
clamor emanating from some of the encounters in delds that 
make science their raw materials of observation are strangely 
incongruous with respect to the state of affairs in the sciences 
themselves. Ironically, even those who actually work in the 
"hardest" sciences now are often satisded with claiming no more 
than "good reasons" and probable knowledge. Most of them
xv
are not afraid to accept humanistic interpretations of their work, 
and are likely to sympathize with Henry A. Murray's percep­
tive definition that "science is the creative product of an engage­
ment between the scientist and the events to which he is atten­
tive."*"
V
The search for modeis of the scientific imagination, at this stage 
of research, must of necessity be largely inductive and empirical. 
It must be committed to painstaking attempts at historical ac­
curacy and cautious scholarship based on the available evidence, 
but it must also possess the imaginative freedom to produce new 
conceptual tools with which to study well-guarded areas such 
as the working of the minds of scientists. Adopting a kind of 
ethological approach to the study of scientific activity and 
bringing in whatever is needed -  now the state of science as 
understood at the time, now findings on the psychodynamics of 
scientists or the social forces on them-seem to me a strategy 
preferable to casting the accounts of achievements into formal­
istic structures. As we are only just beginning to gather the 
chief elements from which theories of the scientific imagination 
may be fashioned, schemes that promise certainties must be held 
at arm's length.
One recalls here a story told by the architect LeCorbusier.** 
Having invented his "modulor," a measure-system for fixing the 
dimensions of architectural space, of urban design, and of plastic 
arts, and believing in its necessity and power with fervor, he was 
arguing intensely for its wide adoption. LeCorbusier even 
journeyed to Princeton to convince Einstein. However, instead 
of the hoped-for endorsement of the system, he obtained a much 
milder and more appropriate judgment: Einstein told him the 
scheme would be quite satisfactory if it only served to make the 
bad more difficult, and the good easier.
In addition to sponsors, institutions, and persons to whom I have 
expressed my gratitude on many of the pages that follow, I 
wish to acknowledge especially a supporting grant for research
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in the history and phiiosophy of science, received front the 
National Science Foundation, and the hospitality of the Center 
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford 
during a research leave in 1975-76. None of my work would 
have been possible without the generous assistance from the 
Albert Einstein Archives at Princeton, the Center for the His­
tory of Physics at the American Institute of Physics in New 
York, the archives of the American Philosophical Society in 
Philadelphia, the Robert A. Millikan Archive at the California 
Institute of Technology, the Ernst Mach Archive in Freiburg, 
and the archives at the Accademia dei Lincei in Rome and of the 
Domus Galilaeana in Florence.
Among those whose technical expertise helped me negotiate 
the huge distance between the mere thought and the printed 
word, I wish to thank Joan Laws for her patient assistance over 
many years, and Marcel Chotkowski La Follette for therapeutic 
editorial help with the printer's manuscript.
I have presented several of these cases for discussion in my 
seminar on the history of science at Harvard, and once more 
thank my students for their thoughtful responses. When a 
chapter is based on a previously published essay-usually in 
somewhat revised form -  the publishing history appears in the 
chapter notes and the Acknowledgments; my appreciation to 
those publications and their editors is also hereby recorded gladly.
How a scientific discovery is made: 
The case of high-temperature superconductivity
Setting priorities for research, choosing which projects are to be 
supported and which abandoned, triggers epic battles at the 
highest levels. It requires predicting which paths and which 
mixture of policies might best advance science and lead to fruit­
ful technologies, liet in such debates little attention is given to 
one of the most fundamental questions: What can historical cases 
teach us about how the scientific imagination works, and hence 
what it takes to make a scientific discovery? There are many 
popular ideas abroad, often based on oversimplified textbook 
accounts of famous discoveries and on charming anecdotes. They 
have little to do with the unruly complexity of the events them­
selves, and can only mislead science scholars and science policy­
makers.
For this reason, it will be revealing to find lessons in specific 
case studies of the kind to which this book is dedicated. To start 
off with an example of the scientific imagination at work, a good 
choice is the discovery of high-temperature superconductivity, 
not least because it is recent enough to simplify the process of 
reconstructing its context. Our investigation, which included 
interviews with Karl Alex Muller and Johannes George Bednorz, 
who discovered the first high-temperature superconductors, also 
throws light on a set of problems of intense current interest: 
How does "curiosity-driven" or basic science interact with "stra­
tegic" research and engineering? How important are both plan­
ning and serendipity in discovery? What laboratory culture 
makes success more likely? How deeply are the roots of crucial
This essay was prepared in collaboration with Hasok Chang and Edward 
Jurkowitz.
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ideas and apparatus buried in the soil of history? How important 
is the practice of borrowing across traditions and disciplines? 
What role do the private style and presuppositions of the indi­
vidual play in research?
As will be shown, in a typical case scientific innovation de­
pends on a mixture of basic and applied research, on interdisci­
plinary borrowing from current as well as from old resources, on 
an unforced pace of work, and on personal motivations that lie 
beyond the reach of the administrator's rule book. While many 
of these findings may be generally familiar to students of scien­
tific creativity, our operational mode of analysis, which is roughly 
comparable to the methods of genealogical research, makes them 
more precise, testable, and generally applicable. As such, they 
may serve as an empirical complement to some of the untested 
assumptions that inform policy discussions, not least in the de­
bates in Washington and in corporate boardrooms over the rela­
tive merits of applied and basic research.
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Superconductivity—the loss of electrical resistance below a criti­
cal, or transition, temperature (71) characteristic of the mate­
rial—was first discovered in mercury by the Dutch physicist 
Heike Kamerlingh Onnes in 1911. Mercury becomes supercon­
ducting at just 4.2 degrees above absolute zero (4.2 degrees 
Kelvin). Teams large and small worked for decades in the hope 
of finding electrical conductors with higher critical temperatures, 
which would be easier and cheaper to keep resistance-free. There 
beckoned the rewards both of new theories to explain the phe­
nomenon and of practical applications to exploit it; among the 
latter was the possibility of enormous new efficiencies in the 
transmission and use of electricity.
But for a long time nature yielded little hope for real progress. 
By 1973, fully sixty-two years after the discovery of the phe­
nomenon of superconductivity, all efforts had stalled at a 7) of 
23.3 Kelvin, the critical temperature of a niobium-germanium 
compound (Nb,Ge). After years of frustrating failures to boost 
7) into a region where there were realistic prospects for com­
mercial use, high-temperature superconductivity was no longer
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Figure i. Superconductivity, the loss of electrical resistance in a material, 
was discovered by the Dutch physicist Heike Kamerlingh Onnes (WgZr, 
shown with his colleague G. J. Flim and their helium-liquefying apparatus 
in 1922). (Photograph courtesy of the Deutsches Museum, Munich.)
considered a promising area. Some theories held that no higher 
7) could be expected. Bernd Matthias, a highly respected Bell 
Laboratories physicist who, together with collaborators, had dis­
covered hundreds of new superconductors, challenged his peers 
to give up "theoretically motivated" searches, or "all that is left 
in this held will be these scientific opium addicts, dreaming and 
reading one another's absurdities in a blue haze" (quoted in 
Bromberg 199$).
All this changed virtually overnight in 1986, with the publica­
tion of a set of papers by Karl Alex Muller and his former student 
Johannes Georg Bednorz, two investigators at the IBM Zurich 
Research Laboratory in Riischlikon, Switzerland. Unlike most of 
the previously discovered superconductors, the new compound 
was a ceramic, a mixed oxide of barium, lanthanum, and copper
XX
Figure 2. In 1987, Kart Alex Muller (/in- /e/i), 60, and his former student 
Georg Bednorz, 37, were awarded the Nobel Prize for the discovery of 
high-temperature superconductors. (Photograph courtesy of IBM.)
(La^CuO ,^ or lanthanum cuprate, doped with a small amount of 
barium). It not only had a remarkably high 7/—in the neighbor­
hood of 30 Kelvin—but was also relatively easy to prepare by 
ceramic techniques and to modify by chemical substitution. 
Whereas ground-breaking discoveries often involve new tech­
nology, in this instance the means to create and to measure the 
phenomenon had been available for decades.
The discovery became an academic and popular sensation, 
especially after Paul C. W  Chu's group at the University of 
Houston and Mao-Ken Wu's team at the University of Alabama 
jointly announced in February 1987 that they had achieved su­
perconductivity at about 90 Kelvin with materials related to the 
Bednorz-Miiller compound, a temperature well within the range 
of the inexpensive coolant liquid nitrogen. Now high school 
students could demonstrate the phenomenon. A climax of excite­
ment was reached at the so-called Woodstock of Physics, a panel 
discussion on high-temperature superconductivity held at the 
American Physical Society's annual meeting on March 18, 1987, 
in New Mark City. Roughly 3,500 physicists crowded into the 
hotel where the meeting was held, some lingering so long after 
the session ended that they had to be ejected from the rooms 
by the hotel staff at 6 A.M.  (Khurana 1987b; Robinson 1987; 
Schechter 1989).
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Here was everything a physicist could wish for: a new class of 
materials with great potential for generating new theories and 
new technologies. Above all, the discoveries provided that most 
rare and most desired moment, a glimpse of vast unexplored 
scientific territory. Like Cortez's men on the peak in Darien, the 
physicists at the meeting "look'd at each other with a wild sur­
mise." Or as a reporter put it: "One could have felt as if one were 
a part of a ceremonial gathering to affirm a new cult" (Khurana 
1987b).
After the tumultuous emergence of high-temperature super­
conductivity—even President Ronald Reagan hailed the "new 
age" of superconductivity as a welcome "revolution" having great 
promise for new products—Muller and Bednorz were awarded, 
with the maximum possible speed, the Nobel Prize for physics
Figure 3. The American Physical Society's 1987 March meeting, later 
named the Woodstock of Physics, was an impromptu crash course follow­
ing the discovery of high-temperature superconductors. According to one 
account, the meeting was "an insane physics demonstration . . . Suddenly, 
over three and a half thousand physicists (with twice that many elbows) 
seemed hell-bent on proving that two bodies row/d occupy the same place 
at the same time." (Photograph courtesy of the American Institute of 
Physics.)
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for 1987. Their discovery unleashed the energies of dozens of 
teams, and laboratories all over the world rushed to synthesize 
other potential oxide superconductors. Indeed, it did not take 
long for the critical temperature to be raised to 12$ Kelvin, and 
to even higher temperatures at high pressure. Today the record 
stands at about 164 Kelvin, with isolated observations, often 
transient, being reported of critical temperatures well above 200 
Kelvin (the freezing point of water is 273.16 K). The opium 
addicts' blue haze has dissipated, and some physicists have even 
dared to hope again that room-temperature superconductors will 
eventually be found.
The main outlines of this discovery are well known, but our 
interviews and correspondence with Muller and Bednorz turned 
up essential details. Here we set forth an account of the discovery 
of the first high-temperature superconductors as Muller and 
Bednorz experienced it, with particular attention to the re­
sources, either intellectual or material, on which the discovery 
depended. T hen we put forward a systematic analysis based on 
this narrative, a schema designed to help answer the more gen­
eral question of what it takes to make a scientific advance.
Muller, who was born in Basel, Switzerland, in 1927, gradu­
ated from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) 
in Zurich in 1938. ETH was the home base of the physicist 
Wolfgang Pauli, who had continued to teach there after being 
awarded the Nobel Prize in 194$. Muller said of Pauli, "he 
formed and impressed me." As will be shown, the student had 
learned more than physics from his teacher. By 1963, Muller had 
joined the research staff of the IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, 
and in 1972 he was put in charge of its physics group. In 1982 
he was promoted to IBM Fellow, becoming one of a handful of 
that corporation's distinguished scientists who were free to work 
on anything they pleased. He was to use that opportunity well.
Previously Muller had worked for almost fifteen years on a 
series of problems in condensed-matter physics, many of which 
had links back to his doctoral research. His Ph.D. thesis, done 
under Georg Busch at the ETH, was on the identification of the
electron paramagnetic resonance lines of iron ions, a subject 
quite unrelated to superconductivity. But as it happened, the 
material in which the iron ions were present as impurities was 
the then recently synthesized oxide strontium titanate (SrTiO j, 
and that fact, in a way nobody could have foreseen, would turn 
out to be Muller's hrst step toward research on high-temperature 
superconductivity.
Indeed, Muller's use of strontium titanate was entirely acci­
dental. Initially, he had set out to map the paramagnetic reso­
nance spectrum of impurities in tin. When that worked out 
poorly, Muller explained in an interview, he went "by chance into 
Professor Heine Granicher's ofhce," looking for crystals of other 
materials. Granicher offered Muller some samples, and among 
them was strontium titanate. It was a fateful moment. Strontium 
titanate not only helped Muller get his doctorate, but also led 
him to study the crystallographic literature about the class of 
materials to which this compound belongs, and set him on a road 
whose destination would become apparent only years later.
When he was made an IBM Fellow in 1982, Muller felt that, 
having passed the age of fifty, he was ready for an entirely new 
challenge. Perhaps he remembered the advice of an old supervi­
sor, H. Thiemann, whose byword had been "One should look 
for the extraordinary." In any case, Muller chose extraordinary 
conductivity as his next challenge.
At the time, superconductivity was not a promising held of 
research. Not only had the incremental progress toward higher 
T  apparently stalled, but IBM had had to abandon the effort to 
produce a computer using Josephson junctions—electronic de­
vices made of superconducting materials that can switch states 
faster than devices made of semiconductors—despite the enor­
mous investments the company had made in this project.
Muller was aware of all this. In 1978 he had spent an eight­
een-month leave at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center 
in Yorktown Heights, New York. John Armstrong, the vice presi­
dent in charge, wisely gave Muller discretion to pursue any 
subject he wished while he was there. That encouraged him to 
look into the troubled held of superconductivity, about which he 
then knew very little. As he put it, he started "from page one of 
Michael Tinkham's book," /HtrodMchow to .SMperrowdMrrAhy (197$).
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But thorough study throughout the available literature turned up 
no theory that would lead beyond the usual materials to new 
substances and higher critical temperatures. Muller then "de­
cided I just don't talk to the theoreticians. They just held me 
back."
After he returned to Zurich, Muller continued to work on 
superconductivity, first alone, and then from 1983 with Bednorz. 
Born in Neuenkirchen, Germany, in 1930, Bednorz was highly 
trained in crystallography, solid-state chemistry, and physics. 
Muller and Granicher were supervising his Ph.D. thesis at the 
ETH; not surprisingly, Bednorz's hrst experimental work was on 
the growth and characterization of strontium titanate.
Bednorz was an ideal partner for Muller. As Bednorz explained 
in their joint Nobel lecture, he had become interested in super­
conductivity in 1978, when he was invited by the IBM Zurich 
laboratory to improve the superconductive properties of stron­
tium titanate single crystals. In this he quickly succeeded by 
adding trace amounts of niobium to the crystal. %t the highest 
achievable 7j was still only 1.2 Kelvin, so his supervisor had lost 
interest, and Bednorz had returned to the institute to work on 
his thesis.
But the seeds of fascination with the held had been sown, and 
when in 1983 Muller asked Bednorz to join him in the search 
for a new superconductor, Bednorz accepted with such alacrity 
that it took Muller by surprise. Still, at the outset the two men 
spent a fruitless couple of years with nickel-based oxides. Right 
up to its culmination, their research was typically in the "little- 
science" style, meaning on a relatively small budget. Bednorz 
later described it as one step on a "long and thorny path." 
Moreover, they worked in self-imposed isolation. Muller admit­
ted that they kept their early work completely to themselves, not 
informing even the IBM managers, in part because superconduc­
tivity research was not then a popular subject with management. 
This decision, made possible by Muller's status as an IBM Fellow, 
was also taken so that if they failed, they could quietly give the 
project "a burial in very restricted family circumstances, in order 
not to jeopardize Bednorz's career."
The breakthrough came when they decided to look for super­
conductors among copper-containing oxides, a class of materials
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fundamentally different from those that had been ransacked by 
the pioneers in the held, such as Matthias. During a literature 
search on these types of compounds, Bednorz happened on a 
ip8$ paper by Claude Michel, L. Er-Rakho, and Bernard Raveau 
of the Universite de Caen that described barium-doped lantha­
num cuprate. But the authors were chemists and had concen­
trated on catalytic rather than superconducting properties.
The decision of the Swiss team to investigate the oxides, 
which is a key turn in this story, "took every condensed-matter 
physicist by surprise" (Chakravarty 1994). Indeed, one physicist 
recently confessed that when he and his colleagues had heard 
that Muller "was searching for high T  in oxide, we thought he 
was crazy." Up to that time searches had concentrated on inter- 
metallic compounds; ceramic oxides were generally thought to 
be insulators, not conductors, much less superconductors. But 
according to their joint Nobel Prize lecture, the team's "aim was 
primarily to show that oxides could do better in superconductiv­
ity than metals and alloys."
They had several reasons for striking out in this new direction. 
Some oxides, including strontium titanate, had previously been 
found to be superconductors of the traditional sort, although 
with T's no higher than 14 Kelvin, they ranked well below 
the niobium compounds. As Muller and Bednorz later noted, 
they were also reasoning from the then-standard theory for 
superconductivity—the BCS theory, named after the physicists 
John Bardeen, Leon Cooper, and Robert Schrieffer—and the 
Jahn-Teller theorem devised by the physicists H. A. Jahn and 
Edward Teller. Muller had read a paper by Karl-ITeinz Hock and
H. Nickisch of the Technische Hochschule in Darmstadt, Ger­
many, and H. Thomas of the Universitat Basel in Switzerland 
(Hock, Nickisch, and Thomas 1983) that led him to think that 
a material that met the Jahn-Teller criterion and was metallic at 
high temperatures might have an unusually high 7J- The lantha­
num cuprate met those criteria as well. Tet among the interesting 
ironies of the story is that the BCS theory is now thought to have 
only limited applicability to high-temperature superconductivity, 
and that the Jahn-Teller effect has little to do with establishing 
superconductivity in the high-temperature superconductors. 
Furthermore, as Muller later put it, "Thu always need a kick of
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luck": Bednorz had prepared the lanthanum cuprate differently 
(by coprecipitation) than had the French team, thereby favorably 
altering the structure, as it turned out. (Dordick 1987).
As Muller explained, however, there was another, very crucial 
factor: the attraction that he in particular felt toward the sub­
stance described by Michel, Er-Rakho, and Raveau. It had a 
perovskite-type structure. This structure had special meaning for 
Muller; indeed, he had an "atavistic type of feeling that it might 
work for superconductivity." When he and Bednorz came to 
deliver their joint Nobel lecture, they gave it the significant title 
"Perovskite-Type Oxides—The New Approach to High-d) Su­
perconductivity."
Perovskites, named in 1830 in honor of the Russian amateur 
geologist Lev Aleksevitch von Perovski, are a class of ceramics 
that have a particular atomic arrangement. In their ideal form 
perovskites, which can be described by the general formula 
ABX,, consist of cubes that are decorated with three elements. 
The A! cation (positively charged ion) lies at the center of each 
cube, the F cations occupy all eight corners, and the X anions 
(negatively charged ions) lie at the midpoints of the cube's twelve 
edges. The cubic structure has particular appeal because, of the 
seven possible crystal systems, it is the one with the highest 
degree of symmetry.
As noted, Muller and Bednorz had each devoted their gradu­
ate research largely to the perovskite strontium titanate. Muller 
later wrote that "the perovskite structure determined, even 
dominated, my scientific efforts for many years" (Muller 1988). 
Indeed, in Muller's extensive bibliography, perovskites recur in 
widely varying studies, ranging from paramagnetic resonance to 
sound attenuation and heat capacity, from structural phase tran­
sitions to photochromism. For example, Muller gave special at­
tention to perovskites in a decade-long investigation of the man­
ner in which the Jahn-Teller effect can lead to structural phase 
transitions (Thomas and Muller 1972).
As Muller emphasized, perovskites "always worked" for him. 
This highly symmetric structure became for him a thematic 
guide, quite different from and supplementary to the elements 
traditionally considered central to the logic of scientif c research. 
It will become apparent in the following chapters that, in this
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tendency, Muller joins many other scientists who found them­
selves being led by thematic commitments, at least during the 
early, rather private stages of their projects. Einstein, for exam­
ple, had a predilection for symmetry, continuity, and classical 
causality, whereas Heisenberg embraced discontinuity and aban­
doned classical causality. In Muller's case the thematic influence 
on the scientific imagination was just as compelling.
After reading the French paper about barium-doped lantha­
num cuprate, Bednorz and Muller prepared the compound and 
showed that it became superconducting at a temperature of 
about 30 Kelvin, a 71 substantially above that of any material 
previously studied. They also confirmed that the sample exhib­
ited another important indicator of superconductivity, the Meiss­
ner effect: when a superconductor in a magnetic held is cooled 
to the temperature at which it loses resistance, all or part of the 
magnetic flux within the material is expelled. Still, Bednorz and 
Muller initially found that their reports were "met by a skeptical 
audience" (Bednorz and Muller 1987a). But soon the confirma­
tions came pouring in, and research groups grew explosively the 
world over.
For a serious study of what it took to make this discovery and 
what lessons it implies, we must press on beyond this sketch of 
events to a deeper level, where the resources that history had 
prepared for the success of the team lie hidden. A complete 
analysis would take into account in more detail the personal 
research trajectories of Muller and Bednorz, evaluate the 
influences of encounters with other researchers, and thoroughly 
explore the educational systems through which they passed, as 
well as the universities and corporate institutions that employed 
them. Here we will concentrate on the vast treasury of
woHrrrr that these two scientists were able to ex­
ploit. On the basis of this case history, we then generalize, 
proposing a structured description of how new scientific work is 
rooted in and nourished by previous achievements, some from 
the distant past.
It is often said that scientific work is "based on" earlier work,
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Figure q. Data indicating the discovery of the hrst high-temperature super­
conductor, barium-doped ianthanum cuprate, published in ZehrrAri/i 
PFyh/f R The crucial figure shows the temperature dependence of the 
resistivity (p) of lanthanum cuprates doped with varying amounts of barium. 
The figure's shock value lay in its abscissa: the materials underwent the 
transition of zero resistivity at temperatures well above absolute zero. 
(Courtesy of Springer-Verlag.)
or that earlier work "gave rise to" later work; there is also much 
talk of "traditions," "influences," and "connections." These no­
tions must be made more precise to be useful. In particular, one 
must seek to operationalize them, that is, to define them in terms 
of identifiable and repeatable operations.
By resources we mean mathematical techniques, physical laws, 
analytical instruments, factual information, and the like. Al­
though an investigator may well create some such resources on
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the spot, more frequently they are derived from previous work 
done by others. Indeed, the most important relation among 
scientific research efforts is that of adapting, assimilating, trans­
forming—or in general "borrowing"—whether consciously or 
not.
Such borrowing leaves identifiable traces, just as one can dis­
cern one's ancestors' traits in one's own makeup. To pursue this 
suggestive metaphor, it should be possible in principle to reveal 
many "generations" of "ancestors" that lie behind a scientific 
work. In short, "influence" can be operationalized by attempting 
to tease out the genealogy of a work by looking for document- 
able facts that are equivalent to a line of inheritance.
One way to locate the resources used in a given piece of 
published scientific work is to trace the citations, in footnotes or 
in the text, to other publications or to private communications 
it contains. To be sure, citations cannot be used blindly, because 
they may be merely pro forma, intended to acknowledge the 
existence of related projects in the same field, or to serve other, 
largely social purposes. Another problem is that not all impor­
tant resources are explicitly cited. Many resources will be con­
sidered generally known and silently assumed. The scientific 
genealogist, therefore, must rely on his or her own scientific and 
historical background knowledge to find implicit citations in the 
target paper or in the ancestral papers. Finally, any genealogical 
exercise is open-ended; how far back to trace the connections is 
a pragmatic decision. We have found that it is not necessary to 
go back further than three or four "generations" to test interest­
ing hypotheses about scientific innovation.
A genealogical analysis of Bednorz and Muller's main scientific 
publications announcing the discovery of high-temperature su­
perconductivity shows the need to distinguish among the various 
types of resources on which the team drew. They made use of 
at least four types of resources: initial, motivating theoretical 
framework and ideas (schema); experimental techniques and ma­
terial resources (production); means of gathering and analyzing 
data (observation); and theoretical concepts for interpreting the 
results (interpretation). Figure $ indicates the kinds of items that 
make up these four main components.
As Figure $ shows, analysis of the original five papers that
Figure $. To determine the immediate inteilectuai and material "ancestry" of the discovery of high-temperature supercon­
ductors, we traced implicit and explicit citations ("+" indicates coauthors) appearing in five papers that form the essential 
core of the Bednorz-Miiller work. This genealogical analysis quickly showed that at least four types of resources fed into 
the discovery, as marked along the left edge of each "layer."
XXXI
constituted the announcement of their breakthrough quickty 
revealed a number of silent resources that Muller and Bednorz 
put to use. For example, among the tools for observation were 
several standard techniques whose origins are no longer referred 
to explicitly in research reports: x-ray powder diffraction for 
analyzing the structure of the sample, and various electrical re­
sistance thermometers, among others. Similarly, the theoretical 
resources needed to interpret the experimental results included 
some long considered commonplace and whose original sources 
were not cited, such as the criteria for identifying superconduc­
tivity: zero electrical resistance and the Meissner effect.
Figure $ indicates how each resource can be connected either 
to one of the two-dozen publications explicitly cited in the basic 
Bednorz-Mfiller papers or to a publication implicitly referred to 
in their papers. For example, the passing mention of the Meiss­
ner effect implicitly refers to the 1933 publication describing the 
effect by the German physicists Walther Meissner and Robert 
Ochsenfeld. Similarly, the platinum thermometers the teams 
used imply reference to an 1887 publication by Hugh L. Calen­
dar of the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, England, that 
ushered in the resistance thermometer as a practical means of 
measuring temperature.
It doesn't take long to see that the Bednorz-Miiller work 
harbors a broad and intricate system of ancestors. Our search 
revealed many cross-references early resources and also
quickly took us back to work published a century or more ago. 
Unwittingly but documentably, the stage for the 1986 discovery 
was set by scientists, many long in their graves. For instance, the 
apparatus used to liquefy helium stems from a liqueher devel­
oped by the MIT engineer Samuel C. Collins in 1947; its prede­
cessor was the Russian physicist Pyotr Kapitza's 1934 liqueher, 
which in turn made use of two principles of cooling first laid out 
by the British physicists William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) and 
James E Joule in the 1830s and by the French chemists Nicolas 
Clement and Charles-Bernard Desormes in 1819.
Obviously, the network of ancestors extends to yet earlier 
generations (Figure 6). Moreover, if one focused on any one 
node—say, the BCS theory of superconductivity—it would reveal 
a broad and intricate network of its own (Figure 7). That, of
Figure 6. More complete genealogical analysis of the Bednorz-Miiller achievement uncovered a broad network of intellectual and 
material ancestors, grouped here generally as in Figure $. For illustrative purposes, the hrst-generation ancestors are
shown in more detail than earlier generations The genealogical tree has been arbitrarily truncated.
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Figure y. Density of connections that characterizes genealogical analysis of 
scientific work is demonstrated by focusing on one node in Figure 6—the 
BCS theory for low-temperature superconductivity—which explodes to 
reveal its own dense network of ancestors. This figure also illustrates a 
quixotic aspect of scientific discovery: the BCS theory in its original form 
is now widely thought not to apply to high-temperature superconductors, 
but ideas do not have to be correct to be fruitful.
course, is the point: in an operationally meaningful sense we 
begin to perceive "what it took" to discover high-temperature 
superconductivity. We can generalize that any significant ad­
vance relies on a large but identifiable set of earlier contribu­
tions. Some may be famous and profound; many more are much 
less significant in themselves. But all have served, almost always
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unwittingly, to prepare for the emergence later of a new scientific 
or technological achievement.
*n?e private r/hm'/mo??
As noted, tracing the genealogy of a scientific discovery through 
the published literature does not uncover every factor of rele­
vance to it. Perhaps the most intriguing needed addition is the 
private dimension of scientific discovery. Because of the tradition 
of formality in science writing, this aspect of discovery rarely 
survives in the published record. But we were lucky. When 
Muller was asked to elaborate on his remark that the perovskite 
structure "always worked" for him, he obliged us by sharing in 
some detail an aspect of his motivation that would ordinarily be 
kept private.
His unlikely choice of a perovskite in his search for high-tem- 
perature superconductors was guided not just by the force of 
(well-rewarded) habit. As he put it: "I was always dragged back 
to this symbol." He first became fascinated with this highly 
symmetrical structure in 19$2, when he was working on his 
doctorate. As noted earlier, Wolfgang Pauli was one of Muller's 
professors at ETH; just at that time, Pauli had published an essay 
on the influence of archetypal conceptions in the work of the 
astronomer Johannes Kepler, in a book coauthored with the 
psychoanalyst Carl Jung (Pauli 1952). Much impressed by that 
essay, Muller started to read Kepler avidly, thus encountering 
Kepler's deep commitment to the guidance of three-dimensional 
structures of high symmetry—the five Platonic solids—in his 
work on planetary motion (Figure 8).
Muller continued, "If you are familiar with Jung's terminology, 
the perovskite structure was for me, and still is, a symbol of—it's 
a bit high-fetched—but of holiness. It's a a self-centric
symbol which determined me . . .  I dreamt about this perovskite 
symbol while getting my Ph.D.; and more interesting about this 
is also that this perovskite was not just sitting on a table, but was 
held in the hand of Wolfgang Pauli, who was my teacher." At 
the time, Muller had divulged this aspect of his inspiration only 
to friends and to Pauli's last assistant, Charles P. Enz. He has 
since discussed it in an introspective essay (Muller 1988) illus­
trated with the Dharmaraja Mandala (Figure 9).
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Figure 8. Like many scientists, MiiHer was aiso influenced by older scien­
tific ideas. Wolfgang Pauli, his teacher, had written an essay on archetypal 
conceptions in the work of Johannes Kepler, including a model of the 
planetary orbits as a concentric structure defined by the enclosed highly 
symmetrical solids. (Reproduced from Kepler, 7Mys%r?H777 Canwog7i?p/w?7772, 
1596.)
To the historian this is familiar ground. Scientists from Kepler 
to Kekule, from Newton to Crick and Watson, were guided in 
the early stages of their research by a visually powerful, highly 
symmetric geometrical design. In faithfulness to Muller's self-re- 
port, our genealogy should therefore include a new type of 
resource, pryyoTM/ /Wv/Mhr p 0W/om', and with it a new line 
of inheritance, reaching in this case back first to Pauli and Jung 
and then to the works of Johannes Kepler, four centuries earlier. 
This added intellectual resource played as big a role in motivat­
ing the 1986 discovery as any of the other resources we have 
mentioned. Other case studies will reinforce the fact that per­
sonal thematic presuppositions of various sorts were essential 
motivators in major advances throughout the history of science.
&)772e
What can we learn about scientific discovery in general from this 
genealogical analysis of a particular advance? Four hypotheses 
offer themselves that may be found to hold generally for modern
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Figure 9. Muller chose the Dharmaraja Mandala (iz^ ovr) to illustrate his 
source of inspiration. (Courtesy of Joachim Baader, Galerie fur tibetische 
Kunst; Munich, Germany.)
science. Although students of scientific discoveries will not find 
them surprising, we would contend that our genealogical method 
of analysis has allowed these hypotheses to be put in a more 
testable, and therefore more useful, form.
r. RorrctMMg q/' rcsoMrccf roz/tzwr/y p/tzrr
f/Yzt/zfwM.t tt'zfAz'zz tz ro7zuc?2rM?zzz//y Jhnp/zMr. For instance,
among the theoretical ancestors of the Bednorz-Muller work are 
ideas from thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, the old quan­
tum theory, quantum mechanics, and quantum held theory. Even
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when a given work superficially appears to be the result of a 
narrow line of research, it is likely to have a deep and broad 
ancestry. When scientists borrow from different subhelds within 
a discipline, these can blend together or be transformed in an 
alchemical process that turns them into gold. One may also note 
that the unpredictable way scientists reach back to earlier re­
search done in a different part of the discipline suggests it would 
be futile to attempt to "rationalize" or "direct" this process, but 
argues for making a scientific education as wide-ranging as pos­
sible.
2. Forrowwg o/* rrroMrrrr %/yo roMfmr/y on%?r ^rrorr
dm'/pAWr. The Bednorz-Mfiller work bor­
rowed directly or indirectly from a wide variety of different 
disciplines, each with its own professional societies and jour­
nals. They included physical chemistry, material science, crystal­
lography, metallurgy, electronics, and low-temperature tech­
niques. This feature, most obvious in experimental projects but 
also found in theoretical ones, has, we suggest, become more and 
more characteristic of modern scientific work.
j?. /hmf ^orrotw rrroMrrrr^o?  ^ rcrMrr/?, %p-
^orrowr rrroMrreryho7^  reyo%rrA A good exam­
ple of this symmetrical exchange is Bednorz and Muller's use 
of a SQUID (superconducting quantum interference device) to 
measure changes in magnetic fields. The initial pursuit of super­
conductivity itself can be regarded as basic, or "curiosity-driven." 
So can Brian Josephson's prediction that superconducting cur­
rents can tunnel across an insulating film. But then the Joseph- 
son effect led to the production of SQUIDs, making possible 
exquisitely sensitive magnetic susceptometers, whose develop­
ment is considered a piece of applied work. The susceptometers, 
however, proved useful in further basic research into supercon­
ductivity, including Bednorz and Muller's. In short, to use a 
metaphor from physics, the exchange of energy between pure 
and applied research resembles the exchange of energy between 
a pair of coupled pendulums. Such feedback effects can be ob­
served even within discipline-oriented research lines.
Ow yrwJfMgy ^or rn'cMti/fr rr-
q/* or Most borrowed
resources had been developed by others in research with a goal 
quite different from that of tire eventual borrower. Moreover, the
research of the borrower also often ends up somewhere other 
than the intended destination; for example, Onnes's initial dis­
covery of superconductivity was based on ideas of Kelvin's, which 
predicted "exactly the opposite of what was found eventually" 
(Meijer 1994). As noted, Bednorz and Muller discovered high- 
temperature superconductivity by studying a compound that had 
been synthesized and researched by others for unrelated pur­
poses. Nor could the team have predicted that now there exist 
more than a hundred high-temperature superconductors, as well 
as a growing set of industrially promising applications—motors, 
transformers, thin films, and power cables—some of them al­
ready on a production basis. What is more, all of this has tran­
spired in the continued absence of any consensus about the 
mechanism of high-temperature superconductivity.
The Muller-Bednorz story, replete with unpredictable turns of 
events and rife with unintentionality, has yet another twist. The 
perovskite structure inspired Muller and Bednorz to gamble 
on investigating the oxides in the first place. The barium cu­
prate compound they prepared contained well-separated planes 
of copper and oxygen atoms, and these layers turned out to be a 
universal property of high-temperature superconductors. More­
over, these layers exist because the compound is not, after all, a 
true perovskite; because of the way its unit cells stack, it has 
orthorhombic rather than cubic symmetry. As Muller said to us 
in this connection, although Kepler was initially dedicated to 
decomposing planetary orbits into perfect circles, he was even­
tually led to ellipses instead—but thereby helped prepare for 
Newton's PriMripM.
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If these four hypotheses are more generally confirmed, they will 
have the effect of providing support for the old assumption 
that there is some underlying unity in science, perhaps not of 
the Theory-of-Everything variety but of a different, operational 
kind.
A distinguished and vocal minority of scientists (including 
Philip W  Anderson) has asserted that we should not look for 
unifying theories emerging from the study of elementary parti­
cles, and that each area of science, such as biology or fluid
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dynamics, has its own laws, which cannot be derived from some­
thing more fundamental. Those arguments, whether right or 
wrong, do not touch our idea of unity, which is exemplified in 
the ceaseless borrowing that connects diverse traditions and dis­
ciplines. In principle, any two research efforts, however removed 
in time, subject, or purpose, may well turn out to be genealogi­
cally connected. And in the limit, the whole of natural science 
may be represented as one thickly linked continuum, which can 
be divided into distinct disciplines and traditions only in a more 
or less arbitrary way. However they may differ, the multitudinous 
projects of science at any given moment share in and emerge 
from a common history.
/'wp/icwtiom' /or xncMrc po/fcy
This study has significant implications for science policy. It sug­
gests, first of all, that far more attention should be paid to the 
history of actual advances, which demonstrate, in operational 
terms, that major accomplishments in science depend on healthy 
systems of education and research administration that nurture 
a mixture of basic, applied, and instrument-oriented develop­
ments. The traditions and management styles of laboratories and 
their parent institutions can greatly advance or hinder research. 
At the Zurich laboratory, Muller and Bednorz benefited from 
access to highly trained machine and glassblowing technicians, 
schooled in the traditions of excellence and craftsmanship that 
can be traced back to the guilds of previous centuries. Then too, 
it was probably not an accident that their discovery, which is 
basically an advance in the science of materials, occurred at a 
laboratory with a long-standing commitment to this science, 
most notably to the study of ferroelectricity.
But the most striking feature of the culture at the Zurich 
laboratory was the willingness to give good people the freedom 
to pursue projects with long gestation periods. This was re­
warded twice in quick succession. The year before Bednorz and 
Muller won the Nobel Prize in physics, the prize had been 
awarded to Gerd Binnig and Heinrich Rohrer, also of the Zurich 
laboratory, for their patient development of the scanning tunnel­
ing microscope. The stories of the transistor and the laser also 
suggest that the chance of serendipitous encounters with key
xl
ideas is increased by permitting research to proceed at an un­
forced pace.
We recognize here the well-known phenomenon of the self- 
amplihcation of confident, successful, high-quality cultures. 
They exhibit what Robert K. Merton of Columbia University, 
who pioneered the modern sociology of science, has memorably 
termed the Matthew effect (a reference to the text: "Unto every 
one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance . . ." 
Matthew 25:29).
It is equally important that the system of research administra­
tion encourage the flexibility that promotes borrowing within 
and across disciplines and between basic and applied research. 
The culture of the laboratory, including its financing, should 
allow both a natural, unforced pace of work and a degree of 
self-direction of the scientific imagination that allows researchers 
to draw on the personal sources of inspiration on which admin­
istrative rule books and traditional science texts are so silent.
But above all, our research suggests that the current debate 
about the relative merits of and support warranted for basic and 
mission-oriented research is oversimplified. Historical study of 
cases of successful modern research has repeatedly shown that 
the interplay between initially unrelated basic knowledge, tech­
nology, and products is so intense that, far from being separate 
and distinct, they are all portions of a single, tightly woven fabric 
(Mort 1994; Ehrenreich 1995). Even research that narrowly tar­
gets a specific application sooner or later must rely on results 
from a wide spectrum of research areas. For example, it is some­
times said that Irving Langmuir looked into blackened light 
bulbs and so created modern surface chemistry. But of course his 
achievement did not spring full-fledged from his brow. Its gene­
alogy, if traced back as carefully as we have traced the genealogy 
of Bednorz and Muller's discovery, would quickly reveal the 
crucial role of many types of research in earlier generations and 
in different fields.
If we wish to achieve noteworthy science, even if noteworthy 
is defined to mean only science with an economic payoff, we have 
no alternative but to support the seamless web of research.
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Part 1: On the thematic analysis of science

Themata in scientific thought
1
When the historian, phiiosopher, sociologist, or psychologist of 
science studies a product of scientific work -  a published paper, 
a laboratory record, a transcript of an interview, an exchange of 
letters-he is usually dealing primarily with an We can
distinguish at least eight different facets of such events, each 
facet corresponding to a different type of interesting research 
question.
First is, of course, the understanding of the scientific content 
of the event at a given time, both in contemporaneous terms 
and, separately, in terms of what we now believe to be the case. 
What did the scientist claim was at issue? What was he in fact 
confronted with? For this we try to establish his awareness 
(within the area of public scientific knowledge at the time of 
the event) of the so-called scientific facts, data, laws, theories, 
techniques, and lore. I would include under this heading the 
larger part of historical research on what are called scientific 
world views, exemplars, and research programs. Chiefly, how­
ever, historians and scientists are still concerned with digging 
out the concepts and propositions embodied in the events 
studied and with rendering them in empirical and analytical 
language.
The second is the time trajectory of the state of shared (that 
is, "public" rather than "private") scientific knowledge that led 
up to and perhaps goes beyond the time chosen for the event. 
Establishing this means, so to speak, the tracing of the World 
Line of an idea or a subject of research, a line on which the 
event (E) is a point. Whether we are studying the problem of 
falling bodies from Kepler to Newton, or the flowering of
3
4quantum electrodynamics from Feynman to the last issue of 
Rcufctc LcMcrt, under this heading we are dealing with 
antecedents, parallel developments, continuities and discontinui­
ties, and the like. This tracing of conceptual development and of 
the "context of justification" is the most frequent and the 
strongest activity of historians of science and historically in­
clined science educators.
Third is the more ephemeral personal aspect of the activity 
in which E is embedded. Here we are in the context of dis­
covery, trying to understand the "nascent moment," which may 
be poorly documented and not necessarily appreciated or under­
stood even by the agent himself. Except for work on a few 
figures such as Kepler or Einstein, scientists (and philosophers) 
until recently have been rather impatient with such studies. The 
very institutions of science -  the methods of publication, the 
meetings, the selection and training of young scientists -  are 
designed to minimize attention to this element. The success of 
science itself as a sharable activity seems to be connected with 
this systematic neglect of what Einstein called the "personal 
struggle." Moreover, the apparent contradiction between the 
often "illogical" nature of actual discovery and the logical 
nature of well-developed physical concepts is perceived by some 
as a threat to the very foundations of science and rationality 
itself.
The alternative path is not easy. In one of his interviews, 
Einstein urged historians of science to concentrate on compre­
hending what scientists were aiming at, "how they thought and 
wrestled with their problems." But he pointed out that the 
scholar would have to have sufficient insight, a kind of educated 
sensitivity both for the content of science and for the process 
of scientific research, as solid facts about the creative phase are 
likely to be few; and that, as in physics itself, the solution to 
historical problems may have to come by very indirect means, 
the best outcome to be hoped for being not certainty but only a 
good "probability" of being "correct anyway."^
A fourth component of historical research is indeed the estab­
lishment of the time trajectory of this largely "private" scien­
tific activity -  the personal continuities and discontinuities in
$
development, or science in the making as experienced in the 
scientist's own personal struggle. Now the event E at time ? 
begins to be seen as the intersection of two trajectories, of two 
World Lines, one for "public science" (let us call it &), and one 
for "private science" (SJ, to use a shorthand terminology which 
is useful enough if not pushed too hard/*
Fifth, parallel to the trajectory of Si and shading into it as 
one of its boundaries is a band tracing the psychobiographical 
development of the person whose work is being studied. We are 
dealing here with the new and tantalizing held which explores 
the relation between a person's scientific work and his intimate 
style of life.
Sixth is unavoidably the study of the sociological setting, 
conditions, or influences which arise from colleagueship, the 
dynamics of teamwork, the state of professionalization at the 
time, the institutional means for funding, for evaluation and 
acceptance, and quantitative trends. Here we deal with the fields 
of science policy studies and sociology of science in the nar­
rower sense.
Seventh, a similar band, parallel to and shading into the tra­
jectories of $i and $2 deals with cultural developments outside 
science that influence science or are influenced by it -  with 
questions concerning the feedback loops in the entities science- 
technology-society, science-ethics, and science-literature.
Finally, there is the logical analysis of the work under study. 
In my own development, first as a student of P. W. Bridgman 
and Philipp Frank and later as their colleague, interest in and 
respect for a valid analysis of the logic of science in fact pre­
ceded work in the analysis of the more strictly historical aspects 
of a case.
These eight areas of study are not separated by hard barriers. 
To be sure, each has invited its own specialization and thereby 
its own operational self-definition. For each we could quickly 
put forward the names of heroes and the shape of future hopes 
of development -  though we might now all agree, with various 
intensities of regret, that the resolution of a real case in the his­
tory of science (in all its ambiguities and interdisciplinary con­
nections) in separable components is, after all, a reductionistic
strategy which our human limitations force or doom us to em- 
ploy.
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The method of dealing with complex entities by resolution or 
reduction found its use in science itself very early -  for example, 
in the passage in the Second Day of Galileo's Dialogo, where 
Salviati and Simplicio are discussing the motion of an object 
released from the mast of a moving ship. Simplicio refuses Sal- 
viati's proposal to resolve the motion into a horizontal and a 
vertical component, one for free fall straight to the center of the 
earth, the other with constant velocity in the direction of initial 
motion. Perhaps we should credit Simplicio's resistance to a 
premonition that the whole method of resolution and reduction 
is precarious and has no more necessity than any other meth­
odological thema -  that is, it is neither verifiable nor falsihable, 
and its usefulness depends entirely on how soon you are satisfied 
with your results.
As we now know, Salviati was grossly exaggerating. Resolv­
ing the motion of the falling object into two components in 
order to understand motion and its causes is only the first step in 
an essentially infinite chain of resolutions. If one wants more 
detail about the motion, other laws enter. The appearance of 
the Coriolis force is responsible for an eastward deflection of the 
object. The laws for falling bodies in real media at various 
Reynolds numbers have to enter to calculate the effect of fric­
tion and turbulence. The more detail one wants to know, the 
more resolutions become necessary. The process would have 
become infinitely regressive if an Occam's Razor had not been 
invented in our century for cutting off all side effects below a 
certain limit. Quantum physics did give us a way to stop, owing 
to the uncertainty principle and the finite size of Planck's 
constant; they extinguish the meaningfulness of all further ques­
tions.
And there is another lesson. The two components Salviati 
chose, while they were plausible enough and even turned out 
to be useful, were not endowed with any provable necessity 
over any other set of two or more components of motion that
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might have been imagined. I mention this to acknowledge that 
my list of components is not to be taken as the recital of an 
unchangeable, sacred Eightfold Way. On the contrary, one 
reason for making the list was to be able to conclude that it is 
incomplete in an important respect. In other words, there re­
mains a set of questions that is irresistible (to me, at any rate); 
that cannot be handled naturally in this eightfold scheme at all; 
and that lay bare a link between scientific activity and human­
istic studies, a link that few have studied so far.
Any listing of such questions must include these: What is 
constant in the ever-shifting theory and practice of science-  
what makes it one continuing enterprise, despite the apparently 
radical changes of detail and focus of attention? What elements 
remain valuable in science long after the theories in which they 
are embodied have been discarded? What are the sources of 
energy that keep certain scientific debates alive for decades? 
Why do scientists -  and for that matter also historians, philoso­
phers, and sociologists of science -  with good access to the same 
information often come to hold so fundamentally different 
models of explanation? Why do some scientists, at enormous 
risks, hold on to a model of explanation, or to some "sacred" 
principle, when it is in fact being contradicted by current ex­
perimental evidence?
Why do scientists often privately not acknowledge a dichot­
omy between the context of verification and that of discovery, 
and yet publicly accept it? If it is true, as Einstein believed/ 
that the process of formulating laws purely by deduction is "far 
beyond the capacity of human thinking," what may be guiding 
the leap across the chasm between experience and basic prin­
ciple? What is behind the obviously quasi-aesthetic choices that 
some scientists make -  for example, in rejecting as merely ad hoc 
a hypothesis that to other scientists may appear to be a necessary 
doctrine? Are the grounds from which such choices spring con­
fined to the scientific imagination, or do they extend beyond 
it?
To handle such questions I have proposed a 72272?^  component 
for the analysis of a scientific work-that is, thematic analysis 
(a term familiar from somewhat related uses in anthropology,
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art criticism, musicology, and other Helds). In many (perhaps 
most) past and present concepts, methods, and propositions or 
hypotheses of science, there are elements that function as the- 
mata, constraining or motivating the individual and sometimes 
guiding (normalizing) or polarizing the scientiHc community. 
In the scientists' own public presentations of their work, and 
during any ensuing scientiHc controversy, these elements are usu­
ally not explicitly at issue. Thematic concepts do not usually 
appear in either the index of textbooks or in so many words 
in the professional journals or debates. Such traditional dis­
cussions concern chieHy the empirical content and analytical 
content, that is, the repeatable phenomena and the proposi­
tions concerning logic and matbematics. By way of a very 
rough analogy, I have suggested that those two elements be 
considered the x and y coordinates of a plane within which the 
discussion seems chieHy to proceed, since the "meaningfulness" 
of concepts is tested by the resolution of concepts or proposi­
tions into those elements -  "meaningful" in the sense that agreed- 
upon rules generally exist for the veriHcation or falsiHcation of 
statements made in that language.
Thus (as we shall see in Chapter 2), in R. A. Millikan's famous 
oil drop experiment, the question of whether or not the electric 
charges on small objects always come in multiples of some fun­
damental constant (called the charge of the electron) could in 
principle have been resolved quickly by coming to terms on 
how and what was being observed through the telescope or 
ultramicroscope when a particle was seen to move in the view 
Held, and whether and how to amend the equation for Stokes's 
law for the fall of small objects by extrapolation of a correction 
term. If that were all, the lengthy debate about the existence of 
a postulated "subelectron" would never have happened. But in 
1910, and continuing for some years afterward, the controversy 
between Millikan and his opponent was joined -  at the intersec­
tion, as it were, of two sets of World Lines. Analysis of the ex­
pressed motivations, and of the ever-hardening attitudes of the 
protagonists on opposite sides of the question shows here, as in 
other cases, the strong role of an early, unshakable commitment 
by the opponents to different themata.
The themata that appear in science can, in our very rough
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analogy, be presented as lying along a dimension orthogonal to 
the x-y plane in which verification and falsification can take 
place, hence somewhat like a z axis rising from it. Although the 
x-y plane does suffice for most discourse within science as a 
public, consensual activity, the three-dimensional (xyz) space 
is required for a more complete analysis -  whether historical, 
philosophical, or psychological -  of scientific statements, pro­
cesses, and controversies. (My argument is not to introduce 
thematic discussions or even a self-conscious awareness of the- 
mata into the practice of science itself. It is indeed one of the 
great advantages of scientific activity that in the x-y plane many 
questions -  for example, concerning the "reality" of scientific 
knowledge -  cannot be asked. Only when such questions were 
ruled out of place in a laboratory did science begin to grow 
rapidly.) It is fruitful to make distinctions between three dif­
ferent uses of themata: the f^ e777%tic co77cepr, or the thematic 
component of a concept (examples I have analyzed are the use 
of the concept of symmetry and of the continuum); the 777CfN 
odo/ogic#/ rb<?77M (such as the preference for expressing the laws 
of science where possible in terms of constancies, or extrema, or 
impotency); and the r&v/M/T pr^poritM/z or f/3<?77z%t7C bypot/ye- 
yfy (exemplified by overarching statements such as Newton's 
hypothesis concerning the immobility of the center of the 
world, or the two principles of special relativity theory).
The attitude I have taken in the task of identifying and order­
ing thematic elements in scientific discussions is to some degree 
analogous to that of a folklorist or anthropologist who listens to 
the epic stories for their underlying thematic structure and re­
currence. Although the analogy leaves much to be desired, there 
are more than superficial relations. For example, the awareness 
of themata which are sometimes held with obstinate loyalty 
helps one to explain the character of the discussion between 
antagonists far better than do scientific content and social sur­
roundings alone. The attachment of physicists such as H. A. 
Lorentz, Henri Poincare, and Max Abraham to the old electro­
magnetic world view and their discomfort with Einstein's rela­
tivity theory become a great deal more understandable when the 
ether is thought of as operating as the embodiment of thematic 
concepts (for example, of the absolute and the plenum). Thus
in their obituary for Abraham, Max von Laue and Max Born 
wrote perceptively:
[Abraham] found the abstractions of Einstein disgusting 
in his very heart. He ioved his absolute ether, his Reid 
equations, his rigid eiectron, as a youth loves his first pas­
sion whose memory cannot be erased by any later experi­
ence . . . His opposition was grounded in physical, fun­
damental persuasions to which he, purely in accord with 
his feelings, held on as long as possible . . . [As Abraham 
himself once said] against the logical coherences he had 
no counterarguments; he recognized and admired them as 
the only possible conclusion of the plan of general rela­
tivity. But this plan was to him thoroughly unsympathetic, 
and he hoped that the astronomical observation would dis- 
conhrm it and bring the old, absolute ether again into 
honors
A finding of thematic analysis that appears to be related to the 
dialectic nature of science as a public, consensus-seeking activity 
is the frequent coupling of two themata in antithetical mode, as 
when a proponent of the thema of atomism finds himself faced 
with the proponent of the thema of the continuum. Antithetical
(00) couples-such as evolution and devolution, constancy and 
simplicity, reductionism and holism, hierarchy and unity, the 
efficacy of mathematics (for example, geometry) versus the 
efficacy of mechanistic models as explanatory tools -  are not too 
difficult to discern, particularly in cases that involve a contro­
versy or a marked advance beyond the level of common work.
I have been impressed by how few themata there are -  at least 
in the physical sciences. I suspect the total of singlets, doublets, 
and occasional triplets will turn out to be less than 100. The 
appearance of a new thema is rare. Complementarity in 1927 and 
chirality in the 1950s are two of the most recent such additions 
in physics. Related to that is the antiquity and persistence of 
themata, right through scientific evolution and "revolution." 
Thus the old antithesis of plenum and void surfaced in the de­
bate early this century on "molecular reality" -  indeed, it can 
be found in the work of contemporary theoretical physicists. 
One may even predict that, no matter how radical the advances 
will seem in the near future, they will with high probability still 
be fashioned chiefly in terms of currently used themata.
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The persistence in time, and the spread in the community at a 
given time, of these relatively few themata may be what endows 
science, despite ail its growth and change, with what constant 
identity it has. The interdiscipiinary sharing of themes among 
various Helds in science tells us something about both the mean­
ing of the enterprise as a whole and the commonality of the 
ground of imagination that must be at work.
I I
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To illustrate some of these points and to show that current as 
well as historical cases are amenable to this analysis, I want to 
focus on an example in one of the liveliest fields of physics 
today, as embodied in publications of Steven Weinberg." The 
line tracing the development of Weinberg's thoughts intersects 
the trajectory of a stream of developments in quantum electro­
dynamics initiated by Enrico Fermi in 1934 and now basing 
itself on techniques started independently in the late 1940s by 
R. P. Feynman, Julian Schwinger, Freeman J. Dyson, and 
Sinitiro Tomonago. Other points on the trajectory include dis­
coveries by groups at CERN, Argonne Laboratory, and the 
National Accelerator Laboratory. In thematic terms, the "event" 
we shall study is only the latest in a very old sequence of 
attempts, reaching past many revolutions and heady victories 
back to the first scientist of recorded history; for the main pre­
occupation is the fundamental constituent of which all matter is 
presumed to be made.
To put it briefly, Weinberg, his collaborators, and other 
groups have been working on the problem of finding common 
ground between the four types of interaction ("forces") that 
are now believed to account for all physical phenomena: the 
gravitational interaction that ail particles experience; the electro­
magnetic force that accounts for phenomena involving charged 
particles and the interaction of light with matter; the "strong" 
nuclear force that acts between members of the large family of 
elementary particles called hadrons; ? and the "weak inter­
action" postulated to describe extremely short-range interactions 
of some elementary particles (such as the scattering of a neutrino 
by a neutron, and the radioactive decay of a neutron into a 
proton, an electron, and an antineutrino).
In 1967, Weinberg (and, independently, Abdus Salam of 
Trieste) proposed that the electromagnetic force and the weak 
interaction are essentially connected. Each of the four types of 
interaction has been considered to be the result of processes 
analogous to radiation or absorption between two interacting 
objects, the particle radiated or absorbed being characteristic for 
each of the interactions. Thus electromagnetic phenomena are 
due to the exchange of the massless photon, whereas the gravita­
tional interaction is thought to be due to the exchange of par­
ticles called gravitons. The weak interaction is mediated by the 
so-called intermediate vector boson (IVB) which, if it is found 
to exist, will have to be exceedingly massive.^  Weinberg's pro­
posal was that the massless photon and the very massive IVB 
are close relatives-that the IVBs are by and large members of 
the photon family but get their mass (the appearance of their 
difference) by virtue of being associated with broken gauge 
symmetry groups.
At the time Weinberg proposed the theory, "there was," he 
notes," "no experimental evidence for or against it, and no 
immediate prospects for getting any." To this day the IVBs 
cannot be produced directly (for instance, in accelerators), but 
indirect evidence for their existence has been reported. In a 
paper published under the names of fifty-five investigators from 
seven institutions in a Pan-European collaboration at the CERN 
laboratory/" two events were found in which a mu-neutrino was 
scattered by an electron, and several hundred events in which 
a mu-neutrino was scattered by a neutron or a proton. (The 
latter reaction showed up nicely also on more recent experi­
ments at Argonne National Laboratory and the National Ac­
celerator Laboratory.) This is evidence that the "neutral cur­
rent" reaction, a new kind of weak interaction predicted by 
Weinberg involving the postulated neutral IVB, may be taking 
place," and so indirectly supports the theory which makes these 
particles a member of the same family as the photons.
Moreover, strong interactions also become amenable to calcu­
lations with the same methods as are used for weak and electro­
magnetic interactions. It is possible, therefore, that the strong 
interactions are caused by exchange of particles that belong to 
the same family as the photon and the IVB. "If these specula-
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tions are borne out by further theoretical and experimental 
work," Weinberg says in the last sentence of his recent survey, 
"we shall have moved a long way toward a unified view of 
nature" (p. $9; see n. 9).
Now let us go to the beginning of this same report, which is 
entitled "Unified Theories of Elementary-Particle Interaction," 
and look at it through eyes alert to themata. What, then, are the 
thematic conceptions, methodological themata, and thematic 
suppositions that inhere in this search for the IVBs and their 
photonlike family membership?
We can list a few of the more evident themata when we scan 
just the first page (see Figure i.i) of the article.^ It begins: 
One of man's enduring hopes has been to find a few 
simple general laws that would explain why nature, with 
all its seeming complexity and variety, is the way it is. At 
the present moment the closest we can come to a unified 
view of nature is a description in terms of elementary par­
ticles and their mutual interactions. All ordinary matter 
is composed of just those elementary particles that hap­
pen to possess both mass and (relative) stability: the 
electron, the proton and the neutron. To these must 
be added the particles of zero mass: the photon, or 
quantum of electromagnetic radiation, the neutrino, 
which plays an essential role in certain kinds of radio­
activity, and the graviton, or quantum of gravitational 
radiation . . .
What strikes us at once is the acknowledgment that "one of 
man's enduring hopes has been to find a few simple general 
laws" and thereby obtain a theory that is "unified" (the first 
word of the title). Unification or synthesis, with its promise of 
increased understanding through increased economy of thought, 
is a member of a connected set of themata, one of its opposing 
aspects being multiplicity (or complexity, variety), but the 
chief antithetical thema being one we discussed before, that of 
resolution or analysis rather than synthesis. Each of these mem­
bers of the constellation has it uses (as will be further studied in 
Chapter 4). Here, clearly, unification is taken to be preeminent.
". . . Why nature, with all its seeming complexity and vari­
ety, is the way it is." Kepler, who asked in the preface of the
Unified Theories
of Elementary-Particle Interaction
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Figure i.t. First page of Steven Weinberg's article, Scientific /tnzerican 2^  t, no. 1 (July 
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All rights reserved.
diyitcnmy; Cowyogr^ p/ifcyy/yy why the planets are at the dis­
tances they are, of the number and with the motions which we 
find them to have, "and not otherwise," would have agreed with 
this description of one of man's enduring hopes. So would most 
scientists since. The second sentence, however, bares a precon­
ception which not all scientists will share. We find here a new 
thematic commitment, that of constructing the desired unified 
view of nature out of "elementary particles and their mutual 
interactions." We hear the echo of Democritus's "all is atoms 
and void." But as we shall note shortly, not all physicists in our 
time have subscribed to this belief. Nor of course would biolo­
gists, psychologists, or social scientists be satisfied with this par­
ticular unified view of 7M7M7T in terms of particles and their 
interactions. A choice has been made here, though a choice that 
promises indeed a breathtaking unification of this part of nature.
What is being conveyed in Weinberg's opening passage by 
"elementary"? A few sentences later (col. i, bottom) it is 
defined to mean that there is not now "any successful theory 
that explains the elementary particles in terms of more elemen­
tary constituents." Some day, to be sure, one may find "still 
more elementary constituents, named quarks" (col. 2, top); but 
until that time, so long as "strenuous efforts" make it "impos­
sible to break particles," they are elementary.
This quality of being elementary anchors the whole arrow of 
explanation, upward from these presumed elementary particles 
to the antithetical entities, constructs (such as nuclei [col. 1, 
bottom], atoms, or ordinary matter, all of which are "com­
posed" of elementary matter). The antiquity of that quest, from 
Thales to Prout to J. J. Thomson to our day, is evident. These 
elementary particles, then, are today's true "atoms" in the sense 
of the Greek They form one leg of another triplet of
themata, the second being the coTMtrMCt made of and explained 
by these atoms or elementary quanta, and the third being the 
notion of the C07??mzm777, the indefinitely cuttablcT
The list of elementary particles then consists of the electron, 
the proton, and the neutron. "To these must be added the par­
ticles of zero mass: the photon . . . the neutrino . . . and the 
graviton" (col. 1, one-third down). We are here clearly in a 
world of particulate discreteness; although the wave property 
that inheres in such particles is of course not doubted, it simply
1$
is not part of the image that has captured attention and pri­
macy."
The number and variety of eiementary particles, Weinberg 
says, are "bewildering." But there are ways of retaining sanity 
and gaining insight by mastering the bewildering variety. The 
ordering of chaos by means of the concept of hierarchy or levels 
of categories -  a manageable few, just four -  comes to the 
rescue as a methodological theme. The division into four cate­
gories-gravitation, electromagnetic interaction, strong inter­
actions, and weak interactions-is not merely a separation into 
separate pigeonholes for very different birds. There is a real 
hierarchy here which orders the subsections, showing a sequence 
of ranges of interactions, from infinity to much less than io"" 
centimeter.
Already one can see from this brief outline that, as Weinberg 
puts it, "a certain measure of unification has been achieved in 
making sense of the world" (col. 3, top). Helping to make sense 
of the world in a way not possible through the demands of 
logicality alone is indeed one of the chief functions of a thema. 
"We are still faced, however, with the enormous problem of 
accounting for the baffling amount of elementary-particle types 
and interactions" (col. 3, top). Methodologically, the theory 
evokes more than an echo of an older scheme of fourfold cate­
gories, one so magnificently successful that it helped to ration­
alize the observable phenomena for some 2,000 years: the four 
Elements, with their own internal hierarchy, from lightest to 
heaviest, and their own rules of interaction. However, the new 
unification through hierarchical ordering promises among its 
many advantages that two and perhaps three of the forces in 
the four categories "have an underlying identity."
The way to discover this identity is through analogies in be­
havior which would collapse the superficially different entities 
to a state in which they share something more than membership 
in a hierarchical order. This quest for something more is an­
swered by turning to the conception of family (for example: 
"Our hopes of perceiving an underlying identity in the weak 
and electromagnetic interactions lead us naturally to suppose 
that there may be some larger gauge symmetry that forces the 
photon and the intermediate vector boson into a single family"
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[p. $$; see n. 9]). The chief explanatory tool on the road to 
greater simplicity is this "family" connection, existing despite 
an "appearance" of greater differences -  for example, the differ­
ence between the photon's zero mass and the necessarily very 
large mass of the intermediate vector boson. Throughout Wein­
berg's article, and many others in this held, one of the recurring 
conceptions is precisely this splendid one of groups, families, and 
superfamilies ("superfamilies of eight, ten, or even more mem­
bers").^ The familial relationships between the elementary 
particles are far more profound than in the ad hoc families that 
were discovered in the chemical periodic table in the past 
century or in, say, the work of Linnaeus. But the methodologi­
cal use as a tool of explanation is not qualitatively different.
Let me take the occasion of the surfacing of this fine anthro­
pomorphic word to go back to Weinberg's opening page, where 
reference is made to "a few additional short-lived particles" and 
we are told that "we can create a vast number of even shorter- 
lived species." Elementary-particle physics is sometimes wryly 
referred to as zoology. Indeed, it is shot through and through 
with themes that may well have their origins in a part of the 
imagination that was formed prior to the conscious decision of 
the researcher to become a scientist. The technical report of, 
say, the analysis of a bubble chamber photograph is cast largely 
in terms of a life-cycle story. It is a story of evolution and 
devolution, of birth, adventures, and death. Particles enter on 
the scene, encounter others, and produce a first generation of 
particles that subsequently decay, giving rise to a second and 
perhaps a third generation. They are characterized by relatively 
short or relatively long lives, by membership in families or 
speciesd"
Listening to these village tales told by physicists, one is aware 
that the terminology may initially not have been meant "seri­
ously." Yet the life-cycle thema works, and so do a number of 
other themata imported into the sciences from the world of 
human encounters. It has always seemed curious to me how stren­
uously the psychologists of the period around the turn of this cen­
tury tried to gain added respectability by borrowing concepts 
from physics for the description of human relationships. Evi­
dently they were unaware that they were reimporting conceptual
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tools when they themselves were closer to the real thing. One is 
reminded of the story of the bank building in Athens, under the 
Acropolis, which looked like a particularly bad copy of a Greek 
temple. It turned out that the architect had not taken as his 
model one of the great temples right at hand, but had gone to a 
much more fashionable source. His design was based on that of 
a bank in Berlin which in turn had been derived from a distant, 
third-rate copy of an idealized Greek temple.
We have not yet finished with Weinberg's first page. Several 
other magnificent themata begin to show themselves: lyotropy 
and ^owogcMcfty (for example, particles of the same species are, 
as far as we now know, "absolutely identical, whether they 
occupy the same atom or lie at opposite ends of the universe" 
[col. i, two-thirds down]); yy777y//etry (col. 3); and co77rerw- 
tio73 ("of energy and momentum at every instant" [col. 3]).
In later pages we encounter the following additional themata, 
among others: the efficacy of geometrical representation (such 
as Feynman diagrams), the efficacy of integers as explanatory 
tools (the debt of modern quantum mechanics to the holiest 
precept of Pythagoras), again conservation (of charge), infinity 
and finiteness (of mass), more on symmetry principles,^ and, 
above all, models (p. $y; see n. 9). The word "model" is prob­
ably one of the most frequently used words in the writings by 
theoretical physicists.
In this manner we are brought to the last sentence in the 
paper. It has been quoted previously, but we can now look at it 
in a somewhat new light: "If these speculations are borne out by 
further theoretical and experimental work [meaning, by analyti­
cal or formalistic as well as empirical content, or by y and x axis 
representations] we shall have moved a long way toward a 
unified view of nature" -  that is, toward the fulfillment of one 
of man's enduring hopes, hopes that find expression in his 
themata, some new and many ancient. In this case, the hope rests 
on the Democritean thematic commitment to a corpuscular or 
atomistic point of view to explain physical phenomena -  not on 
its opposite, the thema of the primacy of the continuum, as in 
the work of the theorist who explained matter as singularities or 
vortexes in a fluid or field, and who could not believe quantum 
discreteness to be truly basic. Most modern physicists are the-
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matically Democriteans, but Einstein, Erwin Schrodinger, and 
others to whom the fundamental tool of explanation was the 
continuum, passionately disagreed; if discreteness had to be 
adopted as basic in atomic processes, one of them asserted, he 
would prefer giving up being a physicist.
Between such thematic opposites, there is no simple way to 
arrive at consensus. Werner Heisenberg was one of those who 
tried to convince Einstein.^ He reported: "It was a very nice 
afternoon that I spent with Einstein, but still when it came to 
the interpretation of quantum mechanics I could not convince 
him and he could not convince me. He always said, 'Well, I 
agree that any experiment the results of which can be calculated 
by means of quantum mechanics will come out as you say, but 
still such a scheme cannot be a final description of Nature.' " 
Heisenberg understood the impossibility of resolving such basic 
preconceptions by appealing to the kind of arguments that work 
so well to bring about scientific consensus on other matters. He 
added, "I doubt whether the unwillingness of Einstein, Planck, 
von Laue, and Schrodinger to accept [quantum-mechanical de­
scriptions as basic] should be reduced simply to prejudices. The 
word 'prejudice' is too negative in this context and does not 
cover the situation."
As if to demonstrate the truth of his own remark, Heisen­
berg went on to reveal that, contrary to most contemporary 
scientists, he himself could no longer agree with the thrust of 
current theory which makes the notion of "elementary particle" 
a basic reference point for explanation. Since elementary par­
ticles can be generated by collision of other particles, he 
felt, are really the complications that require explanation them­
selves; "or to formulate it paradoxically: Every particle consists 
of all other particles." The search for elementary par­
ticles" on which to base a theory of matter goes "back to this 
philosophy of Democritus," but it is an "error" (or, in our terms, 
at least a commitment to a thema abhorrent to him).
His commitment was in another direction: "What then has to 
replace the concept of a fundamental particle? I think we have 
to replace this concept by the concept of a fundamental sym­
metry . . . And when we have actually made this decisive 
change . . . then I do not think that we need any further
breakthrough to understand the elementary -  or rather non- 
elementary-particle." Elsewhere Heisenberg explains "the 
'thing-in-itself' is for the atomic physicist, if he uses the concept 
at all, finally a mathematical structure." This is a thematic 
choice that aligns Heisenberg with the great Platonic tradition: 
One cannot build matter out of matter, but must seek the base 
in formal, mathematical principles; for "our elementary particles 
are comparable to the regular bodies of Plato's They
are the original models, the idea of matter."*"
To be sure, anyone who has studied the rise and fall in the 
acceptance of a thema will wonder whether it is not premature 
to believe the ancient opposition between Democritean and 
Platonic approaches has been settled once and for all, in our 
day, in favor of one rather than the other. We are dealing here 
not with resolvable puzzles, but with the raw material of the 
scientific (and not only the scientific) imagination.
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Having examined the rich texture of themata in a particular 
imaginative publication by a major contemporary scientist, we 
can look at the same matter in another way -  namely, by follow­
ing a particular thema-antithema couple through the history of 
modern science.
To give an example: The whole tradition in physics which 
was founded in Newton's time held that any evidence of chaos 
or of uncertainty must rest on, and be explained by, an under­
lying layer of order and certainty, even as the seemingly erratic 
observable motion of planets in Greek science had been under­
stood as the complex results of many simple and orderly motions 
superposed on one another. This prototype for explanation 
(classical causal sequences account for observed accident or dis­
order) is a thematic commitment. It is not an experimental or 
logical necessity. Indeed, it seemed endangered by the introduc­
tion in the mid-nineteenth century of imagery of the opposite 
kind, originating in kinetic theory. Now it turned out that a 
good way to understand cases of simple order was to imagine 
them to be the result of underlying chaos. Thus a balloon filled 
with gas under pressure and observed to be at rest on the table
is understood by saying that an immense number of gas particles, 
all with different speeds and directions, is unceasingiy coliiding 
with the inside surface of the balloon. The hail of collisions just 
cancels in all directions, and results in the object remaining at 
rest. Simple order on the visible level was thus explainable by 
chaos on the invisible level.
It was, however, not merely an accident that it fell on Ein­
stein, in his :poj paper on Brownian motion, once more to 
reverse the direction of the arrow of explanation -  Einstein 
(who did not believe that God played at dice) reestablishing the 
ontological priorities that went back to Newton (who had 
written that God was a "God of Order"). Einstein's success 
was to explain the erratic, eternal dancing motion of tiny but 
visible particles of dust seen with a microscope. The seemingly 
accidental motions of that visible microscopic world were, 
Einstein found, entirely explainable by positing that the simple 
Newtonian laws which guide the motion of two colliding bil­
liard balls also explain the action of the invisible, submicroscopic 
molecules bombarding the dust particle. A Newtonian order 
could be taken to be at the bottom of things, after all.
With the development of quantum physics, however, it be­
came more and more clear that the appearance of Newtonian 
order among colliding particles was itself explained best by con­
sidering that order (on the scale of measurement which had 
been satisfactory for the purpose so far) was merely the ap­
parent result of a large sum of atomic events, each of which 
individually is subject to the laws of chance -  even as earlier the 
quiescence of a blown-up balloon on the table could be regarded 
as the result of canceling accidents and agitations within. With 
his Uncertainty Principle, Heisenberg was saying that the fun­
damental explanatory thema is after all not the simple, causal, 
point-by-point sequence typical of, say, the progress of a satel­
lite orbiting around a central planet, but the probabilistic se­
quence of a random-number generator or a game of chance. The 
ontological ladder was once more turned around.
And once more, attempts were and are still being made to 
reverse it yet again. Einstein himself, and a small but hardy 
group that followed him, never accepted as verified the primacy 
of the thema of fundamental probabilism in physical nature.
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Their hope has been to show that beneath the layer at which the 
Uncertainty Principle operates, there is yet another ievei of 
nature where hitherto inaccessibie, hidden mechanisms act, on 
classicai principies, to yieid the appearance of randomness in 
atomic processes -  chaos out of order, not vice versa.
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I have not come as John the Baptist; and would indeed like to 
avoid his fate. Let me therefore end with a list of limitations I 
see in the thematic analysis of scientific work.
1. While themata can have a strong grip on the scientist or 
the community, and can be the most interesting aspect of a given 
case, there exist important parts of the history of science and of 
current work where themata do not seem to enter prominently. 
In studying the case of the work of Enrico Fermi and his group 
(cf. Chapter $), I found it no great help to think of it themati­
cally.
2. Even if this were not true, I would not like it to be thought 
that the themata in a scientific work are its chief reality. Other­
wise, work in the history of science would degenerate into 
descriptivism, and scientific findings would seem to be on a par 
with the tales of the old men in the hills of Albania, to whom 
today's story is just about as good or as bad as yesterday's. 
There is in science evidently a sequence of refinements, a rise 
and fail, and occasionally the abandonment or introduction of 
themata. But also there undoubtedly has been on the whole a 
progressive change to a more inclusive, more powerful grasp on 
natural phenomena.
3. The study of the role of themata in the work of scientists 
can be equally interesting whether the work led to "success" or 
to "failure" -  the commitment to a set of themata does not make 
a scientist necessarily right or wrong. In any case, attempts to 
"purge" one's self of themata to improve one's science are prob­
ably futile. However, a conscious examination of the possible 
merits of themata opposite to one's own might well have some 
healthy effect.
4. We need to know more about the origins of themata. It is 
rather clear to me that an approach stressing the connections
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between cognitive psychology and individual scientific work is 
a proper starting point.
I have already expressed my belief that much, perhaps most, 
of a scientist's thematic imagination is fashioned in the period 
before he becomes a professional. Some of the most fiercely 
held themata are evident even in childhood.^" This is undoubt­
edly an area worthy of further research.
$. Once formed, the thematic commitment of a scientist 
typically is remarkably long lived. But it can change. Examples 
are Wilhelm Ostwald, who first turned against atomism and 
then reversed himself once more; Planck; Einstein; and a few 
others. Moreover, embracing a thema such as atomism in one 
field of physics occasionally has not prevented the embrace of 
the opposite thema by the same person for another field of 
physics. A case in point is Millikan's championship of the 
"atom" in electricity, even while he was struggling fiercely 
against the quantum of light. Poincare was conservative and 
ether-bound when it came to relativity theory, but quite oppo­
sitely directed in quantum theory.
6. While the individual scientist is the primary repository of 
themata, they are also shared with minor variations by members 
of a community. Some themata have a career that can be con­
veniently understood in life-cycle terms; that is, their wide 
acceptance can rise or atrophy and fade away. Explanatory 
devices such as macrocosmic-microcosmic correspondence, in­
herent principles, teleological drives, action at a distance, space­
filling media, organismic interpretation, hidden mechanisms, and 
absolutes of space, time, and simultaneity -  all once ruled 
strongly in physics. Detailed study of the mechanisms of such 
rise and decay is much needed.
7. There is always the danger of confusing analysis with 
something else: with Jungian archetypes, with metaphysics, with 
paradigms and world views. (It might well be that the latter two 
contain elements of themata; but the differences are overwhelm­
ing. For example, thematic oppositions persist during "normal 
science," and themata persist through revolutionary periods. To 
a much larger degree than either paradigms or world views, 
thematic decisions seem to come not only from the scientist's 
social surrounding or "community," but even more from the
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individual.) Although thematic analysis may be limited by the 
requirement of some firsthand experience with the scientific 
material, the rewards of doing more specific work on real cases 
seem to me far more evident than those to be had from current 
fashions such as comparisons between historiographic schools or 
the invention of speculative "rational reconstructions."
8. Finally, there is a need for self-awareness. The search for 
answers in the history of science is itself imbued with themata, 
just as is the search for a unified theory of elementary particles. 
Therefore, we must be prepared for the criticisms of those who 
are afflicted, not with our themata, but with their antithemata; 
and we must be ready to run up against the limitations within 
which we necessarily work -  as Einstein did in his frank way 
when he said, "Adhering to the continuum originates with me 
not in a prejudice, but arises out of the fact that I have been 
unable to think up anything organic to take its place."^ His 
own work is, of course, testimony to the fact that one can turn 
such inherent limits of the scientific imagination into strength, 
rather than merely deploring or neglecting them.
2
Subelectrons, presuppositions, and 
the Millikan-Ehrenhaft dispute
Peter Medawar is one of the few first-rank research scientists 
still concerned with the problem of knowledge -  the sources, 
warrants, and degrees of certainty of scientific findings, the 
interplay between fact and belief and between perception and 
understanding. In T/ic /E t o/ t/ic he asks: "What sort of
person is a scientist, and what kind of act of reasoning leads to 
scientific discovery and the enlargement of the understand­
ing?"* He finds the usual approaches too limited: "What scien­
tists do has never been the subject of a scientific, that is, an 
ethological inquiry . . . It is no use looking to scientific 'papers/ 
for they not merely conceal but actively misrepresent the reason­
ing that goes into the work they describe . . . Only unstudied 
evidence will do -  and that means listening at a keyhole.
Medawar proposes that to study scientific activity one should 
live in the laboratory or in the theoretician's workroom and ob­
serve the work as it is carried out. To approach Medawar's aim 
when dealing with historical problems, historians and sociolo­
gists regularly make use of unself-conscious evidence such as 
letters, autobiographical reports cross-checked by other docu­
ments, oral-history interviews conducted by trained historians, 
transcripts of conversations that took place in the heat of battle 
at scientific meetings, and, above all, laboratory notebooks -  
firsthand documents directly rooted in the act of doing science, 
with all the smudges, thumbprints, and bloodstains of the per­
sonal struggle of ideas.
These sources can help us in understanding the belief struc­
ture and activity of some scientists and how they dealt with new 
ideas when systematic tests of them, if available at all, were difH-
cult to believe or apply. In this study I treat the period after the 
earliest phase of discovery, when the stirrings of a new concep­
tion are difficult to document, but before the new work has been 
absorbed into the mainstream of science through the mechanisms 
of justification. In this period one may hope to find evidence of 
the fragile and obscure process of science in the making which 
has been explicitly avoided by Reichenbach* and Popper,** 
among others.
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This study centers on events, in the years around rqio, that led 
two physicists into exactly opposite directions -  one to "success" 
(and the Nobel Prize), the other to "failure" (and eventually a 
broken spirit). Failures are not remembered in science, and they 
are rarely analyzed in histories of science. Hence today this 
controversy is virtually forgotten.
Initially, the protagonists seemed not well matched. Robert A. 
Millikan was a practically unknown professor at the new Uni­
versity of Chicago, a man over forty years old, with few scien­
tific publications. Felix Ehrenhaft, at the venerable University 
of Vienna, was regarded as an accomplished physicist, eleven 
years younger than Millikan, and having a dozen publications.  ^
Their disagreement was about the value of the smallest electric 
charge found in nature. Both men recognized that the subject of 
their experimental research, as well as the import of their con­
troversy, went to the foundations of science.
Millikan's first major paper begins:
Among all physical constants there are two which will 
be universally admitted to be of predominant importance; 
the one is the velocity of light, which now appears in 
many of the fundamental equations of theoretical physics, 
and the other is the ultimate, or elementary, electrical 
charge, a knowledge of which makes possible a determina­
tion of the absolute values of all atomic and molecular 
weights, the absolute number of molecules in a given 
weight of any substance, the kinetic energy of agitation 
of any molecule at a given temperature, and a consider­
able number of other important physical quantities.
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White the velocity of light is now known with a pre­
cision of one part in twenty thousands [thanks largely 
to R. A. Millikan's patron and colleague at Chicago,
Albert A. Michelson], the value of the elementary 
electrical charge has until very recently been exceedingly 
uncertain."
Since Michael Faraday's time it was known that during elec­
trolysis i gram-atomic weight of univalent material would be 
released at the electrode if about 10'^  coulombs of charge pass 
through the electrolyte. If one assumed that this quantity of 
charge was carried by A ions of charge e each (where A is 
Avogadro's number), then Ac =  io" coulombs. If e is now 
measured independently with accuracy, A, the number of atoms 
per gram-atomic weight of any substance, is also known with 
accuracy, and as a result many other fundamental constants may 
be calculated. At the beginning of the twentieth century, e was 
identified by many physicists with the magnitude of the charge 
of the electron. Poor values for e put into doubt the value of A 
and all that followed from it.
The controversy between Ehrenhaft and Millikan, often 
called "The Battle over the Electron," erupted in the spring of 
1910. Only a year earlier, Ehrenhaft had published measure­
ment results for the value of the "elementary quantum of 
electricity" along the same general lines as Millikan. But now he 
suddenly announced finding electric charges much smaller than 
the charges on the electron. Millikan wrote later that Ehren- 
haft's new claim "raises what may properly be called the most 
fundamental question of modern physics."? In a series of in­
creasingly lengthy and detailed articles, Ehrenhaft and his stu­
dents claimed to find "subelectrons." That is, they found drop­
lets of liquid, metal particles, and other small objects to have 
charges with a value much smaller than that of the electron. In 
the course of time Ehrenhaft found charges of a half, a fifth, a 
tenth, a hundredth, a thousandth that of the electron. As his 
work progressed there seemed to be no reason to assume that 
Ehrenhaft would find any lower limit to exist for the electric 
charge associated with matter. On the other hand, in almost no 
laboratories other than those of the Vienna group were these 
results obtained. At the same time Millikan and his students,
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among others, were assiduously refining and publishing evidence 
for the unitary electron.
This controversy reverberated for years in the scientific com­
munity. The number of articles devoted to it multiplied. Dis­
cussants at scientific meetings included Max Planch, Jean Perrin, 
Albert Einstein, Arnold Sommerfeld, Max Born, and Erwin 
Schrodinger. Periodically, the evidence was reviewed in depths 
In 1927, three years after Millikan had received the Nobel Prize 
in part for his work on the charge of the electron, the respected 
physicist O. D. Chwolson still called the fight a "delicate case"; 
and he added, "It has already lasted 17 years, and up to now it 
cannot be claimed that it has been finally decided in favor of one 
side or the other, i.e., that all researchers have adopted one or 
the other of the two possible solutions of this problem. The 
state of affairs is rather strange.""
To appreciate today the seriousness of Ehrenhaft's claims, we 
must guard against some ahistorical impressions. First, anyone 
familiar with the beautiful "Millikan oil drop experiment," now 
routinely assigned in elementary physics classes, may be inclined 
to dismiss contrary findings. Such class activities, however, are 
really only pedagogic exercises to bolster belief in the electron, 
rather than serious tests of belief. Even so, it is quite difficult to 
obtain "good data." According to one instructor's recent analy­
sis of class experience: "In spite of the improvements in the 
Millikan oil-drop apparatus . . . the experiment remains per­
haps the most frustrating of all the exercises in the undergradu­
ate laboratory."*"
Second, the existence of a kind of "subelectronic" charge has 
been postulated in recent years as part of the quark model in 
elementary-particle physics. In that model, objects having one- 
third or two-thirds the magnitude of the charge of an electron 
are assumed; but theory and experiments so far agree that it is 
highly improbable that such fractional charges due to quarks 
would show up outside a nuclear particle (on the droplets and 
similar objects Ehrenhaft and Millikan were watching) even 
once, let alone time after time. In his February 1910 paper, 
Millikan did make a passing remark that Ehrenhaft later seized: 
"I have discarded one uncertain and unduplicated observation, 
apparently upon a singly charged drop, which gave a value of
the charge on the drop some 30 percent lower than the final 
value of c."" The evidence is overwhelming that this one 
anomaly in Millikan's published data (and in all publications by 
others on the same matter, except by Ehrenhaft and his school) 
is the result of an error of measurement. This explanation is the 
one Millikan proposed, and it has been generally adopted.^
Third, we must neither superimpose on the early phases of the 
development our present perception of the opposing points of 
view, nor apply criteria more appropriate for the final justifica­
tion of a theory. It could not be known around 1910 that the 
results of Millikan's research on the electron would ultimately 
be so stimulating, not only in physics but also in chemistry, 
astronomy, and engineering. It could also not be foreseen that 
the amazing results of Ehrenhaft would stimulate nothing usable 
at all, unlike the experiments of, for example, Henri Becquerel, 
who initiated the study of radioactivity with an experiment he 
quite misinterpreted. It is only in retrospect that the "risks" of 
Millikan and Ehrenhaft in the early period seem greatly differ­
ent.
Fourth, the controversy was of added interest at the time be­
cause it concerned not only the nature of electric charges but 
also the behavior of the small particles that carried them. Recent 
improvements in microscopy, as well as the basic work of 
Einstein, Marian von Smoluchowski, and Perrin, had made more 
accessible what Wolfgang Ostwald called "the World of Ne­
glected Dimensions." It was widely thought that research on the 
colloidal state (the dispersed state of matter where particle 
dimensions are between io** and io"^ cm) was a great frontier 
for both pure and applied science, one that might bridge organic 
and inorganic matter. This field seemed filled with promise for 
medical-biological research as well as for industry.^ Against this 
background, the discussions on the charges carried by small par­
ticles gained further importance.
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In their work, Millikan and Ehrenhaft interacted with each 
other and with the trajectory of public science (canonical 
knowledge, institutions for development of controversy or con-
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sensus, etc.) around 1910. Biographical details and some aware­
ness of cultural and social contexts may therefore be expected to 
be of some help in understanding the encounter.
Robert Andrews Millikan was born in 1868 in Illinois and 
died in 1933 in Pasadena, California." At the height of his career 
he was perhaps the most renowned and influential scientist in the 
United States: physicist, administrator, educator, and policy 
maker. As shown in his autobiography, Millikan's origins were 
humble. Like many other American scientists of his generation, 
he was the son of a small-town minister. His parents, Silas 
Franklin Millikan and Alary Jane Andrews, brought up six 
children in a tradition that had little use for pretensions. Robert's 
grandfather had been among the earliest farming settlers of the 
Mississippi River country in western Illinois; it is said that in 
1823 he had walked alongside the covered wagon as the family 
was moving from the Berkshire Hills in the East to the frontier, 
the "Western Reserve." As a boy, Robert Millikan led a life 
recognizable from the stories of Alark Twain-steamboats on 
the Mississippi, family farm work in their one-acre yard, the 
swimming hole, the barefoot existence, the rural, simple, prag­
matic, direct, and fundamentally pious background.
In 1886, Millikan went to Oberlin College, where he regis­
tered for only one physics course ("a total loss"). He discovered 
his interest and aptitude in the subject only when a professor 
asked him to help teach physics. For graduate work he went to 
Columbia University and studied under Michael Pupin for two 
years as the only graduate student in physics. A. A. Michelson, 
whom he met in Chicago in 1894, made suggestions that helped 
Millikan form his experimental thesis work. When he obtained 
a Ph.D. from Columbia in 1893, he found that there was no 
satisfactory job available. With a loan from Pupin, he went to 
Germany in May 1893 for additional study. It was the best 
moment to arrive. Within a few months, the work of Wilhelm 
Conrad Rontgen came up like a storm, followed by that of 
Becquerel, and the held of physics burst into excitement. In 
1896, Millikan accepted an invitation from Michelson to join the 
physics department at the University of Chicago, and, from 
1908, Milllikan's articles on the charge of the electron came from 
Chicago's Ryerson Laboratory. Eventually, Millikan achieved a
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large and varied research output, first at Chicago and, after 1921, 
while shaping and heading the California Institute of Technol­
ogy. He listed nine fields of research in the second edition 
(t9to) of v4772cnc%72 die?? <?f Science, and twenty fields in the 
fifth edition (1933). In Isaiah Berlin's terminology he was a fox 
rather than a hedgehog.
His scientific breadth from the beginning is evident in the 
archival material he left. *3 There is a revealing notebook, prob­
ably starting in 1897 or 1898, entitled "References to Important 
Articles." Orderly entries list recently published articles in 
physics, under headings such as "Zeeman Effect" (1897-1907), 
"Brownian Movement" (from 1903), and "Blondlot's N-Rays." 
These reading lists were probably at least in part connected with 
Millikan's duties at Chicago. He writes in his autobiography:
I soon found myself responsible for the weekly seminar 
in physics, which Professor Michelson asked me to take 
off his hands . . . Furthermore, I soon began to give 
advanced courses on the electron theory, on the kinetic 
theory, and on thermodynamics . . . [After 1900, 
Michelson was so absorbed in his research] he asked me to 
assign research problems to three of the prospective candi­
dates for the doctor's degree . . . and to take the whole 
responsibility for supervising their work, so that by 1902 
and 1903 I had quite a group of problems going in addi­
tion to my own . .
One set of pages in this notebook is entitled "Electron Theory 
of Matter," apparently compiled by adding entries from time to 
times over the years. It begins with "m/e Zeeman effect, PM.
p. 226, 1897," and "Cathode Rays, J. J. Thomson, 
PM. p. 293, '97," and continues with significant articles
over the following few years, including the early determination 
of e by Thomson, J. S. Townsend, and H. A. Wilson. Evi­
dently, Millikan was keeping a careful eye on this work as it was 
developing.
The last page and inside cover of the notebook are entitled 
"Research Subjects," with entries dated from 1898 to 1914. The 
first of the twenty-seven entries, May 2t, 1898, is, "Resistance 
of air in its relation to the velocity of the (falling) moving 
body" -  a major component of the problem that was to be
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treated a decade later in Millikan's work on the charge of 
moving droplets. The ninth entry, probably made in 1903, reads, 
"Stokes law for size of water particles in clouds, see J. J. T. 
articles on size of e and Barus, PM. Ai%g. 4, p. 24/ 1902." Evi­
dently, during the years prior to 1908, when Millikan was pre­
occupied with teaching and with his first investigations of the 
emission of electrons from metals by incident light and by high- 
intensity electric fields, he was laying the conceptual grounds 
for his later work on the electronic charge."
W e leave Millikan for a time, at the verge of starting his big 
work, and turn to the other protagonist, Felix Ehrenhaft. He 
was born in Vienna in 1879 into a professional family; his father 
was his mother was the niece of a student of
J. B. L. Foucault. He studied at both the University and the 
Institute of Technology at Vienna." In his earliest work (1900) 
he was one of the first to produce and study inorganic colloids. 
In 1903 he became assistant to Victor von Lang at the Uni­
versity of Vienna. Accepted as privatdocent in 1903, he was 
teaching statistical mechanics by 1909. Among his colleagues 
were Felix Exner, Friedrich Hasenohrl, Stefan Meyer, Egon von 
Schweidler, Karl Przibram, and Ernst Lechner. Ehrenhaft was 
called to an associate professorship at the University of Vienna 
in 1912 and became director of the Third Physical Institute in 
1920. He found photophoresis and named the effect in 1918. 
After the Nazis took over in Austria in 1938, he came to the 
United States as a refugee. He returned in 1946 to Vienna to 
resume his position, and he died there in 1 9 3 2 .
By 1909 he was already known for his experimental study of 
Brownian motion in gases, building as he did on the theoretical 
ideas of Einstein and von Smoluchowski. For this work he 
received the Lieben Prize of the Vienna Academy of Sciences 
in 1910. He was a genial person whose house was always open 
to scientists from all corners of the world. According to Philipp 
Frank," Einstein found Ehrenhaft congenial and would stay 
with him when passing through Vienna. From about 1920, and 
particularly after his claimed discovery in the mid-1930s of 
magnetic monopoles, Ehrenhaft's life centered on unresolvable 
controversies concerning the interpretation of complex physical
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phenomena. He made some thirty presentations on monopoies 
before skeptical audiences of the American Physical Society in 
the period 1940-46.2° When he is stiii remembered, it is usuaiiy 
in this context.
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The European Continental tradition of physics first entered 
Millikan's training through his teacher Michael Pupin, who had 
received his doctorate in Berlin. Millikan reports in his auto­
biography that Pupin's course on optics and electromagnetism 
was an eyeopener, and he came to admire and respect Pupin 
greatly. But Millikan was amazed by Pupin's attitude to atomism 
at that time. Pupin had been impressed with the teachings of the 
schools of energetics and antiatomism, and he had once told 
Millikan that he did not believe in the kinetic theory at all. The 
importance or truth of the atomic theory was still being argued 
in 1904, when it was a chief subject of debates at the scientific 
congress at St. Louis.T he first Solvay Congress, late in 1911, 
was to a large degree concerned with fundamental, persisting 
impasses in a physics based on the atomic hypothesis, and a few 
critics such as Pierre Duhem scoffed at the hypothesis as late as 
1913.
Many students absorb the epistemology of their honored 
teacher. In the case of Millikan, nothing of the sort happened. 
Let us recall what Millikan resisted, despite Pupin's example. 
Ostwald, Mach, Stallo, Helm, and others around the turn of the 
century hoped to erect science on a purely phenomenological 
base, without "unnecessary hypotheses" such as atomism, to pro­
vide a frequently given example. Despite triumphs of atomic 
theory such as Maxwell's proof of the independence of the 
viscosity of gases from density, there really was little direct evi­
dence from phenomena for the reality of atoms and molecules, 
that is, for the necessity of discreteness itself. Scientists would 
not see particle tracks in cloud-chamber photographs until 
around 1912.22 Not until these supported the more indirect evi­
dence of scintillation screens and Geiger counters did the indi­
vidual flashes or clicks of those instruments become persuasively
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associated with individual atomic events. Until that point was 
reached, the scientists were working with average values, not 
individual atomic entities.
One of the best short descriptions of the school of thought of 
which Ernst Mach was the most powerful proponent has been 
given in a biography of Adach written by the physicist Anton 
Lampa. Because Lampa, too, will soon enter this story, I shall 
use his account. Lampa points out that Mach's research interests 
were in very widely scattered specialities and that Mach sought 
one unifying position which he could adopt in doing any re­
search. That basis he found in the world of elementary sensa­
tions that precedes the world of scientific construction:
In trying to find a point of view which required no 
change when Mach went from [problems in] physics to 
physiology and psychology, he started from a natural 
world picture which everyone, without conscious effort, 
finds within oneself upon one's intellectual awakening.
Mach analyzed that natural world picture. The result of 
the analysis is his Theory of Elements. The physical find­
ings can be resolved into elements that hitherto are not 
further resolvable: colors, sounds, pressures, warmth, 
spaces, times, etc. These elements turn out to be depen­
dent upon circumstances both outside the spatial limits 
of one's own body and within those limits. Insofar, and 
only insofar, as the latter is the case, we call these ele­
ments also experiences [impressions, ].
The physical and the psychological [world] thus con­
tains shared elements . . . The natural world picture 
designates as corporeal objects relatively durable element- 
complexes of colors, sounds, heat, pressure, etc. . . .
The complex of all elements forms the world . . .
The pseudoproblems arise with the formation of the con­
ception of substance (matter, soul); such problems can 
be solved only if one analyses the complexes and goes 
back to the elements.^
One consequence of this position relates to what was called 
"atomistics." In looking for the ideal of a phenomenologic 
physics, Mach refused to give the atom a fundamental basis in 
physics, but instead asked that it be considered at most as a
heuristic device for research. (Under proper conditions and 
safeguards, he would, however, tolerate a far more daring, spec­
ulative use of atomistic ideas than is customary, for he proposed 
using more than three dimensions to represent the structure of 
molecules.)
Making atomic entities the subject of research, whether in 
physics, chemistry, or electricity, was considered by the Mach- 
ists a false and even dangerous metaphysical hypothesis. The 
liberation of science from all metaphysical bonds was Mach's 
lifelong ambition. Hence he acted not only as a productive 
physicist and an influential philosopher but also as a powerful 
figure in the politics of academic life.^ He kept in touch with 
his students and followers and saw to it that his point of view 
would be represented in journals and on faculties.
As it happened, the year 1910, when the Millikan-Ehrenhaft 
dispute first arose, was characterized by two other events rele­
vant to this study. One was the culmination of the widely ob­
served epistemological battle involving Ernst Mach. In fact, the 
same volume of the ZczAtTn'T that carried Ehren-
haft's first detailed account of his discovery of subelectrons also 
contained the heated, painful, often and polemical
articles that were being exchanged between Mach and Max 
Planck.^
A second event in the same year added to the sense of urgency 
felt in Mach's circle: A vacancy became available in the physics 
faculty of the German University in Prague, where Mach him­
self had been active for nearly three decades. Two members of 
the faculty there, Anton Lampa and Georg Pick, began at once 
the search for proper candidates. Pick formerly had been an 
assistant of Mach; Lampa had been a disciple of Mach, then an 
assistant to Victor von Lang at the University of Vienna, and 
from 1904 taught there until his move to Prague in 1909. Lampa 
was a physicist as well as an idealistic fighter for the reform of 
education. As Philipp Frank, later his colleague in Prague, put 
it: "Lampa saw it as his life's chief goal, to propagate Mach's 
views and to find adherents for them."^
Lampa and Pick looked for someone who could be relied 
upon to carry on physics in accord with Mach's views. A chief 
candidate was Gustav Jaumann of Brno. To obtain Mach's ap-
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proval, Lampa wrote to Mach in a letter of February 9, 1910: 
I need not reassure you that Jaumann's high talent seems 
to me beyond doubt and that his whole cast of thought 
is sympathetic. I consider the ideal of theoretical physics 
to be the purely phenomenological presentation [Durite/- 
/z373g], as lies at hand for example in thermodynamics. 
Jaumann proceeds from the wish to build up such a phe­
nomenological presentation for electricity and all that can 
be connected with it. He therefore rejects the theory of 
atoms and of electrons . . .
Lampa ended by sharing some worries about Jaumann and by 
announcing his visit to Mach in Vienna "in a few weeks." Evi­
dently, Mach sent his approval speedily, for in a letter of February 
18, 1910, Lampa thanked Mach for the reply, stating that all 
qualms were laid to rest and that he would intervene warmly on 
behalf of JaumannV Yet the selection process went on for many 
months more. Another candidate was Albert Einstein of the 
University of Zurich, who was still regarded by the Machists to 
be of their persuasion.^ He was just then corresponding with 
Mach and, indeed, signed one of his letters, "Ihr Sie verehrender 
Schuler. "3" Einstein was finally called to the chair in Prague in 
March 1911.3°
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Let us leave these Europeans for a time to their philosophies and 
academic negotiations, and turn to Millikan, who was unaware 
of these events or of their future implications. Around him was a 
very different atmosphere. Millikan confesses to an unsophisti­
cated, pragmatic, straightforward point of view of his own, one 
element of which is seeking direct explanation in terms of con­
crete visualization. The words "concrete visualization" recur in 
his writings, possibly to counter the charge that he engaged in 
making up hypotheses. When Millikan wrote about the electron 
in his early years, he did not of course think of a particle that 
has magnetic moment, angular momentum, wavelength, intrinsic 
self-energy, or any of the properties that we now think of as 
being associated with and defining the electron. He thought of 
the electron as a discrete corpuscle^* of unitary electric charge,
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whose action one can see with one's own eyes. Indeed, he was 
not far from asserting that one can see the electron itself: "He 
w/30 &?y ye<?72 ?/)%? ea:perZ77ze77t," he writes in his autobiography 
about the oil drop experiment, "%7zd TwHrcJy of m^eyriy t^ory 
/z^ tze o^yerueJ it, [/My] Z77 effect SEEN t/?e e/eetroTZ." And 
again, with even less qualification: r/?e e/eotroTZ /rye/]', teE/e/i
777^777 /z^ y 777ez7yM7*ed . . . /y 73c/r/?e7* 3777 7373ee?'r^ /77ry 7707* % /yypot/ze-
y/y. /? ' /S A N EIL EXLEEEMEN7HE FACE 7 /7 3 7 7 r/z/y yeTzerj- 
7 Z0 7 7  377 TrE/e/z tee /ive /z^ y for r/ze /Zryt rNze yee73, /?M7 te/z/e/? %7zy- 
077e te/zo te///y 77737^ /zeTzeefoT*^  yee.'^^
Because the autobiography was published when Millikan was 
over eighty, it may invite a suspicion about the reliability of 
some statements. There are passages where this is a valid con­
cern. However, the autobiography is really a patchwork of new 
and old writings. One can gather by inspecting the materials in 
the Millikan archives that the publication probably was as­
sembled with the aid of an editor under Millikan's supervision.^ 
Large portions of the published book are repetitions of earlier 
publications. This is the case with the preceding passages, which 
come directly from Millikan's Nobel Prize acceptance speech in 
1924.34
Other passages in his documents and publications further 
elaborate the anthropomorphic metaphor that Millikan adopted 
to deal directly with the experimental situation. He writes, for 
example, that when the small oil droplet was "moving upward 
[in the electric field, against the gravitational pull] with the 
smallest speed that it could take on, I could be certain that just 
one isolated electron was sitting on its back. The whole appara­
tus then represented a device for catching and essentially seeing 
an individual electron riding on a drop of o il.'^
Sometimes, while watching a charged oil droplet held in the 
electric field, he observed it change its motion suddenly, when 
the droplet encountered a charged molecule (ion) in the air. 
This observation was even more important; for the JZyco737Z73233'7y 
in the observable phenomenon -  new at the time -  fitted splen­
didly with the hypothesized discontinuity in the concept of 
quantized charge. Here was a great new fact, and the image that 
helped interpret it was directly at hand: ". . . one single electron 
jumped upon the drop. Indeed, we could actually see the exact
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instant at which it jumped on or oE."^ Eariier documents con­
tain the same metaphor. In an early draft of his autobiography,^ 
MiHikan wrote that he "coutd actually see the exact instant at 
which [the electron] jumped on or off." He also provides other 
visual images; for example, "I had seen a balanced drop suddenly 
catch an ion."^ MiHikan had the same power of visualization as 
other distinguished scientists.^ Thus in his brief essay on Ernest 
Rutherford, MiHikan quoted with approval what he called "a 
very characteristic Rutherfordian remark": "Ions are jolly little 
beggars, you can almost see them."4°
At about the time Adillikan began to "see" his electrons, Jean 
Perrin in France was battling for the atomicity of matter with 
the same strength of preconception and consequent focusing of 
vision that characterized Adillikan's determination to demonstrate 
the atomicity of electric charge. Mary Jo Nye writes of Perrin: 
"Perrin's primary goal from the very beginning of his scientific 
career was to prove the reality of the invisible atom, to eliminate 
as "puerile anthropomorphism" those strictures which seemed 
logically necessary to many others . . . One student wrote of 
Perrin . . . 'He "sees" atoms -  there is no doubt at all -  as Saint 
Thomas saw seraphim.' "*"
The way that MiHikan launched his research on the charge of 
the electron illustrates three related factors: ( i ) his capacity of 
looking with fresh, clear eyes at what was going on; (2) his 
powers of visualization as an aid in drawing conclusions; 
and (3), behind all these, almost unconfessed and certainly un­
analyzed, a preconceived theory about electricity which gave 
him eyes with which to look and interpret.
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MiHikan described frankly the series of accidents that set him on 
his way. At one of the weekly seminars in physics at Chicago, 
he presented a review of J. J. Thomson's great paper of 1897 on 
cathode rays. MiHikan later wrote:
[it] put together in matchless manner, the evidence for 
the view that the "cathode rays" consist not of ether 
waves, as Lenard and the Germans were maintaining, but 
rather of material particles carrying electric charges, each
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particle possessing a mass of about a thousandth of that of 
the lightest known atom and therefore constituting the 
most minute known masses in existence. He called these 
particles "corpuscles". . . . [This paper] impressed me 
greatly and started me on the researches which have been 
life work.*^
However, for the next ten years Millikan's researches did not 
go well. Up to 1907, he had published only an article on his 
(189$) thesis, two short notes in 1897 and one in [906, a transla­
tion of Paul Drude's Opticy, and five introductory textbooks. 
In 1907 he published with George Winchester two articles on 
photoelectricity which received some notice.*  ^ In his auto­
biography Millikan hints that he was rather dissatisfied with 
himself at that point. He uses phrases such as "this appar­
ently fruitless work"*** and "my own research failures"*  ^ in 
describing his research. He may well have been concerned about 
his chances as a research scientist. In 1908, for some reason that 
one wishes to know more about, he "kissed textbook writing 
good-bye . . . and [while aware of the risk of further failures] 
started intensively into the new problem"*  ^-  the magnitude of 
the elementary charge e.
There were four obvious merits in Millikan's choice of this 
particular subject. One was that "everyone was interested in the 
magnitude of the charge of the electron,"^ then known only to 
low accuracy and with widely varying results, depending on the 
method used. Another merit was that the best experimental 
method to use seemed to Millikan quite obvious and rather 
simple, although this turned out not to be the case. Third, 
measuring a basic constant with greater accuracy (rather than 
looking for daring new things in physics as Ehrenhaft was to 
do) was quite in keeping with Millikan's talents and tempera­
ment and with the tradition Michelson had set. Fourth, the 
theoretical basis or epistemological assumptions needed for the 
work seemed quite clear to Millikan: "Being quite certain that 
the problem of the value of the electric charge (Franklin's fun­
damental atom of electricity -  apparently invariant and indivis­
ible -  the assumed unit building block of the electrical universe) 
was of fundamental importance, I started into it."*^
Not for him all the turmoil and bitter debate raging in Europe
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concerning the "reality" of molecules, atoms, and electrons, or 
the admissibility of discrete rather than continuous entities! The 
electronic charge existed, and it was of "fundamental impor­
tance" to find the value of the charge. If Afillikan needed phil­
osophical underpinnings for his work, he found them, appropri­
ately enough, in the work of the great American folk hero, 
statesman, and scientist, the sensible Benjamin Franklin.
Millikan consistently refers to Franklin as the first to formu­
late a granular structure and material reality for the "electrical 
particle or atom,"*" and he quotes frequently a sentence he 
ascribed to Franklin: "The electrical matter consists of particles 
extremely subtle, since it can permeate common matter, even 
the densest, with such freedom and ease as not to receive any 
appreciable resistance""" Franklin is the father of the subject, 
"for there are no electrical theories of any kind which go back 
of our own Benjamin Franklin,""* The result of all modern 
research has been merely "to bring us back very close to where 
Franklin was in 1750, with the single difference that our modern 
electron theory rests upon a mass of very direct and convincing 
evidence.""" In 1948, looking back on the recent fiftieth- 
anniversary celebration of J. J. Thomson's "unambiguous estab­
lishment of the electron theory of matter," Millikan remarked 
that since Franklin had begun his experiments in 1747, one 
should have also been celebrating the bicentenary of "Franklin's 
discovery of the electron.""" Even before Millikan turned seri­
ously to his work on the charge on the electron, an account of 
Franklin's accomplishments (and his full-page portrait) could 
be found in some of the early school texts Millikan coauthored. 
A book published in 1908 describes Franklin's "so-called one- 
fluid theory," adding, "A modern modification . . . has re­
cently come into prominence through . . . Lord Kelvin and
J. J. Thomson," featuring "very minute negatively charged 
corpuscles, or electrons.""*
Millikan was not the only one to see a connection between 
Franklin's ideas and the modern theory of electricity. To give 
only two examples: Rutherford had pointed it out in an address 
in Philadelphia in 1906 at the bicentennial celebration of Frank­
lin's birth,"" and some years earlier Lord Kelvin had developed 
it in a paper that concentrated on Aepinus's elaboration of
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Franklin's theory.^ Yet when Adillikan began his work in the 
first decade of the new century, one did not have to accept the 
atomistic view of electricity, let aione subscribe to a theory 
associated with Franldin. If Millikan had followed Pupin's ex­
ample, he could have supported a rival theory of electricity, 
based on the thematic concept of the continuum rather than on 
the thematic concept of atomism. Adaxwell's theory of electric­
ity, while outwardly agnostic on the nature of electricity, per­
mitted electricity to be more easily thought of in terms of 
continuous displacement, a motion within the electromagnetic 
ether, than in terms of an atomistic structure. Maxwell noted in 
!873 in his E/ectn'cTy vkfRgyzcdw; that electrolysis seems to 
invite conceptualizing a definite value for an electric charge: 
"For convenience in description we may call this constant 
molecular charge (revealed by Faraday's experiments) one 
molecule of electricity." He added, however, this convenient 
terminology, "gross as it is and out of harmony with the rest of 
this treatise," this should not mislead us to ascribe reality to 
granules of electricity:
. . . the theory of molecular charges may serve as a 
method by which we may remember a good many facts 
about electrolysis. It is extremely improbable, however, 
that when we come to understand the true nature of 
electrolysis we shall retain in any form the theory of 
molecular charges, for then we shall have obtained a 
secure basis on which to form a true theory of electric 
current and so become independent on these provisional 
hypotheses^
The view that the atomicity of electricity was only a heuris­
tic device was widespread in England and on the Continent 
before the successes of the corpuscular view through the work 
of Pieter Zeeman, H. A. Lorentz, and J. J. Thomson. Arthur 
Schuster wrote of the early 1880s: "The separate existence of a 
detached atom of electricity never occurred to me as possible, 
and if it had, and I had openly expressed such heterodox opin­
ions, I should hardly have been considered a serious physicist, 
for the limits to allowable heterodoxy in science are soon 
reached."^ In 1897, Lord Kelvin still thought that careful con­
sideration should be given to the idea that "electricity is a con-
tinuous homogeneous liquid.""" Max Planck confessed that as 
late as 1900 he did not fully believe in the electron hypothesis."" 
Even where an atomistic hypothesis of electricity seemed per­
suasive, it did not have to imply a unitary charge for the elec­
tron. Millikan later noted that the possibility of the electronic 
charge being merely a "statistical mean" was one that some 
physicists were supporting at the time."* According to all avail­
able documents, however, neither at the start of his work on the 
electron nor later did Millikan subject this possibility to any 
detailed test.
With hindsight, it is easy to see evidence that should have 
clinched for everyone the argument in favor of the particle 
theory of unitary electric charge, even prior to Millikan's work: 
J. J. Thomson's measurement of the constant charge-to-mass 
ratio of cathode rays; Rutherford's measurement of the charge 
on a particles; the charge on cloud droplets of various liquids 
determined by J. J. Thomson, his student Townsend, and H. A. 
Wilson.^ Yet even where the error margins were not enormous, 
the methods all shared one fatal daw with the calculation of the 
unit charge exchanged in electrolysis: They represented the 
determination of an charge from observations made on
very many hypothetical individual charges as the same time. At 
best, these were indirect measurements of fbe charge c,* at least 
e would be the statistical mean value of a distribution of un­
known shape. Nobody before Millikan had measured the charge 
of an individual object, and found it to be equal to one or two 
or any small multiples of a unit of electricity, much less watched 
a charged object changing its charge discontinuously by 1, 2, 
3, . . . units of charge.
Millikan also did not have the slightest hope of doing this 
when he set out to measure the value of the electronic charge. 
When Millikan began this work with his student L. Begeman, he 
used H. A. Wilson's method essentially unchanged. Clouds of 
droplets were produced in an expansion cloud chamber between 
the parallel, horizontal plates of a charged condenser. They 
observed the slowly falling top layers of the clouds containing 
the smallest droplets. One set fell under gravity (at speed v,), 
and another set fell faster, with the additional aid of an electric 
held set up across the condenser (at speed Vg)- Assuming, first,
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Stokes's law to hold for the droplets, second, each of the droplets 
to have formed on a singly charged ion, and not to shrink notice­
ably owing to evaporation and, third, that the different clouds in 
succession were all similarly formed, one could quickly obtain 
the charge of the hypothetical unit of electricity in terms of the 
observables (speeds of fall v, and electric held strength E; 
density of drop 8; and viscosity of the gas The average 
charge per droplet would thus be given by
E8'^ —
This method (to be called 7) was full of unsatisfac­
tory features, both theoretically and practically. Wilson's pub­
lished measurements had shown a spread of values in determina­
tions for e from 2.0 X to"*" esu to 4.4 X io"^ esu, with a 
mean of 3.1 X to"*" esu. (Earlier in 1903, J. J. Thomson had 
obtained e =  3.4 X 10**° esu by a similar method.) However, 
Millikan's plan in 1907-8 was to make only minor changes in the 
procedure, to improve accuracy. Thus Millikan and Begeman 
used radium instead of x-rays to ionize the moist gas prior to the 
expansion that formed the cloud. Their results of ten sets of obser­
vations for e spread from 3.66 X 10"*° esu to 4.37 X 10" "^ esu, 
with the mean given as 4.03 X to"'° esu. It was evidently an im­
provement over Wilson's results -  although it shared with those 
the implicit assumption to rule out a statistical distribution of 
divergent values of electric charges occurring in nature.
Tbe of %% earperw/e/M -  Method 77
The joint paper by Millikan and Begeman was read at the 
American Physical Society meeting in Chicago in early January 
1908. A one-page abstract was published that February.^ Al­
most immediately, prominent attention was drawn to this maiden 
effort-by none other than Ernest Rutherford.^ Millikan's re­
sult had come just in time to help Rutherford and Geiger in their 
major new work: They had measured the magnitude of the 
^-particle's charge to be 9.3 X 10"*" esu, and assumed it should 
be equal to ]2cl. Hence c should be 4.63 X 10**" esu. The values 
for c found earlier by Thomson and Wilson had been 30 percent
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lower, but the new ones by Millikan and Begeman were only i $ 
percent lower. Although the work of Millikan and Begeman ap­
peared to be the best of the three, Rutherford implied that it, 
too, could be improved and the gap closed. Rutherford sug­
gested that a failure to allow adequately for the evaporation of 
the droplets in those methods caused the estimate of the number 
of ions (droplets) present to be too large, and hence the value 
of o too small. Pending such improvements of the method of 
others, the Manchester group associated with Rutherford con­
tinued to use his value 0 — 4.63 X io"*" esu confidently until 
Bohr's early work of 2912; it "had been gospel at Afanchester 
since the measurement of Rutherford and Geiger in 1908.'"^
With the incentive of Rutherford's suggestion, if indeed it 
was needed, Millikan's strategy was now clear: The error 
owing to evaporation had to be eliminated.*  ^ Millikan planned 
to work in his typically gradualist way, by arranging the electric 
field to hold steady the top surface of the charged cloud, keeping 
it suspended to permit studying its rate of evaporation. The 
work was apparently done in the spring and summer of 1909  ^
and seemed at first to require essentially only small modifications 
of existing techniques, chiefly using an exceptionally large 
(io,ooo-volt) battery to set up a stronger electric field, now in 
oppot222072 to the effect of gravity.
When Millikan turned on the electric field, something hap­
pened that at last allowed him to orient and gather his immense 
energy, his talent as an observer and a researcher, his ability to 
use students, his instinct for recognizing important and basic 
problems, and his great eye for the accident that opens an un­
suspected door. He chanced upon a sequence of accidents that 
he described consistently and frankly in the resulting publica­
tion of 1910, and the 1939 draft autobiography, and in the pub­
lished autobiography. As he put it, the accident "772222/0 ft porrf/'/o 
for 2/20 /27*rr 2072c 20 77722^0 2/3 0 7770222277*07720722^ 072 0720 22722/ 2/70
M7720 Z72d7fM?72%J (Aop/o2, 27722/ . . . 777%Jo 72 pOi '^/Pc 20 022227772720 
2^0 %227*%02272g 07* 7*Opo//272g of p7*0p07*220y of 2272 2722/2f22/z722/ iro/%2od 
0/0027*072 . . ."S'*
When he turned on the switch, the cloud, far from being 
held stationary, dissipated instantaneously and completely. The 
strong field, acting on the variously (not, as had always been
assumed, equally) charged droplets, cleared them out, and thus 
there was no top surface of the cloud left on which to make 
measurements. Indeed, the decade-long technique of measuring 
c by cloud watching came to an abrupt end; I have found no 
evidence that anyone used it again. Millikan wrote that the dis­
persal "seemed at first to spoil my experiment. But when I 
repeated the test, I saw at once that I had something before me 
of much more importance than the top surface . . . For re­
peated tests showed that whenever a cloud was thus dispersed 
by my powerful field, % )'<?TD drop/ety rewTH m
those with just the right charge relative to their mass 
to allow balancing their weight in the electric held.'*
It was the first time that one of the cloud experimenters con­
centrated on the individual, charged droplet instead of the 
whole cloud. Indeed, Millikan had stumbled on a new instru­
ment, a very sensitive balance for holding an object of the order 
of io"*3 to io*is grams in view. It marked the change from 
Method I (falling cloud of water droplets) to Method II (bal­
anced droplets of water, later also of alcohol). While that was 
only an intermediate stage before he arrived at Method III (non- 
suspended oil drops), his perception had guided him to a tool 
for opening up a new experimental held, the more so as seren­
dipity struck a second time:
I chanced to observe . . .  on several occasions on which 
I had failed to screen off the rays from the radium [for 
ionizing the air before producing the cloud] that now 
and then one of [the balanced drops] would suddenly 
change its charge and begin to move up or down in the 
held . . . This opened the possibility of measuring 
[later] with certainty, not merely the charges on individ­
ual droplets as I had been doing, but the charge carried by 
a single atmospheric ion by comparing the speeds in the 
electric held of one drop before and after it chanced to 
catch an ion.^
Watching a water droplet suspended in a held made it easier to 
allow for evaporation and so increased the precision of measure­
ment.^ This situation was a direct response to Rutherford's chal­
lenge. The rest of Millikan's work would soon follow fairly natur­
ally -  from the replacement of water by a liquid with much
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lower vapor pressure, to the long labors of removing or narrow­
ing the source of uncertainty, for example, by the modification 
of Stokes's law for small droplets. Even in the first months, in 
the summer of 1 9 0 9 , Adillikan claimed the "c/3 %rgey %<?t7/%//y 
%/w%yy 7 /3  c fw/ftr of error of ?;zy ytop-
wa7c/3 7/7Mr^ re777ewM, 1, 2, 3, 4, or some other exact multiple of 
the smallest charge on a [water] droplet that I ever obtained. 
Here, 7^ C77, w%y t^ <? /fry; Jep777te, y/3%rp, MTMy/z^ igMOMy proof 7 /3 7 7 7  
e/eotrfofry w%y dcpT777e/y z/MfMry 773 ytrMotMre . . ."?*
The importance of the discovery should not divert attention 
from the fact that Adillikan did not design or devise the experi­
ment from which his early fame sprang; rather, he discovered 
the experiment.^ The character of this discovery differs some­
what from that of, say, the existence of Uranus or America. No 
one had doubted the existence of individual droplets. Anyone 
could have put together existing equipment a good decade or 
more earlier if one had only thought of watching a drop instead 
of a cloud. The equipment used by Millikan in 1909 was a 
simple structure made of available materials; even making a big 
enough battery had been no major challenge for a long time. It 
is not altogether clear why Thomson, Townsend, and Wilson, 
among many others, did not think of determining the electric 
charge in the first place with the far simpler method of indi­
vidual droplets than with the rather complex cloud experiments. 
The stranglehold on the imagination exerted by the tradition of 
work on clouds appears to have yielded only to Millikan's acci­
dent.
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Adillikan's first reports on individual droplets were not published 
until December 1909 in TZ?e P^ yy/cTt/ Review, and in February 
1910 in the P/n/oropMcTt/ d i% g % Z 7 7 7 e .  Before analyzing the papers 
or describing the setting in which the scientific community first 
heard of Millikan's verbal report of his discovery in August 
1909, I turned to the work that Ehrenhaft, quite independently, 
was doing at about the same time -  for the trajectories of the sci­
entific work of the two protagonists are about to intersect. Milli­
kan had been led to the single-object determination of charge,
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starting from his cloud work, in line with research techniques 
developed in England and the United States. Meanwhile, Ehren- 
haft had been progressing toward the same research problems by 
techniques more characteristic of work on the Continent, namely 
preparation of colloids and the ultramicroscopic Brownian- 
movement observations of individual fragments of metal (e.g., 
from the vapor of a silver arc) and of cigarette smoke. In this 
period, Ehrenhaft's atomistic preference was as clear and ex­
plicit as Millikan's. Ele ended one of his papers of 1907 with the 
hope that the work would be "a new support for the molecular- 
kinetic hypothesis."^
Ehrenhaft's first report on a new method to measure the 
charge on small particles in order to determine what he called 
the "e/cUwche was dated March 4, 1909,
and appeared as a one-page summary in the of the
Academy of Sciences of Vienna.^ He explained he had noted 
that colloidal metal particles occasionally showed an electric 
charge, as indicated by their motion in a electric field.
(It is plausible that he happened upon this effect during earlier 
studies on Brownian movement.) Measuring the motions of par­
ticles with and without an electric held, and applying Stokes's 
law to obtain their mass, he could thus measure the charges on 
the particles. In short, he was very nearly doing what Millikan 
did, but he did not use a vertical electric held. Two weeks later, 
in a longer report/^ Ehrenhaft announced that he intended to 
arrange it in just that way; however, the results did not appear 
until a year later. Consequently, in 1909 his method suffered 
from obvious shortcomings. Different particles were needed, one 
set observed when moving with a horizontal component in the 
presence of the electric held, the other when moving vertically 
without the electric held; e, therefore, cannot be the charge 
determined on a single object but is an average. Nevertheless, 
Ehrenhaft's three papers, submitted between March 4, 1909 and 
April 10, 1909, are the hrst in the literature in which the paths 
and motions of mdz'U&Mf, charged were followed and
used to compute a value of eT Moreover, the value for c that 
Ehrenhaft here obtains (4.6 X 10"*° esu)s" is far closer to 
Rutherford's (4.6$ X io**°) and Planck's (4.69 X to"*", from 
black-body radiation) than that of Millikan and Begeman
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(1908) had been, and Ehrenhaft did not hide this fact. Indeed, 
in view of the subsequent debate, it is ironic that Ehrenhaft here 
notes that Millikan's measurement results of 1908 were lower 
than Rutherford's, in other words, that Miiiikan's effort "yielded 
values of the elementary quantum that are too small."
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In attempting to gain acceptance for one's work, early communi­
cation in an excellent forum is a great advantage. Here again 
Millikan was extraordinarily lucky. He finished the measure­
ment of c by the balanced-waterdrop method in the late summer 
of 1909, just before the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science was to hold its seventy-ninth meeting in Winnipeg, 
Canada. It was too late for him to get on the printed program/* 
and to the last moment Millikan did not know if he would be 
called on to present his results during the sessions.  ^It must have 
been a heady meeting for this relative newcomer to scientific 
research. The presidential address was given by J. J. Thomson, 
who chiefly devoted his time to discussing three research 
frontiers; the structure of electricity ("We know that negative 
electricity is made up of units all of which are of the same 
kind . . ."); the ether ("The ether is not a fantastic creation of 
the speculative philosopher; it is as essential to us as the air we 
breathe . . . The study of this all-pervading substance is per­
haps the most fascinating and important duty of the physicist"); 
and radioactivity. Among the physicists and astronomers listed 
as reading papers at the large meeting were C. V. Boys, A. S. 
Eddington, A. S. Eve, E. Goldstein, Otto Hahn, W. J. S. Lock- 
year, Oliver Lodge, Percival Lowell, A. E. H. Love, Theodore 
Lyman, D. C. Miller, J. IT Poynting, Lord Rayleigh, E. Ruther­
ford, A. Schuster, and G. J. Stoney.^
The ground for Millikan's presentation was prepared not only 
by the attention directed to the field of research by J. J. Thom­
son, but also by Rutherford's address on August 26 as president 
of the Section on Mathematical and Physical Science.^ * Ruther­
ford's aim was to summarize how recent progress in physics 
strengthened the credibility of the atomic theories of matter and
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of electricity. As he had also done in 1906,^ Rutherford wasted 
iittie time opposing directly the antiatomists who were still ac­
tive, particularly on the Continent. Rather, he made short 
counterthrusts in sentences such as "The negation of the atomic 
theory has not and does not help us make discoveries," casting 
doubt on the atomic theory "is quite erroneous," and, in the 
very last sentence of the paper, "In the light of these and similar 
direct deductions, based on a minimum amount of assumption, 
the physicists have, I think, some justification for their faith that 
they are building on the solid rock of fact, and not, we 
ofteTZ rt? wwMeJ Ay rewe of cw ycif73ri/w 073
r/Aft^g r%73<A of 3773%g373%twe ^ypotAcny."^
Rutherford's main attention was devoted to reviewing the 
developments favorable to the atomistic point of view, which he 
acknowledged to appeal particularly "to the Anglo-Saxon tem­
perament." Nevertheless, on the list of findings he was reporting 
were efforts by three Austrians, Exner and Richard Zsigmondy 
(determination of mean velocity of particles in various solutions, 
from Brownian-movement calculations), and Ehrenhaft (1907, 
experimental determination of Brownian movement by small 
particles suspended in gases). Rutherford's own recent work 
with Geiger on the charge of a particles was further support, 
"showing that this radiation is, as the other evidence indicated, 
discontinuous, and that it is possible to select by a special electric 
method the passage of a single a particle . .
As in the paper he had written with Geiger during the previ­
ous year, Rutherford now cited the work of J. J. Thomson, 
Townsend, Millikan, and Begeman on clouds (Millikan's report 
on using individual droplets had not yet been delivered), as an­
other indication that "electricity, like matter, is supposed to be 
discrete in structure." Ele added: "This method is of great 
interest and importance," although the exact determination of e 
in this manner was "beset with great experimental difficulties."^ 
Rutherford lauded recent work by Ehrenhaft (7909) on the 
charge carried by ultramicroscopic dust particles of metal, and 
grouped Ehrenhaft's value for e with Rutherford's and Geiger's 
as one of "the most recent measurements by very different 
methods which are far more reliable than the older estimates."^
The implication was that these values were more reliable than 
those of Thomson, Townsend, and Wilson. It now is no longer 
reasonable, he concluded, "to believe that such concordance [in 
the experimental values of e and N, based on different theories] 
would show itself if the atoms and their charges had no real 
existence"; hence doubts concerning the atomic theory of matter 
are "quite erroneous."""
Rutherford did voice one regret: ". . . it has not yet been 
possible to detect a single electron by its electrical or optica! 
effect, and thus count the number directly, as in the case of 
a-particles." This was precisely the missing link. Although he 
could not have known that Millikan had already found it, 
Rutherford was optimistic: . . there seems to be no reason
why this should not be accomplished by the electrical method." 
Rutherford evidently had in mind the possibility of using scin­
tillations produced by rays for this purpose. But Millikan was 
on hand at that very meeting, waiting to give his paper a few 
days later in which he would show just how one might go about 
detecting the single electron by another method, that is, by its 
effects on the observed motion of a small droplet of liquid.
At last, Millikan's turn to speak came, and apparently he was 
well received. Millikan later singled out Joseph Larmor as having 
been "intensely interested in my paper,""* and as having sug­
gested that Millikan should look into the limits of Stokes's law, 
promising to do the same himself from the theoretical side."" 
After this presentation on August 31, 1909, Millikan must have 
thought the end of the quest to establish the unitary nature of 
the electric charge was in clear sight. The subject had been 
acknowledged at the highest level to be at the very frontier of 
urgent research; his own, earlier results, even before his recent 
improvements, had been believed and cited with respect; they 
fitted well with the other pieces in the jigsaw puzzle of physical 
theory; and he had been able to present his new method and 
new results just as soon as the need for them was announced 
by Rutherford. He later recalled that even his final, major im­
provement of technique, that of using oil drops to avoid all the 
problems caused by evaporation, occurred to him suddenly while 
he was riding the train back to Chicago from the Winnipeg 
meeting.""
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We do not have a copy of the talk Miilikan delivered at Winni­
peg, but a few weeks later he published a very brief account of 
his work,^ and on October 9 sent the paper -  his first major one 
- to  the Magazine for publication in February
i9io."s These two contributions are the first reports in the liter­
ature of the use of single, isolated Jropr, and of the balancing- 
field method (Method II).
If Millikan and his readers thought that the search for the 
value of e was essentially over, they soon found that the battle 
was just beginning. Indeed, two likely causes for the approach­
ing "fight over the electron" can be found directly in Millikan's 
Af%g#ziyye paper. One has to do with the well- 
known role which feelings about priority claims play in the 
actual unfolding of scientific controversies. In the section giving 
"The Most Probable Value of the Elementary Electrical Charge," 
Millikan presents his own, new mean value, e =  4.65 X io"^° 
esu, and assigns also equal weight to "all the recent determina­
tions of e by methods which seem least open to question":"" the 
value obtained by Planck from radiation theory (4.69 X 10"*"), 
which Rutherford had mentioned with favor at Winnipeg; the 
value of Rutherford and Geiger (4.65 X 10"*"); E. Regener's 
value, obtained by a method very similar to Rutherford's (4.79 
X and Begeman's "recent and as yet unpublished" value
of 4.67 X 10"*", obtained in Millikan's laboratoryV The final 
mean for e, Millikan declares, is thus 4.69 X io"*° esu. Ruther­
ford's objections of 1908 and 1909 have been well met. In addi­
tion, because Millikan's and Rutherford's results are so close, 
Millikan feels that the "results seem to constitute experimental 
verification of Stokes' law for these drops."
But while accepting the work of these authors, Millikan 
specifically rejects the values for e published by four others, and 
gives explicit reasons: Perrin's value "involves so many assump­
tions of questionable rigor"; Maurice de Broglie's relies on Per­
rin's N, among other difficulties; Moreau's depends on Perrin's 
<?. Millikan also specifies why "uncertainties" in Ehrenhaft's 
results, "obtained by a method similar to the one here presented 
save that it involves the measurement of the velocities produced
first by the action of gravity, and second by the action of an 
electrical field upon the charged particles thrown off by a 
metallic arc," make that work unacceptable to him,^ although 
Millikan agrees that "this [Ehrenhaft's mean value for e, 4.6 X 
10*1"] is in very good agreement" with the other accepted 
values.
Millikan's reservations regarding Ehrenhaft's work were rea­
sonable, although they appear more reasonable in retrospect. 
Had Millikan accepted Ehrenhaft's value, it would have worked 
to Millikan's advantage in the sense that it would have brought 
the average value of all accepted determinations of e down a bit 
toward Millikan's own. In fact, he was rejecting a confirmatory 
value, one obtained by an established researcher who had used 
a method closer to his own than the methods of others whom 
Millikan was not rejecting. Millikan's decision was grounded in 
his suspicions, plausible but far from proved, that the value 
obtained by Ehrenhaft was invalidated by the method used to 
obtain it. As we shall soon see, Millikan was also sensitive to the 
obverse, to the possibility that his own results of measurement 
were at times unwelcome and disconfirmatory but that even 
without a solid analysis of the causes he could continue to accept 
his hypothesis and reject the apparent falsification of it.
It appears that from Ehrenhaft's point of view the glove had 
been thrown down before him. Beginning in his next publica­
tion, he and some of his students dedicated themselves to the 
"question of the elementary quantum of electricity." Ehrenhaft's 
own output of a dozen papers over the next four years was 
entirely on this subject. To be sure, Millikan's publication of 
February iqio was vulnerable to criticism. With idiosyncratic 
frankness and detail, Millikan shows in the section "The Results" 
that the measurements with the new technique were still diffi­
cult to make, that he relied heavily on personal judgment, and 
that it was really still his first major paper. The most important 
raw data for five series of data on balanced water drops and ("to 
vary the conditions") one series of balanced alcohol drops are 
presented. The observer is also identified (Millikan or Bege- 
man); but, in a move rarely found in the scientific literature, each 
of the thirty-eight sets of observations is then given a more or 
less personal rating:
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The observations marked with a tripie star are those which 
were marked "best" in my notebook and represent those 
which were taken under what appeared to be perfect con­
ditions. This means that we could watch the drop long 
enough to be very certain that it was altogether stationary: 
that we could time its passages across the cross-hairs with 
perfect precision, and that it showed no apparent retarda­
tion in falling through the two equal spaces. The double- 
starred observations were marked in my notebook "very 
good." Those marked with single stars were marked 
"good" and the others "fair."""
There were two "three-star" observations, seven "two-star" 
ones, ten with a single star, and thirteen without any. The aver­
age value of e obtained in each of the seven series (sets of obser­
vations) is then assigned a "weight" from one to seven, to obtain 
the final, weighted grand average (e =  4.85 X 10**° esu, as 
compared with the unweighted, simple mean of 4.70 X 10"*"). 
Although we can discern a general relation between the total 
number of "stars" in a series and the weight given to the par­
ticular individual series-average, the relation is neither explained 
nor linear: Millikan was evidently saying he knew a good run 
when he saw one, and he was not going to overlook that knowl­
edge even if it was not obvious how to quantify and share it on 
the record.
Equally significant was Millikan's frank admission that an­
other seven observations had been discarded altogether, and so 
had not entered at all into the computation of the final average 
value of e; "First, I discarded three very good observations of 
my own, taken under conditions of potential and position of 
cross-hairs which made them uncertain in spite of the accurate 
timing. These observations . . . would not affect appreciably 
the final result if they were included."*"" Only the internal ethos 
of science, which prizes the fullest disclosure of data, seems to 
have motivated even mentioning this set of discarded observa­
tions. Millikan continues:
Second, I have discarded three observations which I took 
on unbalanced drops, timing them as they rose against 
gravity under the influence of the field, and then again as 
they fell under gravity between the same cross-hairs, when
?4
the held was thrown off. Although all of these observa­
tions gave values of e within 2 per cent of the final mean, 
the uncertainties of the observations were such that / 
tuoz/M t^ ezzz tAey zzot agreed
rcyzz/ty z/ic oz/ier o^ ycrvzzzzoTzy, and consequently 1 felt 
obliged to discard them as it was.*"*
This is an unusual statement. Nothing in the rest of his paper 
has prepared us to expect, as Millikan mentions casually in pass­
ing, he would discard some observations if they "disagreed with 
the results of the other observations." Was it enough that these 
three runs were on zzzzbalanced drops (which became his method 
of choice immediately afterward)? His comment that, in this 
instance, the omission had no practical effect on the final results 
either way is reassuring, but one must not overlook the more 
general methodological point. Such judgments are not infre­
quent. They often can be (and in this case were) supported by 
plausibility arguments which allow the experimenter to assert 
that he believes the discordant observations do not go to the 
heart of the matter, that is to say, are not grounded in a serious 
way in the phenomenon being studied. For just this reason, such 
judgments expose the researcher to a risk, one that he is willing 
to take in the framework of beliefs and assumptions within which 
the judgments are plausible acts, and one which allows him to 
avoid the interruptions, delays, and detailed research that might be 
necessary to pin down the exact causes of the discrepant obser­
vations.
At work here is the belief that, in principle, a reinterpretation 
can be found that would fit the neglected observations into the 
pattern of nature signaled by the accepted observations. Con­
versely, the belief is also present that an alternative picture of 
nature, although in principle not foreclosed -  in this case, that 
charges exhibit a stochastic distribution about the mean value e, 
or that charges are made up of subelectrons or of some con­
gealing of a continuum of charge -  is so unlikely or abhorrent 
that it is not worth even the effort of falsifying it in detail. 
Millikan's confidence was explicit. He announces, "There is no 
theoretical uncertainty whatever left in the method,"^ although 
he adds: "Unless it be an uncertainty as to whether or not Stokes' 
law applies to the rate of fall of these drops on the gravity." On
5 5
TABLE.
SERIES No. 1  (Bn!, pos. water drops). SERIES N<
Distance between plates *545 cm. Dista
Measured distance of fall'1 5 5  cm. Measui
Observer. Fb&s.
1 space. 2 spaces.
* * 2 2 8 5 2*4 see. 4 '8  sec. MiHikan. 2 3 6 5
2 2 8 5 2 '4  sec. 4*8 sec. „ * * 2 3 6 5
* * 2 2 7 5 2*4 sec. 4*8 sec. Begeman. * 2 3 6 5
* * * 2 3 2 5 2*4 sec. 4*8 sec. MiHikan. * 2 3 6 5
2 3 2 5 2 6 sec. 4*8 sec. ,, * 2 3 9 5
* 2 3 2 5 2 2 sec. 4*8 sec. ,, * 2 3 9 5
* * 2 3 6 5 2*4 sec. 4*8 sec. „ * * * 2 3 9 5
2 3 6 5
2 3 6 5
2 3 6 5
2 3 1 2 2*4 4*8 2 3 7 4
Mean time for '
I
 
t!
 
S
4*8 sec. Mean 1
.= 3 4 2 2 * 1. - .* <^ =3 -4 2 2 :
= 1 3 7 7 X1 0 *'"- = 1 8 -2 5 ;
.*.<=1 3 8 5 x 1 0 -'"=: = 4 -5 9 x 1 0 *'". .-.e=l8 -2 5 -;
Figure z.t
the next page even this doubt is laid to rest: "It is scarcely con­
ceivable that Stokes' law fails to hold for them.'"""
As to the last of the neglected observations, MiHikan says 
simply, without apology or plausibility argument: "In the third 
place, I have discarded one uncertain and unduplicated observa­
tion apparently upon a single charged drop, which gave a value 
of the charge on the drop some 30 per cent, lower than the final 
value of e. With those exceptions all of the data recorded in our 
notebooks are given below.'""**
The data, presented in six tables such as the one shown in 
Figure 2.1, also raise questions. Just how many individual drop­
lets were used in these observations? Each of the six series of 
observations may have used as many droplets as there were
observations. Why, then, were the raw data (voltage, times) on 
all drops in each series pooled and averaged in order to obtain 
one preliminary average value of c, which in turn received a 
single weight for the final averaging to obtain one final value of 
e? How confident can the reader be that one integer is the cor­
rect divisor that works for all data in a given series (for example, 
7Z — 3 in Figure 2.1), and how were the data assembled to form 
a given series in the first place? Finally, since the chief point was 
to find e, what prevented Millikan from using a bigger section 
of the battery, or smaller spacing between the condenser plates, 
to obtain usable data on singly charged droplets-not to speak 
of testing, head on, whether fractional charges do exist?
Unfortunately, the notebooks containing the data of Milli­
kan's work of 1909 have not been found, and we cannot watch 
through the keyhole what occurred in the laboratory. But soon 
we shall have better luck, for Millikan continued his work with 
great energy. It was beginning to be seen as good scientific work 
by the criterion of fruitfulness. For example, his 1909 value e 
was adopted in 1913 in Niels Bohr's epochal paper on the hydro­
gen atom,i°s and Millikan's observational method became directly 
applicable in the closely related efforts by his student H. Fletcher 
to obtain A? and hence e from measurements of Brownian move­
ment.
Between the fall of 1909 and the spring of 1910, Millikan's 
methods of experimentation and calculation underwent a process 
of significant maturation (to Method III, to be examined later) 
by working not with balanced water drops but with falling and 
rising oil drops and, as well, by calculating values of elementary 
charge from each set of observations on a given drop. Unknown 
to Ehrenhaft, Millikan reported on his new method first on 
April 23, 1910, to the American Physical Society.**^  In the mean­
time, however, Ehrenhaft had committed himself.
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It began with a note to the Vienna Academy session on April 21, 
i9io.*°s Ehrenhaft had been silent for a year, but now he had star­
tling news. He used a horizontal condenser, with a vertical electric 
field strong enough to make particles rise against gravitation -  a
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deployment equivalent to the one Millikan reported shortly 
afterward in the paper read at an American Physical Society 
meeting on April 23, :pio-and he studied platinum and silver 
particles from arcs. Ehrenhaft reported more than 300 measure­
ments, yielding a new and remarkable result: Particles are not 
only singly or doubly charged but can also have charges "be­
tween and below" these values. The twenty-two measurements 
of charge reproduced in Ehrenhaft's paper range from 7.33 X 
io*i" esu down to 1.38 X 10"*° esu-about one-third of the 
value of the elementary charge he had previously measured. 
Ehrenhaft concluded that these findings cannot be explained 
away as inadequacies of method. Rather, these quantities are "in 
nature." If "theory presupposes the existence" of an indivisible 
quantum of electricity, the value of the latter will thus have to 
"fall considerably below" the hitherto accepted value. A counter­
challenge was thus issued to all believers in c as the quantum of 
charge, for which nothing in theory or experiment seemed to 
have prepared the ground. Out of the blue, the subelectron had 
appeared on the stage.
Ehrenhaft followed his announcement of April 21, 1910,*°" 
with a report delivered to the Vienna Academy on May 12, 
1910,"° in which he coined the word "subelectron" and an­
nounced that his results indicated that indivisible quantities of 
electric charge do not exist in nature at the level of 1 X 10**° 
esu or above. His subelectrons do show a propensity for aggre­
gating; for example, he reports the total charge on gold particles 
to have ranged continuously from 3 X 10"" esu to a heaping 
up (TTwfM72g) of 1.73 X to**° esu, that is, up to a third of the 
usual charge of the electron. Although all his observations are 
made on very small particles observed in the ultramicroscope, 
he sees no reason to abandon Stokes's law in the classical form 
(which would, in any case, make the true charge even smaller) 
or to worry about Brownian movement although it made time 
measurements uncertain. Moreover, he assumes again that the 
density of the metal fragments, developed in an electric arc, are 
of the same density as the mother material in the elcctrodcV
Adore remarkable, however, is the conclusion that emerges 
ever more forcefully as the number and length of the articles by 
Ehrenhaft and his collaborators increase: These experiments do
not permit them to "hold on to the fundamental hypothesis of 
the electron theory," namely, the indivisible electron."** The 
large spread of values for e which have been measured by vari­
ous researchers and by different methods should be taken, they 
say, as a signal that one is dealing here with an aspect of natural 
law itself. These variations of net charge are "in nature."
If Millikan and others felt that Ehrenhaft's data could in 
principle be interpreted without giving up the undivided elec­
tron, they must have felt somewhat embarrassed when Ehrenhaft 
turned to Millikan's data in the PMcwpTw/d THgazmc 1910 
paper on balanced water and alcohol drops. He subjected the 
data to a devastating attack,"'* turning them against Millikan. 
Ehrenhaft recalculated the charge on each drop from each of 
Millikan's observations separately, instead of following Millikan's 
method of lumping several runs to obtain values of e from the 
average of measured values of voltage, and so. on, measured on 
different droplets. The result was a large spread of values of 
droplet charge, from 8.60 X 10"*° to 29.82 X 10"*° esu. The 
case for each of these being an integral multiple of one elemen­
tary charge now did not look at all self-evident (see Figure 
2.2).*" It appeared rather that the same observational record 
could be used to demonstrate the plausibility of two diametri­
cally opposite theories, held with great conviction by two well- 
equipped proponents and their respective collaborators. Initially, 
there was not even the convincing testimony of independent 
researchers.""
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Happily for Millikan, Ehrenhaft's attack in mid-1910 was quickly 
made moot by the timely publication of Millikan's new results 
with his new method. Millikan's documentation of his adoption 
of and early success with the oil drop is extensive."" Of interest 
to us here are the real advances made by Millikan over his and 
all other previous work.
His account in the second major paper in his career, in Stdey/ce 
in September 1910/" verged on the euphoric. He was able to 
measure separately the frictional charge on an oil drop as well as 
the additional charges it may pick up from ions in the atmosphere
2 .spaces ? s <2# # W #
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Figure 2.2 Portion of Felix Ehrenhaft's analysis of Millikan's data on the charges (7 carried by droplets. (SilzMMgr^eWc t^e 
Wiss. [Vienna], n. up , 1910.)
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during its travel, and both types of charges were found to be 
quantized in the same manner, "eMC3 multipies of one definite, 
elementary, electrical charge.""^ He boasted that he could 
"catch upon a minute droplet of oil and hold under observation 
for an indefinite length of time one single atmospheric ion or any 
number of such ions between i and i$o." The method is free 
from "all questionable theoretical assumptions," and the limita­
tion on the accuracy of determining e is only the accuracy with 
which the value of the viscosity of air (,u. or 17) is known. He 
found that Stokes's law breaks down for very small spheres, and 
determined a correction. A view advanced many years ago was 
confirmed by these experiments, namely, that "an electrical 
charge, instead of being spread uniformily over a charged sur­
face, has a definite granular structure, consisting, in fact, of an 
exact number of specks, or atoms, of electricity, all precisely 
alike, peppered over the surface of the charged body." Indeed, 
Millikan now held "the conclusions follow so inevitably from the 
experimental data that even the man on the street can scarcely 
fail to understand the method or to appreciate the results."
N o r  w o u ld  th e  sc ie n tis t  b e  less im p re sse d  b y  th e  c o n f id e n c e  
ex p re sse d  in  th e  fin d in g s : M illik a n  r e p o r ts  th a t  w o r k in g  w i th  
F le tc h e r  f ro m  D e c e m b e r  1 9 0 9  to  M a y  1 9 : 0  o n  d ro p le ts  o f  o il, 
m e rc u ry ,  a n d  g l y c e r i n - o n  " o n e  to  tw o  h u n d r e d  d ro p s "  in  a l l -  
th e y  " f o u n d  in  e v e ry  case 3Z?e /T/w-go <773 3/3 <? /Zrop [ to  b e ]
2/73 exz3C3 77222/22'p /e  o f  3/32? y722%ZZ<?y3 /T a rg e  ttT Z /T  t r e  fo3373/Z 3Zw T e  
& o p  C433gZ73 fro773 3Z?e 2 3 3 3 . "  B e tw e e n  1 ,0 0 0  a n d  2 , 0 0 0  c h a n g e s  o f  
c h a rg e  w e re  o b se rv e d , y e t  "273 7303 0730 M73g/e 273y3%73oe Z/ar 3Z3ere 
Z?ee73 a/3y /Ta73g<? t /T i /T  /Zz'/Z 7303 repreie733 3Z)e adfC733 Z3p073 3Z)e 
J r o p  o f  0730 zZe/273z'3<? zT^arZaZz/e ^33a73333y o f  o/oo37*3023y, 03* a v e ry  
y/zzaZZ oa:ao3 777ZzZ3ipZe o f  3Z?a3 ^22a73323y."""
Of interest is Millikan's treatment of his data. His final value 
of 0 is the mean value of twenty-seven determinations of 0 on that 
many individual droplets, taken from a larger number "studied 
throughout a period of 47 consecutive days." Three other drops 
"have been excluded [because they] all yielded values of 0 from 
two to four per cent, too low" compared with the plotting of 
the values from other drops. A "natural" hypothesis concerning 
these three drops is that each may have been "two drops stuck
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together." At any rate, he adds, "After eliminating dust we 
found not more than one drop in ten which was irregular." The 
context shows that the word "irregular" means that the drop's 
unitary charge e deviated by as much as 4 percent from the curve 
plotting the other valued^" Nevertheless, ten more drops-the 
four slowest and the six fastest ones -  studied during that period 
were also eliminated from the final averaging in the 1910 -Sczczzce 
article before Millikan obtained his "final mean value of c." Al­
though these ten drops would not appreciably alter the final 
mean value, the probable error in each of the individual determi­
nations is necessarily much higher than in the middle range of 
speeds.^*
The pzzNz'czzrzozz zp/-? -  Drop No. z^
With this knowledge of Millikan's use and treatment of data in 
his published work, we can turn to the last and most mature of 
his major papers in the 1909-13 period: his August 1913 Phyyzozzf 
RcvzcTZ? publication, "On the Elementary Electrical Charge and 
the Avogadro Constant."^ This is the most authoritative ver­
sion of the oil drop experiment to that point, and although Milli­
kan continued to make improvements for years, all the chief 
elements were now assembled: a new optical system, a chrono- 
scope (to 0.001 sec), temperature control to 0.02°C, a more 
accurately calibrated voltmeter, a better value for and the 
ability to change the gas pressure in the viewing chamber over a 
wide range. As a result, he could announce that "the largest de­
parture from the mean value found anywhere in the table [of 
values of e, determined for fifty-eight droplets] amounts to 0.3 
per cent., and the probable error in the final mean value com­
puted in the usual way is 16 out of 61,000."^
We are now getting close to Medawar's keyhole, for Millikan 
is generous in this publication in presenting his findings. Millikan 
provides panels containing the critical law observations, together 
with sample calculations, for sixteen of the many drops he had 
followed. A typical example is "Drop No. 41" in his Table XV. 
It is reproduced here in Figure 2.3. Millikan also gives, in his 
Table XX, "a complete summary of the results obtained on all of
TA B LE XV.
Drop M).
24.016
24.142
24.130
24.070
24.000
24.030
24.046
24.028
23.968
24.018
23.770
23.882
42.188
42.078
42.098.
69.900
203.200
23.844
30.606
42.800
42.944
71.400*
30.652-*
.02369
.01431
.004921
.04194
.02326)
.01400{
.03259^
.009380
.009389
.009255
.009260
.009295
V \ 'jr/
.009336
.009328
.009316
.009286
.009289
.009276
.009277
.009282
V< =  5065 '
V/ =  5059,
 ^=  23 .0 5 " C. 
p  =  19.01 cm. 
p, =  .04253 
a  =  .0001816 
//a  =  .1394 /
e, = 6 .0 9 7 X 1 0 - " /
24.008 .009314
(.) (2) (31 (4) (3) (6) (7)
(1) 4 column —time (sec) of drop's fail under gravity 
through ]0.2i mm distance; tweive successive observations, 
and the mean vaiue. [t, <x (i/ui)]
(2) column — time of rising when the (charged) drop is re­
trieved after its fall by applying the electric held.
tx (t/%)]
(3) (t/ty) column =  reciprocal of some of ty observations, 
hence proportional to
(4) M' column — change of charge (in units of e) between 
successive ascents (ty being followed by ty'), owing to the 
encounters of the drop with gas ions during the fall. 
Since
( ^ f ) , M i s g i v e n  by ( 1 ,
In a given case %' is found by adopting that trial value, as-
Figure 2.3
Initial and final potential differences of battery
.temperature
pressure in chamber
(cm/sec), average speed of fail without electric held 
calculated radius of oil drop 
mean fall path -4 - radius*
' -calculated mean value of elementary charge, before Stokes's 
/  law correction**
'Misprint for 0.2073, as given in Millikan's Table XX. 
"Misprint for 6.tm X io**o, as given in Millikan's Table XX.
sumed to be a small integer, that assures that the product 
( i / n ' )  * f ( : / t y ' )  —  ( t / t y ) ]  is constant throughout the ex­
periment with that drop.
($) Column of values of indicates (uncorrected) values
of elementary charge on the gas ions encountered in five 
excursions.
(6) and (7) Columns showing number of elementary charges 
M on drop, initially owing to friction in preparation of drop 
(by "atomizer"). Because etrnt oc (v, -}- %/M), % is obtained 
similarly to (4.) and ($), but now Vi is given by (t/t„) 
and %  by ( t / t y )  for the ascent immediately after the 
descent measurement, f„.
Note: The chief point is the determination of ft.ntc (5) and 
ctrt.t (7) tf:e oot'woitfewce of tAe trro fitter. They are then 
used together to obtain ei, and, after Stokes' law correction, 
e. See ref. 12).
the $8 different drops upon which complete series of observa­
tions like the above [i.e., a table of data on one of the drops] 
were made during a period of 60 consecutive days." And again, 
after showing that no more than a single one of these fifty-eight 
drops gives results for e that deviate "as much as 0.3 per cent." 
from the others,*^ Millikan writes, in italics, and without repeat­
ing the previous qualification, M to re772%?*Ped, too, t/w 
Rdy b 7 2 0 1 % yc/ootcd groztp of dropy /wt rcprcyc/zty of tPc dropy 
cjtp6YW2C72tcd 072 d227*272g do oo72yoo22t2'oc d<!yy, during which time 
the apparatus was taken down several times and set up anew." 
In his book 7Te Efeot2*072, Millikan uses the same passage and all 
the data of the 1913 paper in Chapter 3, "The Exact Evaluation 
of e." He adds for extra emphasis: "These [38] drops represent 
all of those studied for 60 consecutive days, no single one being
omitted."^
Drop No. 47 rcowtcd -  t/je DT'omtory 720teT?oo^ y, 2^22-2^
All of these publications, and the controversy itself, take on 
additional significance in view of the happy circumstance that 
two laboratory notebooks have been found for the years 19:1 
and 1912, containing the data of observation and some of the 
data reduction which led to Millikan's 1913 P/^ yyic#/ Review 
paper.*3" The first notebook begins with an entry dated Octo­
ber 28, 1911, "Density of Clockoil. By R. A. Millikan,"*^ and 
ends some : 10 pages later, with a run dated March n , 19:2. On 
each page there is typically an experiment of one oil drop 
followed during changes of charge as it picks up ions from the 
air. Some experiments are lengthy and elaborate, fewer are brief, 
and a small fraction are aborted early. The second notebook 
begins with a run on March 13, 1912, and the last run, about 63 
pages later, is dated April 16, 1922. Again there is usually one 
experiment per page. In all, there are about 140 identifiable runs 
during about six months.
Millikan's energy is evident in long series of runs following 
one another. The controversy over the existence of the electron 
is in full swing, and the stakes are high. Even though the work 
is still beset by difficulties, Millikan and his students are no longer 
novices. Millikan had been carrying out some form of droplet
&2pc/<?c2ro72y 2^72 d  p rc i2 /.p p o y itio 7 2 y  63
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experiment for about five years. The techniques used in 1911-12 
are not expiorations in unfamiliar territory.
As we trace detaiis of the analysis, we encounter fine details 
and ingenious decisions, hour by hour. (One remembers Henry 
A. Murray's definition, quoted in the introduction: ". . . science 
is the creative product of an engagement between the scientist's 
psyche and the event to which he is attentive.")
Figure 2.4 refers to data taken at an advanced stage of the 
work, in the second notebook, and only a month before the end 
of the series that yielded the 1913 paper. The left-hand page is a 
representative example, chosen here because it is the raw protocol 
from which one of the published tables of data (in this case, 
Drop No. 41 as later renumbered) was drawn. Thus we are look­
ing at the experiment on one of the fifty-eight drops upon which 
Millikan's final calculation of c was based in the 1913 paper 
(4.774 ±  0.009 X io"^°esu) -  a value Millikan could stay with 
for a dozen years, despite all further improvement of technique.
Every part of the page can be coordinated fairly quickly with 
the corresponding published version which we have seen in 
Figure 2.3. Thus the first column (G) is equivalent to the next 
column is ty, both for the full distance of the drop's descent of 
10.21 mm, and sometimes for half that distance. At the top right 
are the readings of temperature, pressure, and potential differ­
ences (apparently for different sections of the battery, modified 
by a calibration correction that appears to have been later re­
vised, before publication). The detailed hand calculations by 
logarithms, in the lower right quadrant, can also be followed up 
to the determination of c,. Modifications made during the final 
computation prior to publication, sometimes several in different 
inks and pencil on the same page, appear in the notebooks, some 
pages carrying indications that the recomputations occurred 
during the summer of 1912.
A key point in Millikan's work is his comparison between two 
sets of figures for each run. In the first run in Figure 2.4, one 
set is given under "Differences" (seven entries, starting with 
[0.00]933). The other is just to the right of it (eight entries, 
with the computed average of [0.00]9301). Each entry in the 
first of these two columns is a calculation of a quantity propor­
tional to the elementary ionic charge, c,.nic, that is, of
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obtained exactly as in the table reproduced in Figure 2.3. For 
example, 0.009237 is one-fourth of the difference between the 
reciprocal times of successive ascents
on the assumption that 72' — 4, that four integral charges were 
picked up between the measurement of ty and fp.
In the same way, the entries in the other column refer to the 
calculation of a quantity proportional to the elementary frictional 
charge, e^ ict, that is, of
again as in Figure 2.3. For example, i/;„ is here 1/24.01 sec (or 
0.04166 sec "*) for all parts of the experiment. To this are added 
successive values of i/ty, as previously calculated -  but again the 
assumption is made for each entry that some integral multiple 
(8, 6, 7, 8, . . .) of charge is present.
Both assumptions become plausible when the scatter of data 
in each of the two columns turns out to be small, and when the 
mean values obtained in each of the two columns, so differently 
based, are nevertheless closely equal. This is just what happens 
here: 0.00931: and 0.009301 are only about 0.1 percent apart. 
(Figure 2.3 indicates that recalculations prior to publication 
changed the first of these values to 0.009314; hut it is still a good 
agreement.)
Millikan expresses his pleasure in the lower left corner. He 
writes: "Beauty. ITMr/? this surely,
Taking the readings occupied about a half-hour. Thirteen 
minutes after that Millikan was ready for another run, as indi­
cated on the upper right-hand page (Figure 2.4). Considering 
his energy and long experience, Millikan may have used these 
minutes between runs to make the first rough calculations from 
his data (although occasionally with small arithmetical errors), 
subject to later reexamination.
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We can look briefly at the right-hand page to see how the 
next run went. Evidently not well. This was now a heavier drop 
(f, is shorter). It did not change its charge drastically between 
ascents, and it appears to have been lost sooner than one would 
like, leaving only four "Differences." Worst of all, the average 
values indicating c,.nic (0.006992) and (about 0.00692) are 
about 1 percent apart. Millikan notes frankly: "Error MgA will 
not use," and adds (probably later): "Can work this up & 
probably is ok but point is [? ] not important. Will work if have 
time Aug. 22." It was a failed run -  or, effecEwfy, 730 r3373 
Instead of wasting time investigating it further, he simply went 
on to make another set of readings with a new drop, on the next 
page of the notebook. Again it was a heavy drop, and for a while 
it was touch and go whether the data could be considered mean­
ingful. He noted on the margin: "Might omit because discrep­
ancy . . but then crossed that note out. Ultimately, these 
data, christened Drop No. 39, made it into the final published 
set.
The second set of observations made on March 13, 1912, was 
by no means the worst drop, nor was the first one (No. 41) the 
best in the series. But it is clear what Ehrenhaft would have said 
had he obtained such data or had access to this notebook. Instead 
of neglecting the second observation, and many others like it in 
these two notebooks that shared the same fate, he would very 
likely have used all of these. For example, the entries on the 
right-hand page make excellent sense if one assumes that the 
smallest charge involved is not e but, say, one-tenth e. Thus in 
the top right-hand corner of the page, if the sums given (for 
such as 0.073872, and 0.09001, and 0.09723 are 
divided 73<?t by the integers 11, 13, and 14, but by 10.9, 12.9, and 
13.9, a value proportional to e^ ict results which matches almost 
exactly the mean of 0.006992, obtained earlier for the ionic 
charge (under "Differences"). From Ehrenhaft's point of view, 
it is the assumption of integral multiples of <? which forces one to 
assume further, without proof, a high "error" to be present, and 
thus leads one to the silent dismissal of such readings -  instead of 
using them to support a conceivable claim that at least in this ex­
perimental run the quantum of electric charge appears to be 
i /  10th of e.
Support for the conception of subelectrons would not fit with 
the rest of the physics of the time. From Ehrenhaft's point of 
view it was for just this reason to be regarded as an exciting 
opportunity and challenge. In Millikan's terms, on the contrary, 
such an interpretation of the raw readings would force one to 
turn one's back on a basic fact of nature -  the integral character 
of e-which clearly beckoned. Admittedly, it did not come 
through in every one of these runs, but that was to be expected. 
In real life, observations of this sort are beset by a number of 
difficulties, some more obscure than others; but one feels sure 
that eventually they can be explained and removed or dealt with 
by plausibility arguments. To cite some difficulties recorded in 
Millikan's notebooks, generally against "failed" runs: The bat­
tery voltages have dropped; the manometer is air-locked; con­
vection often interferes; the distance must be kept more constant; 
stopwatch errors occur; the atomizer is out of order.
In the meantime, Millikan had quite enough observational 
material left -  $8 drops out of about 140 -  to make a sound case, 
the more so as the integral value of e fit very well with other 
secure and unchallenged facts such as Rutherford's measurement 
of the charge of the alpha particle. Indeed, Millikan would have 
warned Ehrenhaft that using readings equally, just as they 
come in, would be defensible only in a completely routinized 
situation where the chances for artifacts entering the "open 
window" have become negligible. This was by no means the 
case here. Thus at the end of a long run on December 20, 1911, 
Millikan was puzzled by the value of e far outside the expected 
limits of error. Aware that occasionally some material such as 
dust might still intrude in the observation chamber, he calmly 
explained the discordant result to himself by a marginal note: 
"e =  4.98 which means that this could not have been an oil 
drop."
This remark illustrates again that the results of Millikan and 
of Ehrenhaft were quite sensitive to the treatment of data -  and, 
before that, to the decision about what is the relevant or even 
crucial aspect of the experimental design, which data are dis­
cordant or suspicious, and which may be dismissed on plausibility 
grounds. As is generally true prior to the absorption of research 
results into canonical knowledge, the selection of the relevant
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portion of experience from the in principie infinite ground is 
guided by a hypothesis, one that in turn is stabilised chiefly by 
success in handling that "relevant" portion, and by the thematic 
presupposition which helps focus attention on itV  One is re­
minded of two other, historic cases in which the strikingly new 
and simple.results announced turned out, on recent reexamina­
tion, to be not easy to correlate with or induce from the data 
obtainable at the time: John Dalton's rule of simple whole- 
number ratios of weights in chemical reactions, and Gregor 
Mendel's simple numerical ratios obtained from his botanical 
experiments.
Of course, Millikan did not need to worry that Ehrenhaft 
might use the discordant results in his notebook. They belonged 
to the realm of private science, with many decisions to be made 
before the work was fully done. Therefore, he evaluated his data 
and assigned qualitative indications on their prospective use, 
guided by both a theory about the nature of the electric charge 
and a sense of the quality or weight of the particular run. It is 
exactly what he had done in his first major paper, before he had 
learned not to assign stars to data in public. This practice is 
familiar to anyone who has done basic experimental research: In 
the midst of a run, one does respond to small clues of the extent 
to which the numbers one is recording do in fact stem from the 
phenomena being observed.
It appears likely that after almost every run some rough calcu­
lations of c were privately made on the spot, and often a summary 
judgment appended. Here are some of Adillikan's exclamations as 
the work proceeds, as recorded in the notebooks next to the data 
and calculations:
Very low Something wrong [November 18, 1911].
Very low Something wrong [November 20, 1911].
This is almost exactly right & the best one I ever 
had!!! [December 20, 1911]. Possiblya double drop 
[January 26, 1912]. This seems to show clearly that 
the field is not exactly uniform, being stronger at 
the ends than in the middle [January 27, 1912].
Good one for very small one [February 3, 1912].
Exactly right [February 3, 1912]. Something the 
matter . . . [February^, : 912]. Agreement poor.
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WiH not work out [February 17, 1912]. Publish this 
Beautiful one . . . [February 24, 1912]. Beauty 
one of the very best [February 27, 1912]. Perhaps 
Publish [February 27, 1912]. Excellent [March t,
19:2]. This drop Bickered as tho unsymmetrical 
[March 2, 1912].
This continues, with beauty appearing more consistently as 
the work progresses, and ends thus, during the last week or so: 
Can't get differences [April 8, :9i2]. Beauty. Tern & 
cond's perfect, no convection. Publish [April 8, 
t9i2]. Publish Beauty [April 10, 1912]. Beauty 
Publish [crossed out and replaced by] . . .
Brownian came in [April 10, 1912]. Perfect Publish 
[April n , 1912]. Among the very best [April 12,
1912 ]. Best one yet for all purposes [April 13, 19:2], 
Beauty to show agreement between the two methods 
of getting v, -j- fz Publish surely [April 13, 1912].
Publish. Fine for showing two methods of getting 
v . . . No. Something wrong with the therm.
A/ypemio?? of diy^c/ief
Two rather contrary tendencies are visible as we watch Millikan 
at work. One is the standard classical behavior of obtaining in­
formation in as depersonalized or objective a manner as possible. 
As every novice is taught, the graveyard of science is littered 
with those who did not practice a yMype72yio73 of ^eh'ef while the 
data were pouring in. But there is the other side of the coin, a 
strategy without which work of novelty could not get past those 
first hurdles whose exact nature can be identified in detail only 
after the fact. To understand this side of the researcher's be­
havior I introduce the notion of the y^ypemio?! of JfyMief,' that 
is, the ability during the early period of theory construction and 
theory confirmation to hold in abeyance final judgments con­
cerning the validity of apparent falsifications of a promising 
hypothesis.^"
This aspect of the operation of the scientific imagination is one 
of its key features, and one that does not contradict another 
notion requiring tests on other grounds, namely, the notion that
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falsification is the crucial duty of the scientist. In the well-known 
formulation of Karl Popper, "I arrived . . .  at the conclusion 
that the scientific attitude was the critical attitude which looked 
not for verification but for crucial tests; tests which could 
re/zzte the theory tested . . Whether or not this conception 
is adequate for the analysis of scientific work in its later stages, 
when it has become part of a public dialogue, a striking feature 
of Millikan's work in progress is that it exhibits a mechanism for 
stabilizing belief in the efficacy of a hypothesis, long enough to 
help it survive to the later stage of testing in public discussion.
If Millikan's only scientific achievement was the oil drop ex­
periment, he might be open to the charge that he was lucky in 
guessing at the usable data, or fortunate in his obstinacy. Such a 
charge would collapse in the face of his next and perhaps most 
influential work, the resumption of research on the photoelectric 
effect.*^ Here he found himself working with the wrong pre­
supposition, but he knew how to rid himself of it eventually. 
Millikan launched into that work with the same energy and obsti­
nacy as into his earlier work on the quantization of the charge of 
the electron, yet with the opposite assumption. As easy as it had 
been for him to adopt quantization as a thematic hypothesis for 
electricity, secure in the belief that it was an ancient and a sen­
sible idea, for a long time he regarded the application of the quan­
tum hypothesis to the energy of light as an unacceptable novelty. 
Millikan wrote that Einstein's "bold, not to say reckless," hy­
pothesis "seems a violation of the very conception of an electro­
magnetic disturbance"; it "Hies in the face of the thoroughly 
established facts of interference."*^ On accepting the Nobel 
Prize, Millikan reported: "After ten years of testing and chang­
ing and learning and sometimes blundering . . . this work re­
sulted, contrary to my own expectation, in the first direct 
experimental proof in tqiq of the exact validity . . .  of the 
Einstein equation . . ,"*^
The ability to exploit and, if necessary, transcend one's pre­
suppositions defines a chief difference between Millikan and 
Ehrenhaft during the period around iqto. I turn once more to
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Ehrenhaft, in order to try to understand Ny presuppositions 
and motivations. That the notebooks of his laboratory group did 
not survive impedes the fuiler study he deserves; but much can 
be retrieved from the published materials. Out of the wealth of 
papers issuing from the Vienna laboratories, one that Ehrenhaft 
published in the in ipto provides im­
portant clues. The key data in this instance again support his 
contention that if an indivisible atom of electricity existed, "it 
would seem to have to be smaller than i X io"^° esu" (if it can 
exist at all). Ehrenhaft presents a set of i ,000 individual measure­
ments on fog droplets, created by blowing moist air over white 
phosphorus. The measurements were taken from the previous 
publication of Karl Przibram, who apparently had undertaken 
these measurements at the request of Ehrenhaft, using a method 
proposed to him by Ehrenhaft.
Figure 2.$ presents the results. Along the abscissa are the ob­
served charges, in units of io"*" esu; along the ordinate, the 
number of observed cases. The graph displays the first hundred 
data as the histogram with the lowest profile. To this, the next 
hundred data are added to make the second histogram, and so 
forth. The striking fluctuation of the daily maxima was acknowl­
edged to be mysterious but did not touch the essential point: It 
is clear that the peaks are not separated by simple integral rela­
tions, nor is there any reason why a continuation of this process 
should not yield charges even smaller than those found. The 
statement in the title of the article is certainly borne out by the 
results displayed.*^
As for many years to come, the audience that came to hear 
and discuss Ehrenhaft's paper, according to the transcript ap­
pended to it, was distinguished, puzzled, and unable to propose 
definite remedies for what to them seemed wrong. In retrospect, 
it is clear that at least one methodological difficulty had entered 
the experiment, and it is significant that the kind of remedy for 
it would not normally be suggested in a public scientific meeting. 
The experimenters appear to have used all their assiduously col­
lected readings, good, bad, and indifferent. The kind of discrim­
ination we saw at work in Millikan's private data analysis was 
lacking. On the contrary, the bias now was in the opposite 
direction. The "window" was opened, and all "measurements"
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were admitted. Ehrenhaft's method was not altogether different 
from what students do to this day when they repeat a weii- 
estabiished experiment. Figures 2.6 (a) and (b) iiiustrate this 
point by showing the widely scattered resuits in some recent 
pubiications of student experiments on the eiectric charges on 
oii drops.
Another ironic possibiiity for explaining Ehrenhaft's resuits 
is that the equipment in Vienna was rather more sophisticated 
than necessary. Miiiikan's equipment and procedure, at ieast in
the crucial early phase, appear to have been much more primitive 
than Ehrenhaft's. Millikan's simple apparatus was put together 
in a rather homespun way. The atomizer was originally a per­
fume sprayer bought at a drugstore and the telescope was a short 
focus tube set up 2 feet from the 1.6 centimeter gap in the hori­
zontal (22-cm diameter) air condenser.^" Ehrenhaft's equip­
ment was far more sophisticated, involving the ultramicroscope 
(with which Siedentopf and Zsigmondy had caused a sensation 
in 1902), which permitted observation of objects down to a 
limit about five hundred times below the resolving power of an 
ordinary microscope. Ehrenhaft himself had perfected its use in 
the observation of Brownian movement. The condenser system 
he used was about an order of magnitude smaller than Millikan's 
in each dimension, and the range of size of charged objects he 
could follow was far wider. Thus it permitted measurements on 
much smaller objects, which fitted with his conception that in 
looking for the smallest charges one should look at the smallest 
available objects. As to fears that Stokes's law would break down 
in that regime, Ehrenhaft had two responses. Insofar as a correc­
tion would be needed, it should come by empirical methods 
rather than, as he perceived Millikan to be doing, by building the 
conception of a unitary electron into the method of correction. 
At any rate, corrections to Stokes's law would tend to make the 
small charges he was finding even smaller.
While Millikan may have appeared to be looking at the world 
of charged particles through a curiously primitive device, that 
was just an aspect of Millikan's strength. The particular dimen­
sions of the apparatus he initially chose, and the voltage of the 
battery available, were
the element which turned possible failure into success. 
Indeed, Nature here was very kind. She left only a 
narrow range of field strengths within which such 
experiments as these are at all possible. They demand 
that the droplets be large enough so that the Brownian 
movements are nearly negligible, that they be round 
and homogeneous, light and non-evaporable, that the 
distance be long enough to make the timing accurate, 
and that the held be strong enough to more than 
balance gravity by its pull on a drop carrying but one
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Figure 2.6a. "A histogram of 74 drop charges determined by seven student 
pairs. Redrawn from the original by student R. Williams, Western Michi­
gan University, Fall 1969." From Haym Kruglak, "Another Look at the 
Pasco-Millikan Oil-Drop Apparatus," of Pfrytirr 40
(May 1971): 769.
or two electrons. Scarcely any other combination 
of dimensions, field strengths, and materials, could 
have yielded the results obtained."'
Nature is not kind to everyone. Relatively few scientists 
know how to find or seize upon a "device of choice" that 
becomes the tool for opening up an area of research. Galileo 
fastened on the pendulum and the rolling ball as keys to dynamics. 
Fermi used the slow neutron, and Einstein the thought experi­
ment of a freely falling experimenter noticing the seeming ab­
sence of gravitational effects. Ehrenhaft refused to see any 
resemblance between such cases and Millikan's device. On the 
contrary, Millikan's work seemed to him unacceptable on episte­
mological grounds; that Millikan's measurements were restricted 
to a smaller region of mass, to droplets that are relatively large 
rather than allowing the use of arbitrarily large and small drop-
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Figure 2.6 .^ "Raw data of balancing voltage and fab time obtained by 
students in the 1971 class (four laboratory sections of approximately 15 
students each are identified by letter symbols). Data points for 72>4 were 
discarded as were a few apparent blunders (designated by small symbols)." 
From Mark A. Heald, "Millikan Oil-Drop Experiment in the Introduc­
tory Laboratory," y4772ew%M /ozzrzM/ of PEyricr 42 (March 1974): 244.
lets, was a detrimental feature. Valid findings should exhibit 
themselves over a large range, rather than within a relatively 
small sanctuary.
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Ehrenhaft's conversion from his original expressed belief in the 
elementary quantum of electricity was so rapid and fervent that 
we can specify the period when it seems to have occurred. His last 
paper in the tradition of the search for the value of the electron's 
charge was received by the Zcitrc/in'fz for publi­
cation on April 10, 1909VS Slightly over a year later, by 
April 21, 1910, the date of the short note in the he
had begun to change his mind: "An indivisible quantum of
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electricity, which theory presupposes to exist, would have a 
value considerably below the one accepted hitherto." By May 12, 
1910,"° the atom of electricity had shrunk to below 1 X 10" 
esu, and the question "whether it can exist at all" was proposed 
as the subject of forthcoming research. When the first full-scale 
paper appeared in May 1910,'^ the words
lymmtzwz, which had been in the titles of the 1909 papers and 
had slipped to the subtitles of the short notes of April 21 and 
May 12, 1910, had disappeared from the title entirely.
Although Ehrenhaft made some gestures to connect the new 
work with that of 1909 (which had used similar experimental 
equipment), it is clear that by the third week of April 1910 he 
had at least very serious doubts about the electron of which there 
were no hints in 1909. By mid-May 1910 he was quite confident 
about the need for subelectrons that, in principle, might have 
no lower limit of charge at all. He drew attention to the wide 
spread or variation between the values reported in the literature 
for e (from i to 6 X to"*" esu), both by different methods and 
by different observers using the same method. If one wants to 
avoid a style of science that piles up "hypotheses and corrections," 
one is led to the recognition that the apparent variations of 
charge are grounded in n a t u r e . ^  The interpretation of the ex­
periments must be modified correspondingly. A few months 
later^ these results had become "certain beyond doubt" for 
Ehrenhaft; one needed really only to look at what nature herself 
made directly accessible to the senses of the assiduous experi­
menter, as one could gather from the data in Figure 2.$.
As Ehrenhaft's publications continued, there was an increas­
ingly epistemological component to the work, that is, the use of 
these experiments to attack the credibility or necessity of atom­
ism itself. In a long paper of 191^^ summarizing his work and 
defending it against his critics, Ehrenhaft still used some of his 
older arguments. He now believed that quanta of electricity, if 
they exist, should be at most on the order of io""esu. With this 
he could turn the tables on Millikan, for now the puzzle that 
needed explanation was why in the experiments of Millikan and 
others a specific value of <? was found again and again. Ehrenhaft 
hinted at a theory that might explain why his smallest particles 
exhibited the smallest charges; this was to be expected, he ex-
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plained, because the smallest quantities of electricity should be 
on bodies of smallest capacity.
But Ehrenhaft's attention was not chiefly on physical argu­
ments. He deplored the fact that although Ludwig Boltzmann, 
a few years earlier, still had to argue for the necessity for atom- 
istics in the natural sciences, current views now accepted this 
conception: "In recent years the atomistic theories of matter, 
electricity and radiation have gained ground in physics more 
than ever before.""^ Everyone in physics was convinced of the 
heuristic value of these theories; but if such a theory was more 
than pure speculation, it must be solidly based on experiments 
that could withstand critical examination. Ehrenhaft noted that 
his study provided such an examination of the foundations of a 
portion of those hypotheses (the atomistics of electricity) and 
that his style was to proceed "from the direct facts'."
Of course, there was never a direct laboratory disproof of 
Ehrenhaft's claims. In the ]ps6 edition of T/?c Theory of tAe 
Electron, El. A. Lorentz still had to remark, "The question can­
not be said to be wholly elucidated." In his review of the case, 
R. Bar noted in 1922"" that "the experiments [of Ehrenhaft] 
left, at the very least, an uncomfortable feeling." Like most such 
controversies, this one also faded into obscurity, without any­
thing as dramatic as a specific, generally agreed-upon falsifica­
tion taking place at all. Indeed, Ehrenhaft continued to publish 
on subelectrons into the 1940s, long after everyone else had lost 
interest in the matter.
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In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Millikan had put an end 
to his side of the debate with a careful review of his work. 
A year after its publication in 1925, Ehrenhaft also gave a public 
address which signaled his realization that the controversy had 
ended for all practical purposes. As it happened, that address 
was also part of a ceremony, one held in a public park, on a 
Saturday in Vienna. The occasion was the unveiling of a bust in 
honor of Ernst Mach, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of 
Adach's death. Morritz Schlick delivered a eulogy."? Another 
contribution came from Einstein, who had admired Adach and
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had once specially sought him out during a 1911 visit to Vienna, 
a meeting apparently arranged by Ehrenhaft. Ehrenhaft's own 
presentation^ was brief but revealing. Perhaps for the first time 
the main pieces of his motivation in the long fight against the 
atom of electricity came into the open.
Ehrenhaft saw Mach as a lonely fighter. Even the bust of 
Mach, which the authorities did not want in the arcade of the 
university building, stood there "alone and isolated." Accepting 
Mach's own habitual underestimation, Ehrenhaft thought that 
Mach had "remained not understood, and had so few followers, 
and those not among physicists . .
. . .  I only want to draw attention to this: the great 
difference between Mach and most physicists arises from 
the fact that through the further development of physics 
each of the two opposing views shows itself to be ever 
more fundamental, ever more contrary and unbridgeable, 
like two professions of faith. Mach [appears] as an advo­
cate of the much more modest, phenomenological point 
of view which finds satisfaction merely with the descrip­
tion of the phenomena, and despairs of other possibilities. 
The others are advocates of views which, through statis­
tical methods and speculative discussions concerning the 
constitution of matter, are reflected in atomism, and who 
believe themselves able to get down to the true Being of 
things.
Ehrenhaft's talk then ended with a Wagnerian crescendo:
Mach had the courage to set himself with mighty argu­
ments against the current of the atomistic Weltan­
schauung that was sweeping along almost all others 
-  the very same atomistics which, in the smallest, 
supposedly indivisible constituents of matter and, te- 
cently, also of electricity, believes to have attained the 
magic keys for opening at last all doors of natural 
knowledge.
But the world follows a remarkable development. On 
the one hand, daring researchers storm further into the 
realm of atomistics, undaunted by such powerful think­
ers as Mach; on the other hand, one must admit that the 
great man whom we celebrate today may be victorious
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in the end. Who dares to render judgment in this Battle 
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Ehrenhaft had indeed touched a key point. Whatever else the 
controversy was about, it was also about two ancient sets of 
thematically antithetical positions: the concepts of atomism and 
of the continuum as basic explanatory tools in electrical phe­
nomena, and the use of methodological pragmatism versus an 
ideological phenomenology.
This is as far as one can safely go on the basis of the docu­
ments now available. Some tantalizing questions remain. At some 
point after his early, striking success in a physics based on atom­
ism, Ehrenhaft evidently had been converted to antiatomism and 
to "antihypothetical" theorizing, both of which were commonly 
identified with Mach, although Ehrenhaft was not a Adachist in 
the positive and productive sense of the term. As we saw, the 
first indications of his change of mind appeared in the papers of 
late April and Aday 1910W But to switch from one thema to its 
opposite is rarely done in science, and we naturally wonder what 
external influences may have helped Ehrenhaft to reach this new 
point of view. The rebuff by Adillikan (published in February 
1910) may well have played a role, although it is not likely to 
have been the major one.
We do not, and perhaps never will, know the reasons. But 
there is another, unpublished letter in the Adach-Lampa corre­
spondence that concerns Ehrenhaft, and it falls in the critical 
period when he was making the switch. It may contain a clue. 
The two-page letter from Anton Larnpa in Prague to Adach is 
dated May 1, 1910, just after Ehrenhaft's first, rather cautious 
announcement of April 21 and before his more detailed presen­
tations of mid-Mayd"
Lampa first tells Adach about an attack on the philosophy they 
both shared, an attack coming from Adax Planck -  the last major 
physicist who still dared to attack Adach openly, although Adach 
and his circle saw themselves as a little, beleaguered group. 
Lampa notes that Planck has published a book "in which he 
maintains 2'% the views of his which you have been fight­
ing against." Planck has embroiled himself hopelessly in contra-
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dictions; hence "reading it will give you much pleasure." Al­
though interesting from the point of view of physics, the book 
is "epistemologically childish."*"*
Then Lampa turns to the results of a recent trip to Vienna. 
Perhaps this was the occasion announced in his earlier letter of 
February 9, 1910, in which he had written to Mach: "I look 
forward with pleasure to be able to greet you personally in a 
few weeks, and to report to you then on the further develop­
ments of the case [the physics appointment, still pending in 
Prague]."*^ Without preliminaries, as though it were familiar 
territory to both, Lampa turns to the work of Ehrenhaft:
If the provisional measurements should be confirmed 
which Ehrenhaft carried out when I was now in Vienna 
as part of his continuing research on the charges on col­
loidal particles, then the electron would be divisible.
Even then Ehrenhaft had found particles with half 
electrons-in the meantime, Lang [Victor von Lang, 
whose assistant Ehrenhaft had been in 1903] has told 
me, he appears to have observed some with 1/3, 1/3 
electrons.
It would be just too beautiful [Er TM'rc Joc/i zzz 
if now the electron were to undergo the same 
fate as the atom did as a result of cathode rays. . . . 
Indeed, from the viewpoint of the more enthusiastic followers 
of Mach, that would have been just too beautiful-a long- 
awaited new hope for a battered cause. AH recent events had 
been discouraging, for example, Perrin's successful crusade on 
behalf of molecular reality. A particularly severe blow must have 
been the defection of Wilhelm Ostwald. In the 1908 edition of 
his text CEe777/e, Ostwald had recanted his antiatom­
ism in the preface, dated November of that year:
I am now convinced that we have recently become pos­
sessed of experimental evidence of the discrete or grained 
nature of matter, which the atomic hypothesis sought in 
vain for hundreds and thousands of years. [Experiments 
such as those of J. J. Thomson and J. Perrin] justify the 
most cautious scientist in speaking now of the experi­
mental proof of the atomic nature of matter. The atomic
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hypothesis is thus raised to the position of a scientihcaHy 
well-founded theory.^
In this dark period for the Machists, Ehrenhaft must have ap­
peared to them as a bright new stard^ He, in turn, can hardly 
have been oblivious to the favorable impression his preliminary 
new findings were making on them; just in that provisional stage 
of his work, and just when they were looking for new ideas -  
and for new men.
Dionysians, Apollonians, and the scientific imagination
3
How do scientists go about obtaining knowledge? How 
they? Few modern research scientists tend to be introspective 
about these questions. During apprenticeship, most scientists 
somehow absorb the necessary pragmatic attitude and then go 
about their business quite successfully, content to leave it to a 
small handful to become interested in epistemology when some 
obstinate difficulty blocks scientific advance.
Outside the walls of the laboratory, however, interest in the­
ories of scientific knowledge runs high among three groups:
(i) a small but vigorous set of professional philosophers; (2) 
students and other laymen who rightly believe that few ques­
tions are more practical or urgent today than how knowledge 
may be reliably gained and where the limits of certainty lie; 
and (3) critics of culture, including the new Romantics, the 
remnants of the counterculture movement, and a tiny band of 
"outsider" scientists and former science students who, disen­
chanted with the politics and performance of the scientific es­
tablishment, are interested in the ideological links among knowl­
edge, power, and values.
With all their differences -  some of which, as we shall see, are 
total, unresolvable, and of great consequence -  these three 
groups have at least one property in common: Certain people 
in each group have high commitment, eloquence, and visibility 
and can command the attention of a public wider than that of 
all scientists put together. Nevertheless, they receive only pass­
ing attention from the scientists themselves. This is not surpris­
ing, since most scientists see little reason to volunteer for a debate 
for which they neither claim particular expertise nor expect
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much reward.* Life is short and research is long. In any case, 
the unwelcome distractions are increasing. Within the labora­
tory, the accelerating pace and complexity of work make heav­
ier demands every year; at the same time, the external world 
keeps pressing for new and ever-more-urgent involvement and 
yet seems to impose ever-larger constraints in obtaining ade­
quate support for scientific research, training, jobs, freedom of 
inquiry, or even for the public understanding of science itself.
These problems are by no means unrelated. Incorrect appre­
hensions by nonscientists of how scientific ideas are obtained or 
tested are at the base of many of the troubles that scientists en­
counter (or from which they tend to shy away). In selecting 
for analysis here two quite different views on scientific episte­
mology, I am keeping in mind their effect on citizens generally. 
Science policy in a democracy depends on long-range factors 
such as the popular understanding of science as a cognitive ac­
tivity, both for its own sake and to permit soundly based par­
ticipation in the making of science policy. The time scale of 
change in this public attitude is far longer than the terms of 
office of congressmen, presidents, or bureaucrats. Don K. Price, 
in his prophetic address as retiring president of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science,  ^during the height 
of concerns over the downgrading of science in the scheme of 
national priorities, warned that the short-range difficulties then 
so evident to scientists should not blind them to the long-range 
ones. He asked that they look beyond the discomforting "politi­
cal reaction" of economy-minded politicians and face the "fun­
damental challenge," which he described as "a rebellion . . .  a 
cosmopolitan, almost worldwide, movement."^
Its mood and temper reflect the ideas of many middle- 
aged intellectuals who are anything but violent revolu­
tionaries. From the point of view of scientists the most 
important theme in the rebellion is its hatred of what it 
sees as an impersonal technological society that domi­
nates the individual and reduces his sense of freedom. In 
this complex system, science and technology, far from 
being considered beneficent instruments of progress, are 
identified as the intellectual processes that are at the 
roots of the blind forces of oppression.*
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Price is no Pollyanna; he agreed that "we have not learned 
how to make our technological skills serve the purposes of hu­
manity, or how to free men from servitude to the purposes of 
technological bureaucracies" (although he added at once, "But 
we would do well to think twice before agreeing that these 
symptoms are caused by reductionism in modern science, or that 
they would be cured by violence in the name of brotherhood or 
love"). He called the rebels pessimists but then said:
I do not think they are even pessimistic enough. To me 
it seems possible that the new amount of technological 
power let loose in an overcrowded world may overload 
any system we might devise for its control; the possi­
bility of a complete and apocalyptic end of civilization 
cannot be dismissed as a morbid fantasy."
Price pointed out that the intellectual core of the rebellion is not 
a disagreement over practical proposals to avert catastrophe but 
a philosophical aversion to the historic establishment of scientific 
reductionism -  "the change from systems of thought that were 
concrete but complex and disorderly, and that often confused 
what is with what ought to be, to a system of more simple and 
general and provable concepts." The relationship the public per­
ceives between science and politics therefore springs out of the 
popular theory of knowledge: "The way people think about 
politics is surely influenced by what they implicitly believe 
about what they know and how they know it -  that is, how 
they acquire knowledge, and why they believe it."
The issue is even more complex, and therefore more interest­
ing, because there exists also another, opposite (one is tempted 
to say symmetrical) set of forces. If the scientist -  whether he 
takes notice or not -  is confronted on one side by writers feed­
ing a rebellion based on popular beliefs concerning scientific 
reductionism, he is also subject to a barrage from exactly the 
opposite direction, from a group of philosophers who wish to 
redefine the allowable limits of scientific rationality. Thus the 
scientist is caught between a large anvil and a fearful hammer. 
The one is provided by what I might call "the new Dionysi- 
ans" -  by authors like Theodore Roszak, Charles Reich, R. D. 
Laing, N. O. Brown, Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., and Lewis Mum- 
ford." With all the differences among them, they do agree in
Di<37Zy.M%7M %73 J 87
their suspicion or contempt of conventional rationality and in 
their conviction that the consequences flowing from science and 
technology are preponderantly evil. Methodology is not their 
first concern; they think of themselves primarily as social and 
cultural critics. But they would "widen the spectrum" of what 
is considered useful knowledge as a precondition of other 
changes they desire. They tend to celebrate elements that they 
do not see in science -  the private, personal, and, in some cases, 
even the mystical. Their skill is high, and the appeal of their 
lively prose is large.
If these new Dionysians constitute the anvil, the hammer is 
wielded by the group I shall call "new ApoHonians."  ^They ad­
vise us to take precisely the opposite path -  to confine ourselves 
to the logical and mathematical side of science, to concentrate 
on the final fruits of memorable successes instead of on the tur­
moil by which those results are achieved, to restrict the meaning 
of rationality so that it deals chiefly with statements whose ob­
jectivity seems guaranteed by the consensus in public science. 
They would "shrink the spectrum" emphatically, discarding 
precisely the elements that the other group takes most seriously.
Both groups present their cases with the apocalyptic urgency 
of rival world views. As in most polarized situations, they in­
flict the most damage not on each other, but on those caught 
in middle ground. Indeed, they seem to reinforce each other's 
position, as cold-war antagonists tend to do. In the face of the 
enemy, each limits the circle of allowable thought and action: 
one ritualistically heaping scorn on a caricature it calls rational­
ity, the other on a caricature it calls irrationality. Each is dissat­
isfied with how science is actually done, and neither hides its 
distaste.
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Evidence for the existence of the new Dionysians is not difficult 
to find.s Although their ideas may be fashionable, it would be a 
mistake to think of them as transient fads. To be sure, the 
twenty-first century is unlikely to discover a new voice among 
the present new Dionysian writers, as our century found Nietz­
sche hidden among nineteenth-century Dionysians; the high
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level of today's sales of these wares does not seem to be 
grounded in lasting literary quality or in fresh depths of insight. 
But even if each of these writers separately lasts only a season, 
the fact that their message falls on so many believing ears shows 
that the succession is not likely to wither away soon.
One of their more measured proponents of today, Theodore 
Roszak, sets the tone of the attack with statements such as these: 
What ir to blame is the root assumption . . . that cul­
ture -  if it is to be cleansed of superstition and reclaimed 
for humanitarian values -  must be wholly entrusted to 
the mindscape of scientific rationality."
I have insisted that there is something radically and 
systematically wrong with our culture, a Haw that lies 
deeper than any class or race analysis probes, and which 
frustrates our best efforts to achieve wholeness. I am 
convinced that it is our ingrained commitment to the 
scientific picture of nature that hangs us upd"
When Roszak proposes to redefine true knowledge as "gno­
sis," within which traditional science is only a small part of a 
larger spectrum (that part which seeks merely to gather "candles 
of information"), one recalls that almost exactly a hundred years 
ago DuBois-Reymond's essay on "Die Grenzen des Naturerken- 
nens" led to the controversy that culminated in the slogan "the 
bankruptcy of science," and that George Santayana wrote in
Science is a halfway house between private sensation and 
universal vision . . .  a sort of telegraphic wire through 
which a meager report reaches us of things we would 
fain observe and live through in their full reality. This 
report may suffice for approximately Ht action; it does 
not suffice for ideal knowledge of the truth, nor for ade­
quate sympathy with the reality.
Indeed, today's critics of what they take to be the method and 
pervasiveness of science Ht into a long and often brilliant tradi­
tion-Thoreau, Shelley, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Blake ("I 
come in the grandeur of inspiration to abolish ratiocination"), 
Goethe, Rousseau, Vico, Adontaigne, and back to the ancient 
Greeks. Epicurus is reported to have said, in a letter to Adene- 
caeus, "In fact, it would be better to follow the myths about
the gods than be a stave of the physicists' destiny; myths ahudc 
to the hope of softening the gods' hearts by honoring them, 
while destiny implies an inflexible necessity." To me, the exem­
plar in this case is Dostoyevsky's Notcr ftw/z UMdergyozzTzT 
I must pause here to recollect how moving the case was when 
it was still presented with literate passion:
Nevertheless, there's no doubt in your mind that he 
[modern man] will learn as soon as he's rid of certain 
bad old habits and when common sense and science have 
completely re-educated human nature and directed it 
along the proper channels. You seem certain that man 
himself will give up erring of Nr ottw free tei// and will 
stop opposing his will to his interests. You say, more­
over, that science itself will teach man (although I say 
it's a luxury) that he has neither will nor whim -  never 
had, as a matter of fact -  that he is something like a piano 
key or an organ stop; that, on the other hand, there are 
natural laws in the universe, and whatever happens to 
him happens outside his will, as it were, by itself, in 
accordance with the laws of nature. Therefore, all there 
is left to do is to discover these laws and man will no 
longer be responsible for his acts. Life will be really easy 
for him then. All human acts will be listed in something 
like logarithm tables, say up to the number 108,000, and 
transferred to a timetable. Or, better still, catalogues will 
appear, designed to help us in the way our dictionaries 
and encyclopedias do. They will carry detailed calcula­
tions and exact forecasts of everything to come, so that 
no adventure and no action will remain possible in this 
world.
Then -  it is still you talking -  new economic relations 
will arise, relations ready-made and calculated in ad­
vance with mathematical precision, so that all possible 
questions instantaneously disappear because they receive 
all the possible answers. Then the utopian crystal palace 
will be erected; then . . . well, then, those will be the 
days of bliss.
Of course, you can't guarantee (it's me speaking now) 
that it won't be deadly boring (for what will there be to
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do when everything is predetermined by timetables)?.
. . . Well, chances are that man will then cease to feel 
desire. Almost surely. What joy will he get out of func­
tioning according to a timetable? Furthermore, he'll 
change from a man into an organ stop or something like 
that, for what is man without will, wishes, and desires, 
if not an organ stop?
As a contemporary version of that tradition, I choose a book 
that has had a wide popular impact precisely because it did not 
pretend to have anything so sophisticated as an explicit episte­
mological message. Long selections from it first appeared in the 
fall of 1970 in New Former. An unprecedented storm of 
publications followed: It was simultaneously available under six 
different imprints, one of them going through twelve printings 
in six months, another through twelve more printings in eight 
months, some still available on the bookstands. It seemed per­
manently installed on the best-seller list. Seven articles in rapid 
succession discussed the phenomenon in ?T<? Nctf Fo?T Tw^ ey. 
Its meaning was so widely analyzed that another widely circu­
lated book sprang up devoted entirely to reprints of the reviews. 
Its message was castigated by many worthies, from then-Vice 
President Spiro Agnew (to whom it seemed permissive and im­
moral) to radical activists (who considered it counterrevolu­
tionary) ; its popular success has never been fully explained. That 
book is, of course, Charles Reich's 7Te of Awenc#.
Reich's basic attitude toward nature, science, and rationality 
is still representative of the new Dionysians. In fact, I find the 
book more revealing as an example of that world view than more 
recent ones -  somewhat as an art historian interested in the pop­
ular understanding of the arts would do well to attend not only 
to what is hanging in museums but also to some samples of 
widely liked Kz'McA It furnishes direct answers to the question 
how, in this framework, knowledge about the natural world 
should be sought.
Reich's is, on the whole, an optimistic book that promises a 
kind of paradise or utopia for the United States; but it says little 
about the problems faced by the majority of the world's people. 
This relatively parochial platform is a hint of the fundamental 
solipsism that pervades the book. Indeed, the first rule of the
91
new attitude Reich espouses, which he calis Consciousness HI, 
is that it "starts with self . . . The individual self is the only- 
true reality. Thus, it returns to the earlier America: 'Myself I 
sing.' ""
With this inward turning to the idiosyncratic individual self, 
Reich juxtaposes no antithetical command that would allow the 
self to be transcended. The direct result is a Ptolemaic, homo­
centric conception of the world order. It may allow intense, mov­
ing and satisfying experiences; but doing or understanding sci­
ence is not among them, nor is any field of scholarship in which 
the warrant of validity stems not from private enthusiasm but 
from some form of community consensus, for those activities 
require the recognition that the individual self is not the "only 
true reality." Rather, precisely the contrary is the case. The task 
in science is to achieve results that, to the greatest extent feasible, 
allow one to "describe a reality in space and time which is inde­
pendent of ourselves".^
This is a point on which almost all scientists will agree, from 
beginners to sages. In its extreme form, this view has been stated 
perhaps most eloquently by Max Planck and Albert Einstein. 
Einstein stated a "basic axiom" in his own thinking, namely, 
that "It is the postulation of a 'real world' which, so-to-speak, 
liberates the 'world' from the thinking and experiencing sub­
ject,"^ and repeatedly insisted that "physics is an attempt to 
grasp reality as it is thought independently of its being ob­
served."^ In the essay "Religion and Science," Einstein reiter­
ated the tension between the two contrary drives in these 
words: "The individual feels the futility of human desires and 
aims, and the sublimity and marvelous order which reveal them­
selves both in nature and in the world of thought." Einstein 
thinks of this sympathetically as "the beginnings of cosmic reli­
gious feeling," which, together with the "deep conviction of the 
rationality of the universe," he recognizes as "the strongest and 
noblest motive for scientific research."^
In the constant struggle to go beyond what he called the fu­
tility of individual human desires and aims, Einstein came to 
agree fully with Planck that the final aim of science is the very 
opposite of its necessary initial stage of private, even heroic, 
struggle. That final aim of Public Science is the search for a
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world picture that is "real" insofar as it is covariant with re­
spect to differences in individual observers.
The starkness of that vision -  and although not ait scientists 
wouid explicitly follow Einstein and Planck so far, they share it 
operationally to a large degree -  may be one reason why the 
new Dionysians seem inevitably tempted to reach for the word 
"dehumanizing" when discussing the methods of science. Yet 
these methods, to yield testable truths, must go beyond Private 
Science, even though they cannot get started without going 
through that stage first. Nor do they contradict the fact that 
human concerns can (and should) remain central in those ac­
tivities that have direct societal impact. Thus Einstein said, 
"Concern for the person must always constitute the chief ob­
jective of all technological effort." Moreover, the path from the 
"merely personal" through the projection of a rational world 
order does, after all, eventually lead back to the solution of com­
plex and pressing human problems -  physical, biomedical, psy­
chological, social. Indeed, as I shall soon note, it is the only 
known method for finding such solutions.
But let us return to Reich, and through him to the whole move­
ment of which we take him to be an indicator. Another "Com­
mandment" of Consciousness III, Reich tells us, is that it is 
open "to any and all experience. [Elsewhere he calls experience 
"the most precious of commodities."] It is always in a state of 
becoming. It is just the opposite of Consciousness II, which tries 
to force all new experience into a pre-existing system, and to 
assimilate all new knowledge to principles already established."*" 
With this premise, Reich announces an important thema, one 
that characterizes the movement: the primacy of direr/ expe­
rience -  nonreductionistic, unanalyzed, unreconstructed, unor­
dered. This is the guiding attitude, on the one hand, toward 
music ("the older music was essentially intellectual; it was lo­
cated in the mind . . . ; the new music rocks the whole body 
and penetrates the soul"**) and, on the other, toward nature 
itself.
The new Dionysians are, of course, all (or nature and the ex­
perience of nature, but in a specific way. In one of his most re­
vealing passages, Reich explains that the Consciousness III person 
"takes 'trips' out into nature; he might lie for two hours and
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simply stare up at the arching branches of a tree . . . He might 
cuitivate visual sensitivity, and the ability to meditate, by staring 
for hours at a globe lamp."^ (He might also find at that point 
that "one of the most important means for restoring dulled con­
sciousness is psychedelic drugs." Although Reich does not stri­
dently advocate the use of drugs, he holds that "they make pos­
sible a higher range of experience, extending outward toward 
self-knowledge, to the religious." Incidentally, this seems to be 
the only reference to religion in the book.)
Nature, thus, is what one takes "trips" out into. By nature, 
Reich explains, he means "the beach, the woods, and the moun­
tains,"*" which he claims are "perhaps the deepest source of 
consciousness . . . Nature is not some foreign element that re­
quires equipment. Nature is them."^"
This homocentric epistemology, in which man and nature 
overlap in a total experience of natural phenomena -  an act of 
imagination without criticism -  rules out the very possibility of 
rational understanding of natural phenomena. And it is meant 
to do so: "Consciousness III . . . does not try to reduce or sim­
plify man's complexity, or the complexity of nature . . .  It 
says that what is meaningful, what endures, is no more nor less 
than the total experience of life."^ *
Even the scientists who are farthest from the usual rationalistic 
stereotype would have to disagree vigorously. To a mystic like 
Kepler, experience had a very different function. It triggered a 
puzzle in the mind, and it was through the working out of such 
puzzles that, in the view of Kepler and other neo-Platonists, per­
sons could feel that they were communicating directly with the 
Deity. Newton, at the end of the OptirEt, expressed an analogous 
hope for moral benefits to be derived from the study of nature: 
If Natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing this 
Method, shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of 
Moral Philosophy will also be enlarged. For so far as we 
can know by Natural Philosophy what is the first Cause, 
what Powers he has over us, and what Benefits we re­
ceive from him, so far our Duty towards him, as well as 
towards one another, will appears to us in the Light of 
Nature.
Even Goethe, though more secular in his expectation, intended
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that his holistic, noninstrumental approach to nature study would 
improve the state of science, by opening up new subjects for 
study -  "Optical illusion is optical truth" -  and by recruiting 
from a large, previously untapped reservoir that could yield new 
types of working contributors to science. He writes on the last 
page of the F%7*/7e73/eZ)?*f.' "All who are endowed only with habits 
of attention -  women, children -  are capable of communicating 
striking and true observations . . . M23/33 p<??'3nT723777Z3273 e3 %23ge- 
/7 3 3 3 3 3  3 C 2 C 7 3 3 M ."
None of these or similar ambitions are, however, reflected in 
the holism of the neo-Dionysians. What counts there is experi­
ence freed from analysis, from questions, even from the percep­
tion of complexity itself. The method is a direct shortcut 
through complexity. But the "method" that Newton had in mind 
in the preceding quotation consisted of two steps: "As in Mathe­
matics, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult 
Things by the Method of Analysis ought ever to precede the 
Method of Composition." It is so in scientific work to our day: 
first reduction, then synthesis. Einstein, too, in the essay "Motiv 
des Forschens"^ wrote with some regret that we must be satis­
fied with first "portraying the simplest occurrences which can 
be made accessible to our experience." More complex occur­
rences cannot be constructed with the necessary degree of ac­
curacy and logical perfection. He acknowledged that one must 
choose: "supreme purity, clarity, and certainty, 333 3/je C033 of 
0O773p/e3e73C33." But, he thought, this should be considered only 
the halfway house. He noted that the reality of human limita­
tions restricts the efHcacy of logic in two ways; it would be 
foolish to hide it or deny it and self-defeating to define the 
permissible use of reason in science to narrow ground. On the 
one hand, from the general laws on which the structure of theo­
retical physics rests (he wrote in 1918),
it should be possible to obtain by pure deduction the 
description, that is to say the theory, of natural processes, 
including those of life -  if such a process of deduction 
were not far beyond the capacity of human thinking.
The physicist's renunciation of completeness for his 
cosmos is therefore not a matter of fundamental 
principle.
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[In addition, there is another iimitation: ] To these 
elementary iaws there leads no logical path, but only 
intuition supported by being sympathetically in touch 
with experience [EwfziNMTZg m dz'e . . .
There is no logical bridge from experience to the basic 
principles of theory . . . Physicists accuse many an 
epistemologist of not giving sufficient weight to this 
circumstance.^
Thus, Einstein cautions, after a preliminary world image has 
been constructed by the method of reduction and simplification, 
one can hope that, as science matures, it will turn out to apply 
to natural phenomena as they offer themselves to us in all their 
complexity and completeness. The history of science provides 
a wealth of examples that attest to this truth. The effort to en­
compass the totality of experience is in principle achievable in 
physical science -  not at the beginning but at the end of the two- 
step process. But Einstein has also introduced at this very point 
a warning that he was to repeat frequently, one that, for quite 
different reasons, must appear as surprising to the new Romantics 
as to the new positivists: The supreme task is to arrive at uni­
versal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up 
by pure deduction -  but there is no "logical bridge" to the laws.
Obviously, I have chosen Einstein because of the clarity, hon­
esty, and independence of his methodological remarks. The pro­
cess he describes is one most scientists will recognize as applicable 
to really fundamental work (although the use of the word "in­
tuition" is bound to embarrass some of them). Aforeover, almost 
by definition, the methods an Einstein used cannot reasonably be 
denied the label "rational," no matter how different they are 
from the models for rationality set up as strawmen by the new 
Dionysians or icons by the new Apollonians. It might therefore 
be fruitful to clear a little area in the battlefield between them 
and look in more detail at the credo of Einstein^ concerning 
the use of the scientific imagination.
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Einstein discussed his view on the nature of scientific discovery, 
and of theory construction in particular, in a generally consistent
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way on many occasions, notabiy in his essays "On the Method 
of Theoretical Physics" (1933), "Physics and Reality" (1936), 
and "Autobiographical Notes" (completed in {946). He gave 
what was perhaps his clearest and most succinct presentation of 
his thoughts on the act of scientific reasoning in a letter (writ­
ten on May 7, 1932) to his old friend Maurice Solovine. He be­
gan this portion of the letter by explaining that Solovine had 
misunderstood certain of Einstein's previous statements concern­
ing epistemology. Einstein apologized and then asserted: "I prob­
ably expressed myself badly. I view such matters schematically 
thus . . A"'
There followed a diagram (Figure 3.1) -  not entirely surpris­
ing. (As we know from Einstein's autobiographical writings and 
other evidences, he preferred to think visually.) Einstein went 
on to explain:
(1) TheE (experiences) are given to us [represented 
by the horizontal line along the bottom of the figure].
(2) are the axioms, from which we draw conse­
quences. Psychologically the rest upon the E. There 
exists, however, no logical path from the E to the /4 , but 
only an intuitive (psychological) connection, which is 
always "subject to revocation" [disavowal].
This point is one of the most persistent methodological re­
marks of Einstein, from 1918 on, when he was still doing his 
best consciously to toe the positivistic line. He wrote in the 
Spencer Lecture (1933)^ that the axioms are "free inventions 
of the human intellect," and similarly in many of his letters. To 
return to the letter to Solovine:
(3) From the /f, by a logical route, are deduced the 
particular assertions S, which deductions may lay claim 
to being correct. [As he had said in the Spencer Lecture: 
"The yrrz2cr727'e of the system is the work of reason."]
(4) The S are referred [or related] to the E (test 
against experience). This procedure, to be exact, also 
belongs to the extra-logical (intuitive) sphere, because 
the relation between concepts that appear in 5 and the 
experiences E are not of a logical nature. [In his "Reply 
to Criticisms" (1949)2? Einstein elaborated on this point: 
The distinction between sense impressions or experience
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Figure 3.:. From a letter of A. Einstein to M. Solovine, May 7, 1952. 
Courtesy of the Estate of Albert Einstein.
on one hand and ideas or concepts on the other is a neces­
sary distinction, regardiess of the reproach that using it 
makes one "guiity of the metaphysical 'original sin.' "] 
These relations of the S to the E, however, are 
(pragmatically) much less uncertain than the relations 
of the yd to the E. (For example, the notion "dog" and 
the corresponding experiences.) If such correspondence 
were not obtainable with great certainty (even if not 
logically graspable), the logical machinery would be 
without any value for the comprehension of reality 
(example, theology).
The quintessence is the externally problematic 
connection between the world of ideas and that of 
experience . . .
Now let us suppose that a connection can be made between 
the prediction $ and the experiences E that are at hand.
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Einstein had discussed this question in his "Autobiographical 
Notes."^ At least in the case of the grand theories of greatest 
interest to him -  those whose "object is the of all physi­
cal appearances" -  he asserted that comparing the predictions of 
a theory with experiment is but one of two criteria according to 
which one can "criticize physical theories at all."^
The first criterion is that of "external confirmation." This is 
the easier one to meet, since one can often ("perhaps even al­
ways") make an adequate connection by suitable "arti­
ficial additional assumptions." Adoreover, Einstein phrased this 
criterion in a remarkably generous way: "The theory must not 
contradict empirical facts." This principle of disconfirmation or
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falsification is, of course, quire different from the much stronger 
injunction that was usually associated with scientific "confirma­
tion" by empirical test. Just how effectiveiy he followed this 
first criterion was shown repeatedly, for exampie, in his stead­
fast and unswerving adherence to his ideas when, from time to 
time, evidence came that purported to show that his predictions, 
though not in unambiguous fiat coTMT^ tEcEoT? to the "facts of ex­
perience," at the very least were not being mpporte^ by experi­
mental test. Moreover, though unwilling to accept the possibility 
of confirmation of a theory by "verification" of its prediction, 
Einstein in practice also held to the falsification principle only 
skeptically (or weakly) when the theory being purportedly falsi­
fied by experimental test had in his views certain other merits 
compared with its rivals. (See, for example, his refusal to accept 
Walter Kaufmann's experimental "falsification" of 1906 of Ein­
stein's newly published special theory of relativity. The limited, 
ad hoc character of the rival theories that seemed to be borne 
out by Kaufmann's experiments signaled to Einstein that those 
theories "have a rather small probability." It turned out that he 
was right; the experiment, as is so often the case, was far less 
decisive or "crucial" than others had thought.3°)
Going on to the second criterion, Einstein explains that it "is 
concerned not with the relation to the material of observation, 
but with the premises of the theory itself, with what may briefly 
but vaguely be characterized as the 'naturalness' or 'logical sim­
plicity' of the premises (of the basic concepts and of the rela­
tions between these which are taken as a basis.)" Clearly, here is 
a place for individual aesthetic or other preferences -  although 
as soon as this is confessed, Einstein feels he, too, must apologize 
for it. "The meager precision of the assertions contained in the 
last two paragraphs I shall not attempt to excuse by lack of suffi­
cient printing space at my disposal, but confess herewith that 
I am not, without more ado, and perhaps not at all, capable to 
replace these hints by more precise definitions."
We now need an important clarification. At the heart of the 
method of scientific discovery shown schematically in Figure 3.1, 
there was the leap up from the plane of experience E to the 
premises /t. That leap, as Einstein stressed, is logically discon­
tinuous; but it cannot be entirely "free" after all, if the premises
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later are to pass the tests of naturalness and simplicity (and the 
like) in order to meet the second criterion for a good theory.
In fact, the leap E channeled and guided. One such guide, at 
least for Einstein himself, was given by the fact that he attained 
the concepts for use at the /I level by a form of mental play 
with visual materials "to a considerable degree unconsciously" -  
by a powerful iconographic rationality which he added to the 
more conventional semantic and quantitative ones. Another 
guide in the leap from E to S is one shared by all scientists en­
gaged in a major work on novel ground: the guidance provided 
by explicit or, more usually, implicit preferences, preconceptions, 
presuppositions.
Einstein himself saw this and commented on it repeatedly. 
A good statement occurs in his essay "Induction and Deduction 
in Physics":
The simplest conception [model] one might make oneself 
of the origin of a natural science is that according to the 
inductive method. Separate facts are so chosen and 
grouped that the lawful connection between them asserts 
itself clearly . . . But a quick look at the actual develop­
ment teaches us that the great steps forward in scientific 
knowledge originated only to a small degree in this 
manner. For if the researcher went about his work 
without any preconceived opinion, how should he be 
able at all to select out those facts from the immense 
abundance of the most complex experience, and just 
those which are simple enough to permit lawful con­
nections to become evident?^
It has always been this way in major scientific work. As 
shown, for example, in the cases treated in the first chapters of 
this book and also in On'gz'm of ,S'A<?7Mz'/A we
recognize the existence of (and even the necessity, at certain 
stages in scientific thinking, of postulating and using) precisely 
such unverifiable, unfalsifiable, and yet not arbitrary conceptions 
or hypotheses -  a class to which I have referred as thematic pre­
suppositions -  as necessary for scientific work as the empirical 
and analytical content. In Einstein's own scientific papers we 
can watch him stating his presuppositions boldly, as, for exam­
ple, when he first announces his two basic postulates of relativity,
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almost brusquely declaring them to be hunches (FcryyyyytMyygeyy) 
that he decides to elevate to the status of postulates -  without 
even bothering to connect them plausibly with the experimental 
material on the E level.
There is, of course, another side to this thematic origin of 
scientific thought. Dedicating oneself to some presuppositions or 
themata means one is likely to exclude others, as Einstein indeed 
did when he refused to accept the themata that were so basic 
in the work of the Copenhagen school on quantum mechanics. 
Here again one sees that the "leap" to yd, the "system of axioms" 
in Figure 3.1, is not entirely "free" but "guided."
We can now see that much of the fight of the priests of the 
counterculture against what they attack as overly rationalistic 
science is a sham: It is largely a fight against strawmen of their 
own making. They conceive of scientific rationality as limited to 
strictly quantitative and semantic-logic processes, but that ap­
plies at most, and only to a degree, to Public Science, that is, 
to science as a pedagogical or as a consensus-seeking activity. 
What they attack is, however, only a poor caricature of Private 
Science, the process by which reasoning men and women make 
discoveries. There the discontinuous and thematic characteristics 
cannot be overlooked. To call them "irrational" is at best play­
ing with words and denying rationality to some of our best 
thinkers. On the other hand, to let oneself be frightened into 
doubting the validity of thematic choices during the play of the 
scientific imagination would endanger the very process of scien­
tific discovery itself.
If the new Dionysians have noticed the failure of scientists 
like Einstein to conform to such models, they do not let on. 
They feel that nature should be studied by neither induction 
nor the analytical-synthetic method, not even if it allows a spec­
ulative leap where human limitation makes it necessary and hu­
man ingenuity makes it possible. Rather, authors like Reich 
advocate that one coast through total, unselected experience with 
one's hands off the wheel and one's rational gearbox in neutral.
The true enemy in books such as Tbc Grccmizg of /Ty/eric# 
is, in fact, not science, not the Corporate State, not the Depart­
ment of Defense, not even the regrettable failures of science -  
the cases in which scientists or technologists allowed themselves
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to be used knowingly for destructive purposes. The real enemy 
is rationality itself, of which science is seen to be a preeminent 
exemplar. Thus we read that the Corporate State has "only one 
value, the value of technology-organization-efficiency-growth- 
progress. The state is perfectly rational and logical. It is based 
upon principle."^ It would appear that the vision of Saint-Simon 
had really triumphed in our day.
What, then, is wrong with rationality? Reich gives the answer 
on the second page of his book, where we read that the ra­
tionality of the modern state must be "measured against the in­
sanity of existing 'reason' -  reason that makes impoverishment, 
dehumanization, and even war appear to be logical and neces­
sary." Among the evils of rational thought, discussed at greater 
length later, are not merely its failures to prevent the recent 
wars, but the intellectual justifications that were given for those 
warsT Thus we arrive at the remedy -  a recipe for escape from 
rationality: "One of the most important means employed by the 
new generation in seeking to transcend technology is . . .  to 
pay heed to the instincts, to obey the rhythms and music of 
nature, to be guided by the irrational, by folklore and the spir­
itual, and by the imagination."^ "Accepted patterns of thought 
must be broken; what is considered 'rational thought' must be 
opposed by 'non-rational thought' -  drug-thought, mysticism, 
impulses."^
Technically, one could analyze Reich's many conceptual dif­
ficulties in more detail. As Charles Frankel has accurately noted 
in a critical article:
The Irrationalist's theory of human nature is steeped in 
the tradition of the dualistic psychology it condemns. It 
talks about "reason" as though it were a department of 
human nature in conflict with "emotions." But "reason," 
considered as a psychological process, is not a special 
faculty, and it is not separate from the emotions; it is 
simply the process of reorganizing the emotions.^
Precisely because such flaws are simple to expose, the chief puz­
zle about the new Dionysians is, and will remain, the large extent 
of their popular appeal. And here it may be significant to notice 
an ironic asymmetry. Many scientists throughout history have 
written about their motivation for turning to their work as if it
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were an intellectual and emotional turning away from the tur­
moil within and all aroundV Reich also wrote at a turbulent 
time, in the Vietnam war year of 1970 -  at the height of a reign 
which Nr audience, at any rate, seemed to recognize as tragic 
and stupid even without the subsequent evidence of the secret 
bombing of Cambodia, the Pentagon papers, the sale of the pub­
lic trust, the conspiracy to abridge civil rights, the arrogance 
that led to the Watergate crisis, not to speak of the continua­
tion of a senseless arms race and the widening of the world's 
poverty. Reich, however, charges the horrors of his time to the 
sovereign rule of reason and urges his readers to turn inward, 
thereby abandoning their chief weapon for organizing and vali­
dating any realistic attack on the ills he deplores. Indeed one 
key to the wide appeal of the Dionysians may be that they re­
lease their followers from all responsibility for effective action. 
Furthermore, at a time when so many feel they can only sit by 
in helpless disbelief to watch the unrolling of an absurd tragedy, 
the new Dionysians, in their attacks on scientific thought, furnish 
a convenient, safely passive target for expressing intellectual dis­
taste.
Now to the hammer. The philosophers who have taken it on 
themselves to protect rationality in the narrowest sense of the 
word are also members of a long tradition. Some of their genes 
can be traced back to the logical positivists of the pre-World 
War II period, who are themselves descended from a long line 
of warriors against the blatant obscurantism and metaphysical 
fantasies that haunted and thwarted science in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Rereading today Otto Neurath's influ­
ential essay "Sociology and Physicalism" (1931-32), one can 
glimpse the fierce doctrine that helped this school to achieve its 
victories:
The Vienna Circle . . . seeks to create a climate which 
will be free from metaphysics in order to promote 
scientific studies in all fields by means of logical 
analysis . . . All the representatives of the Circle are in 
agreement that "philosophy" does not exist as a
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discipline, along side of science, with propositions of its 
own. T/ic of rcze/zrz'/L' propoyhz'ony t/ie
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construct a "science which is free from any world view." 
But the line of descent goes back much further, all the way to 
Lucretius, to Democritus, to all who undertook the antimeta- 
physical mission of liberating mankind from the enchantment 
and terror of superstition. Thus a modern Lucretius, Bertrand 
Russell, proclaimed that "all these things, if not quite beyond 
dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which re­
jects them can hope to stand":
That Man is the product of causes which had no pre­
vision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, 
his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs, are 
but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that 
no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, 
can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all 
the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspira­
tion, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are 
destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar 
system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement 
must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a uni­
verse in ruin.ss
Although it is no longer fashionable to force the rationalists' 
message upon a fearful populace with quite so much glee, the 
ancient division between thematically incompatible world views 
continues to exist and is not likely to disappear.^"
Some of today's most eloquent defenders of rationality have 
been associated with the school of Karl Popper, who himself was 
influenced, at an early point, by the prewar positivist movement. 
Out of Popper's many contributions over the decades, I shall 
refer here only to one small portion that happens to have rele­
vance to this particular study. He considers that the rationality 
of science presupposes a common language and a common set of 
assumptions which themselves are subject to conventional ra­
tional criticism. There does exist a contrary opinion, namely, 
that there may be cases of individual scientific work that have 
not been and perhaps never can be subjected fully to such a 
critique. To Popper this is quite intolerable; he writes that this
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so-called Myth of the Framework is "in our time, the essentia! 
bulwark of irrationalism.'^"
In his view, progressing from one valid stage of scientific the­
ory to another cannot involve breaking the thread of continuous, 
rational, progressive development. "In science, and only in sci­
ence, can we say that we have made genuine progress: that we 
know more than we did before." '^ To be sure, "an intellectual 
revolution often looks like a religious conversion." But a critical 
and rational evaluation of our former views must remain possible 
in the light of the new ones. If it were not possible, what guar­
antee would we have that science was indeed accruing a content 
of truth? What guarantee that the changes in science are indeed 
a progressive sequence of steps toward objective knowledge, and 
not merely a sequence of conversion experiences from one un­
founded set of beliefs to another?
A critical discussion of this position is, however, made diffi­
cult by a set of self-inflicted taboos. Popper writes:
I cannot conclude without pointing out that to me the 
idea of turning for enlightenment concerning the aims 
of science, and its possible progress, to sociology or to 
psychology, or to the history of science, is surprising and 
disappointing. In fact, compared with physics, sociology 
and psychology are riddled with fashions and with 
uncontrolled dogma. The suggestion that we can find 
anything here like "objective, pure description" is clearly 
mistaken. Besides, how can the regress to these often 
spurious sciences help us in this particular difficulty?
. . . No, this is not the way, as mere logic can showT
What, exactly, is at stake here? On one level, it is the defini­
tion of where the philosopher of science should look for valid 
problems and tools. Popper rules out, as of no interest, the con­
text of discovery, and hence the actual working out of a prob­
lem by an actual person.
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a 
theory seems to me neither to call for logical analysis, 
nor to be susceptible to it. The question of how it 
happens . . . may be of great interest to empirical 
psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of
toy
scientific knowledge. The latter is concerned only . . . 
with questions of justification or validity.^
Fair enough as a statement of preference -  although one may not 
personally subscribe to it, particularly if one's own fascination is 
precisely with a historical study of the "personal struggle." One 
may even regret that Popper shares with many scientists -  and, 
for that matter, with Reich and the new Dionysians -  a com­
plete lack of interest in studying the creative act of scientists 
(even, one must assume, of Einstein, who, Popper claimed, was 
"perhaps the most important" influence on Popper's own think­
ing^), thereby denying the possibility of a critique of the scien­
tific imagination.
But if not to real cases, where is one to turn for data to ex­
amine Popper's logic of discovery and to test out his hypotheses? 
It is at this point that some modern philosophers of science have 
recently evolved a technique of criticism that tries to force the 
understanding of scientific work as far to the right as the new 
Dionysians wish to force it to the left. Instead of looking at 
actual case studies in their historic setting (a technique of what 
they call the "spurious sciences"), they look at a "rational re­
construction" of the events.
Popper himself proposed the technique in a rather gentle way: 
Admittedly, no creative action can ever be fully 
explained. Nevertheless, we can try, conjecturally, to 
give an idealized reconstruction of the problem situation 
in which the agent found himself, and to that extent 
make the action "understandable" or "rationally under­
standable," that is to say, adequate to the situation as he 
saw it. This method of situation analysis may be 
described as an application of the rationality principled^
This proposal was taken up by others and clothed more dog­
matically, most vigorously by Imre Lakatos, Popper's former 
student and successor to his chair at the London School of Eco­
nomics. In the influential work of Lakatos the opinion of what 
constitutes a valid study of a historical case is laid down in words 
such as these:
In writing a historical case study, one should, I think, 
adopt the following procedure: ( i ) one gives a rational
reconstruction; (2) one tries to compare this rational 
reconstruction with actual history and to criticize both 
one's rational reconstruction for lack of historicity and 
the actual history for lack of rationality.^
Lakatos then gives examples of what happens to a historical case 
study when done in this style, including his own reconstruction^ 
of "Bohr's plan . . .  to work out first the theory of the hydro­
gen atom [1912-13]." "His first model was to be based on a 
fixed proton-nucleus with an electron in a circular orbit . . . ; 
after this he thought of taking the possible spin of the electron 
into account . . All this was planned right at the start." As 
it happens, Bohr's early work has been very carefully studied by 
historians of science; but this version, produced by "rational re­
construction," is an ahistorical parody that makes one's hair 
stand on endT Otto Neurath's dictum that "Philosophy does 
not exist as a discipline, alongside of science, with propositions 
of its own" has been stood on its head: The study of the actual 
work of scientists does not exist as a discipline, alongside of 
philosophy, with propositions of its own.
The resulting rationalization of actual historic cases, although 
not without technical interest in philosophy itself, is so risky an 
idea and so unacceptable to most historians of science "^ that one 
is forced to speculate it may be motivated by higher stakes than 
appear on the surface. In the writings of the more extreme new 
Apollonians, one senses that their philosophical position is not 
being developed simply for its own sake, or for the sake of its 
potential evaluation in the crucible of rational critique, but that 
their ambitions are much larger. They seem to hope to save scien­
tists from the threat of the irrational, suspecting that scientists 
will be unable to do a good job without expert help in deciding 
which of their theories are truly scientific and which are merely 
pseudoscientific. Thus Lakatos confessed sadly:
If we look at the history of science, if we try to see how 
some of the most celebrated falsifications [of hypotheses] 
happened, we have to come to the conclusion that either 
some of them are plainly irrational, or that they rest on 
rationality principles radically different from the ones 
just discussed."
Hence rational reconstruction; hence the effort to replace the
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"naive" version of methodological falsification actually followed 
by scientists when left to their own devices with a 
version . . . and thereby rescue methodology and the idea of 
scientific p7*<?g7*eyy. This is Popper's way," Lakatos tells us, "and 
the one I intend to follow."^
Flanging over the whole stage is the shadow of David Hume, 
with his repugnant message, as Popper puts it, that "not only is 
man an irrational animal, but that part of us which we thought 
rational -  ^27777%73 including practical knowledge -  is
utterly irrational."^ The new Apollonians dedicate a major ef­
fort to the disproof of this specter, with particular attention to 
scientific reasoning.
But their ambitions, and the perceived threat, are even larger 
than that: Ad ankind must be saved -  from obscurantism, astrol­
ogy, and revolution. Lakatos writes that a recent theory of scien­
tific progress -  which allows the role of changing exemplars 
rather than of logical proof alone -  makes "scientihc change a 
kind of religious change."^ Such a theory, he says, not only 
poses a threat to technical epistemology, but "concerns our cen­
tral intellectual values," hence affecting "social sciences . . . 
moral and political philosophy." Moreover, it "would vindicate, 
no doubt unintentionally, the basic political credo of contem­
porary religious maniacs ('student revolutionaries')." Elsewhere, 
Lakatos is led so far as to speculate on the possibly sinister per­
sonal influence of the author of such a theory of scientific 
change: "I am afraid this might be one clue to the unintended 
popularity of his theory among the New Left busily preparing 
the 1984 'revolution.'
Now we recognize what is really at stake: civilization itself. 
These philosophers of rationalism see themselves as the soldiers 
at the gates, fending off a horde of barbarians. Popper himself 
has, of course, made no secret of his mission. Long before the 
new Dionysians were as prominent as they are now, he said that 
the conflict with advocates of irrationalism "has become the most 
important intellectual, and perhaps even moral, issue of our 
time."^ Irrational attitudes and the flagging of the critical habit, 
he warns, could well open the way for demagogues which prom­
ise political miracles. One must preserve what has been gained, 
with all its shortcomings, for "our present free world, our At-
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lantic Community . . . ruled by the interplay of our individual 
consciences . . .  is the best society that has ever existed."^ 
Lakatos, for his part, warned that a work on the nature of scien­
tific change, with which he disagreed, is "a matter for mob psy­
chology," "vulgar Marxism," and "psychologism," and has even 
triggered "the new wave of sceptical irrationalism and anar­
chism."^
Thus, each of the opposing Dionysian and Apollonian groups 
is imbued with a sense of urgency to save the Republic. Each 
thinks that following a proper process for gaining valid knowl­
edge is a key for salvation and proposes to clarify the under­
standing of that process, but in fact does not look at the way the 
scientific imagination works in action. One side condemns the 
scientists for being too rational; the other chides them for being 
too irrational. Caught in between, scientists, virtually without 
exception, pay no attention to either side, not even to defend 
themselves against grotesque distortions of what it is that they 
really do.s" In effect, scientists hand the public platform over 
to the propagation of two sets of quite different but equally er­
roneous answers to questions such as those posed at the begin­
ning of this chapter: How do scientists actually go about gaining 
knowledge, and how r/iozdd they?
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This is not the place, nor is it my intention, to build a prescrip­
tion for a cure on an analysis of the symptoms. Deeper involve­
ment of research scientists in discussions concerning their meth­
ods would surely improve the understanding of science -  includ­
ing their own. Certainly, those four phases of scientific work 
which rest on rationality, by any definition of the word, could 
benefit from more modern analysis: rationality in the deductive 
portions of private theorizing; rationality in the structure of a 
theory once it has been worked out moderately well; rationality 
in the process of communication and validation among scientists 
operating in the area of public science; and the perception, at 
least among our more exalted spirits, of an underlying rationality 
and uniqueness in the world order seen through science -  perhaps 
the only order open to human perception which is not a Rasho- 
mon story, inherently different for each observer.
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In addition, sound pedagogical materials are needed to show 
that there are processes at work in the making of science which, 
while they are acts of reason, cannot be forced into the logical- 
analytical framework. Entering into such processes are the ways 
by which new ideas arise and are handled during the nascent 
moment; the sources of individual thematic choices, and the rea­
sons for cleaving to them; the connection between the elemen­
tary concepts, of both science and everyday thinking, and the 
complexes of sense experience; and the eternally surprising fact 
that we so often find the logically simple suitable for building 
a theory of nature's phenomena.
As Peter Aledawar has observed, the hypothesis of the inter­
action of essential dual components may still be the most fruit­
ful one.
Scientific reasoning is an exploratory dialogue that can 
always be resolved into two voices or episodes of 
thought, imaginative and critical, which alternate and 
interact . . . The process by which we come to form a 
hypothesis is not illogical but non-logical, i.e., outside 
logic. But once we have formed an opinion we can 
expose it to criticism, usually by experimentation.""
This is not compromising between rationality and irrationality. 
On the contrary, it is widening the claim of rationality, and 
widening also the scope of much-needed research on the nature 
of scientific rationality in practice. In opposition to the two 
groups I have analyzed, Medawar holds that
the analysis of creativity in all its forms is beyond the 
competence of any one accepted discipline. It requires 
a consortium of the talents: psychologists, biologists, 
philosophers, computer scientists, artists and poets would 
all expect to have their say. That "creativity" is beyond 
analysis is a romantic illusion we must now outgrow."*
Whether for pedagogic purposes or as a field of research, 
whether as a part of philosophical analysis or as a key to a study 
of politically significant intellectual rebellions and reactions, the 
methods by which humans use their scientific imagination are 
themselves much in need of more thorough scientific study. Pos­
sibly the worst service the new Dionysians and the new Apol- 
lonians render is that their antithetical attacks continue to dis­
credit the accommodation of the classically rationalistic with the
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sensualistic components of knowledge. We should, rather, strive 
to acquire a clearer notion of how actual mortal beings, with all 
their frailties, have managed to use both these faculties to grasp 
the outlines of a unique and fundamentally simple universe, char­
acterized by necessity and harmony. Such knowledge, we may 
hope, can be of practical use at a time when our species seems 
to depend on tapping all the resources of reason for the genera­
tion of new ideas that are both imaginative and effective.
Analysis and Synthesis as methodological themata
4
The terms "analysis" and "synthesis" bring to mind, on the one 
hand, certain methodological practices in the works of Plato, 
Descartes, Newton, Kant, Hegel, and others and, on the other 
hand, techniques in Helds as disparate as chemistry and logic, 
mathematics and psychology. The width of this spectrum of 
associations alerts us to the realization that at the base of these 
two related terms there lies a speciHc methodological thema- 
antithema (00) pair. Indeed, it is one of the most pervasive and 
fundamental ones, in science and outside/ This chapter attempts 
to uncover and identify this thematic content, to clarify the 
meanings and uses of the terms "analysis" and "synthesis," and 
especially to distinguish among four general meanings: ( t ) Anal­
ysis and Synthesis, and particularly synthesis, used in the grand, 
sense, (2) Analysis and Synthesis used in the rccoTMtitM- 
t/OTMl sense (e.g., where an analysis, followed by a synthesis, re­
establishes the original condition), (3) Analysis and Synthesis 
used in the sense (e.g., where the application of
Analysis and Synthesis advances one to a qualitatively new 
level), and (4) Analysis and Synthesis used in the j?/(fg777f7Zt%/ 
sense (as in the Kantian categories and their modern critiques).
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High on the list of achievements our culture has traditionally 
deHned as best are grand, synoptic, and unifying works usually 
characterized as "syntheses" of the thinking of a period or a 
Held. Examples are the philosophical treatises of Aristotle and 
Aquinas, Spinoza and Kant; the scientiHc syntheses of Euclid,
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Descartes (PrmHp/ct), Newton (PrwcfpM), Darwin, Maxwell, 
Mendeleyev, Freud, Einstein; and, in our day, the groups respon­
sible for the unification of biochemistry and genetics (e.g., 
Watson and Crick) and of evolutionary biology (e.g., Dobzhan- 
sky and Mayr). Many significant literary works also have this 
unifying character and intention, for instance, the Greek epics, 
the works of Dante, Milton, Goethe, and Tolstoy. Although 
the latter deplored in IT%r %%% Pc%ce (Book V) that now a 
"science of the whole" was no longer possible, he felt that at least 
in the arts a synoptic view of man's life and worth could exist.
With all their differences in both intent and method, these 
cultural products share a property that helps to explain the 
power they have over the human imagination: The synthesis 
provides a framework of interpretation and analysis of particu­
lars that helps to propel thought and feeling to important truths. 
In the Aristotelian cosmos, a stone, falling from a height to its 
"natural" place, is understood to follow not any arbitrary but a 
necessary scenario within the total setting; in the same sense, the 
young reader, caught up in the world view exemplified by the 
work of an Aquinas or a Goethe, can thereby construct persua­
sive interpretation (whether profound or not) of the complex 
or anguishing details of his own experience.
Certain high cultural products are considered specifically 
rather than synthetic in intent -  for example, the 
mathematical analyses of Descartes and Fourier or the philosoph­
ical works of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell; sometimes 
an analytic portion may be embedded in the work of synthesis. 
However, although it is not difficult to enumerate synthetic 
works in a list of cultural achievements, and although synthetic 
works pervade the training and consciousness of educated per­
sons from an early age, works of explicit analysis rarely achieve 
such high status. (The poets Wordsworth and Coleridge, for 
example, pronounced the analytical activity of experimental 
scientists as the work of inferior minds.) Yet when we examine 
the Analysis and Synthesis conception from the point of view 
of praxis rather than "high culture" (e.g., Analysis and Synthe­
sis as expressed in professional, scientific, and scholarly work), 
the positions of analysis and synthesis are entirely reversed, and 
the former is more prominent.
A working inteiiectua! will rarely ciaim to be concerned with 
"synthesis," and if he does so, he is more likely to be referring to 
a smaH range of specific activities, such as the chemicai synthe­
sis of materiais, whether ammonia or hormones, fibers or resins, 
or to a test of a chemicai structure in which analysis is confirmed 
by synthesis.  ^ "Analysis," on the other hand, appears promi­
nently in a large number of intellectual activities. The dictionary 
definitions of analysis, for example, tend to center on the reduc­
tionists or pragmatic core of meaning: breaking or resolving 
the complex into simple elements, and the determination of these 
elements (as in chemistry, resolving into simpler molecules; in 
optics, finding spectral compositions; in grammar, finding ele­
ments of which phrases or sentences are composed; or in the­
matic studies of folklore, music, literature, or science, determin­
ing the basic themes on which the structure of the work 
depends).
The professional manifestations of work concerned with 
analysis stretch from psychology to linguistics, from economics 
and business practice to chemistry, from engineering to medi­
cine. For a philosopher, the task of analysis refers to the process 
of reaching conceptual clarification. Adathematics makes the 
most widespread and diverse use of the conception. One is apt 
to encounter the word "analytic" first in school in courses on 
analytic (or coordinate) geometry, dating back chiefly to Rene 
Descartes (1637), who succeeded in showing that each point on 
a geometric figure, or in space, can be reduced to an ordered set 
of numbers, later called coordinates.^
In view of their praxis-oriented purposes, major encyclopedias 
not surprisingly tend to have many and elaborate discussions of 
analysis but very little on synthesis (neither the
subtitled "Knowledge in Depth," nor the 
of tAc NMtory of has an entry for "synthesis") -  a situa­
tion contrary to the relative places assigned to analysis and 
synthesis as earmarked of the high cultural achievements of the 
past. Therefore, it is the more important for us to seek out the 
relations the Analysis and Synthesis couple in order to
understand the full power of each of the components, rather 
than be misled by the asymmetrical valuations of them in con­
temporary theory and practice -  possibly the result of the pre-
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ponderance (and success) of reductionistic thought in our time. 
It is appropriate, of course, to give credit to those successful ex­
amples of synthesis-seeking endeavor that do exist today, for 
example, the kind of "global" thinking of certain environmen­
talists; the quest in Helds such as particle physics toward the uni­
fication of all fundamental forces; and, in the Held of education, 
a number of interesting experiments under titles such as trans- 
disciplinary, interdisciplinary, or general education programs. 
At the same time, we should remember that some obfuscationist 
movements also often grow under the banner of "synthesis," 
"uniHcation," or "holism."^
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To specify the properties of a "synthesis" in operational terms, 
no historic case is more inviting than that exemplar of all success­
ful scientiHc syntheses, the so-called "Newtonian Synthesis," the 
historic uniHcation of celestial and terrestrial physics. We can 
discern in it the strengths and weaknesses of synthesis as an 
intellectual strategy, and the interaction between analysis and 
synthesis as parts of a method that allows the production of a 
cultural object named a "synthesis."
THc roort Hz t/ze HHtory of pbyyzc#/ yczezzcer. The signiHcance 
of the Newtonian contribution is clearer if it is Hrst positioned 
with respect to the history of physical science itself, and with 
respect to the history of the method of scientiHc discovery. For 
the Newtonian synthesis, these roots reach back to antiquity, to 
the two earliest grand syntheses in natural philosophy, associated 
with the names of Thales and Pythagoras, respectively. The 
former was essentially positivistic and materialistic, with a cer­
tain resemblance to modern empiricism, whereas the latter was 
metaphysical and formalistic, with a certain resemblance to ra­
tionalism. One typically used the observed fact of the three 
states of an observed material (water) as a key for understand­
ing the problem of persistence and change in the material world; 
the other typically based itself on the properties of numbers and
geometrical figures, and its methods were closely associated with 
religious ritual. It is significant that these two systems, each 
coming into Western culture at about the same time and im­
pelled by the persisting drive to find basic unity underlying the 
diversity of all experience, nevertheless were diametrically oppo­
site in assumption and mutually exclusive in content.
From each of these two schools, a separate chain of distin­
guished followers emerged over the next centuries. Aristotle's 
pivotal position derives from the fact that he is the first major 
thinker who is not chiefly a follower of either of the two main 
trends, but who made a powerful attempt to adapt elements 
from both of the antithetical systems in a new synthesis (al­
though at the cost of persisting internal divisions, e.g., among 
physics, mathematics, and metaphysics). Nothing even faintly 
analogous was done successfully in natural philosophy until 
Kepler's and Galileo's joining of neo-Platonic and materialistic 
conceptions, and then only on a much less ambitious scale. They 
are the necessary forerunners of Newton, whose synthesis must 
be understood as the last grand bridging of the materialistic- 
positivistic and the formalistic-metaphysical traditions in natural 
philosophy.
From then on, other such attempts were made in increasingly 
narrow fields within the pure sciences. For example, Faraday's 
central theme, in his research on relations between gravity and 
electricity, was what he called "the long and standing persuasion 
that all the forces of nature are mutually dependent, having one 
origin, or rather being different manifestations of one funda­
mental power." (Even though he failed to find the connection 
between gravity and electricity, as did Einstein with analogous 
ambitions, Faraday opened the door to Maxwell's work when 
he found the direct relation and dependence between light and the 
magnetic and electric forces.) Other achievements that followed 
in the same tradition were J. R. Mayer's view of natural phe­
nomena as the playing out of a law of conservation of energy; 
Maxwell's joining of the phenomena of electricity, magnetism, 
optics, and radiant heat in one theory of electromagnetism; and 
the work of Einstein, which resolved the clash between the 
electromagnetic world view and the mechanistic world view in
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the first part of this century and which found connections be­
tween previously separated conceptions such as space and time, 
and mass and energy.
7Te rootr m tbe /wtory of wtct/^ ody of yoicMtifio dbcot'cry. The 
second prerequisite for appreciating the impact of the New­
tonian synthesis on modern thought concerns the history of 
methods of scientific discovery. Here it is significant that to this 
day, most scientists who understand Newton's view will, by and 
large, still agree that it also applies to their own work, and will 
recognize the chief elements in what is now often called the 
hypothetico-deductive method, at the center of which analysis 
and synthesis are located.
As used in scientific works since the beginning of the seven­
teenth century, analysis and synthesis refer to parts of a trans­
formational procedure of reasoning much indebted to Plato's 
discussion (e.g., in the $09-511 and $33-534), and
subsequently named analysis and synthesis in Greek, resolution 
and composition in Latin.  ^Plato warned that merely descending 
from the high ground of axiom, or from an unexamined hypoth­
esis whose truth is not assured, may suffice to erect self-consistent 
systems (as in "geometry and the sister arts") or even systems 
that work well enough on a technical level, but it does not lead 
to science (cpfrtcwc). Using modern terms, this warning 
amounts to saying that attempting synthesis without a previous 
analysis does not lead to truths. To gain true knowledge, one 
must proceed by going first up and then down, as if on an arch 
made of steps -  that is, at the beginning one puts forward a hy­
pothesis (literally, a placing under). As Plato proposed:
Using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as 
hypotheses -  that is to say, as steps and points of departure 
into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she 
[reason] may soar beyond them to the first principle of 
the whole; and clinging to this . . .  by successive steps 
she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, 
from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.
In terms of later commentary, reason here is seen, in the first 
half of the process, to proceed "upwards" by induction to the 
perception of "first principles." Then reason follows the arch
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downward in the second half of the process, to produce a 
demonstration: Postulating those truths as first principles, the 
searcher for knowledge descends to a conclusion by deduction 
in a series of steps. The second part of the cycle, corresponding 
to synthesis, can succeed because it was properly preceded by 
analysis in the first part.
With all their differences, Descartes and Newton (at least in 
their exhortations) agreed with this Platonic ordering: Descartes 
wrote, "It is certain that, in order to discover truth, we should 
always begin with particular notions in order to reach general 
notions afterwards, though reciprocally, after having discovered 
the general notions, we may deduce from them others which are 
particular." Newton put it similarly in a famous passage 
Book IV, Query 31):
The investigation of difficult things by the method of 
analysis ought ever to precede the method of composition. 
This analysis consists in making experiments and observa­
tions [these are of course Newton's crucial addition to the 
process! ], and in drawing general conclusions from them 
by induction, and of admitting no objections against the 
conclusions but such as are taken from experiments or 
other certain truths . . .  By this way of analysis we may 
proceed from . . . effects to their causes . . . And the 
synthesis consists in assuming the causes discovered and 
established as principles, and by them explaining the phe­
nomena proceeding from them, and proving the explana­
tions.
The sequence of analysis/synthesis or ascending/descending 
was referred to by Newton in, among other places, his preface 
to the fnwipM.' "The whole burden of philosophy seems to 
consist in this: from the phenomena of motion to investigate the 
forces of nature, and then from these forces [e.g., the postulated 
universal gravitation] to demonstrate the other phenomena." 
Whereas Descartes's process of identifying postulates gave a 
large role to clear and undisbelievable ideas and the role of intui­
tion, Newton relied on observation and experiment to anchor 
the first principles in experience, at the top of the arch. It is 
this difference more than any other which causes modern scien­
tists to trace their philosophical roots to Newton rather than to
Descartes. What neither Descartes nor Newton, nor any major 
scientist up to Einstein's time, fully faced was that the "hypoth­
eses" can never be aitogether purged of their origin in the fal­
lible human imagination. Einstein held not only that the axioms 
from which testable consequences must be deduced are "free 
inventions of the human intellect," but that there are elements 
in both halves of the arch which "belong to the extra-logical 
(intuitive) sphere."^
reypcct trotT % ry^t/icrm? We can dis­
tinguish seven contributing aspects by which the achievement 
of Newton (and that of his followers who built on his findings 
and had some of the same ambitions) may be regarded as an 
exemplar of synthesis in the cultural sense.
t. The starting point was the initial identification (and fur­
ther analysis when necessary) of individual and seemingly dis­
parate chiefly the various separate classes of objects
that encompass an infinity of individual cases. These cases 
ranged from the motion on earth of projectiles, including the 
falling apple, to the precision of the equinox, and the complex 
perturbations in the moon's motion, the tides, the motion of 
comets, and the motion of planets.
Newton also was often conscious of cxc/zvdmg candidate- 
elements from the eventual synthesis. This refers not only to 
"occult qualities" that were no longer desired but to light and its 
propagation, chemical reactions, much of fluid mechanics and 
the theory of elasticity, sensations in the human body, and the 
properties of the ether (which he confessed he considered a 
necessary substructure of space, needed for the propagation of 
light, of gravity, probably of sensation, and probably also as the 
manifestation of the sensorium of God). Also sacrificed were 
the commonsense methods of intuitive "reasons" (e.g., of our 
muscles) which had still sufficed to make plausible the Cartesian 
solution for the solar system, representing it as a huge vortex of 
motion in the ether.
2. The key act in the synthesis was Newton's induction and 
postulation as a first principle of the law of universal gravitation, 
applicable to any two objects regardless of kind, size, distance, 
material intervening between them, or whatever. It was im-
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portant to the success of the synthesis that scientists and other 
inteiiectuais couid immediately see the law to be endowed with 
a startling simplicity and universality, since it applied to all 
material objects throughout the cosmos. Moreover, the law 
evoked the synthesizing image of mutual binding forces literally 
pulling the fragments of the far-flung cosmos together.
3. The law of universal gravitation, together with Newton's 
own laws of motion and the mathematical apparatus for han­
dling problems in kinematics and dynamics, allowed Newton to 
show systematically that each of the previously mentioned 
fragments could be deduced and gathered together as special 
cases of the motion of real (ponderable) bodies. This unification 
could accommodate not only individual observations (such as 
those concerning the motion of the moon) going back to Baby­
lonian times but also previously found laws (e.g., the three 
empirical laws of planetary motion of Kepler), which were 
thereby "explained."
4. One must not underestimate the philosophical effect on 
Newton's contemporaries of his demonstrations that causal and 
quite "ordinary" actions were at work in producing complex or 
frightening effects (e.g., tides or comets) and that the world of 
obvious change was explainable by the persistence of a few 
simple laws that any schoolboy could memorize. By extending 
the reign of familiar terrestrial processes and showing them to be 
at work throughout the knowable world, a single, almost hyp­
notic and seductive image could suggest itself, that of the uni­
verse as a majestic clockwork.
3. Three related aspects helped make the synthesis 
in the modern sense:
(a) Newton showed how to treat the complex phenomenic 
world by means of mathematical method (some of which New­
ton had to invent for the purpose).
(b) He introduced the evidence of observation or simple
experiments at crucial points in his work, if only occasionally 
as experiments.
(c) His system allowed predictions that later could be and 
were successfully checked (e.g., the calculation that the comet 
of 1682 would have a period of approximately seventy-five 
years, being merely an object moving on a Keplerian ellipse
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and subject to the Newtonian force of gravity toward the sun; 
e.g., the determination on dynamical grounds of the shape of 
revolving planets such as Earth and Jupiter; e.g., the discovery 
of previously unsuspected planets such as Neptune and Pluto, by 
deducing their positions from the perturbing gravitational effect 
they exert on visible planets).
6. What helped make the synthesis so Lw'Mg was its vast extent 
over individual classes of cases, so that the "unpacking" of the 
cases kept physical scientists busy for over two centuries. We 
need only mention two examples of this power: The law of uni­
versal gravitation suggested that electric forces obey the same 
kind of inverse-square law; and the motion of the whole spiraling 
galaxy in which we now know our solar system to be embedded 
shows that the parts are under the mutual actions of the Newton­
ian force of gravitation.
y. What helped make the Newtonian synthesis a powerfzz/ 
carewp/ztr was that it not only modified chief parts of natural 
philosophy but also changed civilization. These changes were 
not only through technological consequences (for to begin in­
dustrializing a society, one must first learn Newtonian physics) 
but also through effects on the imagination in biology, psy­
chology, economics, sociology, theology, and the arts. As Fon- 
tenelle expressed it, if written by the hand of someone knowl­
edgeable in the mathematical sciences, "a work of morals, of 
politics, of criticism, perhaps even of eloquence, will be finer."
This same interplay between analysis and synthesis, induction 
and deduction, was thought to be applicable in all of the natural 
and social sciences. The same hope to capitalize on both the 
experimental and the mathematical part of the "scientific method" 
stood before them all. Nature, society, religion, and the human 
mind were equally open to the promise of its success. It seemed 
that the problems in all of these fields might yet be reduced to 
the mathematical treatment of quasi-mechanical interactions of 
parts that obeyed specific laws under the general reign of "the 
Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," to cite a powerfully 
motivating phrase in the American Declaration of Independence.
LwzEztrfow of t/ze NcTctoyzMM ryyztbcrE. The use of a real case 
allows us to stress that syntheses, by their very nature, can be 
successful only within limits; beyond that, they fail.
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The "failure" of the Newtonian synthesis was not merely 
that, to Newton's own dismay, it did not encompass fields such as 
contemporary chemistry (or, as we now would put it, any of the 
four forces of nature other than gravitation), but that in the 
long run it could not account adequately for the ever-widening 
range of phenomena, such as those in cosmology or in the realm 
of the very small (atomic and nuclear physics). Newtonian 
science is now linked at one end with relativity theory, which is 
particularly important for bodies with very great mass or moving 
at very high speed; and, at the other, it approaches quantum 
mechanics, for particles of extremely small mass and size. For 
the vast range of problems between these extremes, Newtonian 
theory gives accurate results and is far simpler to use; moreover 
without Newtonian mechanics, relativity theory and quantum 
mechanics could not have emerged in the first place.
An additional failure developed from the initial boundary 
conditions. A synthesis necessarily excludes its antithetical alter­
natives, and any one of these may develop a cultural force of its 
own. This is at the base of the rebellion of the romantic move­
ment, and the modern counterculture movements espouse many 
of the same attitudes and arguments, as noted in Chapter 3. The 
case for that point of view has been put most succinctly and 
clearly by the historian and philosopher of science E. A. Burtt:
. . . the great Newton's authority was squarely be­
hind that view of the cosmos which saw in man a puny, 
irrelevant spectator (so far as being wholly imprisoned 
in a dark room can be called such) of the vast mathe­
matical system whose regular motions according 
to mechanical principles constituted the world of 
nature. The gloriously romantic universe of Dante 
and Milton, that set no bounds to the imagination of 
man as it played over space and time, had now been 
swept away. Space was identified with the realm of 
geometry, time with the continuity of number. The 
world that people had thought themselves living in -  
a world rich with color and sound, redolent with 
fragrance, filled with gladness, love and beauty, 
speaking everywhere of purposive harmony and 
creative ideals -  was crowded now into minute 
corners in the brains of scattered organic beings. The
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really important world outside was a wortd hard, cold, 
colorless, silent, and dead; a world of quantity, a world 
of mathematically computable motions in mechanical 
regularity. The world of qualities as immediately per­
ceived by man became just a curious and quite minor 
effect of that infinite machine beyond.^
A clarifying digression is in order: The phraseology I have 
used in introducing this quotation should not be taken as a 
declaration of adherence to a Hegelian theory. The theory of 
Dialectic, especially as Hegel developed it, claimed that human 
thought through history developed in stages characterized by 
the dialectic triad, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The last is seen 
as the resolution of a necessary struggle between the two others, 
going beyond each -  although this synthesis too may subse­
quently function as a thesis that calls forth a new antithesis and 
hence a new struggle. One essential feature of the theory is that 
the thesis "produces" its antithesis. It exists apart from, and is 
imposed upon, the individual thinkers, whose discourses are thus 
merely the audible expressions of the rule of irresistible higher 
forces; Hegel claimed in his Ewyc/opedM, Part I, Chapter 4, 
that Dialectic is "the universal and irresistible power before which 
nothing can stay."
Another essential feature of the theory of Dialectic is that the 
resolution of contradictions between thesis and antithesis is not 
achieved by finding some parts of one or the other in error, or 
by issuing a modification of both that allows a new accommo­
dation, but by accepting contradictions within the synthesis, 
thereby "negating" or canceling them.
The difficulties with this theory, logical and otherwise, are 
many;" but the chief difficulty comes when we examine actual 
cases to see whether such scenarios really do occur. It turns out 
that they do not, provided one takes seriously the methods and 
findings of modern history of science.
In their disenchantment with the limits of the Newtonian 
world view that in fact developed, the romantic opponents might 
have had an ally in Newton himself, to some degree. While most 
others were captivated by his demonstration in the PrwczpM 
that the raw materials of the world are forces, matter, motion, 
and mathematics, Newton himself was not. As we now know 
from the analysis of Newton's previously unpublished papers
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(e.g., in Frank E. Manuel's book Tbc Rc/fg7<?77 of NcartoTZ, 
discussed in Chapter 9), Newton saw himself as not only a 
scientist but also a historical scholar who had a duty to study the 
scriptures as a form of objective historic record. Although the 
study of the causes of natural phenomena, Newton admitted, 
does not bring one directly to the First Cause and Creator, it 
does perfect Natural Philosophy, which in turn enlarges "the 
Bounds of Moral Philosophy."
In treatises such as that on "The Revelation According to 
Daniel," Newton showed the fusion of his religious and natural- 
philosophical concerns. He believed that to find the design be­
hind the obscure prophecies in the Apocalypse was as important 
as to find the cause of the motion of the moon and of the planets. 
Moreover, he hoped to find one great, unifying structure within 
which all details, physical or not, are parts of one coherent 
cosmos. Indeed, the properties of and necessity for God are 
built into Newton's very physics, into his conceptions of absolute 
space and time, the ether, gravitation, and sense perception. 
Whereas to us the PrmcfpM and the Optfc^y are breathtaking 
synthetic works in science, to Newton they must have appeared 
as preliminary way stations to a much grander synthesis that 
eluded him, one by which he had hoped to attain knowledge of 
the Creator of both the book of nature and the book of the 
scriptures. How far he had to go must have been oppressively 
obvious to him, as indicated by the fact that he published 
almost none of his voluminous theological writings, on which he 
spent a large fraction of his time even during his most produc­
tive scientific period.
One must therefore distinguish more carefully than is often 
done between the Ncwt077M77 Synthesis and Netrt^'y synthesis; 
the former refers to the successful development of physical 
science from the late seventeenth century, the latter to New­
ton's own achievement -  of which his magnificient PrwcfpM was 
only the first, incomplete stage of a much more ambitious 
quest.
There are three points to add to this examination of the building 
of a grand synthesis in the cultural sense. (:) In the sciences, 
such a cultural synthesis is achieved by a constant interplay of 
analysis and synthesis in the transformational sense. (Thus
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Newton based himself on previous analytical triumphs such as 
those of Galileo, e.g., the method of resolution and composition 
of vector quantities). (2) Any synthesis must fit into a set of 
boundary conditions, of which the choice of initial "elements" 
often is the clearest expression. Thereby it leaves open the poten­
tial for the rise, sooner or later, of an antithetical attempt at 
synthesis centering on the omitted elements. Any synthesis 
fashioned by the human mind is incomplete, often even by its 
own standards. (3) Nevertheless, the persistence of synthetic 
attempts and the high place we give them show that a thematic 
drive toward synthesis exists and is essentially unavoidable. 
William James referred to one of its manifestations in the re­
mark that "the ideal which this philosophy strives after is a 
mathematical world-formula" -  that is, in some form or other 
we are heirs to the Laplacian vision, a view of the future as the 
comprehensible extrapolation of present, measured states -  in 
principle, to arbitrarily fine degrees of inclusivcness, detail, and 
accuracy. Helmholtz, too, hoped in his way to achieve (in 
principle) "the complete comprehensibility of nature." As we 
shall note, this drive has the earmarks of the ancient hope for 
the transcendental knowledge of the "One."
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It is appropriate to turn from our oldest grand scientific syn­
thesis and apply the same apparatus to the most recent attempt 
of the same sort -  that of current sociobiology. For this purpose 
I shall base my remarks largely on Edward O. Wilson's book.'" 
What interests us here are the overall claims sociobiology makes, 
how these claims and aims fit into the history of ideas, and 
whether sociobiology has the earmarks of being indeed the be­
ginning of a major synthesis.
The overarching aim of sociobiology -  the task that Wilson 
says is to be completed within the next 20 or 30 (p. 5) or perhaps 
too years (p. 373) -  is of course signaled first in the subtitle of 
his book, 7Te New SyMthesh. We find it again in the title of 
Chapter 1, "The Morality of the Gene," and in statements 
throughout, particularly on the early pages.
A basic axiom is that the "individual organism is only [the
I2J
genes's] vehicle, part of an elaborate device to preserve and 
spread them," and, as a corollary, that to "explain ethics and 
ethical philosophers" one need understand "the role of evolution 
in shaping the whole device." Our "hypothalamic-limbic com­
plex" Hoods our consciousness with all the emotions -  hate, love, 
guilt, fear, and others -  and has been "programmed to perform as 
if it knows that its underlying genes will be proliferated maximally 
only if it orchestrates behavioral responses that bring into play 
an efficient mixture of personal survival, reproduction, and altru­
ism." Wilson quotes Richard Lewontin approvingly: "Natural 
selection of the character states themselves is the essence of 
Darwinism. AH else is molecular biology." In the same sweeping- 
way, Wilson asserts later: "In the microscopic view the human­
ities and social sciences shrink to specialized branches of biology. 
History, biography, and fiction arc the research protocols of 
human ethology; and anthropology and sociology together con­
stitute the social biology of a single primate species."
It is an ambitious vision. To name only entities to which 
Wilson himself refers: Elements in the intended synthesis include 
evolutionary biology, genetics, biochemistry, ethology, anthro- 
pology, psychology, sociology, the humanities, and ethics. One 
can almost glimpse a mutual accommodation of conceptions such 
as bonding, sex, division of labor, communication, territoriality, 
patriotism, warfare, learning, aggression, fear, altruism, and the 
structure of DNA. Indeed, if one thinks of what has been left 
out of this projected synthesis, one comes up with a very short 
list. But significantly at the head of such a list stand the notions 
of the transcendental and of free will.
Let me inject here, for what it is worth, that regardless of the 
ultimate merit and success of this great program, I find the aim 
useful. I have a fourfold set of reasons for this judgment. 
First, science needs more such wide-ranging, intellectually stimu­
lating efforts than we get, more than our usual fare of small 
additions to the pale sandheap of individual analytical results. 
Second, even if it fails eventually, the challenge that sociobiology 
has thrown down before the neighboring disciplines is bound to 
have a strong, perhaps transforming effect on some of them, even 
if not along the lines envisaged by its proponents. That is how 
progress is made. Third, I view Wilson's book as a significant
cultural artifact in its own right because it represents rather 
accurately, and eloquently, one typical, current world view 
characterizing this part of the twentieth century -  for example, 
in its plea for a sophisticated form of flexible, almost stochastic 
predeterminism and materialism, in its apparently dispassionate 
concern with a secularized ethic, and in its accent on rationality 
and its underemphasis on symbolic forms. In short, with all its 
limitations it exemplifies what is widely considered to be some 
of the best thinking today. Fourth, and lastly, the discussions of 
the work among scientists and others present them with an 
opportunity for the difficult and hence often neglected task of 
assessing the possible ethical and human-value impacts of their 
own scientific work.
pretwrorr. To understand the aims and claims, the powers 
and limits of sociobiology, it is essential to realize that this field 
of research, and the motivating spirit behind it, is part of a long 
evolutionary development. Sociobiology too has its phytogeny, 
and was already well established in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, at the time when the mechanists and vitalists were doing 
battled' In 1845 a group of young physiologists, among them 
Helmholtz and DuBois-Reymond, swore an oath "to account for 
all bodily processes in physical-chemical terms." They did not 
prohibit all metaphysical discussions of that science, but merely 
declared, in DuBois-Reymond's famous phrase, "ignorabimus," 
that is, that we shall never know the great world riddles, other 
than those portions that reveal themselves within mechanistic 
science.
This group was distinguishable from a parallel but more ex­
treme group of experimental biologists and medical materialists 
who may be called the "nothing-but" school. To those, all things 
were to be reduced to a homogeneous mechanistic scheme, in­
cluding the world riddles despaired of by the others. This 
naturally led them to attack the established order, the alliance 
between church and state, and all the other impedimenta to 
radical progress, in science and without. Not surprisingly, many 
of them were socialists and visionary fighters for social justice. 
For example, Rudolf Virchow, one of the sympathizers, sup­
ported the German Revolution of 1848 and became the chief of
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the liberation opposition to Bismarck. It is both ironic and signifi­
cant that from the present perspective, the medical materialists 
and the Helmholtz group were far closer to each other than 
to any of their common enemies; they were, for example, united 
in being antitranscendentalists.
To me, the most interesting figure among all these was the 
splendid biologist and German Darwinist, Ernst Haeckel. A 
fiery materialist, monist, and sociologist, he scoffed at all myth- 
mongers and offered a complete science-based world view, one 
that would solve all puzzles. His turbulent book of 1899, written 
toward the end of his career but at the height of his fame, was in 
fact titled simply 7T<? Ri&Re of t/ic Hmww. It swept over 
Europe like a crusade against mystification, against what he re­
garded as "the untruth foisted on the people by their spiritual 
and economic masters." Science was to triumph over theology 
by spreading the gospel of evolution infused with a modicum of 
pan-psychism. Haeckel's chief point was that there was a mon­
ism or unity of the inorganic and the organic world, grounded 
in the laws of the conservation of matter and energy (what he 
called "the law of substance").
It was indeed a replay, complete in many details, of an ancient 
message. Here is, first, Lucretius, introducing the world view of 
the first Greek atomist:
I will essay to discourse to you of the most high system 
of heaven and the gods, and will open up the first- 
beginnings of things, out of which nature gives birth 
to all things and increase and nourishment . . .
When human life to view lay foully prostrate upon 
earth crushed, down under the weight of religion who 
shewed her head from the quarters of heaven with 
hideous aspect lowering upon mortals, a man of Greece 
ventured first to lift up his mortal eyes to her face and 
first to withstand her to her face . . . On he passed 
far beyond the flaming walls of the world and traversed 
throughout in mind and spirit the immeasurable universe; 
whence he returns a conqueror to tell us what can, what 
cannot come into being, in short on what principle each 
thing has its powers defined, its deep-set boundary 
mark . . .
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This terror then and darkness of mind must be dispelled 
not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day, 
but by the aspect and the law of nature; whose first 
principle we shall begin by thus stating: Nothing is ever 
gotten out of nothing by divine power. Fear in sooth 
takes such a hold of all mortals because they see many 
operations go on in earth and heaven, the causes of which 
they can in no way understand, believing them therefore 
to be done by divine power. For these reasons, when we 
shall have seen that nothing can be produced from 
nothing, we shall then more correctly ascertain that 
which we are pursuing, both the elements out of which 
everything can be produced and the manner in which all 
things are done without the hand of the gods.^
In Flaeckel's battle against notions such as personal immortal­
ity, the conventional belief in a creating God, or in the belief in 
a mind or a purpose behind evolution, Haeckel did not have 
to refer explicitly to Lucretius or to the distant predecessors, 
Leucippus and Democritus. His sentences had their own grand, 
Teutonic sweep:
All the particular advances of physics and chemistry 
yield in theoretical importance to the discovery of the 
great law which brings them to one common focus, the 
law of substance. This fundamental cosmic law estab­
lishes the eternal persistence of matter and force, the 
unvarying constancy throughout the entire universe. It 
has become the pole-star that guides our monistic 
philosophy through the mighty labyrinth to a solution 
of the world-problem.
The promise of eternal persistence and of a guiding pole-star 
was vivid in the colorful and reassuring chapters in Haeckel's 
book: "The History of Our Species," "The Phylogeny of the 
Soul," "Consciousness," "Immortality," "The Evolution of the 
World," "The Unity of Nature," "Our Monistic Ethics," and, 
finally, "The Solution of the World-Problems." In comparison, 
Wilson's book is an exercise in understatement and scientific 
objectivity. I doubt that it is able to arouse a small fraction of 
the hopes and fears that Haeckel's book did for about a half- 
century.
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Another grand precursor of Wilson is Jacques Loeb, the 
author of The Aferh%mrtic CoMcepri<?M oj Tije (1912). He was 
born in 18^ 9, the very year of Darwin's Orighz. A scientist in the 
old style of philosopher and social innovator, he too was certain 
that scientific findings might lead directly to political and social- 
development consequences. Influenced by Schopenhauer as were 
so many others of his generation, he seems to have turned to 
biology in order to find evidence against the conception of the 
freedom of will. Perhaps his best work was on animal tropism, 
the involuntary movements imposed by environmental condi­
tions such as light upon organisms; he considered it a model for 
understanding behavior in terms that avoid the use of the noxious 
conception of "will. ' The accomplishment for which he is most 
famous, artificial pathogenesis by physical-chemical means, fell 
in the same category of scientific research findings with anti- 
transcendental and antimetaphysical implications.
From 19: t on, cheered by the proof of the existence of mole­
cules by Perrin and others as the "final vindication of mechan­
istic philosophy," he spoke and wrote on "the mechanistic con­
ception of life," and published his book of that title in ^12. As 
Donald Fleming puts it, in it he reduced life to a "physical- 
chemical phenomenon, free will to an illusion generated by 
tropistic causes, and religious faith to an absurdity. He pro­
claimed the total validity of mechanistic principles and derived 
from them a system of human ethics based on instincts whose 
unobstructed expression would rejuvenate world society." As 
early as 1911, "he said that the main task for students of heredity 
was to determine 'the chemical substance in the chromosomes 
which are responsible for the hereditary transmission of a 
quality.' "
In his book, Loeb asks whether "the wishes and hopes, efforts 
and struggles" -  man's inner life -  should be "amenable to a 
physical-chemical analysis." And he answered yes, even if the 
proof would have to come from much research that still waited 
to be done: "For some of these instincts, the chemical basis is 
at least sufficiently indicated to arouse the hope that the analysis 
from the mechanistic point of view is only a question of time."
In the last pages of Loeb's book, just as in Haeckel's and in 
Wilson's, Loeb has a section entitled "Ethics." Here is a passage:
We eat, drink and reproduce not because mankind has 
reached an agreement that this is desirable, but because 
machine-like, we are compelled to do so. We are active 
because we are compelled to be so by processes in our 
central nervous system . . . The mother loves and cares 
for her children, not because metaphysicians had the idea 
that this was desirable, but because the instinct of taking 
care of the young is inherited just as distinctly as the 
morphological characters of the female body . . . Not 
only is the mechanistic conception of life compatible 
with ethics: it seems the only conception of life which 
can lead to an understanding of the source of ethics.
In comparison, Wilson's is a soberer, more scientifically grounded 
and modest effort. Ironically, just for this reason, it will not 
have the same popularity that those predecessors had.
for ryyztbem. We can now return to our 
earlier discussion of the properties of a synthesis in operational 
terms, to test against the earlier model the claims inherent in 
sociobiology of producing a major synthesis in our time. We 
shall make due allowance for the obvious fact that the Newton­
ian synthesis, while a natural standard of comparison, is also by 
far the most distinguished case that we have; even while referring 
to it to compare the half-dozen major structural elements of 
synthesis, we thereby calibrate, so to speak, the top reading on 
that kind of thermometer.
:. Almost by definition, a synthesis does not spring out of 
nowhere. It has roots in the history of the Helds within which it 
produces coherence. We noted that for the Newtonian synthesis, 
these roots reach back to antiquity, in one part to the grand 
scheme of Thales. We indicated that Wilson's work, too, has a 
distinguished phylogeny. Today's sociobiology is the current 
terminal point on a trajectory or line of system builders issuing 
primarily from the same materialistic-mechanistic and antimeta- 
physical school of Thales of Miletus and his followers -  
Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Leucippus, Democritus, 
Anaxagoras, and Lucretius. The more recent stations on this 
trajectory of physiologues, teaching "disenchanted" or "positive" 
explanations of nature's phenomena, are some aspects of Newton
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and Laplace, D'Alembert and Condorcet, Comte, Virchow, 
Helmholtz, DuBois-Reymond, Herbert Spencer, T. H. Huxley, 
Haeckel, Loeb, Mach, Julian Huxley, Haldane, the early Ly­
senko, and Schrodinger (in "What Is Life?").
If we look beyond their many differences, they all share 
fundamental ambitions, approaches, and themata. For example, 
the matrix of social values and the moral base are taken not as a 
priori but as susceptible of explanation within a materialistic 
world view. These natural philosophers tend to opt for con­
tinuity instead of uniqueness, for unity rather than discreteness. 
In modern sociobiology, the old thema of classical physical 
casuality exists, although modified and recast in terms of ten­
dencies and "potentials" -  an even older yet still current thema. 
Among the moderns, many are social innovators, and opt for an 
essentially optimistic and liberal, that is, evolutionary, political 
stance.
Thus looking at this aspect of syntheses in general -  synthesis 
as the climactic achievement of a long-term trajectory-the 
ambition of sociobiology is entirely recognizable.
2. /72<?/zmo73 of eLswMM. The raw materials
from which a synthesis must be fashioned are individual, seem­
ingly disparate elements or separate classes of entities. Thus the 
Newtonian laws govern the motions of objects having from 
atomic to galactic size. Yet Newton also specifically excluded 
large sets of elements from his synthesis.
Looking at sociobiology from the outside, as I must do, it 
seems that the field is in some danger of not knowing how to 
exclude explicitly some tempting candidate-elements. One has 
the impression that the range of behaviors, traits, events, and so 
on, clamoring for inclusion is enormously large. To be sure, 
history reminds us that exclusion very frequently is not, and 
perhaps cannot be, an a priori conscious decision, but can only 
come at the end of a long series of unsuccessful attempts at 
inclusion. That is, exclusions are the result of the discovery of 
"impotency principles." And to find those, one needs time.
3. A /int principle. After Newton, nothing so basic as the 
intuition of the universal law of gravitation as the one first 
principle on which to build a system will perhaps ever be granted 
to another synthesist. But sociobiology does make several basic,
fundamental postulates, for example, the central theorem of 
modern evolution that animals behave so as to optimize their 
inclusive fitness; that there is some molecular base of behavior, in 
other words, that the genes "program the potentials"; that for 
all phenotypes, including behavior, there is selection by inter­
action of genes and environment; that there is a continuity of 
mammalian traits in humans. For an eventual success in the large 
sense, it would seem to me necessary to postulate explicitly the 
smallest number of independent statements, and insofar as 
possible to exhibit the role of parsimony and necessity among 
those postulates that do remain.
4. Co/^hoM of a <??*%/ ryrtcw. Again, since Newton (with 
the possible exception of General Relativity), nothing so mag­
nificent can be expected to arise again in our time by way of a 
system based on one or a few principles -  least of all in a theory 
that is still under construction before our very eyes. Still, there 
are beginnings here, such as understanding the size of families 
and colonies, and diffusion speeds. More such victories, and a 
good cataloging of them, will be needed to make this synthesis 
widely persuasive. No doubt that is the growing edge of the 
whole effort.
I recognize that those working in other sciences may well be 
depressed (or overly impressed) by the success under this head­
ing which the 300-year effort of modern physics has had at its 
culmination, for that is a model that physics willy-nilly puts 
before the other sciences. The power of the deductive network 
produced in physics has been illustrated in a delightful article by 
Victor F. WeisskopfV He begins by taking the magnitudes of 
six physical constants known by measurement: the mass of the 
proton, the mass and electric charge of the electron, the light 
velocity, Newton's gravitational constant, and the quantum of 
action of Planck. He adds three or four fundamental laws (e.g., 
deBroglie's relations connecting particle momentum and particle 
energy with the wavelength and frequency, and the Pauli ex­
clusion principle), and shows that one can then derive a host of 
different, apparently quite unconnected, facts that happen to be 
known to us by observation separately: for example, the size and 
energies of nuclei, the mass and hardness of solids such as rocks, 
the height of mountains on earth, and the size of our sun and of
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similar stars. This is indeed fulfilling Newton's program, tri­
umphantly. The program of Lucretius, and the related one of 
Wilson, must, however, not expect to reach this level soon.
$. %7zJ ceTMn?/ "i?7Mge." As Newton demysti­
fied comets, sociobiology in its current version holds out a promise 
of "explaining" complex or disturbing effects in the processes of 
human society, from homosexuality to warfare. Even if there is 
only a quite partial delivery on that promise, the effects upon the 
world view of our society will be enormous. There is missing, 
however, a central visual image, analogous to the clockwork con­
jured up by the Newtonian synthesis. There is not even a complex 
one such as Darwin's "tangled bank." The voluminous and pains­
taking work chronicled in Wison's book and similar sources may 
never lend itself to such a feat of fruitful oversimplification.
6. PreJictzoTZ. Predictive capability is usually regarded as the 
ultimate test of how "scientific" a synthesis is-the prouder and 
the more confident, the "harder" the science. In this respect, 
sociobiology seems to be in only an early stage of development. 
However, we may be touching here on an essential difference 
between the biological as against the physical sciences, rather 
than on a rzTzc z?zz% 77077 of scientific synthesis as such.
7. CzzPw%/ 7*Mc/3. The claim of the Newtonian synthesis as 
a powerful exemplar of a cultural synthesis that changed civili­
zation has been amply documented. (If one were allowed only 
a single example, an analysis of the sources of the imagination 
in Thomas Jefferson's draft of the American Declaration of 
Independence might suffice.)
By this measure, of course, the strategy with respect to socio­
biology is, once more, patience. It does appear that both the 
proponents and the more vociferous and politically oriented op­
ponents of sociobiology are united in the expectation that the 
New Synthesis of which Wilson speaks will be one that changes 
our culture, that is, that it will be a cultural synthesis. If it does 
not, the synthesis will still be one in the "transformational" 
sense.
In sum, we may conclude that on many, perhaps most, counts 
the Wilsonian synthesis has a fair chance eventually to bear out 
its claims, particularly if the crucial elements now lacking are
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supplied in the ongoing research, notably with respect to cohe­
sion and so-called prediction. All this has nothing to do with 
whether one likes the New Synthesis, or even whether the ideas 
of sociobiology can be as severely abused as were, on occasion, 
Darwin's and Einstein's. The issue of tT/Tty will be
decided in the laboratories and in Held research. If the evidence 
in favor of sociobiology brought in by experimenters does turn 
out to be voluminous, varied, and positive, the fathers of the 
Held will be installed in the Pantheon. But it is a curious ques­
tion whether Haeckel and Loeb and the others who will be 
waiting for them there will in fact approve of this new version 
of the ancient quest. We can imagine they will at least raise an 
eyebrow that in our time the offsprings of Lucretius no longer 
Hnd any theological opponents to engage head-on, but that they 
address themselves to the modern equivalent of the ancient seat 
of moral force, that is, to society and social science.
It may take a long time to Hnd out whether the promised syn­
thesis is in fact possible, whether the social behavior of animals 
can generally" be linked, across all species, to the mechanism of 
natural selection. I am inclined to think that even if the New 
Synthesis will not have all the features the most optimistic socio­
biologists would like to see, biology, sociology and many neigh­
boring Helds will have been shaken up in a fruitful way. We 
may not get in one jump to the new New Jerusalem, but we 
can still hope to end up much wiser about the behavior of peo­
ple and of other animals. One must remember that even in mak­
ing a synthesis, between complete success and failure there is a 
large and useful middle ground.
Having examined uses of the terms "analysis" and "synthesis," 
and the characteristics of syntheses in two examples in science, 
our tasks are now to identify dangers and even pathologies in 
the Analysis and Synthesis process; to distinguish more ade­
quately between analysis and synthesis; and also to differentiate 
Analysis and Synthesis from other activities and concepts. We 
shall want to keep in mind that often the lines cannot be drawn 
in a natural way and are thus imposed either too sharply or not 
sharply enough.
U3
o( itrMctMtc, <?7zJ o^  cU?//c7ztr (r)r the T ^/y-
%7Mf ^y^therfr proccrr. From the beginning, the process of 
Analysis and Synthesis forces us to assume a priori the existence 
of some unity in nature and in knowing, a unity that is pene­
trable, fragmentabie, or made otherwise manageable by the 
analysis of cognate pieces, and reestablishable by synthesis. The 
natural phenomena themselves, however, do not show these 
properties in any direct or easy way. Unlike, say, "analogy," 
a concept that may force itself early on the alert intellect by 
reason of the existence of formal, simple symmetries in the ma­
terials of observation, few if any natural processes by them­
selves persuasively impose the concept of Analysis and Syn­
thesis. Thus in observing a natural process of decay or growth 
directly, it would be a mistake to believe that one discerns pro­
cesses of analysis or synthesis "by themselves" rather than, say, 
the transformation of qualities. To be sure, we know that at 
every cell division the unwound DNA helix replicates the origi­
nal double helix by synthesizing a structure from the materials 
of its environment in proper order; similarly, a physiological 
psychologist has found that brain-damaged animals (including 
man) frequently recover by going through a rebuilding in a 
sequence which exhibits recapitulation of the organism's growth 
from its early stages. But all such examples are the results of 
structuring the observations in the frame of a sophisticated model 
theory.
The guidelines for discerning the fissures along which to 
break a complex into separate "fragments" for analysis, or for 
identifying the pieces that serve as raw material for the synthe­
sis, are usually imposed on us by the tnyJitz'oyz in the particular 
scholarly field. A modern example is offered by the treatment 
of the universe of the Zinacanteco Indians, as well described 
by the anthropologist Evon Z. Vogt." Acknowledging that any 
effort to delineate separable features in the total way of life of 
these Mexican Indians leaves one with elements that are still in­
timately interrelated, Vogt says he has "quite arbitrarily di­
vided them into a series of chapters -  beliefs about the universe, 
the organization into a ceremonial center and outlying hamlets, 
social life, economics, the life cycle, and ritual." These chap­
ters, each within traditionally established lines of demarcation, 
help us to dissect, analyze and understand better the culture in
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terms of these traditional components. Conversely, he hopes, 
the reader "will be able to synthesize the diverse elements super­
imposing one description onto another to form a picture of a 
highly integrated system, and thus to approach more clearly 
the Zinacanteco view of their own way of life." It is clear that 
each reader's synthesis will be an individual product with a par­
ticular orientation, depending on the cultural and professional 
framework of the individual reader, for there are of course no 
absolute criteria for the process of either analysis or synthesis.
F?27*2/:w cff<?c2r of 2/20 <272/222?*%/ f7*%7/2eTr07*E The cultural frame­
work rules one's conception of the Analysis and Synthesis cou­
ple as a method as well as ruling the distinction within the 
couple. The type of synthesis in a given held will depend not 
merely on whether the Zeitgeist is dominated by Plato and 
Euclid or, say, by Sartre and Gbdel. Even within a fixed time 
period, large cultural differences can assert themselves. A simple 
way to illustrate that is to point to differences today in dealing 
with disease within different ethnographic contexts. The symp­
toms perceived by the patient as well as by the healer, the pre­
sumed cause, the analysis of likely stages of the disease, and of 
course the cure prescribed -  all depend heavily on the specific 
societal context. The Western patient will be concerned with 
physiological and chemical changes; a Mexican Indian may 
typically be concerned with redirecting his lost "inner soul" 
into the corral of his gods. The sense of unity and holism in 
the latter case (which has its price, too) stands in sharp con­
trast with an intellectual system which tends to partition man 
%/* Z72Z2Z0 into separable spheres such as the bodily, mental, and 
spiritual. The expressions of disease among "primitive" groups, 
even within an industrial society, tend to be influenced by a 
more holistic orientation; consequently, the link that members 
of such groups tend to draw between "functional" and "or­
ganic" pathology will also be quite different.
P?*o/?/c777<22Zcr of 7^2%/yw <2222/ .S'y7?2/7<?yZr Z22 222c. If Analysis and 
Synthesis are relativistic with respect to the cultural framework, 
they can also differ for different fields within the same culture; 
as John Locke held, modes of reasoning can differ, for example,
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between mathematics and morals. Moreover, advances in knowl­
edge change what are considered to be the necessary parts of a 
complete and coherent picture of the universe. Even at a given 
time in a given held, cognitive modes are different among intel­
lectual workers; the processes of synthesis or analysis that sug­
gest themselves will necessarily differ for those who tend to 
think visually and those who tend to think semantically.
For such reasons, it may be 272 pTwrip/e irresolvably disput­
able what the specific elements are toward which analysis should 
proceed and what the shape is of the desired structure to which 
the process of synthesis strives. Thus when Descartes said, "Di­
vide each problem that you examine into as many parts as you 
can and as you need to solve them more easily" (Diicozvw <772 
Afct/iod), Leibniz objected that such a method provides no 
guide that would prevent one from dividing the problem into 
"unsuitable parts" and so "increase the difficulty."
This very objection has frequently been raised against sys­
tems analysis (as the technique is used, for example, to design 
capabilities for meeting energy needs of a nation for some pe­
riod in the future). There, typically the "problem" is broken 
into a few subunits within which quasi autonomy and quasi 
equilibrium are believed to exist, and where higher-order inter­
actions are, at least for the moment, not important. Judgments 
of this sort can be seriously open to error, the more so where 
actions taken on the basis of a first-stage systems analysis are 
difficult to modify when later stages of reexamination reveal 
faulty presuppositions. Similar objections can often be leveled 
against "cost-benefit" analyses.
An even simpler case is the fallacious method of selecting the 
"elements" in accord with the ease of making gross measures 
for them. Some examples are given in Chapter 6 on making 
science indicators; to give another example, pollution is mea­
sured in the United States (under the Clean Air Act of 1970) 
by the relatively simple-to-obtain total weight of each of six 
basic contaminants -  particulates, sulfur oxides, carbon monox­
ide, photochemical oxidants, nitrogen oxides, and hydrocarbons. 
Now the Council on Environmental Quality, a federal agency 
that advises the President and Congress, has found this yardstick 
fails to distinguish between the relatively harmless large particles
and the small ones that are deleterious to the human lungs. 
Moreover, it provides no gauge of toxic substances such as acid 
sulfates, nitrates, trace metals, and organic compounds, nor of 
the possibly hazardous interaction among two or more of these 
substances.
/TzTy.sb' vcn'ZM ryyztAtw. Opposing thematic commitments of 
professionals within a particular group at a given time may 
cause them to accentuate either analysis or synthesis. For exam­
ple, the author of a recent review of anthropological kinship 
studies notes that after a hundred years of discussion,
despite the apparent diversity of perspectives, two camps 
may be sorted out: the splitters and the synthesizers. To 
the splitters, kinship is divisible, for analytic purposes, 
into a series of discrete aspects -  kinship nomenclature, 
alliance (marriage) and dissent systems, household and 
family organization. To the synthesizers, it is a kind of 
social idiom, a way of understanding social life that is 
inseparable from other ways of talking about life in 
society -  in terms of economics, politics, or ritual. The 
splitters are, in most instances, formalists or ethno- 
scientists of one variety or another, whereas the synthe­
sizers are often advocates of positions, such as symbolic 
anthropology or structuralism. Both camps are con­
cerned with the descriptive foundations of social an­
thropology . . . Kinship is a kind of crucible for 
theories of description and analysis.^
Generally only the more exalted spirits among scholars and 
scientists are able to avoid falling into the camp of either the 
splitters or the synthesizers, and keep in view the coherence of 
Analysis and Synthesis. Freud saw this when he wrote, in his 
letter of April y, 1907, to Carl Jung, "It seems downright de­
ceitful to conceal the fact that psychosynthesis is the same thing 
as psychoanalysis. After all, if we try by analysis to find the re­
pressed fragments, it is only in order to put them together again." 
Similarly, Descartes knew that his use of algebra in developing 
analytical geometry was meant to bring together the various 
parts of mathematics and, moreover, to make one generally ap­
plicable method of analysis; Descartes thought his universal
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mathematics more powerful than any other instrument of knowl­
edge, "being the source of all others."
We noted that it may be a mark of our time-one that tends 
to espouse pluralism and to frown on monism -  that there is an 
asymmetry between analysis and synthesis, for example, that text 
entries under analysis are far more* frequent than those under 
synthesis. But the monists are by no means routed, nor ever can 
be if they are responding to a thematic drive. In William James's 
Fr%g772%rM77; (1907), Lecture 4, he considered the difference be­
tween pluralists and monists as nothing less than "the most cen­
tral of all philosophic problems," and he indicated that the dis­
pute is not a resolvable one:
I wish to turn . . . upon the ancient problem of "the 
one and the many" . . .  I myself have come, by long 
brooding on it, to consider it the most central of all 
philosophic problems, central because so pregnant.
I mean by this that if you know whether a man is a 
decided monist or a decided pluralist you perhaps know 
more about the rest of his opinions than if you give him 
any other name ending in bt. To believe in the one or in 
the many, that is the classification with the maximum 
number of consequences.
There is little doubt that the division between synthesizers (or 
"lumpers") and splitters can be found in practice, and that the 
synthesizer belongs among the monists, as the splitter belongs 
among the pluralists. Whereas the one reaches out for the uni­
versal and whole -  recall Thales' "all is water," Pythagoras's 
"all is number," Democritus's "all is atom and void," and John 
Wheeler's "There is nothing in the world except empty curved 
space"^ -  the other finds himself at home among the particular 
parts. Each takes courage for his breathtaking simplifications by 
a thematic commitment, in one case to break through the bar­
riers, in the other to neglect, in reductionistic analyses, all second- 
and higher-order interactions among the pieces. To be sure, each 
of these two approaches by itself can produce very successful 
work and may correspond to a fundamental intellectual ability 
and skill, separately testable and separately listed in the taxonomy 
of educational objectives.^ Yet Plato's warning, cited earlier, 
remains appropriate. Analysis alone or synthesis alone leaves the
work incomplete; reason at its best first ascends through analysis 
and then descends through synthesis.
The best exampie of a major spirit of science in our century 
refusing to favor one polar position or the other was Niels Bohr. 
In launching the /73te7*7Mtif7M/ of f/wficd Science,^
he put it into a single, powerful paragraph:
Notwithstanding the admittedly practical necessity for 
most scientists to concentrate their efforts in special Helds 
of research, science is, according to its aim of enlarging 
human understanding, essentially a unity. Although 
periods of fruitful exploration of new domains of 
experience may often naturally be accompanied by a 
temporary renunciation of the comprehension of our 
situation, history of science teaches us again and again 
how the extension of our knowledge may lead to the 
recognition of relations between formerly unconnected 
groups of phenomena, the harmonious synthesis of which 
demands a renewed revision of the presuppositions for 
the unambiguous application of even our most elementary 
concepts. This circumstance reminds us not only of the 
unity of all sciences aiming at a description of the 
external world, but above all, of the inseparability of 
epistemological and psychological analysis. It is just in 
the emphasis on this last point, which recent development 
in the most different Helds of science has brought to the 
foreground, that the program of the present great 
undertaking distinguishes itself from that of previous 
encyclopedic enterprises, in which stress was essentially 
laid on the completeness of the account of the actual 
state of knowledge rather than on the elucidation of 
scientiHc methodology. It is therefore to be hoped that 
the forthcoming will have a deep inHuence
on the whole attitude of our generation which, in spite 
of the ever increasing specialization in science as well as 
in technology, has a growing feeling of the mutual 
dependency of all human activities. Above all, it may 
help us to realize that even in science any arbitrary 
restriction implies the danger of prejudices, and that our 
only way of avoiding the extremes of materialism and
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mysticism is the never-ending endeavor to balance 
analysis and synthesis.
Evidence is accruing that a physio­
logical component may help explain the existence of the analysis/ 
synthesis dichotomy in human thinking, as well as the preference 
for one or the other in particular cases. Recent research has found 
that the right and left halves of the human brain appear to be 
capable of distinct modalities of thought. For right-handed per­
sons, the left half appears to be more concerned with language 
processing, linguistic structures, and "logical" sequences. The 
right half appears to deal preferentially with holistic images and 
is also identified with spatial orientation, the production of music, 
and pictorial representation. There is also some evidence that the 
right half may be the seat of the more intuitive activities and may 
act to a large degree independently of and simultaneously with 
the left half.
A number of consequences may follow. One is the possibility 
of a difference of development in one or the other of these 
modalities, corresponding to individual physiological differences. 
Another is that problem solving that involves both synthesis and 
analysis may be divided in time sequences between the two halves 
of the brain, starting, for example, with ideas that have relaxed 
standards of logicality in the right-hand side, then preliminarily 
focused by the logical processes of the left side, and then handed 
over again to the right side, where sometimes a sudden and to­
tally unexpected solution may be recognized. It should, how­
ever, be emphasized that these interesting suggestions are still at 
an early stage of testing.
E x tr^c  772073E772. Analysis and synthesis should be distinguished 
from other forms of human knowledge that are frequently not 
considered part of ordinary human reasoning. To Plotinus, as to 
Aquinas, the direct perception of the One was transcendent, di­
vine knowledge. The sensorium of God was undifferentiated and 
without process, whereas man's intellectual activity was dualistic 
(subject/object dualism) and discursive. The closest human 
knowledge could come to that state was through the process of 
intuition; as Descartes also understood and used this conception,
intuition arrived at knowledge without stages, directiy and with 
certainty.
At the end of our earlier discussion of the Newtonian syn­
thesis, we made reference to a core feature of the concept of 
synthesis. In its heightened form, the occasional occurrence of a 
more or less "direct" perception at the end of the process of in­
duction can open up a prospect of all-pervasive and seamless 
quality which, in Plato, evidently led him to accept the first 
principles so produced. In Plotinus, this vision surfaced in the 
conception of the OneT However, in its most extreme form it 
can also be characteristic of the state of mind in certain mental 
disorders.
Different forwr of %?zd Syzzthcyh? Many social scien­
tists have been concerned with the extent of the habit to model 
the methods (including that of analysis and synthesis) used in 
other sciences too closely on the physical sciences. In fact, we 
may suspect that historical accidents favored the physical sci­
ences in a way that makes them too "simple" to be altogether 
adequate models.
Thus the exemplar for physical science work has indelibly 
been its early success in astronomy, for example, by focusing on 
the wandering pinpoints of light representing the planets and by 
creating a model of the solar system from observations of their 
relative motions against the background of the fixed stars. The 
profusion of complexities and data had to yield a simple system 
eventually, for the planets trcrc independent of one another; 
a single force on each from the sun is a close enough approxima­
tion for understanding their motions. The planets formed there­
fore a "pure" sample, possibly the simplest of all the samples 
with which science has had to deal ever since, and hence the 
success of early systems makers of astronomy was a success of a 
philosophy of oversimplification hardly acceptable now, even to 
the physical sciences. It was possible to make cumulative observa­
tions over very long time spans on "the same things"; the sam­
ples were stable-the most stable in existence. The data were 
therefore reproducible, allowing the formation of an interna­
tional community of scientists who could learn to gain consensus 
by reference to repeatable observations made within their indi-
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vidual horizons. Moreover, the history of physical science al­
lowed the parallel development of careful observers like Tycho 
Brahe and daring speculators like Kepler who could be quite di­
vided on all essential presuppositions, and yet collaborate.
When we turn to the social studies, the situation appears to be 
strikingly different. For one thing, the "world" of samples is 
rarely clean and stable enough to allow easily reproducible mea­
sures by other groups or by other techniques, particularly at the 
microlevel or with fine-structure. Nor is it likely that the distance 
and decoupling between the observer and the observed can be 
achieved as successfully in the social studies as it has been in most 
of the physical sciences. In short, one should not be surprised if 
the forms Analysis and Synthesis can take in these different fields 
are markedly different.
077 yy77t^e?7C % priori
One of the major, if doomed, attempts to explore the power of 
the Analysis and Synthesis conception was Kant's distinction be­
tween analytic (or explicative) judgments -  a particular class of 
"necessary" truths-and synthetic judgments. To illustrate, he 
said that the statement "All bodies are extended" does not am­
plify in the least one's concept of body but has only invited an 
analysis of the concept. On the contrary, the judgment "AH 
bodies have weight," he held, contains in its predicate something 
not actually incorporated in the general concept of body; it 
therefore amplifies this knowledge and must be called synthetical.
Kant further divided judgments and propositions into a pos­
teriori (empirically based truths) or a priori (not so grounded, 
therefore transcendental, shown by "pure reason"), a division 
that gives rise to the two corresponding types of knowledge. 
Furthermore the dichotomies %77%/yrir and ry77t^ e?7C, on the one 
hand, and a posteriori and a priori, on the other, invited the con­
cept of four pairs of possible subdivisions of judgments and prop­
ositions.
Whether this device, so evidently seductive, could yield opera­
tionally meaningful categories was another matter. It is now 
rather generally granted that the conception of the synthetic a
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priori, for example, is a labile notion, much battered,"" and cer­
tainly not workable for mathematics as Kant thought. (Many 
hold now that mathematical propositions are analytic a priori 
only.) Any notion that claims to be a priori is under the con­
stant threat of challenge by new data (e.g., from neurophysiol­
ogy or cognitive psychology) which has given an entirely new 
view of the complex relations between "experience" and prior 
genetic potential. As noted previously, the change of world view 
from a Euclidean and Newtonian universe, in which Kant lived, 
to the one dominated by Einsteinian and other recent notions of 
science, changes the ground completely, as in the very meaning 
of what one may consider "empirical."
Thus Einstein himself, in his own work and letters, docu­
mented a pilgrimage that had begun at an early point in a phi­
losophy of science close to Mach's sensationism and operation- 
alism, and that in the end led him to a rationalism that accepted 
the concept of an objective, "real" world behind the phenomena 
to which our senses are exposed. As Einstein said in one of his 
letters (January 24, 2938, to C. Lanczos), "Coming from skepti­
cal empiricism of somewhat the kind of Mach's, I was made, by 
the problem of gravitation, into a believing rationalist, that is, 
one who seeks only the trustworthy source of truth in mathe­
matical simplicity."
The problem he had encountered, as he explained in his essay 
"Physics and Reality" (1936), was that the aim of the general 
theory of relativity had been to connect it in "as simple a man­
ner as possible" with "directly observed facts"; but the aim 
proved to be unachievable. The inclusion of nonlinear transfor­
mation, as the principle of equivalence demanded, was inevitably 
fatal to the simple physical interpretation of the coordinate; that 
is, it could no longer be required that coordinate differences 
should signify direct results of measurement with (ideal) mea­
suring sticks and clocks. The solution of the dilemma, from 1912 
on, was to attach physical significance not to the differentials of 
the coordinates but only to the Riemannian metric correspond­
ing to them."*
As Einstein put it in his Spencer Lecture of 1933:
Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical 
concepts, but they most certainly cannot be deduced
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from it. Experience remains, of course, the soie criterion 
of physica) utility of a mathematical construction. But 
the creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain 
sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can 
grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed.
Indeed, in his lecture "Physics and Reality,"^ Einstein explicitly 
stated that Mach's theory of knowledge is not sufficient because 
of the closeness it supposes between experience and the concepts. 
Einstein then advocated going beyond this "phenomenological 
physics" to achieve a theory whose basis may be further re­
moved from direct experience, but which in return has more 
"unity in the foundations."
Coming to write about Kant from this point of view later in 
life in his "Autobiographical N otes,E instein felt that the dif­
ferentiation Kant made between the indispensability of certain 
concepts taken as necessary premises for every kind of thinking, 
and of concepts of empirical origin cannot be defended. "I am 
convinced, however, that this differentiation is erroneous, i.e., 
that it does not do justice to the problem in a natural way. AM 
concepts, even those which are closest to experience, are from 
the point of view of logic freely chosen conventions . . ."
Einstein had just recounted his delight in discovering at an 
earlier stage that the mental "objects" with which geometry 
deals seemed to him to be of no different type than the objects of 
sensory perception, "which can be seen and touched":
This primitive idea, which probably also lies at the bottom 
of the well-known Kantian problematic concerning the 
possibility of "synthetic judgments % priori" rests obvi­
ously upon the fact that the relation of geometrical con­
cepts to objects of direct experience (rigid rod, finite 
time interval, etc.) was unconsciously present. If thus it 
appeared that it was possible to get certain knowledge 
of the objects of experience by means of pure thinking, 
this wonder rested upon an error. Nevertheless, for any­
one who experiences it for the first time, it is marvelous 
enough that man is capable at all to reach such a degree 
of certainty and purity in pure thinking as the Greeks 
showed us for the first time to be possible in geometry.*^
At the end of the same volume, Einstein returned once more
to Kant and what he called those "who today still adhere to the 
errors of 'synthetic judgments % prion'.' " He felt that his own 
theoretical attitude was
distinct from that of Kant only by the fact that we con­
ceive of the categories not as unalterable (conditioned by 
the nature of the understanding) but as (in the logical 
sense) free twzwTztiozzy. They appear to be % priori only 
insofar as thinking without the positing of categories and 
concepts in general would be as impossible as is breathing 
in a vacuum.^
This Einsteinian perception of the Tzcoeyyfty of poyitmg 
goriey was one of the few survivors of the battle that surrounded 
synthetic judgments a priori. Indeed, Gzz^ fyyz'y .Syzzrbcyfy 
Jio^ot07?2y irye/f z'y % reflection of tbc exiytence of % fnnd%777ent%i 
tf)e777%tic conpfe. Some of its manifestations appear under names 
such as the many (manifold) and the one; parts and whole; dis- 
aggregation and aggregation; reductionism and holism; dismem­
berment (dichotomization, categorization, reduction, etc.) and 
unification; fragmentation and wholeness; and so on. The single 
best terminological characterization for the Analysis and Syn­
thesis couple may, however, be the opposition Differ<?77ti%tio77 
%7td /77tegr%tio73.
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Earlier, we gave a number of examples of the thematic role of 
Differentiation and Integration, separately and jointly. We 
noted the search for categories to disaggregate and order differ­
ent types of "elementary particles" in modern physics and, 
conversely, the attempts to find a "unified theory" for them all 
(see Chapter 1), and we noted that the method of dealing with 
complex entities by Differentiation (resolution, reduction, etc.) 
found its use in science very eatly (resolution of motion into 
components in Greek astronomy and in Galilean ballistics). 
Afany other examples could be added to illustrate the pervasive­
ness, in science and beyond, of Differentiation and Integration, 
but we shall limit ourselves to instances of the two chief types 
of Differentiation, each of which accounts for part of the im­
mense range and power of the methodological thema.
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ryyfWM of c r^cyoriey, /eveE, or /jicr^ ro/ i^er. The use 
of taxonomic systems has been illustrated in the discussion on 
current eiementary-particie physics (Chapter :), for example, 
in the division of forces into four categories and of particles into 
families and superfamilies. Other instances suggest themselves 
readily, from the systems of Linnaeus and Mendeleyev (taxon­
omy without then-known developmental relationship of parts) 
to the "stages" in the life-cycle theory of Erik Erikson or in the 
genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget (progress by going through 
sequential and causally connected steps).
These are, however, the exceptions. In every held of scholar­
ship, tMcccMjzJ taxonomic systems are a minute fraction of the 
ever-growing total. At their best, hierarchical schemata of this 
kind convey the conviction of causal relationships and allow us 
to make confirming experiments and insightful extensions. At 
their worst, taxonomic schemes produce the very opposite 
effect; in the absence of some "first principle" to which to rise 
and from which to derive an ordering matrix, they may simply 
fall back on the production of pigeonholes with plausible labels 
which invite one to disaggregate the incoherent vastness of pos­
sible observables. Since those labels were obtained in the first 
place through some intuitive perception of portions within the 
grand aggregate, the danger of a vicious circle is obvious. One 
can easily end up masking perplexity under the guise of parcel­
ing out portions of it into the various corners of some lofty 
but arbitrary construction.
A special case of differentiation via taxonomy is DzJferewtM- 
ypcctrorcopy, that is, by laying out next to one another 
presumably ^^interacting parts of a whole, whether they are 
separate axioms, separate "traits," or separate wavelengths. In 
his influential book ^77 /^yrE of Ernst Mach ex­
pressed his hope to combine reductionism and sensationism and 
to find six separate "elements" in preconception and physiology: 
"If the seemingly limitless multiplicity of color-sensations is sus­
ceptible of being reduced, by psychological analysis (self-obser­
vation), to six elements (fundamental sensations), a like simpli­
fication may be expected for the system of nerve processes." (In 
fact, he believed that the six fundamental sensations were 
white, black, red, yellow, green, and blue.)
Differentiation by spectroscopy is so basic a conceptuai too! 
that it seems (and probably is) inescapable for the human mind. 
A few weH-known examples remind us how constantly we are 
assailed by the products of this strategy: The Stoics divided the 
sciences into physics, ethics, and logic (or dialectic); Aristotle's 
work abounds in differentiations -  causes are either efficient, 
material, formal, or final; dialectical reasoning is of two forms 
(syllogistic and inductive); the principal sciences are three in 
number (medicine, mechanics, and morals); the units of lan­
guage allow handling it grammatically versus logically;' and 
statements are necessary or contingent.
The medieval distinctions between the parts of the trivium 
and quadrivium (alive today in the practice of splitting educa­
tion into the natural sciences, social studies, and the humanities) 
show the same crutch of the imagination at work. Immanuel 
Kant abounds in such bifurcations and divisions: He holds that 
the methods of investigating nature and mind are either rational 
or empirical; philosophy is divided into speculative and practical 
uses of pure reason; the faculties of the soul are three (of knowl­
edge, of pleasure and pain, and of desire); and so on.
John Locke lists five types of primary qualities -  "solidity, 
extension, figure, motion and arrest, and number." Similarly 
Isaac Newton had listed the "universal qualities of all bodies 
whatsoever" -  "extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, 
and inertia." Schools of scholarship similarly differentiate them­
selves into two, three, or more groups: those looking for 
"revolutions" in science versus those stressing continuities and 
evolution; those explaining life phenomena essentially on 
mechanistic-materialist grounds (E. Haeckel, Jacques Loeb, 
E. O. Wilson) versus rational (including primarily environ­
mental, or Marxist) explanations or versus nonmaterialistic 
(transcendental, theological, or emergent) explanations. It is 
practically impossible to read a page of scholarship in any field 
without encountering this type of differentiation.
Diffe7*e7MM'ti<773 /7_y The simplest, most frequent,
most powerful case of Differentiation is, however, 
tio72. It is also the most dangerous. Wolfgang Pauli considered 
the dichotomous divisions forced on our thinking by Aristotelian
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logic as "an attribute of the devil." The list of dichotomous 
categories is nearly endless in every held. Wilhelm Ostwald dis­
tinguished between classical and romantic scientists, A. Szent- 
Gyorgyi between Apollonian and Dionysian scientists, and Carl 
Jung between sensation-based scientists and intuitive scientists 
(the first associated with reductionistic thinking, the second 
with holistic thinking). Psychologists have found (Chapter 7) 
that young persons early make a choice either for a "people"- 
oriented career or for a "thing"-oriented one. A random listing 
of the enormous number of antithetical in constant use would 
contain matter/antimatter, animate/inanimate, subjective/objec- 
tive, observer/observed, order/chaos, Parmenidean unchanging 
structure versus Heraclitean flux, a priori/a posteriori, either/or, 
plus/minus, yes/no, induction/deduction, internal/external, 
macro/micro, formal/functional, classic/romantic, synchronic/ 
diachronic, Being/Becoming, male/female, lumpers/splitters, 
sacred/vulgar, friend/enemy, good/evil, as well as raw/cooked, 
day/night, sun/moon, and the host of dyads by which not only 
in structural anthropology but in general, meaning is given to 
each of the two opposing members by virtue of the particular 
opposition within other dyads to which each member may also 
be related.
Our very language seems so constructed; when Peter Mark 
Roget, physician and Secretary of the Royal Society, had cate­
gorized 997 basic ideas into 6 great Classes and 24 Sections of his 
the chief order that emerged was the division of 
synonyms and antonyms -  yet another reminder that the bi­
nary approach is built into our semantic structures. Themata- 
antithemata groups, too, are usually dichotomous (although 
sometimes trichotomous).
The pervasiveness of dichotomization as the prime form of 
Differentiation or analysis (sometimes to the point of oppressive­
ness) can lull one into failing to see that dichotomization may 
sometimes do little justice to the complexity of the case. "Either/ 
or" may be not a solution but a new problem, to be solved by 
"both" (as in modern physics since complementarity was intro­
duced), allowing for the of alternatives instead of
forcing a choice between them.^ Yet the almost automatic 
tendency to bifurcation makes one suspect that it has its roots in
the ontogeny or phylogeny of ideas, or both. We are told by 
child psychologists that one of the first and most important 
cognitive accomplishments of the newborn is to dichotomize the 
total experience into self and other and then to dichotomize 
further among these entities (as well as up/down, right/left, 
ahead/bchind, etc.). Along the same lines, Ernst Gombrich has 
argued that the learning of children proceeds essentially by dif­
ferentiation, by constantly delimiting further the original "un­
differentiated mass."^ "
It is probably no accident that the cosmogonic ideas of antiq­
uity, those earliest works of cultural synthesis, are also full of 
accounts of the developmental breakup into antitheticals. The 
first thirty-one paragraphs of Genesis are again, from the 
thematic point of view, an account of proliferation by repeated 
dichotomization. Thus on the first day occurs the separation of 
heaven and earth, and of light and darkness (day and night, 
evening and morning). On the second day, heaven and the 
waters are separated. On the third we encounter the dichotomy 
of seas and earth, as well as the animate versus the inanimate 
(the earth bringing forth plants). On the fourth appear the 
greater and the lesser of the lights in the firmament of heaven; 
on the fifth, two kinds of animals, in water and in air; and on 
the sixth, earth animals and man. The whole sequence exempli­
fies the dictionary meaning of dichotomy -  literally, a cutting 
asunder, a separation of a class into two subclasses that differ in 
some quality or attribute.
Similarly, the ancient Milesian cosmogenic myth held that at 
the beginning there emerged, out of a primal unity, parts of 
"opposite things" which later interacted or reunited in meteoric 
phenomena or in the production of individual living things. The 
persistence of fundamental themata is nicely illustrated by the 
fact that quite analogous basic ideas infuse the cosmogony of 
the evolutionist camp of modern cosmologists. According to one 
of their recent proposals, the universe originated in a single 
"particle" called universon. It immediately divided into two 
such particles, a cosmon and anticosmon, which separated into 
our cosmos and, elsewhere, an anticosmos, each condensing into 
stars and galaxies (or into matter and antimatter, respectively). 
Within each of these worlds, the initial mixture of radiation and
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neutrons, through subsequent stages of differentiation by ex­
pansion and neutron decay, finally leads to the buiiding up of 
heavier eiements by thermonuclear fusion processes, preparing 
the ground for the later formation of molecules, including those 
on which life is based. It is not too daring to predict that at 
every stage in the future, no matter how rapidly and diverse the 
progress of science may be, there will be some school of cos­
mogony which continues the use of the same thematic tools of 
analysis and synthesis.
We began this essay by noting the existence of works that act 
as cultural syntheses. Like other syntheses, they are the results 
of the action of both members of the Analysis and Synthesis 
couple, themselves a form of the general and basic thematic 
couple Differentiation and Integration. In their power and 
limitation lie the power and limitations of the cultural syntheses. 
Works as different as those of, say, Newton and Einstein, there­
fore can turn out to have fundamental functional similarities. In 
this example, both scientists tried to analyze the phenomena of 
light by heuristic models and also tried to unify the phenomena 
of light and matter. Moreover, both were concerned about the 
limitations of the syntheses they had achieved. If we study not 
only their published scientific work but also their philosophical 
essays and personal correspondence, we find that both men were 
not satisfied with any primarily "scientific" world construction 
but yearned for a still grander synthesis. Their unrivaled suc­
cesses within the limits set by the problems themselves, and their 
yearning to go beyond them, help us to discern both the upper 
boundaries of human ability and the spirit that motivates it.
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Fermi's group and the recapture of Italy's 
place in physics
The turning points of modern history have sometimes the char­
acter of mythological events. Such an event took place in Rome 
one morning in October 1934, in an upstairs room at Via Panis- 
perna 89A, an old physics laboratory of the University of Rome. 
There Enrico Fermi and his young collaborators, to their sur­
prise, came upon a key observation from which one may well 
date the effective beginning of tire nuclear age. It was the dis­
covery of the powerful effect which a beam of neutrons can 
have in initiating the instability of nuclei in a target, provided 
the incident neutrons are first slowed down or "filtered" by 
passing through a moderator, such as hydrogen-containing par­
affin. Fermi himself later described the nascent moment in a 
conversation with the astrophysicist Professor S. C. Chandrasek­
har:
I will tell you how I came to make the discovery which I 
suppose is the most important one I have made. We were 
working very hard on the neutron-induced radioactivity, 
and the results we were obtaining made no sense. One 
day, as I came to the laboratory, it occurred to me that 
I should examine the effect of placing a piece of lead 
before the incident neutrons. And instead of my usual 
custom, I took great pains to have the piece of lead pre­
cisely machined. I was clearly dissatisfied with something:
I tried every "excuse" to postpone putting the piece of 
lead in its place. When finally, with some reluctance, I 
was going to put it in its place, I said to myself: "No, I 
do not want this piece of lead here; what I want is a 
piece of paraffin." It was just like that: with no advanced
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warning, no conscious, prior, reasoning. I immediately 
took some odd piece of paraffin . . . and placed it where 
the piece of lead was to have been.*
Fermi was the least Dionysian, the most Apollonian, of physi­
cists. The impulsive filtration of the rays was, methodologically, 
perhaps unique in his career. But so were what Segre calls "the 
miraculous effects of the filtration by paraffin,"  ^ in terms of 
producing a vastly enhanced radioactivity in the silver cylinder 
which served as a target for the slowed -  "moderated" -  neutron 
beam.
Serge and others of that group report that within hours Fermi 
had puzzled out how and why it happened. With this, a chain 
reaction of unforeseeable but almost inevitable results was initi­
ated. The most immediate effect was on the work of Fermi's 
own group and with it on the transformation of physics in 
Italy and beyond. It led ultimately to the award of the Nobel 
Prize to Fermi on December 10, 1938, as the official proclama­
tion reads, "for his demonstration of the existence of elements 
produced by neutron irradiation and for his related discovery of 
nuclear reactions brought about by slow neutrons." Less than 
two weeks after that ceremony, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strass- 
mann sent to Die their paper which indi­
cated the presence of barium in a uranium sample which had 
been irradiated by neutrons slowed down by Fermi's technique.** 
Otto Frisch and Lise Meitner quickly understood that here was 
evidence for uranium fission which could no longer be over­
looked. And almost exactly four years later, the first nuclear 
reactor, built in Chicago under Fermi's personal direction and 
again with the use of the same moderating principle, produced 
the first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction under the control 
of man.
Against the background of these memorable events, one may 
be surprised to learn that physics as pursued in Italy about a 
half-century ago, when the physicists of Fermi's generation 
began their careers, was on the whole and with few exceptions 
far below first rank. During the 1920s and 1930s in Italy, im­
portant work was done in physics at centers such as Florence, 
Naples, Padua, Palermo, Pisa, Torino, and elsewhere.** But it 
cannot be doubted that the events of 193/). in the Rome labora-
tories of the Fermi group were crucial to the position physics 
achieved in modern Italy.
Hence it seemed worth gathering all relevant information, 
whether new or previously available in the widely scattered 
literature, in order to try to discern in this complex of scientific, 
institutional and personal connections the main components, and 
so to see the confluence of forces which led to the energizing 
events. Some aspects of this case will undoubtedly be unique to 
Fermi's particular group-Occhialini calls it "absolutely the 
perfect group"^ -  one that included Fermi's young collaborators, 
Edoardo Amaldi, Oscar D'Agostino, Franco Rasetti, Bruno 
Pontecorvo, and Emilio Segre, as well as associated members 
such as Orso Mario Corbino, Ettore Majorana, and G. C. Tra- 
bacchi. Other aspects of this case, however, will be unique to 
Italy itself; and others still may be common to other countries 
also.
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At the head of any list of factors we certainly must place 
Fermi's own insight into physics. His considerable experimental 
skill was of course a major part of it, but, as has often been 
noted, his style of experimentation avoided complex and difficult 
equipment in the manner of his contemporary E. O. Lawrence. 
Moreover, it would be quite false to see Fermi as working 
chiefly in experimental physics; in fact, until 1934 he seems to 
have thought of himself only occasionally as an experimentalist. 
He was indeed a master of theoretical physics, including its 
mathematical aspects. This shows up from the beginning; by 
1922, among the first of the 270 papers he ultimately published, 
he had shown his ability to handle probability theory and gen­
eral relativity in a way which attracted considerable attention 
to the twenty-one-year-old newcomer to the field.
In addition, his attention to the various aspects of physics 
made him practically encyclopedic. Segre called him "the last 
universal physicist in the tradition of the great men of the 19th 
century,"s and "the last person who knew all of the physics of 
his day."  ^ This wide-ranging interest opened Fermi's mind to 
new ideas long before others in Italy took notice of them. Thus
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al! who knew him agreed that he was probably the first physicist 
in Italy who took quantum physics seriously and undertook to 
learn it. Similarly, Rasetti recalls:
I remember then that there came one day an issue of 
with a review article by Rutherford on the 
nucleus [ 1920, on the experiments on the first artificial 
disintegrations of nuclei. G.H.] I knew nothing about it, 
next to nothing about it. Perhaps I had just heard of the 
existence of the nucleus, but I knew nothing then of the 
structure of the nucleus. And Fermi was extremely 
excited. Nobody in the physics department would have 
noticed this article in Ahm/rc. Fermi immediately noticed 
it, and I remember he gave a talk [to Rasetti and Nello 
Carrara, another fellow student. G.H.J.s 
Superimposed on Fermi's well-nigh encyclopedic interests 
was, however, an ordering principle which prevented the large 
range of new, incoming ideas from becoming dispersed and 
self-destructive. All biographies assert that Fermi ordered the 
overwhelming and vast amount of knowledge into a set of very 
few principles and "cases," which allowed him to understand 
almost any new problem as an example of one of about seven 
primitive or primary physical situations. Fermi would return 
throughout his career to a listing or digest of the chief ideas in 
physics which he had made when he first organized the field for 
himself as a young student.
This perception of nature's basic parsimony appears to have 
played a major role in the events of 1934. The best witness here 
is Amaldi.9 Amaldi and Segre had been working on the effects of 
pressure on the high terms of the spectra of the alkalis and 
observed an experimental effect for which Fermi subsequently 
produced and published the theory.
We were working with electrons in such excited states, 
they were bound with approximately ( i/ioo)th of 
electron volts, extremely weakly bound, and moving 
almost free, bound so weakly that they were almost free 
and with very long wavelengths. And in that paper, in 
order to explain the effect that we had found, he made the 
theory of a collision of a very slow electron against an 
atom. And this is exactly the same theory that was used
i j 8
Ferym'r grozzp m p^yricr 0 9
one and a half years later for slow neutrons against 
nuclei . . d"
Although it would be too much to say that the theory of slow 
electrons suggested directly the theory of the slow neutrons, the 
incident is one of several illustrations of Fermi's re-use of theo­
retical results in novel and apparently unconnected situations.
A key to understanding Fermi's mastery, however, lies neither 
in his experimental skills, nor in his theoretical insight, nor in 
his encyclopedic knowledge, nor in his striving for fundamental 
simplicity and parsimony, but rather in the subtle balance of all 
these. Although it is commonly agreed that physicists more or 
less of the class of Bohr, Rutherford, and Einstein in the early 
and mid-twentieth century may each have had an advantage 
with respect either to large new theoretical ideas or to purely 
experimental intuition, nobody combined these capabilities -  
which are often so separate-as effectively as Fermi did. The 
commonly accepted ideal for the style of doing physics is today 
much closer to Fermi's than was the case even in the 1930s. Of 
that period, O. R. Frisch wrote:
Madame [Joliot-] Curie had little respect for theory.
Once when one of her students suggested an experiment, 
adding that the theoretical physicists next door thought it 
hopeful, she replied, "Well, we might try it all the same." 
Their disregard of theory may have cost them the dis­
covery of the neutron."
Very similar stories of the disdain of theorists for the work 
of experimentalists are also common. Nothing of this sort, how­
ever, could be charged against the Fermi group.
Another important aspect of Fermi's position was that by 
preference and necessity he was self-taught. His first contact 
with physics came when he bought a second-hand book on the 
elements of physics as a fourteen-year-old boy in the market of 
Campo dei Fiori. At about that time also he met a colleague of 
his father, Adolfo Amidei, who lent him a series of books on 
physics and mathematics which Fermi successfully studied on 
his own. By the age of seventeen he appears to have taught him­
self the essentials of general relativity. One may take it from 
the testimony of his colleagues that his seminal papers -  for ex­
ample, those on Fermi statistics and on beta decay -  to a com
siderable extent were written by Fermi as exercises to apply to 
and thereby check on conceptions and theories which he had 
taught himself, in connection with other problems.^
Again, virtually ail his colleagues and former students agree 
that Fermi was unmatched as a teacher, and that his teaching 
reflected the characteristics which have been discussed previ­
ously. For example, his introductory course was enormously 
wide ranging in the subject matter covered.^ More important, 
however, is the fact that much of his teaching was carried out 
by thinking aloud before the class -  in a rational, organized way 
-about the subjects on which he was then engaged in firsthand 
study himself. The joy that teaching gave Fermi makes it likely 
that it was one of his most intense human relationships, as well 
as being yet another opportunity for self-education. This fact, 
together with the characteristics cited -  and of course his ca­
pacity for prolific output-made Fermi the natural center of a 
lively and productive group, not only in Rome in the 1930s, but 
also in his later career in the United States.^
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Possibly even more important than the scientific excellence and 
pedagogic capabilities of the central figure in the Rome group 
was the particular methodology -  conservative and pragmatic at 
the same time -  for the choice of problems and the conduct of 
research. Here we encounter a distinctive style which was 
crucial to the success of the Italian group as a whole. In a sense, 
it represents a fusion of Fermi's personal characteristics and his 
scientific experience on the one hand, and the needs and oppor­
tunities for physics research on the other, within the setting 
given by existing scientific institutions and the state of science 
in the world at the time.
We have some glimpses of this methodology, even from the 
very first reports we have of Fermi as a young student in Pisa, 
where-in the hot and smelly chemistry laboratory-Fermi was 
given the task of analyzing a sample chemically. With a group 
of students whom he had organized for this purpose, Fermi took 
the sample into a room in the physics department and put it 
under a microscope. Franco Rasetti recounted:
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We determined first, from the shape of the crystals, how 
many ingredients there were, and we finaHy separated the 
3 or 4 or $ ingredients . . .  For each ingredient we 
looked at the crystal shape; that already tells a lot, if it's 
a cubic crystal, if it is a monoclinic crystal . . . then we 
looked at the color of each sample . . .  if it, let us say, 
was potassium permanganate, it was almost black, very 
dark purple; if it was copper sulfate, it was light blue, and 
so on. Then we said, well, they don't waste expensive 
elements. Nobody is going to put there gallium chloride 
. . .  so they must be salts of common elements. So by all 
these various reasonings, we guessed what every one of 
these ingredients was . . .  At the end, an assistant who 
was in charge of this lab, said: "This is really marvelous, 
how you analyze this, not following any of the rules."^
A great deal of Fermi's enterprise-and that of his later 
colleague in Rome, Rasetti -  is already visible here: his ability to 
organize, to distinguish between essentials and incidentals, to 
make very reasonable,^ simple assumptions and shortcuts con­
trary to current "rules," to make a commonsense, qualitative 
approximation before any detailed quantitative solution, to im­
provise -  and to succeed. Neither aesthetic nor other philosoph­
ical or quasi-metaphysical principles -  except that of simplicity -  
could preoccupy or delay Fermi."
The pragmatic approach to soluble problems which would 
lead to a reasonably quick payoff differed fundamentally from 
the method in some other centers. For example, Chadwick testi­
fied to the fact that he had looked for neutrons on and off for 
a period of about twelve years after joining Rutherford in 1920. 
The research grant of the Cavendish being about 2,000 a year 
for all the work which had to be supported, Chadwick felt that 
he could not obtain or afford the necessary equipment for trying 
out certain of his ideas. He persisted, nevertheless, as best he 
could. In recounting the abortive experiments, he rather proudly 
added, "I wasted my time -  but no money."^ Lengthy investiga­
tions with admittedly inadequate apparatus would have been 
much less likely in a laboratory run along the lines of the 
Italian group.
Another style which Fermi's group eschewed was that asso-
dated with Niels Bohr, who in many ways was completely dif­
ferent from Fermi, and who in turn tended to regard Fermi's 
solution as too simple to be profoundly important. As one ob­
server has said: "Bohr is such a bad authority on these [Fermi] 
papers because Bohr really had it in his mind that there was some 
profound problem with neutrinos and energy and so on, and 
didn't want to have it solved except in a mystical and deep way. 
It was solved by Fermi in 'too elementary' a way."*" Bohr's fa­
vorite procedure was to drive contradictions patiently to their 
ultimate extreme, and to ponder the ensuing conceptual conflict 
as a necessary preparation for its ultimate resolution."" From the 
beginning, Fermi quite consciously and explicitly rejected as 
somewhat mystical and too philosophical the approach of Bohr, 
and indeed of others whose theoretical work dominated the 
scene. Fermi would say, though smiling and not with doctrinaire 
belief, "We proceed according to the rules of Bacon . . . The 
facts. We will make our experiments and then the experiments 
will tell what it is.""* To the same effect, Enrico Persico writes: 
From his adolescence onward, Fermi had a quite definite, 
positivistic view of the world, although it is doubtful that 
he would have accepted this or any other conventional 
label for his philosophy. He had not been raised in a 
religious environment, and so did not have to pass 
through a religious crisis, as many Italians do when they 
reach the age of autonomous thinking. As a matter of 
fact, philosophical discussions did not interest him very 
much, and even the development of scientific philosophy 
that occurred during the years of his maturity, through 
the activity of the Vienna circle and other groups, seems 
to have left him rather indifferent. This was perhaps 
because many of the fundamental ideas of logical posi­
tivism were already deeply rooted in his mind as self- 
evident truths, and because philosophical subtleties and 
polemics did not appeal to his taste.""
Possibly the most important part, however, of this pragmatic 
style was Fermi's ability to choose the right moment, the exact 
time when the state of knowledge and experimental capabilities 
matched the opportunity as it opened up."" Fermi's ability to 
perceive, before anyone around him could tell him, that rela-
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tivity and quantum theory were the correct areas for future 
work in physics, marked the very beginning of his career. His 
ability to perceive the opening of a major opportunity in a new 
Held, to detect and shift to the advancing frontier -  rather than 
to wrestie with some "crisis" in existing conceptuat structures -  
characterized his career throughout. Segre recalled:
But already at Los Alamos [during World II] Fermi 
had the feeling that his next phase of activity would not 
be in neutrons but in something new, and he reminded 
me that just as [in the early 1930s] he discarded all his 
investments in spectroscopy to go to nuclear work, so 
now he would leave the slow neutron in order to proceed 
to new conquests in the Held of high-energy physics. In 
a half-joking mode he quoted Mussolini: "Rinnovarsi o 
perire -  to renew oneself or to perish."^
This brings us directly to the circumstances under which the 
Fermi group in Rome, after its formation, turned its attention to 
the work in nuclear physics which ultimately gave it its preemi­
nence and which led to the events of 1934.
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From the time when he was brought to the University of Rome 
in 1926 until the end of the 1920s, the work of Fermi and his 
growing group was largely in spectroscopy and atomic physics.^ 
But soon after Fermi had been appointed professor of theoretical 
physics at the University of Rome in 1926, he began to see that 
the ongoing revolution in quantum mechanics would necessitate 
deep study-both in order to do justice to the intellectual ex­
citement aroused by papers such as those of Schrodinger and 
Dirac, but also from a practical point of view -  to see what the 
advent of quantum mechanics meant in terms of the research 
program of Fermi and his students. A cool assessment of the 
situation showed him by the end of the 1920s that the vigorous 
development of quantum mechanics "signaled the completion of 
atomic physics." Segre writes:
These ideas suggested a radical change in the research 
projects of the Institute because our experimental 
tradition in Rome went back to the spectroscopic work
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initiated by Rasetti under Puccianti at Pisa. AH our 
successes in experimental physics up to that time had 
been on spectroscopic subjects; our equipment was 
spectroscopic; and our knowledge was mainly in the 
Held of atomic physics. "^
Amaldi recalls the feeling at the institute at the time: "You had 
to move to something where the phenomena, the facts, were still 
unknown -  it was very clear that this was urgent."^
In a field advancing as rapidly as physics, it is now not at all 
unusual for a group of collaborating scientists to note that they 
may be overtaken by events, and to decide to explore a more 
promising field. But rarely if ever in the history of modern 
physics was an entry into a new field made in a way so prag­
matic, unsentimental, well-phased, and ultimately successful.^ 
The decision of Fermi and his collaborators to change to nuclear 
physics out of all possible new fields was full of risks and would 
require great labor from everyone, since there was no experi­
mental or theoretical background available to them -  except in 
Fermi's own case, for example, by his study of Rutherford's 
work on the artificial disintegration of nuclei, referred to earlier, 
and of the influence of the magnetic moment of the nucleus on 
the hyperfine structure of spectra, published in 1930.
There were fewer than five years between the time when 
Fermi's group decided to enter the field of nuclear physics as 
novices and the time when this decision was carried out and re­
sults were achieved. Within this period, the major creative work 
took place during a few feverish months in 1934, and the group 
began to break up late in 1935.  ^ During the period from late 
in 1929 to late in 1934, the sequence of events proceeded in a 
series of eight steps, all of which were, in retrospect, evidently 
necessary for achieving the goal. Of course, the Fermi group did 
not consciously proceed according to a rationally constructed 
grand plan.
First, a decision had to be made concerning the direction and 
magnitude of the effort, and it had to be carried to the highest 
level of government to obtain financial and administrative sup­
port. This is the chief significance of Orso Afario Corbino's 
speech on September 21, 1929, at the Societa Italiana per il Pro- 
gresso delle Scienze, on "The New Goals of Experimental
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Physics."3" Corbino -  a senator of the Kingdom of Italy as well 
as a professor of experimental physics, and the director of the 
Physics Institute at the University of Rome within which Fermi 
and his group worked -  carried to the public, the scientists, and 
the Senate the message that research in physics in Italy must 
change in the direction of research into nuclear physics.
Corbino named Fermi as the person to play a dominant role. 
The talk was "in fact written certainly with intimate collabora­
tion with Fermi."3* It carefully stated reasons why, by choosing 
one among all the Felds of physics then existing, an opportunity 
could be created for contributing at the highest, internationally 
recognizable level, so that "Italy will regain with honor its lost 
eminence"^" in physics. To this end, ". . . the only possibility 
of great new discoveries lies in the chance that one might be able 
to identify the internal nucleus of the atom. This will be the 
worthy task of physics of the future."^ Traditionally, "the high­
est category in physics research" had been "the discovery of new 
phenomena,"34 with x-rays and radioactivity being memorable 
examples of startling findings beyond the horizon of then cur­
rent theory. But this style of research was exhausted, for "mod­
ern physics already possesses the basic knowledge of the possible 
phenomena which may develop or be produced experimentally 
on earth."3s There was only one exception: "the Feld of arti- 
Fcial modiFcations of the atomic nucleus.'^" Moreover, new 
branches of physics would not arise until one obtained possible 
artiFcial modiFcations of the atomic nucleiT Rutherford had 
"given us the only possibility of artiFcial transmutation,'^ but 
by his method the effect occurred very infrequently.
"Will it be possible to attack the atom in some other way? "3" 
It seemed to Corbino that accelerators would have to be built in 
Italy, as they were then in construction elsewhere. But the Fnan- 
cial and technical difFculties were evident. At any rate, "One 
can therefore conclude that while great progress in experimental 
physics in its ordinary domain is unlikely, many possibilities are 
open in attacking the atomic nucleus. This is the most attractive 
Feld for future physicists.'^"
With a kind of national goal for physics research put before 
them -  although, it is important to notice, only in general terms, 
not as a speciFc mission to do a speciFc experiment -  the second
step was for Fermi's group to engage in a process of basic, gen­
eral self-education in the held of nuclear physics. For this pur­
pose Amaldi was charged, in the autumn of 1931, to give a 
seminar in which the new edition of the basic work of Ruther­
ford, Chadwick, and Ellis was read and studied.^ The member­
ship of the seminar consisted -  in addition to Amaldi -  of Fermi, 
Rasetti, Majorana, and Segred^
Third, the group had to remain scientifically alive and visible, 
and hence to publish, even during the transition period while 
shifting from atomic and molecular physics to nuclear physics. 
Thus, as late as 1933 Segre and Amaldi still published largely on 
spectroscopy, though on subjects that in part were transitions 
toward nuclear physics.^ Fermi, too, continued to publish pro- 
lihcally-from early 1930 to his first experimental nuclear phys­
ics paper in 1933 -  more than twenty papers in a large variety 
of physics subfields, usually alone, but sometimes with one col­
laborator. But the general direction of his motion, from the win­
ter of 1930-31 onward, was toward nuclear physics, while wait­
ing for the laboratory and the group to get ready -  and for the 
opportunity to strike. Thus, as he was turning from his earlier 
predominantly theoretical work toward a period in which he 
would be predominantly engaged in experimentation, he studied 
the hypcrhne structure of spectral lines caused by nuclear spin; 
it may be regarded as one of the "bridges" from the old to the 
new.^
During the same period, Fermi began his self-education in 
constructing instruments for research in nuclear physics. With 
the help of Amaldi, he tried to construct and operate a cloud 
chamber. To circumvent the poorly equipped and inefficiently 
staffed machine shop, Fermi had to
make use of the "do it yourself" methods that were 
characteristic of him, both in theoretical and in experi­
mental work. In order to minimize shop work and build 
a cloud chamber with his own hands, aided only by the 
most elementary tools, he first inspected several hardware 
stores and bought assorted kitchenware and gas 
plumbing.^
But by the spring of 1931, Fermi had to give up the project, 
and go back to theoretical work. It must have been a sobering
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experience, and may have contributed to the decision that mem­
bers of the group wouid have to go abroad to iearn techniques 
at established centers of research in nuclear physics.
The fourth stage saw a great, but temporary, dispersal. It was 
in fact the second phase of a two-phase set of expeditions. Rasetti 
had earlier gone to Millikan's laboratory in Pasadena to work on 
the Raman effect. Segre had gone to visit Zeeman in Amsterdam 
to work on the Zeeman effect of quadrupole radiation. That was 
before the decision to go into nuclear physics. The second phase 
of the "expeditions" started in 193!, with Rasetti going to Lise 
Meitner's laboratory at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut at Berlin- 
Dahlem and learning how to make a cloud chamber, prepare 
polonium samples and neutron sources, and make counters.
Segre went to Hamburg to work with Otto Stern, and Amaldi 
to Debye's laboratory in Leipzig. Their purpose was not directly 
to learn nuclear work, but was somewhat more general. The in­
tention was
that we all would go to a place where you learn a new 
experimental technique, and bring them all back . . . 
with an eye to enlarging our held. We were even con­
sidering at a certain moment building a cyclotron . . .
We knew that one had to learn vacuum technique; we 
couldn't make a vacuum of our own between all of us 
put together . . . And so then we would have more 
variety, more freedom.^
In the summer of 1931, Amaldi recalls, he met Rasetti and 
Segre in Norway, and then they talked further with Fermi. They 
were getting ready for some important work. Precisely what was 
not yet any clearer than it had been in Corbino's speech, two 
years earlier. But the poor state of the current nuclear theory -  
the neutron had not yet been discovered -  and the confidence 
derived from learning that the experimental techniques were 
quite manageable, combined to enable them to guess correctly 
where the bull's-eye of the target would be, once a specific 
target began to come over the horizon. As Amaldi put it: "Then 
we said that it was better that we concentrate our efforts in 
something that is in so primitive a state that there is a lot to be 
done. That was quite clear."*"
The next step may have seemed a rather brazen one. Before
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any signiRcant work had yet been done by the Rome group in 
the Reid of nuciear physics, an International Congress on Nuclear 
Physics, organized by Fermi and sponsored by the Reale Ac- 
cademia d'ltalia, was held in Rome in October 1931. It was the 
Rrst full-scale international conference on the subject. Most of 
the active experimental and theoretical contributors to nuclear 
physics came. The list included Blackett, Bothe, Bohr, Marie 
Curie, Ehrenfest, Ellis, Fermi, Geiger, Goudsmit, Heisenberg, 
Meitner, Pauli, Sommerfeld, and others.*  ^ This conference is 
usually regarded as the announcement by the Rome group of 
the inauguration of its work in nuclear physics.
By the autumn of 1932, Fermi and Rasetti were ready to pur­
sue in earnest "a joint program of research in nuclear physics in 
Rome."4" The research budget of the department had been raised 
to between $2,000 and $3,000 per year: "a fabulous wealth when 
one considers that the average for physics departments in Italian 
universities was about one tenth of that amount."^" A large and 
excellent cloud chamber was designed, and constructed by a pri­
vate Rrm of mechanics, as was a gamma-ray crystal spectrometer. 
The group tried its hand at making Geiger-Muller counters, 
using techniques brought back to Italy by Rossi after his visit to 
Bothc's laboratory. Rasetti prepared "a neutron source compar­
able to the most powerful ones then in use elsewhere."s* Rasetti 
and Fermi, with their gamma-ray spectrometer, observed the 
gamma rays of mesothorium of 2.6Mev. Amaldi comments: 
"That was the only piece of work that had been done in nuclear 
physics [in the Rome laboratory]."^
In other laboratories, the situation was not a great deal better. 
That is to say, experimental equipment for nuclear physics re­
search was generally still very much in an uncertain and often 
homemade state. Until 1932, the chief sources of particles for 
studying nuclear disintegration were emitters of natural alpha 
particles, either short-lived decay products of radium with heavy 
gamma radiation background, or the long-lived polonium, 
"which was difHcult to come by (in fact, one practically had 
to go to Paris) ."°3 Similarly, detectors for measuring nuclear 
radiation were quite unreliable. Decent counters were just being 
developed, and what was available was "still too noisy to be of 
much use."s*
As the experimental facilities at Rome were being built up, 
the expectations for the right phenomenon coming along height­
ened. ft was as if the group were poised for the moment when, 
in the words of Segre, they could say: "Well, now we are all 
equal, because on this one, we have the source, and we start."^
The RTZTmy in nuclear experimental physics was 1932,
and for the physicists of Rome it must have been both exhilarat­
ing and disturbing. They were still on the sidelines. The exis­
tence of the neutron, Chadwick's great discovery which had 
been missed by the Joliot-Curies, had been recognized by E. Ma- 
jorana in Rome in the Joliot-Curie experiments; despite urging, 
he had not published nor taken seriously enough these ideas. In 
the same year, the cyclotron of E. O. Lawrence and Ad. Stanley 
Livingston began to operate, ushering in the era of nuclear re­
actions by means of particle beams under the experimenter's 
control. Cockcroft and Walton's accelerator at the Cavendish 
Laboratory also went into action, with striking results (disinte­
gration of lithium nuclei).
These successes at established centers might have discouraged 
other nuclear "beginners," and the continuation of the confused 
state of the theory of the nucleus during the early 1930s might 
have reinforced a feeling of discouragement in an ordinary 
group.^ But Fermi at that very point demonstrated his mastery 
of theory with the completion in 1933 of his paper on the the­
ory of beta decay. V. Weisskopf later called it "a fantastic paper, 
which I think stands out as a monument to Fermi's intuition . . . 
Beta decay, with Fermi's idea, stands apart from the rest of nu­
clear physics because it is the creation of particles."^
The approach and results of Fermi's beta-decay theory were 
sufficiently novel for the manuscript to be rejected by the editor 
of the journal Nature as containing abstract speculations which 
were too far from physical reality. Fermi obtained quick publi­
cation by sending it to Riccrca the weekly journal
of the National Research Council (C.N.R.) of Italy, where it 
was published at the end of 1933. This journal had previously 
been used only rarely by Fermi and his group, but it was soon 
to become one of their chief outlets for quick publication of im­
portant results. Professor 1. 1. Rabi commented later that this 
"made the Riccrc# one of the most prized journals in
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physics, and caused ah physicists interested in nuciei to learn 
enough Italian to follow these fascinating researches."""
And now, the moment for which the whole Rome group had 
been waiting -  without knowing clearly what it would be like -  
that moment came: the announcement, at the January iy, 1934, 
session of the Academie des sciences in Paris, of the discovery 
by the Joliot-Curies that bombarding boron or aluminum with 
alpha particles produced in the targets new radioactive isotopes 
(of nitrogen and phosphorus respectively), with the emission of 
positrons. It was entirely unexpected; the discoverers had stum­
bled on it, and nearly missed it.""
For the first time, elements had been made radioactive in the 
laboratory "artificially." A whole new horizon opened up to 
nuclear physics -  and essentially in the way the prophetic Cor- 
bino had envisaged in his speech of 1929.
The Joliot-Curies' publication reached Rome in about Feb­
ruary 1934. The excitement seems to have been very great. G. C. 
Wick recalls the meeting of all members of the Rome group in 
Fermi's ofhce to discuss the opportunities for research which 
were suddenly evident."" Suddenly, all the pieces could be fitted 
together after the long period of preparation."* It is striking that 
almost all the expertise needed came from within the group of 
collaborators who, for some years, had been together in the 
Rome group -  with the exception of the chemist D'Agostino, 
who was brought in during this period and became an excellent 
collaborator.
The idea for exploiting the new effect in a new way was, as 
one might expect, Fermi's. The Joliot-Curies had produced their 
artificial radioactivity by using alpha particles as projectiles. 
Fermi however said "that obviously should be done with neu­
trons. Neutrons should be much better.""" The means were al­
ready on their bench. Rasetti had prepared a neutron source of 
polonium-beryllium, drawing on his experience in Lise Meitner's 
laboratory. When it quickly became obvious that it was neces­
sary, Segre and Fermi were able to make much stronger radon- 
beryllium sources.""
It is essential to remember that Fermi's suggestion would 
elsewhere have been dismissed as unlikely at best and absurd at 
worst. O. R. Frisch has said:
lyo
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I remember that my reaction and probabiy that of many 
others was that Fermi's was really a silly experiment 
because neutrons were much fewer than alpha particles. 
What that simple argument overlooked of course was 
that they are very much more effective. Neutrons are 
not slowed down by electrons, and they are not repelled 
by the Coulomb field of nuclei.^
Amaldi recounts that they knew that they would get some­
thing interesting only if they could organize the work quickly 
and in an effective way, and made a systematic search for the 
effect."" With an additional grant of $1,000 from the C.N.R., 
apparently obtained easily and without any strings attached, 
they immediately set out systematically to try the effect of 
neutron bombardments on all elements. Thus started a period of 
activity that, for a time,'"' made the Rome group the leading one 
in the field, and exceptional in its internal organization.
The organization of the Rome group now differed from that 
of its own earlier phase and from the usual procedure in, for 
example, the Cavendish Laboratory. At the latter, the work was 
more dispersed, with one, two, or at the most three investigators, 
above the level of technical support, working together on one 
of the many rather different problems within the area of the 
laboratory's general field of preoccupation. As director, Ruther­
ford would serve as a more or less occasional participant and 
adviser, once the main direction of research had been set for a 
given person or small group. Fermi's laboratory, on the other 
hand, now organized itself to focus all forces on one project and 
to concentrate all its expertise in one major effort, once that was 
identified as the area which would bring the maximum result for 
the laboratory as a whole.*  ^The change here was from a wide- 
ranging group of subgroups to a group acting as a "team." It was 
an institutional innovation.
The effectiveness of the group was enhanced by an act of al­
most intuitive choice on the part of Fermi in assembling his 
group. Specifically, he had avoided having members of the 
group either overlap so closely in their competences and inter­
ests that they would begin to assert their own territorial impera­
tives, or to be so far apart that they would not overlap suffi­
ciently. This balance has since been recognized as a key element
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in the assembiy of a successful group of collaborators. As the 
chief theorist, Fermi himself was intellectually at the center of 
the group. This avoided the kind of problems which from time 
to time characterized work at the Cavendish Laboratory, where, 
it has been said, the experimentalists were rarely in touch with 
the theorists.
In the long run, the effect of this style of doing physics was 
felt profoundly everywhere, and not least in Italy itself. One can 
see the same style motivating and infusing the work during the 
period bridging the decay of Fermi's own group in Rome and 
the renaissance of physics in Italy after the war. U. Fano be­
lieved the "establishment was established" as a model for the 
period after 1934, and Ageno claimed he had learned from Fermi 
not only physics, but a whole style of laboratory work, includ­
ing the organization and conduct of research.*  ^ Amaldi shows 
how he, Bernardini, Gian Carlo Wick and others, assembled after 
Fermi's departure and determined, during the war, to concen­
trate their group effort in Rome upon a carefully chosen, man­
ageable and important problem, that is, cosmic rays."" Others 
participating were M. Conversi, E. Pancini, and O. Piccioni. The 
effectiveness and concentration of the group were essential for 
physics in Italy to emerge in a productive state at the end of 
World War II, when the vigorous high-energy physics research 
was rooted firmly in the cosmic-ray research which had been 
carried out just before and during the ward"
Early in 1934, the first fruit of the Italian attack on nuclei 
with neutrons was the discovery of artificial radioactivity in 
fluorine and aluminium. This was published in March 1934 under 
Fermi's named* In rapid succession, forty of the sixty elements 
the group irradiated revealed the existence of at least one new 
radioactive isotope. A new one was found every few days; the 
members of the group looked back later to this as the most 
glorious and satisfying part of their lives.
Publication after publication followed rapidly. Almost casu­
ally, two institutional "inventions" were made at that point. One 
was multiple authorship: after the first two papers by Fermi 
alone, he drew in the rest of the group, and as many as six au­
thors appeared under the title of the publications -  an unusually 
high number at the time.
Another "invention" was the preparation and mailing out -  to 
a list of about forty prominent physicists around the world -  of 
what now are called "preprints" of articles in press at Rfcerc# 
In this way -  improving even on the journal's re­
markably fast publication process of about two weeks-Fermi's 
group could make its discoveries known in printed form within 
days of the work being finished, and could send the preprints to 
active nuclear physicists who might not have access in their own 
libraries to the journal itself. Amaldi remarks: "This procedure 
was facilitated by the fact that my wife Ginestra was working 
at that time at the
The comments from scientists abroad showed quick accep­
tance of and interest in the results from RomeT In Rutherford's 
letter to Fermi, the line "You seem to have struck a good line to 
start with" may seem to have the somewhat patronizing overtone 
of welcoming a newcomer to experimental nuclear physics; but 
that was undoubtedly not intended. Rutherford was certainly 
right in one implication: After a long period of preparation for 
the transforming event which he could only have dimly foreseen, 
Fermi had indeed "struck gold."^
The discovery of the existence and effectiveness of y/ow neu­
trons follows in about six months. In a sense, it was only a matter 
of time before the Italian group came upon it, but between their 
discovery of the effectiveness of neutrons in causing radioactivity 
in fluorine as the first instance, and the determination that slowed- 
down, that is, moderated, neutrons can produce vastly increased 
and quite different activities, everyone seems to have thought 
that the more energetic the neutrons, the greater would be their 
effectiveness, that slow neutrons would have only a small capture 
cross section. All excitation curves known at the time for reac­
tions produced by protons, deuterons, and alpha particles showed 
a rapid decrease with decreasing velocity of the particle inducing 
the reaction.^ This was a consequence not so much of ortho­
doxy as of the deficient state of an incomplete theory; the effect 
of photomagnetic capture on the total capture cross section for 
neutrons was not yet known.
And yet, partly by his own work one and one-half years ear­
lier on the paper which dealt with the effect of slow electrons, 
Fermi may well have been pondering the possibilities for slow
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neutrons, and at the very least was sensitive to clues on this 
point. When the "mythological event" did take place in Octo­
ber 1934, it took him very little time to develop the correct be­
ginnings of a theory for the role slow neutrons play in activation. 
He and his group thereby entered into what has been called a 
heroic pioneering period of startling results, which served, within 
a period of a few months, to reinforce and vastly strengthen the 
position this group had already achieved in physics. Not only 
was physics changed thereby. Scientifically, Italy had indeed re­
gained "with honour its lost eminence," as Senator Corbino had 
hoped. And world history itself had been turned in a new di­
rection.
Fitting- 2)!
Fermi's mastery of physics and his style of research may not have 
been enough in themselves to produce the transformation in 
physics in Italy. With these characteristics alone he still might 
have had the same fate as Amedeo Avogadro, the first holder of 
a chair in theoretical physics in Italy rz/Mwe), whose con­
tributions to chemistry are, of course, very well known, but who 
neither received adequate recognition in his time nor formed a 
school. From the beginning Fermi understood the tradition 
within which science was carried on in Italy and took good 
advantage of the system which existed for the institutionalization 
and professionalization of science. "Fermi was fully aware of the 
system and was eager to reach the top as fast as possible."?? So 
when, on returning from Leiden, Fermi "looked eagerly for a 
job," he undertook to
advance his career through a substantial number of 
publications. Thus he wrote (in Italian) as many papers 
as he could. Although he kept his standards high, it is 
clear that he counted them carefully and felt satisfaction 
in seeing the pile of his reprints mount ever higher. He 
wanted to reach the next step in the academic career, the 
FZ'CM as rapidly as possible, and he believed that
the sheer number of publications was important -  
especially if the judges should be too lazy, or unable, to 
assess the value of his contributions.?^
An interesting aspect of Fermi's sensitivity to the tradition 
and to the existing opportunities within the tradition was his 
ability, in an early and crucial stage of his career, to seek out 
and respond to mathematicians, and to obtain support and pa­
tronage from that group. Fermi had studied mathematics, even 
with passion, but chiefly because he considered it necessary to 
the study of physics, "to which I want to dedicate myself ex­
clusively," as he explained to his first mentor, Adolfo Amidei, 
in
But physics, and particularly theoretical physics, had fallen 
into a poor state in Italy by 1920. The last "great" Italian physi­
cist had been Volta, in the early part of the nineteenth century. 
Righi had just died-in 1920-without a clear successor to his 
position as Italy's leading physicist. At the very time when 
physics in Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United 
States was proceeding in a lively manner, and remarkable, even 
revolutionary ideas were being brought forth elsewhere, Italy 
was, from that point of view, a "provincial backwater in which 
practically no one was active in current developments."^"
Physics in Italy was indeed weak institutionally by the usual 
measures, including variety and strength of the professional so­
cieties in that particular field, numbers of its members, and num­
ber of chairs at its universities; except for Rome, where there 
were two physicists, there was only one chair in each of the 
other major Italian universities, and the turnover of professors 
was about one in a decade. Institutional weakness was also evi­
dent in support of research, How of students, quality of research 
journals, number and distinction of national and international 
conferences, inHuence of a substantial number of scientists of 
that Held within government, and attention given them by the 
press and public. It is not without signiHcance that the only 
Nobel Prize in physics awarded to an Italian before Fermi in 
1938 was the prize-half share-for 1909 to G. Marconi for 
radiotelegraphy -  and that, if anything, was something of an 
embarrassment to many Italians, since he had not found support 
in Italy.
Fermi was probably aware of some good and even distin­
guished work done, at that time or in the recent past, by certain 
Italian physicists such as Bartoli, Puccianti in Pisa, Garbasso in
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Florence, and Corbino, who had been a student of Macaluso in 
Palermo and who was brought from his native Sicily to Rome 
by Blaserna. Of these, Corbino was perhaps the most outstand­
ing. But while knowledgeable and interested in many branches 
of physics, he too was no longer active at the time. Fermi must 
have seen fairly clearly from the beginning that the state of Ital­
ian physics was on the whole not excellent, for on entering the 
Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa in 1918 he found that he al­
ready knew most of the subjects which were being taught, that 
he had to learn modern physics on his own, and that there were 
only two other students in physics-Franco Rasetti and Nello 
Carrara.
It is, therefore, indicative of his promise as a future statesman 
of science that immediately after graduation from Pisa, on re­
turning to Rome, he associated himself with and was indeed 
acceptable within a circle of distinguished mathematicians which 
centered on Castelnuovo, Levi-Civita, and Enriques."
The state of excellence in mathematics in Italy at the time, as 
indicated by names such as Cremona, Peano, Severi, Volterra, 
Enriques, Ricci-Curbastro, Levi-Civita, and Castelnuovo, was 
indeed high. These men had advanced Italy into the front rank 
of mathematics and brought it international recognition. Most 
universities had several chairs in mathematics. The number and 
quality of students and of journals were good. Therefore, just 
as Fermi's early students and colleagues were to come from a 
field outside physics which had promised a better career -  Segre, 
Rasetti, Amaldi, Persico, and Majorana were all initially headed 
for engineering-Fermi himself had to make his way into a tra- 
dionally weak academic field in Italy, and had to do so through 
support derived from a strong and vigorous one.
Fermi's ability to use opportunities offered by academic politics 
and by current nationalistic ambitions was also of some signifi­
cance. It is commonly held that Fermi was deeply apolitical. But 
this estimate cannot apply to the politics of university life on 
which, for better or worse, depended the creation and mainte-
nance of a new and relatively costly establishment such as Fermi's 
group.
We know from Fermi himseif that aimost immediateiy after 
he returned to Rome following graduation from Pisa, he ar­
ranged to present himseif to the director of the Physics Labora­
tory at the University of Rome, the man then thought to be not 
oniy the most prominent Itaiian physicist, but aiso the foremost 
itaiian statesman of science -  Orso Mario Corbino. In Fermi's 
words: "I was then 20 years oid; Corbino was 46. He was a sena­
tor of the Kingdom, had been a minister of pubiic instruction, 
and was universally known as one of the most eminent schol­
ars."^ Fermi found himself immediately welcome, and they dis­
cussed Fermi's studies: "In that period we had almost daily con­
versations and discussions which not only clarified many of my 
confused ideas, but aroused in me the deeply felt reverence of 
the pupil for the master. This reverence steadily increased during 
the years I was privileged to work in his laboratory."^
For the subsequent history of this case, it was a crucial en­
counter. Corbino^* understood physics well, having done inter­
esting experimental work himself; he was now effectively in­
volved in industrial consultation, administration, and political 
work; he had become senator in :p2o and minister of public in­
struction in 192!; although not a member of the Fascist Party, 
he was also briefly minister of national economy until 1923. In 
Rome, where all the power in Italy was centered, Corbino under­
stood and enjoyed the wise exercise of power. "An excellent 
speaker, he was endowed with sparkling wit, and his intellectual 
traits were complemented by a warm and generous personality 
and a propensity to academic maneuvers. He liked to arrange 
promotions, transfers, and the like, and usually succeeded in 
these attempts."^
But most significantly, by ^22, after nearly a decade of hav­
ing made no contributions to physics himself despite his excep­
tional ability and deep, continuing interest, Corbino was passing 
through a serious personal reassessment. During a discussion, as 
minister of public instruction in the Senate in 1922, he exclaimed: 
Now, Honorable Senators, I also have passed through a 
crisis which I want to prevent for my colleagues of
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tomorrow . . .  I stiH yearn for science. I yearn above 
all, in the bitterness of political action, for the peaceful 
days passed among experiments and apparatus. And I 
regret that, after the death of Augusto Righi, Italian 
physics has been unable to find his successor.^
It is not difficult to see that on encountering the evident genius 
of Fermi within this framework of his own preoccupation, Cor- 
bino, the politician, entered into a state of symbiotic collabora­
tion with Fermi, the scientist; this was not less effective for 
being probably largely unconscious. It was as a result of Cor- 
bino's efforts that, despite the essential rigid structure of the 
Italian university, a chair in theoretical physics was created at 
the University of Rome, and in such a way that it could be 
filled only by Fermi. Soon thereafter, again through Corbino's 
influence, Fermi became the only physicist elected to the Royal 
Academy of Italy, at the age of twenty-eight.^ Similarly, Cor- 
bino was the moving force behind the administrative actions nec­
essary to obtain appointments and funds for every one of the 
members of Fermi's circle, including the creation of yet another 
chair in physics, in 1930, for Rasetti^-in spectroscopy, at pre­
cisely the time when Rasetti was leaving spectroscopy and going 
into nuclear physics.
The support provided by Corbino, and, through him, by the 
administration of the Italian state, was such that Fermi's group 
became essentially a protected operation. Without this protec­
tion it is almost inconceivable that young Fermi could have 
weathered the opposition from hostile forces such as the other 
professor of physics at Rome, Lo Surdo, and from other estab­
lished persons who, for many years, did not look kindly upon 
Fermi's growing activities. For Fermi, Corbino was a godsend 
not only as a protector but also as administrator -  just as Fermi 
later had George Pegram as a sympathetic administrator at Co­
lumbia, Arthur H. Compton at the Metallurgical Laboratory at 
Chicago, and Samuel Allison at the University of Chicago. The 
appointment of Lo Surdo as director of the Physics Laboratory 
after the death of Corbino in January [937 signaled danger to 
the institutionally fragile group, and may have had an effect in 
turning Fermi's thoughts more strongly to emigration.
Corbino's influence on the growth and activities of the Fermi
group is everywhere evident -  for example, in the change of di­
rection of the group's work as indicated in his speech of 1929, 
and on such occasions as his opening speech in 1931 at the Rome 
Conference on Nuclear Physics or his taik at the royal session of 
the Accademia dei Lincei in 1934. Often he spoke at the risk of 
offending other interests; thus Segre recalls that Corbino "was 
jumped on terrifically by all the physicists in Italy" -  except for 
Fermi's collaborators-after his speech in 1929.
Corbino even busied himself with drawing students' attention 
to Fermi at a time when there were almost no students in physics 
at the University of Rome. As Amaldi recalls:
Fie started to make propaganda . . . For instance, in 
my case, I was Corbino's student in my second year . . . 
Then he stopped five minutes before the end [of his 
lecture] and said: "Now some of you should stop your 
study of engineering and you should go into physics, 
because we now have a new professor of physics here in 
Rome . . .  I can assure you that this is the man who can 
bring physics to a high level in Italy. In this moment, the 
young people should go into physics."""
Corbino also was of considerable importance to Fermi's group 
since he talked frequently and informally with all of them as 
friends; thereby he "contributed materially to their education, 
and not only as scientists.""" Last, but not least, Corbino either 
outlined a sort of epistemology for Fermi and his group, or at 
least in part adopted and echoed Fermi's. For example, Corbino 
in 1929 pointed out some of the weaknesses of the traditional 
Italian ways of doing physics, including the habit of looking for 
new and unforeseen phenomena "without any aid from the theo­
ries which existed." He predicted that the future development 
in experimental physics must be coupled more strongly with the 
state of the theory, and also that modern research in any coun­
try must be carried on in full awareness of the deepest tenden­
cies of scientific research elsewhere in the world.
While not a nationalist, Fermi was not insensitive to the op­
portunities opened up by national ambitions. By temperament 
and training, he saw himself as a member of the world commu­
nity of scientists. But his early, somewhat discouraging expe­
riences during his stay in Gottingen with Born, Heisenberg,
F e n w A  g ro t/p  h  pL<?c m  pAyyfcy 1^9
Z72 rCtTCHf180
Jordan, and Pauli in 1922-23 may have shown him that his ex­
pectations for his own career, and the hope that Italy might 
achieve first rank in physics, could be brought together to mu­
tual benefit.
Fermi considered the possibility of emigrating in 1922"* when 
he saw the Fascists becoming well entrenched. Upon his return 
from his trip to Germany and the Netherlands, he appears to 
have brought back an appreciation for the need to supplement 
and replace the old Italian tradition, one dissociated from theo­
retical advances which were mostly made abroad. Fie would 
therefore have agreed fully with Corbino -  if, indeed, he was 
not himself responsible for many of the ideas in that speech -  
when Corbino said in 1929:
Considering that collaboration between theoretical and 
experimental physicists in Italy is only now beginning, 
and that we are far from having the lavish means in our 
laboratories which other countries possess, it is not sur­
prising that Italian physics was not able to contribute 
more to scientific progress in this great period of renewal.
If we can correct these two deficiencies, Italy will regain 
with honour its lost eminence."^
This theme was of course a factor operating not only in the 
genesis of Fermi's group. Indeed, it formed a very integral part 
of contemporary Italian life and culture. Every child was being 
exposed to an atmosphere of grandiloquent nationalism which 
extolled the glories of the past, stressed analogies between the 
hoped-for future and the Roman Empire, and dwelt on the list 
of exceptional figures in recent Italian history. But the focus 
of national hopes on Fermi was nevertheless deliberate and early. 
It had found expression in the report of the committee which, 
on November y, 1926, awarded to Fermi the first place in the 
competition for the new chair of theoretical physics at the Uni­
versity of Rome. The report was Corbino's work, and he wrote 
there about the person whom he probably regarded as the new 
Righi:
He moves with complete assurance in the most difficult 
questions of modern theoretical physics, in such a way 
that he is the best-prepared and most worthy person to
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represent our country in this held of intense scientific 
activity that ranges the entire worid. The Committee thus 
unanimously finds that Professor Fermi highiy deserves to 
have the chair of theoretical physics, the object of this 
competition, and feels it can put in him the best hopes for 
the establishment and development of theoretical physics 
in Italy."3
The degree to which free and rational science conflicts with 
the ideology of totalitarian states has often been the subject of 
inquiry. In Italy, at any rate, the C.N.R. and the Royal Acad­
emy, in both of which Fermi served and which in turn sup­
ported his work, were used by the Fascist government to 
supplement the existing Italian Physical Society and the Italian 
Association for the Advancement of Science. One experienced 
observer has gone so far as to say that "Fermi would have been 
almost impossible in Italy without Mussolini.""** But whatever 
the character of a regime, if it was desirous of supporting 
science, it would have had to invent some way of dealing with 
Fermi, given the absence of a clear tradition for his subspeciality.
For his part, Fermi was in principle not interested in ideol­
ogies. One component of the scientific tradition in every 
country, for better or worse, has been for the members of the 
profession to accommodate themselves by and large to what­
ever government is in power. Robert Hooke's draft preamble to 
the statutes of the Royal Society of London declared that the 
scientists of that day did not intend "meddling with Divinity, 
Metaphysics, Morals, Politics, Grammar, Rhetoric, or Logics." 
When Grand Duke Leopold II, himself elected a fellow of the 
Royal Society of London in 1838, consented to the calling of 
the influential first Riunione degli Scienziati Italiani at Pisa in 
1839, he granted permission only on the condition that "neither 
philosophy, nor politics, nor history, nor eloquence, nor poetry, 
nor legislation, nor public economy, nor public administration" 
be discussed."^
Fermi probably would have found this natural and acceptable, 
as did, for other reasons, those in the state administration who 
had to support him. Nor did Fermi care to take up causes not 
directly related to his work. For example, in Italy there was a
i8z
popular prejudice against science as a possible source of irreli­
gious beliefs and as antithetical to genuine culture. Fermi did 
not enter into this debate.
On the other hand, there was a long tradition in Italy of 
having scientists drawn into the councils of government, which 
resulted in a freer and more natural association of political lead­
ers with Italian scientists and scholars than was the case in many 
other Western countries."" The line leading from Blaserna to 
Corbino and then to Fermi was only one example of such cases.
Another example of the deliberate effort to connect the work 
of the Fermi group with the desire to meet national needs may 
be seen in the passage toward the end of Corbino's speech of 
1929 in which he pointed out supplementary benefits which 
might accrue from greater support of modern physics in Italy. 
Fie noted that the theory of relativity-of which Fermi himself 
was one of the chief exponents in Italy -  could be turned to 
great use to provide abundant energy: "In these nuclear phe­
nomena, the transcendental importance of which does not need 
to be emphasized, one would transform matter into energy and 
vice versa to the tune of 2$ million kilowatt hours for every 
gram of transformed matter.""? If this should not come quickly, 
Corbino hinted at other advantages: "Thus, even if physics were 
to move toward a saturation level, the study of its application to 
other disciplines, such as biology, if conducted by true experts 
with the resources of modern physics, could bring results of 
the greatest scientific and practical value."
These have, of course, been the arguments brought out quite 
regularly by physicists when they have sought financial support 
from society. What is impressive, however, is the foresight of 
Corbino, whose remarks precede those of other physicists such 
as E. O. Lawrence in their search for finding a legitimate basis 
for the support of research in physics in the solution of practical 
problems. Fermi rarely had to speak up this way on his own 
behalf, as long as Corbino was at hand to do it for the group.""
Finally, in listing the various ways in which Fermi's career and 
Italy's national ambitions coincided, we cannot avoid mention­
ing the hypothesis that, somewhere in the minds of the sup­
porters of Fermi's group, there may have been an unexpressed
hope that they would gain the kind of recognition which comes 
with the award of a Nobel Prize to a country which is regarded 
as scientifically of the "second rank." The local effects of such an 
award as that for physics in 1907 to a physicist in the United 
States and in 1949 to one in Japan have not been "measured," but 
they were considerable in terms of the great increase in national 
self-confidence in that field of science. The appropriateness of 
Fermi for the eventual receipt of such a prize must have become 
more and more obvious in early and mid-1930s, and may well 
have been entertained even earlier by alert, politically active 
persons such as Corbino."" To be sure, if this example may seem 
to provide a sort of recipe for the way a scientifically "develop­
ing" nation might go about securing a chance of winning a 
Nobel Prize in a field of science, it is still obvious that by far the 
chief requirement is first to have a Fermi appear -  and then to 
hold him.
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Charles Weiner has coined the useful term "the travelling semi­
nar" to describe the lively interaction of European and Ameri­
can physicists in the 1920s and 1930s, even before the exodus 
from German universities as the result of the rise of Nazism.*"" 
Scientists, and particularly physicists, had developed to a re­
markable degree a sense of being engaged in an international 
undertaking. Weiner writes:
During the years immediately preceding the rise of the 
Third Reich, Europe was bubbling with intellectual ac­
tivity in many fields of scholarship. Physics was excep­
tionally ebullient . . . European physicists and their 
students were constantly in motion, travelling back and 
forth to exchange newly born ideas. As today, travel and 
communication were essential aspects of the life of the 
physicists, contrary to the folkloric image of the scientist 
locked up in his laboratory, uninterested in personal 
interactions. Major stops on their itineraries included 
universities and laboratories in Munich, Leipzig, Got­
tingen, Leyden, Zurich, Cambridge, Copenhagen, and
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Berlin. In the 1920s it was essential for physicists to have 
first-hand experience of the work being performed in 
the capitals of research.*"*
At the Cavendish Laboratory, about 1930, for example, there 
was a continuous stream of visitors. Some came for two or three 
days to give a talk, and some would come for two or three years 
to take a degree. John Cockcroft recalled that "roughly half the 
laboratory group were from overseas."*"^
Otto Frisch, one of the several hundred German scholars, 
scientists, and advanced students who found themselves abruptly 
dismissed when the racial laws were put into effect in Germany 
in the spring of 1933, went to work in the laboratory of Blackett 
in London, joining there a group of physicists. "We called our­
selves the League of Nations, because there were so many differ­
ent nations represented. There was a German and a Swiss and an 
Italian [Occhialini], and one chap was a Greek from France, 
and an Indian, and so on."*"^
Fermi seems to have understood the international character of 
physics from the beginning. For example, he undertook the 
study of languages for this reason. Amidei recalls: "I advised 
him [about 1917] -  and he immediately followed my suggestion 
-  to study the German language, because I foresaw that it would 
be very useful for reading scientific publications in German 
without having to wait until they were translated into French or 
Italian."*"* His own trips to Gottingen, Leiden, Copenhagen, 
and the United States at early stages of his career helped to 
express and reinforce that sense of belonging to an international 
community of physicists -  a community in which Italy still had 
to make its way.
In fact, good use was made by Fermi's circle of all four chief 
modes -  embodied more or less in formal institutional arrange­
ments -  for expressing and using the internationality of science. 
One was traveling abroad, if necessary with a fellowship such as 
one from the Rockefeller Foundation or from the Italian gov­
ernment, in order to learn techniques and to obtain speedy pub­
lication abroad -  this was part of the reason for the trip of 
Segre and Amaldi to Rutherford's laboratory in the summer of 
1932).. There was also the need to measure oneself against the 
knowledge and plans of others, and to strengthen the bonds of
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international colleagueship. Even D'Agostino, the chemist who 
had been induced to join Fermi's group, had learned his tech­
niques at the Joliot-Curies' laboratory in Paris.
A second institutional mode consisted of the attendance at 
and the conduct of international conferences, starting from that 
in 1927 at Como, and including the conference on nuclear 
physics in Rome in 1931. For the latter the funds had come 
from Italian industry, and the ubiquitous Corbino had presided 
over the negotiations for the grant. Many of those who came 
to Rome had been, or in turn would soon be, hosts to visits from 
members of the Fermi group. These facts indicate a peculiar 
aspect of the Roman internationalism. The collaboration be­
tween Fermi and Corbino produced a kind of ad hoc interna­
tionalism, as homemade -  and as effective -  as their radioactive 
sources used for research, and rather different from the formal­
ized internationalism in other parts of Europe, such as at the 
Solvay Congress, and the conferences of international unions 
or professional societies.
A third mode was the provision of hospitality in Rome to 
visitors from other countries. Serge recalls: "We had had a 
tremendous number of visitors who had brought in a lot of life. 
We had had Bethe, Bloch, Peierls, London, Feenberg [and 
Placzek and Bhabha]. By 'visitor' I mean someone who spent 
some time really and participated in the life of the place [rather 
than someone who came just for a day, as Raman and many 
others did]."*°s Others who belong to that list include S. Goud- 
smit, C. Mpller, G. Uhlenbeck, and E. Teller. There were a 
number of visitors in Rome on Rockefeller fellowships in 
physics or mathematics.
It is, however, significant that despite all these visitors, the 
group in Rome differed fundamentally from most other major 
physics centers insofar as there was no place in it for long-term 
participants from other nations. Unlike the situation in London, 
Cambridge, Paris, Copenhagen, Hamburg, or Berlin, Rome was 
not a physicist's "league of nations." The work was done by a 
relatively small, tightly knit group of Italians who, as scientists, 
had practically grown up together. When in the spring of 1933 
a vast number of German scholars and scientists were dismissed 
and many institutions and individuals outside Germany bestirred
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themselves to find work and shelter for them*"" -  long before the 
Ethiopian War and the racial agitation overtook Italian politics 
-  the Rome group was not considered, or did not consider itself, 
ready and able to provide more than a very transient refuge for 
a few. Nor did it exploit this opportunity to acquire the kinds of 
talents and expertise which helped to transform many labora­
tories outside Italy, converting them from ephemeral teams into 
true institutional centers with an international composition.*"^
The fourth feature of the institutional internationality of 
science is publication abroad and the sending of preprints to a 
list of colleagues in many countries. The policy of Fermi's group 
as to publication was carefully balanced to include publication 
in foreign, as well as in Italian, languages and journals. Only 
when great speed of publication became essential in 1934 during 
the period of the rapid growth of the list of newly identified 
radioactive isotopes, was publication undertaken in Ricerc# 
where there was no "refereeing" to delay publica­
tion and where preprints were made available very promptly for 
distribution abroad.
Apart from these four modes there was pressure owing to the 
incentive to realize Corbino's -  and others' -  hope of placing 
physics in Italy in a prominent position on the world map of 
science. It may have been partly for this reason that, apart from 
collaborating with short-term visitors from abroad, the Fermi 
group chose to remain a purely Italian group.
As we saw, the choice of problem and methodology of re­
search, by which the artificially radioactive isotopes produced 
by neutrons were discovered, did not spring from some con­
ceptual "crisis" in science. On the contrary, once the Italian 
group had chosen to enter into international competition for 
recognition as a major center for nuclear physics-itself a deci­
sion prompted not by a "crisis" but by the feeling that the 
earlier fields of physics and expertise were becoming exhausted 
and therefore boring -  the chief sense of crisis was the threat of 
missing the main chance, or of being beaten to it. As it turned 
out, this unspoken pressure, which the Italians had put on them­
selves, paid off magnificently, not only for science in Italy, but, 
by the very nature of science, for science everywhere.
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There was a superb match -  and a mutually beneficial influence 
-  between the structure and organization of the group of scien­
tists in Rome on one side, and their scientific ambitions or pro­
grams on the national and international level on the other. 
There appear to have been a half-dozen factors in the operation 
of the Rome group which, acting together, characterized its 
social structure and made in a large measure for its effectiveness.
As'd/%22'072 22772/ protcc?2<772. The group's relative isolation and pro­
tection from outside effects was striking and owed much to Cor- 
bino as an administrator and a politician. As Segre said:
Perhaps this is an oversimplification, but you should put it 
so: that Fermi was the scientific and technical leader, and 
Corbino took care of finding the money and the adminis­
tration, and so on . . .  It implied more politicking than 
you would expect because Fermi had enemies in Rome, 
had a lot of people who were his enemies, and since they 
couldn't hit Fermi, they were rather inclined to hit 
smaller fryd°"
For example, Lo Surdo at Rome considered it a personal affront 
when Fermi was called to Rome. There were others, "and one 
of the important functions of Corbino was to neutralize all these 
people."""
To a degree, Corbino personally played the role which con­
ventionally, in a better-established scientific discipline, would be 
taken by institutional arrangements. In any case, Enrico Fermi 
was able to maintain a personal sense of distance from political 
combat. AH reports agreed that he was content to leave authority 
unchallenged, as long as a good working atmosphere was avail­
able. As the grandson of a farmer who had become county sec­
retary to the Duke of Parma, and the son of an administrator in 
the railway system who had had a very satisfactory career, 
Fermi had in some measure the point of view of a civil servant; 
he had little desire to invest energy in what must have seemed to 
him the thorny and perhaps insoluble problems of science and 
society.
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There was another beneht the group derived from its isolation 
and its protected position. This was a period of great achieve­
ments and ebullience in physics; but at the same time the social, 
economic, and poiitica] conditions of Europe were in disorder. 
Not the [east problem that anyone interested in or working on 
physics faced, in Italy as elsewhere, was that there were hardly 
any career expectations in the held, other than perhaps in sec­
ondary school teaching and to a very limited degree in the uni­
versities. Most of Fermi's associates had switched from engi­
neering studies, which traditionally led to much more secure 
employment in Italy.
Under Fermi, they settled for relatively poorly remunerated 
posts as assistants, and they continued to do that for a consider­
able time. Amaldi remarked later that they simply did not worry 
about this as a problem."' It probably helped that almost all in 
the group, excluding Fermi himself, came from professional 
families which were relatively comfortable financially. They 
lived modestly -  and, in Amaldi's case, by supplementing his 
income through the income earned by his wife as editor. Amaldi 
added:
We were not interested at all in that period to make a 
quick career. I was not at all interested and this is more or 
less the general idea. We felt it was so nice what we were 
doing, so agreeable, so wonderful, that there was no 
reason to go away and get a better position. I remember 
this because on this we had very long discussions. One 
of us said, "Well, after all, what is the reason to get a 
better position, to go in a place where you don't work!
Here it is so nice, this is the thing that we should do, this 
is where you live and work . . ."We were so convinced 
that we were doing nice things."^
In this particular group, as in some others at the time, research 
was carried on in the manner which allows it to be regarded as 
a "charismatic" activity, rather than as a "mere" academic 
career."^ Ben-David is, I think, right when he refers to the 
incidence of high scientific achievement as charismatic in the 
sense that it possesses the features of an expression of the "deep­
est and most essential qualities of a specially gifted person."'"
It is, however, also true that Fermi's pragmatic and skeptical 
realism modified the "metaphysical pathos" which tended to be 
associated with the pursuit of science on the other side of the 
Alps. Nevertheless, the creative and physical energies which 
Fermi aroused in his associates and in himself shows that, within 
the protective environment provided for them, in the eye of a 
gathering hurricane they could carry on science in the most 
elevated manner.
SwMlI grtwp. More needs to be said now about the
formation of Fermi's group, for it did not follow the lines of a 
well-accepted model. In 1932, Frisch remarks, "In Europe there 
were few laboratories in which nuclear physics research was 
conducted, and I think the word 'team' had not yet been intro­
duced into scientific jargon. Science was still pursued by indi­
vidual scientists who worked with only one or two students and 
assistants."^ By 1932, however, Fermi had already built up a 
group which, while small (by present standards), was agile, 
widely trained so as to be ready to pounce on the important 
problem, and willing to wait for it.
When Fermi had to, he could run a larger group, too, as he 
showed later at Chicago, although not without grumbling. A 
small group of high quality seemed to fit his personality better. 
It was not his style either to build an institute in the manner 
which has since become fashionable, with a wide range of major 
facilities which others would come to use for their own research 
problems, or to build a teaching center which would attract and 
train large numbers of students from near and far. He liked to 
invest his energy in a group which provided personal contact on 
physics problems which were of direct, current relevance to his 
research interest. The efficiency of such a group tends to de­
crease, and the organizational problems increase as the group 
increases in size.
A small group also may have the edge in the ability to exploit 
a lucky break, or even to recognize it properly when it does 
come along accidentally. The advantage of Fermi's group in this 
respect was shown precisely when Amaldi and Pontecorvo were 
assigned the task of producing reliably reproducible intensities
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of artificial radioactivity from silver where a neutron source was 
used to bombard it. It was during this work that they stumbled 
upon an effect which ultimately, in the mind of Fermi, pro­
duced the hypothesis that slow neutrons may have a much 
bigger capture cross section than anyone had thought. The key 
observation was that of the "miraculous" effect of a wooden 
table in one part of the laboratory, on which the activation 
experiment gave large yields, as against a marble table on which 
the experiment gave small yields. (The effect was due to the 
slowing down and scattering back toward the target of neutrons 
which were heading down into the hydrogenous material, i.e., 
wood.) It was just this observation which led to the explanation 
of the effect attributable to slow neutrons, upon which the great 
advances in the last part of 1934 depended. But it is also just this 
kind of "lucky break" which, if made in a large and busy labora­
tory, might well not have come to the attention of the person 
whose contribution is essential to change the observation from a 
bothersome irregularity-which indeed could have been easily 
removed, for example, by carrying on all observations on one 
table only -  to a transforming discovery.
C<?^ cr3073 recrz32r77?e72t. From the beginning, Fermi's group 
was different from any other known to me in the history of 
physics. It was characterized by a cohesion which stemmed from 
an extraordinary history of recruitment and apprenticeship. 
Fermi, of course, had offered himself for, or at least consented 
to, "recruitment" by Corbino, and after arriving in Rome in 
1926, Fermi, with Corbino's support, proceeded to recruit a 
group of a half-dozen crucial collaborators. Rasetti, a school­
mate and friend of long standing, an ex-engineering student at 
Pisa, was brought in as Corbino's assistant (%3Z3M). Rasetti has 
described his earlier intellectual recruitment by Fermi:
I must say that I discovered Fermi very early . . . 
perhaps a month or two after we had registered [October 
1918] . . . I had seen this student who was sitting next 
to me. We got started to talking accidentally. It took me 
just a few days to realize the absolutely exceptional 
nature of Fermi."^
In Florence, Rasetti and Fermi were together for about two
years. "We were practically together from morning tiH eve­
ning.""^
Segre was recruited in 1927, and his story teiis vividiy how 
acquaintance or friendship preceded the relations built up 
during active coliaboration in physics, rather than the other way 
round, as is usually the case. Segre said that, in 1929,
Several things happened at once . . . Rasetti came to 
Rome; and Giovanni Enriques, who was the son of the 
mathematician, decided to bring me and Rasetti [along], 
because he wanted to explore some mountains in Central 
Italy -  I was the only one with a car . . .  so we went, all 
three, and in this way I got acquainted with Rasetti, who 
was a young physicist.""
Segre had once heard Fermi speaking about quantum theory and 
was impressed: "It was absolutely plain that here was a man who 
knew what he was talking about." Either Giovanni Enriques or 
Rasetti suggested to Fermi that Segre was a possible person to 
bring from engineering into physics; so Fermi and Segre, in the 
summer of 1927, met in a very characteristic fashion:
We went to the seashore together several times, 
swimming and bathing, and so on. Then he would ask 
me, "Well, how would you do this?" . . . He had a 
heavy, dangling rope attached to one end, and I had to 
study the vibration . . . He wanted to see whether . . . 
he had found a man to bring in, in physics . . .  I was 
also smelling him, more or less; it was a reciprocal 
process.""
Segre in turn recruited Ettore Majorana, his schoolmate in en­
gineering, whom he considered a prodigy, "through direct deal­
ings between myself, Fermi and Rasetti."^"
Persico, who was also an engineering student for the first two 
years at the University of Rome, had of course been a boyhood 
friend of Fermi, originally a schoolmate of Giulio, Fermi's 
brother, who died in January 191$. The loss of his beloved 
brother affected Fermi deeply, and he turned simultaneously to 
Persico and to a dedicated study of science, an interest both 
shared.*  ^ Pontecorvo was a close family friend of Rasetti, and 
transferred from Pisa to Rome in order to continue his studies 
under him.
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Amaidi was recruited in part by Corbino's talk about Fermi in 
Corbino's ciass, but the ground had been prepared in a char­
acteristic way. Segre recounts:
Fermi spent the summer of 192$ in the Dolomites. As 
usuai, severat of the mathematicians from Rome and their 
families were there to escape the heat of the piains, Levi- 
Civita. Castelnuovo, Bompiani, Ugo Amaidi, and the 
younger Francesco Tricomi. R de L. Kronig, a young, 
brilliant physicist, also joined the company, and he and 
Fermi went on long hikes with Ugo Amaldi's 17-year-old 
son, Edoardo, who had just finished high school. The boy 
was fascinated by their conversation, although he un­
derstood very little of it. Later, when Kronig left, Fermi 
and Edoardo Amaidi, the strongest athletes of the 
company, went off together on a strenuous bicycle tour 
of the Dolomites.*^
It is not without significance that the wives of Fermi and 
Amaidi were both, before their marriages, students at the Uni­
versity of Rome, Laura (Fermi) taking Corbino's course of 
electricity for engineers, though a student of general science, 
and Ginestra (Amaidi), an astronomy student, taking a course 
in the physics laboratory with Amaidi and Segre. Fermi and 
Amaidi were both at Laura's parents' house when there was a 
gathering of young persons. Another meeting place was Profes­
sor Castelnuovo's apartment, where there was an open house 
every Saturday evening to which, in the Italian manner, his 
friends and colleagues, such as Volterra, Levi-Civita, and En­
riques, would come with wives and children for "a few hours of 
informal chatter among congenial friends."*^ There Laura 
would meet her classmates and teachers. Fermi, Rasetti, and 
Segre also would attend.
It emerges from this description that bonds of cohesion were 
forged very early, in a setting determined by the particular 
structure and customs of Italian society at the time as much as 
by shared interest in the subject of physics. If one compares the 
recruitment of groups of collaborators in other centers of 
physics in Europe at the time-where scientists joined pre­
dominantly after their professional promise and formative edu­
cation had already occurred, or where, as at the Cavendish, they
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came from the United Kingdom, Australia, the Soviet Union, 
the United States, and the far corners of the earth -  one realizes 
that we are dealing here not so much with a research group as 
with something closer to a family T*
F%7777/y-e77tf7'pn.fe 77?oJe/. Fermi himself had come from a closely 
knit family and was very attached to his brother and his sister. 
His own fate was determined decisively by the decision of a 
colleague of his father, Adolfo Amidei, intellectually to "adopt" 
Fermi at the age of thirteen. He had noticed the young boy in 
a manner which itself gives a glimpse into the structure of so­
ciety at the time. Amidei recalled that in 1914 he and Alberto 
Fermi, his colleague in the Ministry of Railways, after leaving 
the office at the end of the day, "walked together part of the 
way home, almost always accompanied by the lad Enrico Fermi, 
my colleague's son, who was in the habit of meeting his father 
in front of the office. The lad, having learned that 1 was an avid 
student of mathematics and physics, took the opportunity of 
questioning me. He was 13, and I was 37."*  ^Amidei's interven­
tion not only provided Fermi with books and someone to talk 
about science with, but also a mentor to help plan and shape his 
career, not entirely in agreement with the plans of his parents. 
One sees here a model not too different from that of the way 
Segre and Amaldi were adopted by Fermi.^"
We may think of Fermi as the center of a set of planetoids, 
representing the students and collaborators whom he had re­
cruited, Fermi himself having a position like that of Jupiter 
surrounded by its moons. The Rome group preferred a different 
model-the light-hearted analogy with the ecclesiastical hier­
archy, in which Fermi's central position was indicated by his 
nickname "il Papa," because of his infallibility in quantum 
physics. In addition to the chief collaborators, there was also a 
changing group of students.
This whole system, however, itself rotated about the center 
of that universe -  Corbino, acting as the sun. If Corbino was not 
the father -  the Rome group did refer to him as "Padre Eterno" 
or "Padreterno"*^ -  he was at least the godfather. He was al­
ways at hand, dropping in to talk, participating in seminars and 
important decisions. In fact he was living with his famliy in the
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same building, one door above the Physics Institute of which he 
was the director. Laura Fermi reports the Fermi and his col­
leagues were called, appropriately, "Corbino's boys." The 
usual autocratic European academic model of the dogmatic head 
of an institute assigning work to more or less obedient assistants 
was entirely out of the question in this familial system.*  ^So was 
the idea of looking far away for recruits. On the contrary, 
nothing is more remarkable than the fact that Fermi, and to 
some degree, Corbino, chose from among those who happened 
to be nearby, and then transformed the raw material.
Laura Fermi's descriptions of the way the whole "family" 
traveled -  with wives and children -  on excursions and vacations, 
only underline the interpenetration of their human and scientific 
relationships. Yet another piece of evidence is that the members 
of this group, before others, accepted multiple authorship for 
their papers-the sharing of the rewards they felt entitled to 
was made possible by their easy relationships. That this infor­
mality and communal feeling could coexist in a context of hard 
and disciplined work was an outcome of Fermi's genius as the 
leader of a groupd^
2277d zwprouiMtz'oy?. Superb use was made of relatively 
small funds, and of improvisation wherever necessary. Not only 
were the salaries very low, but so was support for the labora­
tory's research, considering its enormous output and success. 
The lack of a good shop and of an adequate machinist was a 
great handicap. In the early 1930s the Rome group thought 
about, but-despite Corbino's hint in 1929 that frontier work 
would require an accelerator -  was never able to build a cyclo­
tron.^" Segre reports: "You see, it was a different type of 
physics. It was done on a few tables with string and sealing 
wax. It was extremely simple. It cost very little." To be sure, it 
was not very different elsewhere. Rutherford's laboratory had 
perhaps ten times as large a budget, but that was still little.
There is evidence that the Mediterranean context gave Fermi's 
associates a certain edge to make up for this; what could not be 
bought or made could more easily be borrowed, improvised, or 
arranged on a personal level. G. C. Trabacchi, the chief of the 
section of physics of the Istituto di Sanita Pubblica -  the only
person outside his own laboratory group whom Fermi thanked 
in his Nobei Prize address -  could be counted on to be helpful, 
regardless of detailed official protocol. He had been an assistant 
to Corbino and his laboratory was next door. The Fermi group 
called him "the Divine Providence," for through him radioactive 
sources could be obtained. Trabbachi had one gram or more 
of radium -  a much larger quantity than most other labora­
tories. The director of his Istituto, Marotta, also preferred a 
rather informal style of administration and was willing to see 
that help would be givenA" Segre was skillful too in exploiting 
the fact that Rome was, in a certain sense, a small place in which 
persons knew each other. He tells how a jeweler whom he hap­
pened to know lent him a ten-kilogram ingot of gold for the 
experiments on radioactivity. "I couldn't have pocketed it and 
just run away-one knew more or less which family one was 
f r o m . It was an extension of the way Segre, and others, had 
entered into the scientific circle in the first place.
Fermi's personality in many ways coincided with the scientific 
realities which demanded improvisation and frugality. Thus it is 
said that he tried to get along on half his salary. Indeed, the 
frugality of his scientific claims in physics, where he always 
tended to underclaim -  unlike the more effusive Corbino, who 
sometimes embarrassed the group by premature or excessive an­
nouncements -  is not unrelated. As with money, so with time. 
Fermi's sense of concentration and efficient use of time -  as in 
the division of labor -  were legendary, and they were imposed 
on the group as a whole.
Finally, there is a set of other factors which need be touched 
on only briefly. One must return to the fact that good use was 
made of what is now called "public relations," through confer­
ences, publication of scientific work, texts, popular articles, and 
the strategic insertion of reports about the Fermi group. It is 
clear that Fermi begrudged the time taken by these efforts, and 
the occasional misunderstandings which they were likely to gen­
erate. But he recognized that no science, even in the protected 
mode in which he was privileged to work, can fail to take the 
opportunity of achieving public understanding and support. 
Indeed, he succeeded -  some Italians I have spoken with have 
said he succeeded too well, that his example and the fields he and
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his associates cultivated are now preempting too large a share 
of the total funds available. This, too, is part of the inevitable 
opportunity costs of any success, and similar discussions are 
taking place in every major scientific country.^
CoTzc/mfiwg oZwruRticw
In sum, Fermi's group helped physics in Italy to "come of age" 
in the 1930s, by all the usual criteria; in terms of support-  
financial and institutional -  recruitment, opportunities for ca­
reers, and national and international recognition. This was 
achieved by a group unlike any other we know of in physics 
before that time: a group that modeled itself to a large degree 
on a family; had internal and external aspirations, one of which 
was to bring honor to Italy through the work of the Italian 
scientists; tried to operate within a tradition -  though this does 
not mean archaic -  using available institutions but on occasion 
making institutional innovations; was essentially a small-scale 
operation; and was politically and economically a protected 
operation.
In her paper "The Uses of the Traditional Sector: Why the 
Declining Classes Survive,"*^ Professor Suzanne Berger had 
drawn attention to the hardy survival of a peculiarly Italian 
institution, "the small-scale, familial, protected economic unit" 
in the midst of the economic and political life of the advanced 
industrial state. Her interesting paper points out roots of this 
phenomenon in the social life and history of the nation. There 
are suggestive parallels between her findings and those in this 
paper; perhaps these will intrigue scholars of Italian society and 
cause them to pursue the further study of this case.
Today, a half-century after scientists of Fermi's generation 
entered upon the scene, the level and productivity of Italian 
physicists are exceedingly high and internationally acknowl­
edged. Thus at the ceremonial celebration of the fiftieth an­
niversary of the International Union for Pure and Applied 
Physics in September 1972 at the National Academy of Sciences 
in Washington with the participation of leading physicists from 
all parts of the world, it was taken as entirely natural that at the 
opening both the address which set the keynote, and the first 
major paper, should be given by Italian physicists.
Rcrzzzzh grozzp zzzzd /M/y'y p/zzcc Hz pHyyzcy i 97
The excellence of current physics in Italy -  particulariy in a 
number of subHelds which have their roots in the work of Fermi 
and his students -  has itself, however, aspects of anomaiy which 
invite a brief mention, for the advantageous position of this 
Held is by no means shared by most other Heids of science in 
Italy. This fact is amply documented in the report Review of 
A7%tzo7M/ Science Policy -  which provides the most
recent available comparative data. Here are some of its sobering 
Hndings. Comparing research and development (R & D) ex­
penditures in OECD and other countries, one Hnds that Italy 
stood lowest (at $3.80 per capita in 1963 and $6.80 per capita 
in 1963).*^ In qualiHed research scientists, engineers, and tech­
nicians, Italy is also in the lowest place: 6 per t,ooo population -  
one-third to one-fourth of that of the others listed."'? Italy's 
share of public research expenditure in the total national budget 
was 2.4 percent in 1967, about half the Hgure for countries such 
as France and Germany.^ Almost half the budget for all the 
sciences goes to just three overlapping Helds: physics, space re­
search, and nuclear research.
Only 1.7 percent of the research expenditures in higher edu­
cation in 1963 was Hnanced by business Hrms."" The inade­
quate stafHng of modern scientiHc research in universities in 
Italy has been often commented upon; one indication**" is the 
Hgure of 4.9 equivalent full-time research workers per assistant, 
a Hgure much in excess of what is considered reasonable for 
adequate research support elsewhere. Among other obstacles, 
well known to all who are acquainted Hrsthand with the situa­
tion, is the severe lack of space for adequate research and teach­
ing. One is, Hnally, not surprised by the comment in the report: 
"To sum up, there is no organized career for researchers in 
Italian universities."*"
But at the end of this melancholy account, one suddenly 
comes upon the one really positive part:
One cannot fail to be impressed by the magnitude of 
Italy's effort in favor of fundamental nuclear physics and 
the development of a national power reactor program 
. . . Furthermore, in her nuclear physicists, Italy pos­
sesses a group of dynamic scientists whose importance, 
both politically and scientiHcally, cannot be valued too 
highly. Nor can it be denied that this group has been a
Ip8
psychological and cultural driving force in national life.
These are results which more than justify the monies
spentT"
One need not expect to be able to trace direct lines leading 
from Fermi's first encounter with Co rhino to the favored posi­
tion of the held of research today which was initiated in Italy 
by Fermi's group. But despite the unforeseeable adversities of na­
tional and international history which interposed themselves, it 
is clear that today Corbino would have good reason to be 
satisfied with the continuing success of his optimistic program 
of
6
Can science be measured?
"?Ac z/zz'zzzf co7zz/z?*<?/.7e77&  ^t/zzTzg z/jc yzzorc correct/y the 
c/oycr t/j<? z/yzzzg zzpproztc^ ey rotr^rd pzzrc z^z^ zzzz'zy 2y z'zy 
<77*zgz77."
Johannes Kepler, letter to M. Maesthn, April 19, Z397.
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In January 1973 the chairman of the U.S. National Science 
Board (NSB) sent the report S<?z'<?7zc<? /^dze t^ory 73772 [&/. 72]* 
to President Richard Nixon for transmittal to Congress, stressing 
in his covering letter that the document, prepared by the NSB 
staff in the National Science Foundation (NSF),
presents the first results from a newly initiated effort to 
develop indicators of the state of the science enterprise 
in the United States . . .  If such indicators can be 
developed over the coming years, they should assist in 
improving the allocation and management of resources 
for science and technology, and in guiding the Nation's 
research and development along paths most rewarding 
for our society.^
More than three years later, these hopes had become more con­
crete. In December 1975 the NSB sent to President Gerald Ford 
the second such volume, Sozezzce /Tzdz'catory 7377^  [3 ./. 7^ ].'^  Al­
though it was longer than S./. 72, by about zoo pages, and con­
tained many more sections and analyses, this second report was 
built on the same model. Yet Ford's letter of transmittal to the 
Congress (February 23, 1976) made clear that the administration 
did not view this series of reports as mere academic efforts to
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develop and perfect indicators for their own sake, but, rather, 
that the reports would serve to underline that
The nation's research and development efforts are 
important to the growth of our economy, the future 
welfare of our citizens, and the maintenance of a strong 
defense. The nation must also have a strong effort in 
basic research to provide the new knowledge which is 
essential for scientific and technological progress/
It was a unique launching for a young discipline. By gathering 
in one convenient place widely scattered data from ongoing 
studies, the -Science publications have suddenly pro­
vided a tool for high-level scrutiny of the quality and quantity 
of the research enterprise. Such focused attention was bound to 
come into being sooner or later, partly because of the national 
expectations from research, and partly because the scale of sup­
port has made science very visible, as shown by some of the 
"indicators" in the reports: By 1974 the annual cost of basic 
research in the United States was nearly $4 billion (two-thirds 
of that supplied by the federal government), and a total of $32 
billion was being spent on all national research-and-development 
(R&D) efforts (including defense and space projects), of which 
one-half came from federal sources. Clearly, any enterprise that 
employs over a half-million scientists and engineers and commands 
15 percent of the relatively controllable portion of the federal 
outlay must be subject to calls for accountability of its perfor­
mance and to justification of the national investment in terms of 
returns that the taxpayer can appreciate.
The developing science indicators are therefore positioned at 
the intersection of a variety of pressures and hopes. From the 
academic's point of view they are merely a new subset in the 
long-established field of social indicators -  a specific form of sta­
tistical series that measures changes in significant aspects of 
society (e.g., measures of population, health, education, income, 
or crime). But even while they are being shaped, science indi­
cators are not likely to remain unused in policy decisions; for 
example, S.7. 72 promised that these indicators can "assist also in 
setting priorities for the enterprise, in allocating resources for its 
functions, and in guiding it toward change and new oppor­
tunities.""
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In fact, these two science indicator publications received a 
considerabie amount of pubiic attention in the press; the content 
of S./. 74, in particular, lent itself to headlines such as "U.S. 
Science Lead Is Found Eroding."" Already in 1974, the chairman 
of the NSB noted, "The indicators appear to be of increasing 
usefulness to the executive and legislative branches of the gov­
ernment in dealing with science policy issues, and in providing 
an objective basis for discussions of public policy affecting R&D 
activity."^ Indeed, he indicated that they had played a role in the 
president's budget decisions concerning basic research funding 
for fiscal year 1977."
These two publications, therefore, are of extraordinary in­
terest not only to policy-oriented decision makers-who may 
have been the primary audience the authors had in mind from 
the beginning -  but equally to working scientists and scholars. 
They will be interested, first because of the wealth of data 
(usually in the form of time series) and what they reveal, on 
subjects ranging from the relative share of research support, 
publications, or students in different research fields, to the mea­
sures of public attitudes toward science and technology, but also 
because the use of science indicators will undoubtedly come to 
influence their professional lives deeply. No matter how care­
fully quantitative reports from professional or governmental 
agencies are hedged in their release, they become normative. 
Therefore, during this crucial period in the development of sci­
ence indicators, we should examine critically the concepts and 
methodologies used in the measurement of the quantity and 
quality of science and technology." On the one hand, the need 
for sound indicators cannot be doubted, and their usefulness will 
depend on the credibility they have within the scientific com­
munity. On the other hand, this is the time to discern and correct 
shortcomings, and to argue for humility in the face of sometimes 
rather crude quantifications, before the science indicators are 
so firmly set that they will be difficult to change or dislodge. One 
recalls here Einstein's remark:
Concepts which have proved useful for ordering things 
easily assume so great an authority over us that we forget 
their terrestrial origin and accept them as unalterable 
facts. They then become labeled as "conceptual neces-
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sities," "22 pn'cn situations," etc. The road of scientific 
progress is frequently blocked for long periods by such 
errors. It is therefore not just an idle game to exercise our 
ability to analyze familiar concepts, and to demonstrate 
the conditions under which their justification and use­
fulness depend.*"
Without foregoing entirely a detailed analysis of selected por­
tions of &Z.72 and S./.7 ,^ I shall concentrate in the following 
remarks chiefly on some fundamental epistemological problems 
adhering to any attempt to make "indicators," no matter for 
what purpose, while referring to the two publications, particu­
larly the stage-setting for actual examples.
The idea of making quantitative indicators of anything at all 
fascinates some persons and repels others as dangerous or absurd. 
This difference is caused largely by thematically incompatible -  
and therefore often unresolvable -  personal views concerning 
the ability of quantifiables to lead to or attest to the deepest 
reality. The history of science is full of cases in which some 
purists claimed that only when you measure something do you 
really know what you are talking about, whereas others held 
that quantification (other than for classification or similar pur­
poses) distorts the full, natural sense of things by confining phe­
nomena in a strait jacket. Like all thematic tensions, this one is 
healthful for the eventual progress of a science because it tends 
to juxtapose deeply felt, articulated models and methods.**
Most scientists today, if forced to choose, would tend to lean 
toward the first of these two positions. But thoughtful spokes­
men would also perceive and verbalize the consensus on a hier­
archical order: The ultimate use of quantitative measures within 
science is that they can guide one eventually to an understanding 
of the basic features associated with conceptions expressible in 
numeric terms, but 720? exhaustively motivated, described, or 
explained by them -  basic features described in terms such as 
simplicity, symmetry, harmony, order, and coherence.
Similar polarizations concerning quantification, and a similar
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attempt at resolution, may be noted in the new held of technol­
ogy assessment. In his article, "Technology Assessment from the 
Stance of a Medieval Historian," Lynn White has put it mem­
orably in these words:
Some of the most perceptive systems analysts are pon­
dering today how to incorporate into their procedures 
for decision the so-called fragile or nonquantihable 
values to supplement and rectify their traditional 
quantifications. Unhappy clashes with aroused groups 
of ecologists have proved that when a dam is being 
proposed, kingfishers may have as much political clout as 
kilowatts. How do you apply cost-benefit analysis to 
kingfishers? Systems analysts are caught in Descartes's 
dualism between the measurable rer cxteMM and the 
incommensurable rcr but they lack his pineal
gland to connect what he thought were two sorts of 
reality. In the long run the entire Cartesian assumption 
must be abandoned for recognition that quantity is only 
one of the qualities and that all decisions, including the 
quantitative, are inherently qualitative. That such a 
statement to some ears has an ominously Aristotelian ring 
does not automatically refute it.^
Since the most respectable parts of the "hard" sciences, at 
least on the surface, seem to be preoccupied chiefly with quanti­
fiable measures, nothing is more natural than the development of 
"quantifiable" indicators about science. This tendency also par­
allels both the ongoing "scientification" of modern social studies 
through the introduction of more sophisticated mathematical 
methods and operationally demonstrable concepts, and the ever­
growing desire of administrators to rationalize the allocation 
and use of resources. In any case, the desire to formulate some 
indicator measures, on any basis, is almost irresistible. Who in 
this field would not want to find out how many scientists there 
are, how much money they spend, and how many papers they 
publish? Who in the Congress or in science administration would 
not like to see how the science enterprise in this country com­
pares with that of other nations, or to what extent the expendi­
tures for basic research bear fruit in terms of industrial develop-
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ments that can claim to be "outputs" of basic science? And, 
above aH, who wouid not like to have some, %wy measure of how 
"good" the efforts of our scientists and engineers are?
Fortunately, .S./.72 took note of the need for developing indi­
cators of stipulating on the very first page of its text that
intrinsic measures should inciude those of the "quantity and 
quality of associated human resources," and that extrinsic indices 
would center on "the achievement of national goals . . . and 
the consequent impacts on that elusive entity, the 'quality of 
life.' " One cannot help but applaud this ambition, the more so 
as the quantification of qualities, ever since Nicole Oresme's 
attempt in the fourteenth century, has been a precarious task.
In measuring qualities, three types of opportunities exist that 
are not available when the usual quantitative indicator is made by 
folding a large number of individual contributions into one 
grand total. The first is the identification of or % cfMCMl 
perhaps in a mass of noisy data. The quality and health of 
a science, as we know from personal experience and the abundant 
evidence of historical study, not infrequently depend on nothing 
so much as the appearance of one paper of high imagination or 
the founding of a professional society, the accession of a new 
journal editor or the entrance of a new patron. (For example, 
nothing was more significant for the quality of science in Italy 
in the 1920s than the appointment of young Enrico Fermi to the 
University of Rome.) Insofar as singular events that have the 
potential of transforming a held can be identified quickly, they 
should find some place in any publication that claims to indicate 
the quality or health of science at a given time -  even if such 
events are not quantifiable and the potential not quickly real­
izable.
Second, even in a consensual activity like science, contempo­
raneous estimations of quality are difficult. The full significance 
of an important event does not necessarily appear immediately, 
and identification of quality often requires historical perspective. 
Very few physicists in 190$ were aware that it was one of the 
greatest years in the history of their held. Sadi Carnot's funda­
mental paper of 1824 on thermodynamics was not recognized as 
important until 1834, and then only by one scientist, Emile 
Clapeyron; after that, it took another decade before the scientihc
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world began to appreciate, through William Thomson's work, 
the merits of the 1824 publication. Moreover, details of the 
intellectual structure of Carnot's work have been adequately 
understood by historians of science only in the past fifteen years.
Similarly, the profound implications of Max Planck's work 
of 1900 did not become clear quickly, even to Planck himself. It 
began to be understood generally-at different rates in different 
countries -  only after the tqn Solvay Congress. And suggestions 
of the existence of what are now called "Black Holes" lay about, 
essentially neglected, in the literature for decades before current 
interest focused on them. (Conversely, some sensations of a 
moment have a habit of disappearing in time.) Instances can be 
adduced ad infinitum.
Although on the whole we may be more alert to "significance" 
today than in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it 
is not realistic to hope that the quality of scientific work and of 
scientific life will be estimated safely right away, "in real time." 
Therefore the assessment of the state of science for a given year, 
while useful and interesting, must be reexamined and updated in 
the light of changing results of informed historical scholarship.
Third, we are still very far from solving the methodological 
problem of how to determine the quality of a subject field. Some 
attempts exist, such as the recent review by a panel of peers of 
the quality of previously granted research proposals but the 
methodology for developing measures of quality requires much 
further experimentation. One possibility^ may be to evaluate 
the quality of publications in a field, or the quality of a journal, 
by appropriate random sampling and evaluation, analogous to 
what is often done in scientific research itself. Thus a properly 
chosen, rather small sample of, say, one hundred articles in a 
Held, or even a few hundred pages of a journal volume, might be 
evaluated in depth by a high-grade panel of assessors, somewhat 
the way a set of research-funding proposals is ranked both rela­
tively and absolutely.
We can Hnd very few indices of quality in $./. 72 and H.7. 74. 
One is the listing of the number of Nobel Prizes received by U.S. 
scientists from 1901 to 1974. There are, of course, difHculties 
with this simple quantisation of quality. The assumption that 
the award is given on the basis of an international search for
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work of highest quality, uninfluenced by political or other ex­
traneous considerations, is certainiy sounder in science than in 
some other fields; but the number of awards per year is so small 
that fluctuations over a short period are not likely to be very 
meaningful. There are obvious other problems -  how to count 
prizes when they are shared, to which country to credit a prize 
given to a migrating scientist, or how to treat the time delay be­
tween the publication and the honoring of it. Should one pay 
more attention to the fact that the United States has the largest 
number of prizes since 1901, or that the rate of receiving prizes 
in the United States has become smaller since 1951-60, or that in 
relationship to the population as a whole, U.S. scientists rank far 
below those of the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom? In fact, what precisely is the link between quality of 
research and the Nobel Prize?" All these questions hint at the 
larger problem: that numbers by themselves may or may not in­
dicate anything meaningful.
The Seiche volumes also attempt to measure
quality -  with due acknowledgment of the difficulties and 
dangers -  by means of literature indicators, comparing "the rela­
tive standing of a given nation's literature in the bibliographic 
references of a large sample of the world's scientific literature. 
The assumption is that the most significant literature will be 
most frequently cited by subsequent investigators . . .  By this 
measure the United States ranked or tied for first place in each 
of eight major scientific Helds."" does, however, acknowl­
edge that this method of assessing the quality of scientific litera­
ture is subject to factors that may severely slant the results -  for 
example, differences in publishing habits in different countries, 
editorial policies, or the representativeness of journals in the 
sample being analyzed."
There are additional attempts at quality measures, as in the 
interesting distinction between degrees of innovations calculated 
for several hundred specific innovations, from improvements of 
existing technology to "radical breakthroughs" (and the result­
ing finding that the "radicalness" of major U.S. innovations has 
been slipping markedly over the past two decades) but, on the 
whole, it is clear that quality measures are still in an early stage 
indeed; hence the opportunity for improving them is that much 
larger.
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Enterprises such as the making of economic indicators or science 
indicators -  almost by definition, and surely by virtue of the vast­
ness of the task-tend to gravitate to the use of aggregative, 
composite indicators, to bulk or gross measures rather than to 
attempts to look for fine or detailed structure. To use an anal­
ogy, the preference is to measure the intensity of a source by 
cumulating the energy emitted at all wavelengths, rather than 
passing the beam through gratings or prisms to lay out the spec­
trum and measuring the detailed energies radiated at different 
wavelengths. Of course, important questions exist for which it 
turns out no fine details are needed, in which therefore a "pre- 
Newtonian" treatment of the beam (i.e., without spectral reso­
lution) is adequate; in any case, that is usually the far simpler 
measurement to make. But such bulk measurements could not 
have led to the optical discovery of Fraunhofer lines, Balmer 
lines, black-body radiation, hyperhne structure, and so on -  all 
important to the advance of physics.
Here again, contrary thematic preferences enter the research­
er's design. Some are "lumpers" and will be naturally predis­
posed to seek bulk measures; others are "splitters" and will seek 
fine structure. To some, the decay of a society may be indi­
cated by, say, the rate of fall of the gross national product or 
the net trade balance; to others, the same information is con­
tained in significant details, such as the observation that the mas­
tiff is starving at the master's gate. To some, the rather smooth 
exponential rise of the curve of the cz7777zJ%?c6f number of science 
abstracts as a function of time is the raw material for specula­
tion; to others, the essence of the work lies in filtering out the 
few, sporadically appearing significant articles from the steady 
stream of the banal, or even in the strange, sometimes large fluc­
tuations of the annual output of articles/"
By training and preference, research scientists tend to be more 
interested in identifying significant detail than in aggregating 
data. Their interest in a new idea is often aroused by what might 
seem a specific, minor anomaly, an unexpected mismatch along 
the edges when expectations and reported findings are superim­
posed; and they usually test their theories by referring to care­
fully selected phenomena in a well-defined corner of phase space.
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Thus a peculiarity noted in the "hne structure" of phenomena 
(e.g., the observed differences in the intensity of artificial radio­
activity found on two different laboratory tables in Fermi's 
group in 1934) is more likely to signal the existence of a fruitful 
new area of work. On the other hand, gross properties are more 
likely to be useful for exhibiting, confirming, or summarizing 
the state of an existing, perhaps well-established, theory. They 
also succeed in a held such as economics because of the possi­
bility of converting very different products to the common de­
nominator of priced
When bulk measures are called upon in scientific research, it 
is generally assumed that they do not mix together incommen­
surable populations. I11 fact this can be known only post hoc, 
that is, when an adequate theory has determined what the pure 
and the mixed populations, respectively, consist of. I greatly 
doubt that we are near enough to such an understanding in the 
case of science indicators, and I am struck by the tendency 
throughout most of .S.f.7.2 and S./.74 to opt for bulk measures 
(such as time-line series for "mathematics" or "engineering" or 
"social sciences," taken as a whole), even when more detailed 
spectroscopy of data was available in the literature.^
The Science volumes seem to be looking primarily
to thermodynamics for their model. That is a dangerous exem­
plar. Thermodynamic variables such as pressure, volume, tem­
perature, and compressibility are indeed wonderful indicators of 
the state of a sample -  up to a point. They have clear operational 
meanings; they are connected to a body of knowledge that al­
lows these measures to achieve interest by demonstrating that 
gross matter behaves according to laws; above all, they are inde­
pendent of any detailed understanding (or ignorance) of the 
microstructure of matter. But even after the resolution of those 
enormous conceptual struggles (spanning more than a century) 
that were needed to develop notions by which the laws of ther­
modynamics could be formulated and tested,^ thermodynamics 
remains not such a clean and simple model on its own terms, for 
example, when dealing with mixed rather than pure systems.
To illustrate the tendency toward bulk measures and the pre­
dominant influence of the "lumpers," consider the very title of 
the books, Science According to a doubtlessly
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apocryphal story, when Jerome Wiesner was in charge of the 
Office of Science and Technology, he had his staff run a contest 
to discover a iess clumsy, shorter term for identifying the activi­
ties referred to as "sciences and technologies." The iargest num­
ber of proposals were that the single word "science" be used. To 
be sure, calling it "science and technology" instead of "science" 
is still a gross oversimplification, the gathering into an arbitrary 
two sections a large set of different activities that exist in a more 
complex space and do not fit along one line. The very fact that 
there is no good name for the set of activities for which indi­
cators are here sought is an indicator of the complexity of the 
activities.
If nothing else can be done about this problem quickly, at least 
a note of caution is needed when bulk measures and global state­
ments are used: for example, qualifying the claim that the indi­
cators can be used for describing state of science enter­
prise";^ or listing all the separate sciences and technologies 
included in the gross measures. In addition, even at the risk of 
making science indicator publications more bulky, there should 
be a balancing effort at disaggregation and at giving detailed ref­
erence to and summaries of main publications that do contain 
fine structure.
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A significant example of insufficient fine structure in -S./.ya is 
found in the section "Science and Engineering Personnel" -  
"Supply and Utilization." There, "science indicators" merge 
into the more general "social indicators." This section offers a 
remarkably brief treatment of one of the chief preoccupations 
of many scientists in the very year for which these indicators 
were designed (as well as the previous two or three years) -  
namely, the substantial decrease of financial support for science 
and technology, with consequent unemployment, underemploy­
ment, and holding actions. A report issued by this nation's chief 
research support agency and addressed to the President for trans­
mittal to the Congress bears an extra measure of obligation to 
present in the clearest light just those problems that may be 
most difficult or embarrassing for the life of science. Obviously,
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few official "indicators" will be scrutinized more skeptically by 
scientists, scholars, and their professional societies than employ­
ment data. To be sure, there is no proof that a nation's science 
effort as a whole is necessarily of lower quality when there are 
fewer employed scientists and few funds, but the human costs 
of unemployment require that we act on the basis of this assump­
tion until contradictory evidence exists. A report that underplays 
the highly visible and personally often tragic problem of un­
employment and underemployment risks the label of cover-up, 
the more so as the claim was made that the indicators would re­
flect impacts on the "quality of life."^
One notes, for example, that space was available in .S./.7.2 to 
state that "the overall science and engineering unemployment 
rate was still only about half of that for all workers"^ -  a 
euphemism produced by mixing into one gross indicator two 
differently prepared populations (not to speak of the fact that 
the high unemployment rate in the general work force -  offi­
cially between $ and 6 percent throughout 1972-was neither 
humanly nor politically satisfactory). But in order to allow a 
full picture of the national situation to emerge, and to permit the 
identification of specific disaster areas which merit special help -  
surely an important function of indicators -  it would have been 
more to the point to analyze the details of unemployment and 
underemployment, including those who have been excluded 
from the employment statistics or those who are subprofession- 
ally employed. AM this is the more urgent as the effects of in­
sufficient employment on the life of the scientist often are un­
usually severe -  in terms of the rapid loss of a scientist's or an 
engineer's capacity to stay in the profession once the ability to 
remain updated is impaired. Moreover, if the categories of the 
unemployed or underemployed are not in line with generally 
"accepted" definitions of unemployment, this might cast doubt 
on those definitions.
Alan C. Nixon, recently president of the American Chemical 
Society (ACS), has pointed ouC the discrepancies between sim­
plified aggregative figures and figures based on detailed analysis. 
For example, if the definition of people with employment prob­
lems is allowed to include transient or part-time employees, and 
so on, the unemployment figure was 8.3 percent of the ACS
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membership, and 9.$ percent for the Ph.D. members. Nixon's 
analysis is oniy one example highlighting the artificiality of some 
of the concepts in general use for official employment statistics. 
Thus the fine report kFo?T m /faerie#, prepared by a special 
task force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,*? 
warns that
The statistical artifact of a "labor force" conceals the 
fluidity of the employment market and shifts attention 
from those who are not "workers" -  the millions of 
people who are not in the "labor force" because they 
cannot find work . . . Although this narrower concept 
of a "labor force" is useful for many economic indices, 
it is inadequate as a tool for creating employment policy.
For example, it excludes from consideration "people who answer 
'no' to the question 'Are you seeking work?' but who would in 
fact desire a job if one were available and under reasonably satis­
factory conditions." Such people, the task force report indicates, 
range from those in school or training programs because they 
have been unable to find suitable jobs, to many women and 
older people who no longer even look for jobs.^
Although the dismaying details of the employment situation in 
science were apparently not considered sufficiently urgent to 
prompt a warning flag in $./. 7.2, they tuere significant in shap­
ing the career decisions of many young people to whom the 
portents were clear. To give an example that cannot be found 
in the global indicators of S./.7-2.'3° From 1961 to 1970 the num­
ber of doctorates granted in physics rose, roughly parallel to the 
rise in the total student population, to about 1,550 in 1970; then 
the curve turned down, and the projection of new physics 
Ph.D.'s in 1978, based on students in the pipeline, is now 950, 
that is, 60 percent of the output of 1970.3° Such trends lead to 
contrary but equally arresting predictions. Some now warn of a 
severe shortage of trained physical scientists and engineers in the 
1980s; others see in the recent downturn an early response to the 
general exacerbation of the employment problem in the next 
decade.
One of the reasons announced for the existence of .S./.7.2 was 
to "provide an early warning of events and trends which might 
reduce the capacity of science . . .  to meet the needs of the
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Nation."3* Lack of careful attention to the employment picture 
is, therefore, a serious matter if one places reasonably healthy 
employment opportunities and, hence, efficient utilization of a 
national resource, high on a list of the needs of the nation. The 
concept of a policy of reasonably full employment at or near a 
level of trained competence is neither simple to implement nor 
generally agreed upon. Yet by 1973 it was no longer merely a 
matter for politicians of different ideologies to disagree about 
in the United States. The "full employment" movement was be­
coming stronger, as measured by the bills introduced in Con­
gress, and conclusions, such as that in the HEW report IEo?T /72 
that the provision of the opportunity for each family's 
"central provider to work full-time at a living wage . . . should 
be the /frrt of public policy."^ However, as measured by 
&A72 and the time for the idea had not yet come for
policy planners concerned with scientists and engineers.^
Another detail of the employment situation that concerned 
many scientists in the early 1970s was, of course, the employ­
ment, and training for employment, of women and minorities. 
It is remarkable that S./.7.2 included little on this subject, even 
though other NSF surveys had gathered much useful dataT 
does have four pages on the employment of women and 
minorities in science and engineering.) Even though women sci­
entists constituted only 9 percent of the total number of physical 
scientists (chemistry, physics, and atmospheric and space sci­
ence) in 1970, their rate of unemployment was almost double 
that of men/'5 The rate of inflow of women and minority scien­
tists would have been useful indicators in S./.72 and even the 
modest starts made toward improvement, such as the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) Minority Biomedical Support Pro­
gram begun in 1972, would have merited notice as an example 
of the impact of policy changes on the fine structure of the life 
of science.
To summarize, then, the global and optimistically slanted in­
dicators put out by a government agency may often clash with 
the soberer details found in the personal lives of scientists and in 
surveys made by professional societies or other organizations. 
Therefore, the danger exists that "science" and its preoccupying 
problems, as they emerge from "official" science indicators, may
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constitute an entity qualitatively different from science and its 
problems as perceived by individuai working scientists or by the 
governing boards of professional societies.
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To avoid the charge of naivete, anyone reviewing a U.S. gov­
ernment publication such as 5.7.72 must keep in mind two po­
litical realities. Everything that a government appointee wishes 
to publish involving the mission of his agency must be cleared 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Moreover, 
in the specific case of 5J.72, that report had to undergo scrutiny 
by OMB and other White House staff in the days when OMB 
was not loath to impound funds appropriated for agencies such 
as the NSF and when OMB's deputy director was Frederick V. 
Malek, an aggressive member of H. R. Haldeman's White House 
"management team," with wide-ranging mission and power. 
(Malek had earlier been special assistant to President Nixon and 
has been identified as the developer of the "Departmental Re­
sponsiveness" program that aimed at obtaining political leverage 
through grants and contract programs of federal agencies.'^) 
Many of the weaknesses and omissions in the published version 
of 5.7.72 may well stem from these two historical facts. Con­
versely, the disappearance of Nixon, Haldeman, and Malek from 
the governmental scene before the publication of 5.7.7^ may ex­
plain in part why 5.7.7^, although cautiously worded, is a sub­
stantially more useful and explicit document; changes in the 
political situation, as well as critiques received after the publica­
tion of 5.7.72, may have helped toward this end.
An inherent generic limitation in such government reports in 
general and a special ambiguity in the status of the NSB deserve 
comment here. On the one hand, the scientific community, and 
to some extent the Congress, see the NSB as an independent 
board of scientific statesmen, in a position to speak out forth­
rightly to the President and the Congress on the state of science 
and the interests of the scientific community, and whose schol­
arly and scientific training and credentials should certify the in­
dependence and quality of any report they issue. On the other 
hand, the administration sees the NSB as a part of the adminis-
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tration, subject to the political discipline of the administration, 
and therefore required to conform in any of its public pro­
nouncements to "the President's program," just as is the case for 
full-time government administrators.
The result is evidently an uneasy accommodation in a con­
stant tug of war between the NSB and the OMB, the agency in 
practice responsible for enforcing conformity with the presi­
dent's program on the part of all presidential appointees in the 
executive branch. The final text of a report is the result of long 
and complex negotiations between the NSB, the NSF director, 
and the OMB. To put the matter bluntly, it appears that in pre­
paring the report $./. 72 the NSB tried to seek a compromise 
between what it would have liked to say and what it thought 
could get passed, feeling that even a necessarily watered-down 
or negotiated version of the report would have a considerable 
positive public impact with respect to the support of science.
In addition, another issue may have inhibited any desire by the 
authors to stress questions of unemployment -  that such discus­
sions might open the board to the charge of being "self-serving" 
in its report, especially with respect to any statement which 
could be interpreted as favoring the economic interests of the 
scientific community.
To be sure, there is a dilemma here. My criticisms of the re­
port do imply that in the current state of the world it is absurd, 
if not contrary to the obligations of a modern society, to have 
no plans for putting trained scientists to work on socially useful 
jobs that take advantage of their skills. They also imply that the 
existence of a body of scientists whose talents are seriously under­
utilized represents a notable symptom of the lack of health in 
the scientific enterprise unless proved otherwise. But how far 
can this be generalized? Is the case of science greatly different 
from that of, say, scholars and artists?^ In either case, is it ap­
propriate for a group of scientists to speak up only for scientists, 
or conversely to arrogate to themselves the task of speaking up 
also for nonscientists? Questions such as these, and the more seri­
ous problems associated with the ambiguous positions of the 
NSB, suggest that the public record cannot by itself be an ade­
quate basis for assessing the health of science. Once again we 
see merit in the argument for stimulating the academic sector to
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provide assessments that are "independent," or at least numerous 
and varied enough so that their biases become evident in the en­
suing discussions.
Gathering censuslike data on the state and performance of the 
professions is obviously useful and interesting, regardless of the 
various ultimate uses of the data, and this is, in fact, done regu­
larly by NSF, the National Academy of Sciences-National Re­
search Council, and the professional societies. Indeed, it appears 
that most if not all the data used in .S./.72 (with the exception of 
the Delphi Experiment and the commissioned study on public 
attitudes) were taken from previously available sources. What, 
then, is the difference between data and indicators?
To put it in terms of an analogy -  measurements of a patient's 
rapidly declining blood pressure remain data until they are seen 
by someone with enough understanding of physiology to recog­
nize them as indicators of a change in the state of health. I pro­
pose that the term "indicator" is properly reserved for a mea­
sure that explicitly tests some assumption, hypothesis, or theory; 
for mere data, these usually remain implicit. Indicators are the 
more sophisticated result of a complex interaction between the­
ory and measurement.
Even "taking data," as is well known, is not possible without 
at least an implicit theory. But an implicit theory is often fal­
lacious, as the discovery of inadequacies in "simple" census data 
has shown: Significantly more people in certain categories were 
discovered to have been invisible to the takers of the U.S. census 
than had been allowed for in the hypotheses underlying the 
method of measurement.
Data may be believed to be necessarily objectively factual, 
and yet it may also be possible that the existence of an implicit 
and possibly erroneous theory has been overlooked. For example, 
I once worked near a superb experimental physicist, one of 
whose publications typically was on the tensile strength and 
other properties of fifty alloys. He ground out data at a phe­
nomenal rate. It turned out, however, that what he was doing 
was testing an implicit theory that the small amount of impurities
z'w r e c e n t
in these particular samples of the alloys has a negligible effect on 
the properties of the metal. His measurements were very sound; 
that is, they were repeatable on these particular samples. But the 
level and type of impurities turned out later to have a large ef­
fect on the properties, severely limiting the applicability of the 
measurements to the general case.
At an early stage the plausibility of some data for use as 
indicators may be a good guide. However, eventually there must 
be an explicit theoretical base for choosing some data, discarding 
others, and noting the absence of needed data or of needed fine 
structure. No such explicit theoretical base appears in &/. 72 or
5 ./. 74. Instead, one can occasionally glimpse an i7//piicit theory 
of science (as we shall see in the last section of this chap­
ter).
The attempt to put data ahead of an explicit theory reminds 
me of a discussion reported by Werner Heisenberg. In 1926, 
just after his first major contribution to quantum physics, Hei­
senberg met Einstein. Heisenberg explained that he had aban­
doned such hypothetical conceptions as the unobservable electron 
orbits; "since a good theory must be based on directly observable 
magnitudes," he thought it more fitting to base his theory on 
observable frequencies of the emitted light instead. Moreover, 
Heisenberg thought he was there following faithfully Einstein's 
own model: "Isn't that precisely what you have done with rela­
tivity?" Einstein's reply took Heisenberg completely aback: 
Possibly I did use this kind of reasoning . . . but it is 
nonsense all the same. Perhaps I could put it more diplo­
matically by saying that it may be heuristically useful to 
keep in mind what one has actually observed. But on 
principle, it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on 
observable magnitudes alone. In reality the very opposite 
happens. It is the theory which decides what we can 
observe. You must appreciate that observation is a very 
complicated process. The phenomenon under observation 
produces certain events in our measuring apparatus. As a 
result, further processes take place in the apparatus, which 
eventually and by complicated paths produce sense 
impressions and help us to fix the effects in our conscious­
ness. Along this whole path -  from the phenomenon to
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its fixation in our consciousness -  we must be abie to tell 
how nature functions, must know the natural laws at least 
in practical terms, before we can claim to have observed 
anything at all.""
To be sure, those who make science indicators need not re­
gard themselves bound by the credo formulated by theoretical 
physicists; yet the story has some application to the -Science /%- 
JitWory volumes, which are full of observations but studiously 
avoid discussing an underlying theory.
It is significant that the term "science indicators" was, to my 
knowledge, first published in a paper by Harvey Brooks"" in 
which he proposed "four models of the research system" -  the 
Polanyi-Price model, the Weinberg model, the social overhead 
investment model, and the Toulmin model -  and linked these 
models with "indicators for more quantitative planning and for 
providing a means by which the output of the system might be 
measured or assessed." In a related paper two years later,*" Brooks 
noted a number of "unresolved issues of science policy" -  over- 
specialization, centralized versus pluralistic management, the 
place of engineering, mathematics, and physical sciences in new 
national priorities, critical size versus dispersion in research, the 
integrity of the self-regulatory systems of science, models for 
the support of graduate education, and the relation between 
American and world research efforts. Each of these is, of course, 
susceptible to discussion in terms of indicators, developed for the 
purpose and shaped by the model of the research system.
For example, even the carefully more "upbeat" S./.ya (and 
certainly the .S./.74) gives evidence of a sense of the ending of 
the "endless frontier" in the United States, the decrease in mo­
mentum and advantage with respect to other countries, and the 
glum future of contracting prospects for political and financial 
support for science and technology. (Even in the 1930s, the 
average annual growth of academic science in the United States 
was 6 percent, and of R & D funds as a whole, 9 percent.) If 
one believes, therefore, that industry depends on, and has extra 
responsibility for, basic research, one will notice with dismay 
that in real dollars the expenditure by American industry in sup­
port of its own basic research declined so markedly that in 1974 
it was down to 68 percent of the level of 7966, having thereby
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returned to the level of i960 or 196id* An obvious next step 
would be to obtain indicators to test the economic forces, among 
others, that have progressively discouraged long-term research 
in industry -  for example, how support for research in industry 
has been related to profitability and tax structure -  none of which 
was discussed in these volumes.
Moreover, with the burden shifting correspondingly to the 
universities, it is the more ominous to see that expenditures for 
basic research per scientist and engineer in doctorate-granting 
universities were almost 30 percent lower in constant dollars in 
1974 than in 1968. The total R&D expenditure from all sources, 
as a percent of GNP in the United States, had dropped corre­
spondingly, from 3 percent in 1964 to an estimated 2.2 percent 
in 1976. Of that total, the share provided by federal funds for 
the "Advancement of Science" -  fundamental research and sci­
ence instruction-in the early 1970s was 3 percent of the R&D 
total in the United States (and thus only 0.06 percent of GNP), 
versus 16 percent of R&D for the United Kingdom, 23 percent 
for France, 41 percent for West Germany. On the other side 
of the coin, the United States allotted 71 percent of its federal 
R&D funds to "National Defense" and "Space" -  versus 46 per­
cent for the United Kingdom, 33 percent for France, and 22 
percent for West Germany. Since these NSB volumes frankly 
put the main emphasis on the normative aspects of indicators, one 
hopes that in the future there will be detailed work to analyze 
such trends, for example, by presenting the details of basic re­
search allocations by Helds in the budget of the various spon­
soring federal agencies. In this manner one might test to what 
degree the original expectations and mandates of the various 
agencies are continuing to be fulfilled and to what degree their 
missions have been changing.
Precisely because science indicators will be used, for better or 
worse, by science policy makers, they must not in their present 
early stage of development be directed only or primarily to such 
an audience. Rather, indicators are to be thought of as more 
meaningful the more they lend themselves to be tools for con­
firmation or refutation in handling questions, hypotheses, or 
theories that interest scholars and practitioners concerned with 
the state of the sciences or engineering, from their various plat-
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forms in science policy studies, history or sociology of science, 
and so on. Indicators must not be thought of as given from 
"above" or detached from the theoretical framework, or as un­
able to undergo changes in actual use. They should preferably 
be developed zzz rerpozzre to and as aids in the solution of inter­
esting questions and problems. (To be sure, the possibility can­
not be dismissed that the theoretical basis eventually may need to 
be amended -  useful concepts can survive theory shifts, as we 
know from many cases in the history of science -  or that a 
"natural history" sort of data accumulation, with weak ground­
ing in theory, may occasionally provide measures useful for 
later, serious work.)
Different models or perceptions (of the development of sci­
ence, of the science-society feedback loop, and even of the 
prognosis concerning the good or bad uses to which science in­
dicators might be put) will produce spectra of different indi­
cators, as well as different views of the limitation inherent in 
some indicators or of the way in which indicators are function­
ally dependent on the input and output expectations. This pros­
pect of diversity is not dismaying in the least. The major attrac­
tion of science indicators is the possibility that eventually they 
may help test aspects of different theories, and models of the 
scientific process. If &/.7J or ST.7% had begun from some of the 
current theories, for example those of Brooks, Elkana, Merton, 
Popper, Price, Toulmin, or one of the Marxist theorists, signifi­
cantly different indicators would have been developed. Thus, 
starting from Robert K. Merton's categories, indicators would be 
required to help measure the degree of universalism, organized 
skepticism, and so on, and the effort would be to determine 
whether the system in fact attends to these norms and to its 
own claims or pretensions regarding them -  measured by the 
degree of openness to (including funding of) young talent, the 
degree of international collaboration in science, the health of the 
peer-review process, and the like. It is chiefly these comparative 
tests of different models that will permit development of better 
models concerning the life of science.
I do not believe the NSB would strongly resist such ideas. In 
his testimony, the NSB chairman recognized that "Output indi­
cators . . . are closely associated with the objectives of R&D
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and are intimately bound to the social systems that convert and 
incorporate their results."^ In fact, S./-7  ^ reports that in the 
United States the percentage distribution of scientific literature 
for selected fields shows that clinical medicine has the largest 
share and chemistry and physics nearly the smallest share, 
whereas in the USSR this is exactly reversed.
There are two other reasons for welcoming the admission of 
a diversity of models and of corresponding indicators. One is 
that in the absence of conscious pluralism, ozze theory is likely 
to establish itself, or at least discourage the others. The possibility 
that the evaluation of science may be captured by one ideologi­
cal group is by no means an idle fancy. In fact, the philosopher 
of science Imre Lakatos, the leader of a sizable group of adher­
ents, repeatedly and frankly announced such a goal. In his most 
recently published discussion,^ Lakatos identified his own school 
of thought, and especially his "methodology of research pro­
grammes," as a version of "Demarcationism." A chief role of 
the "demarcationist philosophy of science" is to "reconstruct 
criteria" that help to distinguish "progressive" research 
programs from "degenerating" ones. Thus Lakatos warned, not 
only "medieval 'science' " but also "contemporary elementary 
particle physics and environmentalist theories of intelligence 
might turn out not to meet these criteria. In such cases, the 
philosophy of science attempts to overrule the apologetic efforts 
of degenerating programmes."
Lakatos gave the label "Elitism" to the contrary conception, 
that is, the notion that in distinguishing between worthy and un­
worthy work ("progress and degeneration, science and pseudo­
science"), the "only judges are the scientists themselves." That 
idea he scorned as stemming from an "undemocratic, authori­
tarian" school of philosophy, whereas his own demarcationists 
"share a democratic respect for the layman." The layman must 
be helped, of course; for this very purpose "a statute book, writ­
ten by the demarcationist philosopher of science, is there to 
guide the outsider's judgment." But is leaving too much
to chance; perhaps direction is safer after all: The demarcation­
ists, Lakatos announced, will "lay down Artu of rational
appraisal which can direct a lay jury in passing judgement."
It is a breathtaking ambition. Far from being dismissed out of
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hand, the idea was considered for a time by a major, private re­
search funding agency in the United States for use in selecting 
among appiicants' proposals. Undoubtedly, there would not be 
universal acclaim if this (or any other) particular philosophy of 
science takes over the indicators by which the NSF measures 
the quality of science. The absence of any explicit theory to 
guide the making and use of indicators may not be good; but 
the adoption of a single one is likely to be worse.
Another argument for plurality is that, precisely as in the 
sciences themselves, indices may be developed eventually that 
are iwtWM72t with respect to theoretical models. These indices 
will be the most useful ones: among other advantages, they and 
only they allow rival theories to be put to meaningful quantita­
tive tests.
Even now, quite opposite theories of science can lead to de­
mands for the same indicators. For example, in the early 1970s 
the OMB's view was evidently to regard the professional person 
as a statistic in the free market; from that viewpoint, a rapid 
decrease in the expected number of new physics Ph.D.'s could 
be seen as a salutary adjustment of an "oversupply" situation.*^ 
On the opposite side, to someone concerned that the intellectual 
and industrial bases provided by science are being eroded, the 
same curve has a different and much more ominous message. But 
both parties will agree on the 77ccd for such manpower indicators.
Advocates of different theories of science will also agree in 
their concern for the institutional strengths of science. 3./.7^ in­
cluded an "Institutional Capabilities" section*  ^-  to which one 
would naturally look to find measures of the diversity of centers 
of research and of the strength of the professional societies and 
their scientific journals. However, this first effort at compiling 
an "official" array of science indicators did not address such 
questions; for example, the report does not even hint at the fact 
that a number of professional societies are in severe financial 
troubled** Development of such indicators on professional health 
is badly needed, and it may well be possible to phrase such indi­
cators in a form invariant with respect to theoretical frameworks.
As a practical matter, an NSB publication by itself cannot be 
expected to go very far in using and comparing a large number 
of conceptual frameworks (although one would hope that their
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existence would be noticed). Whatever the NSB elected to do 
in this connection, scholars not on the staffs of Washington 
agencies should be encouraged to work on such problems on a 
proper scale. Science indicators will be far healthier when in­
stitutional, programmatic steps are taken to support academically 
centered research.
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What, then, is the theoretical framework implied in the Sc2C72oe 
/ 72d2C%t<??'.f volumes? Some of the answer comes from what is 
said there, some from what is not said; some comes from the se­
quence, and the rest from the style, of the contents. Since on 
this score and .S./.74 are quite similar, examples will be
drawn from the model-setting first volume.
By way of background it may be useful to recall that the year 
1972 was one of heavy, worldwide scientific activity. A few 
examples from physics and astronomy only will suffice, using a 
listing of scientific advances prepared in late 1972 by the Amer­
ican Institute of Physics:
A Columbia University team identified the strong cosmic ray 
source in the Crab Nebula as identical with the pulsar there. 
Canadians recorded remarkable bursts of radio emission from 
Cygnus X-3. At Brookhaven, progress was made toward super­
conducting electric-power transmission. Fusion reactions became 
a more probable source of power owing to successful experi­
ments in laser-produced implosion and adiabatic compression of 
the plasma. The world's largest particle accelerator became op­
erational and gave its first results; so did two new colliding-beam 
storage rings. A beautiful puzzle was found in neutrino astron­
omy, where the difference in observed and expected neutrino 
flux from the sun is so large that the model either of the sun or 
of the neutrino's stability must be revised. Discovery of traces 
of naturally occurring plutonium-244 further extended the peri­
odic table. By laser-ranging, the distance to the moon was deter­
mined to within 6 inches; and the method could now be applied 
to measuring continental drift. Accurate radio ranging of Venus, 
Mercury, and Mars gave preliminary data for another test of 
gravitational effects in Einstein's theory of general relativity.
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More Black Hole theories attracted fascinated attention. And 
three American physicists shared the ^72 Nobel Prize for the 
development of a theory to explain superconductivity, one of 
them (John Bardeen) becoming the first person to win two 
Nobel Prizes in the same field.
S./.72 mentions none of these findings or events, thus illustrat­
ing perhaps the difference between "knowledge indicators" and 
science indicators.^ Another "big story" in science in 1972 -  the 
continuing decrease of support in funds, facilities, educational 
prospects, and so on -  does appear there in aggregate indicators, 
presented in deadpan style. Thus the curve for federal obliga­
tions for academic R&D plants is shown to drop precipitously, 
from about $103 million in 1965-66 to about $17 million (in 
constant dollars) in 1971V This decline has had enormous im­
pact on the lives of scientists in the United States-but only 
one paragraph in <S./-7.2 acknowledges the existence of this prob­
lem. (Nor, of course, does S./.7.2 mention the dismissal in 1972 
of the president's science adviser and the dismantling of the sci­
ence advisory apparatus, set up by President Eisenhower some 
fifteen years earlier.) As in other pages, it is as though the 
authors had been on the verge of telling what some of these 
indicators in fact m&'cztrc, but then hesitated and drew back.
No such hesitation attaches to two other aspects of the image 
of science implicit in S./.72. One is the primarily Baconian, rather 
than Newtonian (and primarily "hard sciences" rather than 
natural CM772 social sciences), view of "science." From the outset 
(in fact in its second paragraph), the report speaks of "the 
capacity of science -  and subsequently technology [thereby re­
vealing its trickle-down theory of science-technology relations] -  
to meet the needs of the Nation." It is interesting to note that the 
experts polled in the Delphi Experiment (see previous discussion, 
"Numerical Data Versus Indicators") listed their priorities the 
opposite way: Their desired "criteria for use in determining total 
funding levels for basic research" were found to be, first, the 
"potential for fundamental new insights," and, second, "science 
needed to generate technological solutions to major societal 
needs."'"'
In the same Delphi Experiment, the tenth and last of the "cri­
teria" for funding considered important among scientists was
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found to be "competitive pressure: activity of greater emphasis 
existing in other nations." But whereas international competition 
is the least and smallest part of the image of science reflected by 
the panel of scientists, the text of S./.ya indicates that it is the 
first And most significant part. A long section entitled "Inter­
national Position of U.S. Science and Technology" is placed at 
the very beginning of the book. (In S./.74 the section is retitled 
"International Indicators of Science and Technology.") Empha­
sis is placed on "international comparisons" -  for example, in 
expenditures; manpower; national origins of literature; literature 
citations; the "Patent Balance" as a measure of "inventive out­
put" by American nationals versus patents awarded by the 
United States to nationals of certain foreign countries; relative 
productivity in manufacturing industries; balance of trade in 
technology-intensive products; and similar indicators for trans­
national comparison. A motivating theme for this section can be 
seen in such findings as "the deficit balance in the high- 
technology area developed with Japan in the mid-1960's and 
persisted in the following years, with the largest increase (al­
most 120%) occurring in 1971."^
What this view of science and technology stresses, of course, 
is the competitive, not the cooperative, element. To be sure, 
scientists have been known to champion this view too, particu­
larly when trying to get their governments to underwrite large 
expenditures for scientific facilities. What is, however, rather 
strange is that we find in these reports no counterweight of the 
kind so familiar to working scientists, namely, the evidence that 
actual scientific research is not a national but a transnational 
enterprise.
Let me give a concrete example. T/ic Rcw'ctr /IP-
rtMCty, a semimonthly publication of the American Physical So­
ciety, prints abstracts of articles that have been forwarded from 
the editorial office of T/ic Revicu) to the printer for
early publication. A quick check of a typical recent issue^ shows 
that -  leaving aside minor items such as "Comments" or "Ad­
denda,"- 140 research papers are listed. Of these, $1, or about 
36 percent, are collaborations with persons at foreign addresses 
or are written entirely by foreign authors. If one also allows for 
the fact that many an author listed at a U.S. address appears to
be a visitor rather than a "U.S. nationai," one finds an even more 
gratifying degree of internationalism emerging from the publi­
cation of a U.S. professional society.
However, when the country of origin of the 70277*73%/ is chosen 
as a measure of the "National Origins of Literature" (as in the 
citation data given on pages 7-11 in &/. 72), not only does a 
rather different view of the U.S. share of the literature result, 
but one is almost automatically prevented from seeing or asking 
about measures of transnational r/7%7*773g in actual scientific work. 
Future issues of the So/f77ce /iij/twon* volumes could well try to 
define indices of such cooperation, among both individuals and 
institutions, and the relation of such cooperation to the viability 
of science itself. In this regard, demonstrates much im­
provement over &/. 72 -  for example, in the interesting tabula­
tion that in the science journals of the six major R & D per­
forming nations taken together, almost 60 percent of all citations 
to the science literature, in eight selected scientific fields, are to 
articles published OMM/Je the country of the particular journal.^
Eventually, one may even hope that analogous efforts in 
other countries, of which the OECD surveys of science activity 
of the 1960s were precursors, would produce a body of work 
that allows the sciences and technologies to be studied as specific 
examples of a "world system." We know that from the vantage 
point of many sciences, each location on earth is only a special­
ized sample of the universe as a whole. There are common physi­
cal laws and uniform physical properties of matter, stretching 
from one end of our globe to the other, as indeed they do from 
one end of the galactic cluster to the other. This fact imposes 
some necessary features on the organization of science as done 
in different parts of our own world, and makes science an inter­
esting candidate for the study of world systems. The sciences 
and technologies may already be the best operational exemplifi­
cation of the concept itself. Moreover, in terms of training, 
research models, communication, prestige sharing, and so forth, 
the larger scientific community in the twentieth century is or­
ganized on transnational lines and has aspects of universality 
analogous to those characterizing the phenomena it studies. The 
system of recruitment and colleagueship at the best universities 
is a case in point. Scientific data collections are also increasingly
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produced by Internationa) effort. One can we)) imagine science 
indicators specially designed to measure these and other prop­
erties of the worid system.
Whi)e the "official" view or mode) of science that emerges 
from 5 ./. 72 understandably does not stress these aspects, it also 
omits some indicators that one would expect to find in any 
mode). For examp)e, the relatively low place assigned to educa­
tion is striking. We are told that federal R&D expenditures for 
education (in constant 1958 dollars) rose from an almost negli­
gible amount in 1963 to about $100 million in 1972 (or 0.8 per­
cent of total federal R&D).^ But the report nowhere indicates 
that this amount was only about 0.1 percent of the annual ex­
penditure of the whole education "industry" (now over $ioo 
billion, of which the federal contribution is still somewhat less 
than 10 percent) and that very little educational research was 
being done other than that supported by federal funds. Symbolic 
perhaps of the ever-ambivalent attitude of NSF to supporting 
science education research, the NSB report even neglected to 
mention the substantial and useful role the NSF itself has played 
in fostering such research, for the NSF was not even on the
S./.72 list of sponsors of education R&D.^
On the other hand, education (and dissatisfaction with its 
state) was an important aspect of the conception of science that 
emerged in the poll of scientists and other experts in the Delphi 
Experiment, recounted in Chapter 6 of S./.7.2. In the list of "Na­
tional Problems Warranting Greater R&D Effort," the "inap­
propriateness and expense of education" fell in the eighth cate­
gory (out of twenty-one, ranked in terms of "areas which could 
benefit from science and technology"); 62 percent of the panel­
ists-most of them distinguished scientists, educators, or admin­
istrators -  thought it an area warranting major increases in 
R&D."s Similarly, 92 percent of the Delphi Panel thought that 
one of the primary "Factors Impeding Technological Innova­
tion" is that the "education of scientists and engineers [is] inap­
propriate for innovation."^ Indicators that would respond to 
such concerns would have to be far more extensive and more 
detailed than the scanty ones now given.
.S./.7.2 also includes discussion of a survey of public attitudes 
toward science and technology, commissioned by the NSB. 
Among the interesting preliminary results is the early warning
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indication of public concern with the ethical and human values 
impacts of science, and the basic ambivalence or multivalency 
about science. Thus although a large and rising majority agrees 
"that science and technology have changed life for the better," 
39 percent of the sample of the U.S. population expressing an 
opinion also did not think that "overall, science and technology 
do wore good than harm," and 34 percent of the group express­
ing an opinion felt "the degree of control that society has over 
science and technology should be increased."^
It would seem that the public, the Delphi Panel, and the NSF 
authors of are synchronized at least on the need for a
better public understanding of science. The Delphi Panel listed 
"negative public attitudes toward technology" high among the 
factors impeding technological innovation, and expressed great 
concern with the "lack of understanding of [the] process of dis­
covery" and with the "lack of public understanding of [the] role 
of basic research."*  ^Among the criteria for allocating basic re­
search funds among scientific Helds, the panel of experts gave 
considerable weight to whether the work "fosters public under­
standing of basic research."*"'
Considering this concern, it seems reasonable to develop more 
detailed indicators of public attitudes toward science, as well as 
some assessment of the actual level of public understanding of 
specific scientific knowledge and processes. An educational assess­
ment of scientific understanding by various age groups in the 
United States already exists in the literature."" Such findings 
might well serve as one element of such a survey. Ultimately, 
any study of science and technology must allow a visible place 
for the intellectual benefits reaped by the population at large, 
and not merely because that population pays for these de­
velopments.
The Baconian view of science implicit in the Science /yzdz'- 
reports, and the preoccupation with the "harder" sciences 
and their technological fruits, prevented any examination of 
whether there is an appropriate balance of funding between the 
natural and the social sciences. Many other indications tell us 
that there is not. For example, the "success ratio" (the ratio of 
total funding applications to the successful ones) is generally far 
lower in the NSF programs in the social and behavioral sciences 
than in the "hard" sciences programs. Only 3 percent of the
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NSF's total research obligations (of $$91 million) in fiscal year 
197$ was made available for the NSF for basic research in all of 
its thirteen social and behavioral sciences programs, from anthro­
pology and psychology to the history of science."* Since the 
NSF provides one-third or more of all available basic research 
funds from federal sources for these fields, few alternatives exist 
for applicants, and the health of the sciences as a tr/io/e
greatly depends, therefore, on the willingness and success of 
NSF to obtain the needed funds for the large and growing group 
of America's social and behavioral science researchers. This is 
obviously a highly charged topic, one that soon would raise the 
question whether the Congress was wise to be persuaded some 
years ago not to fund a separate social sciences foundation.
One could go further, praising other individual aspects of the 
-Science reports or identifying needed improvements""
and criticizing questionable treatment of data."" But, in sum, 
what do the hrst issues of the .Science volumes indi­
cate? The volumes already mark the significant beginning of an 
important enterprise that will have repercussions on science pol­
icy, on scholarly work in the history and sociology of science, 
and above all on the life of science itself. But, in addition to 
giving a wealth of data, ?*e%/fy y/iotf ycicTicey
r%73 " 772^%-
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I am left with the strong feeling that while a favorable answer 
to the question is not yet guaranteed, it is highly probable that 
future issues in this series can converge to a positive result. The 
problem of making and testing indicators is an immensely attrac­
tive one. Good researchers are entering the field. And the vol­
umes themselves have identified and can aid the development of 
the bases and scope of the enterprise -  in strengthening the theo­
retical foundations and making these more explicit; in grounding 
indicators in stated problems; in perceiving the fine structure and 
the qualitative changes more clearly; in infusing a greater spirit 
of courage and independence; and in bringing together indepen­
dent research scholars in the sociology and history of science 
and related areas, in order to cross-check, extend, and profes­
sionalize further the making of science indicators.
7
On the psychology of scientists, and 
their social concerns
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There is much discussion these days on ethical problems of scien­
tific advance, the social responsibility of scientists, the partici­
pation of scientists in public policy discussions, and the need to 
bring the scientist and "citizen" together to clarify their mutual 
expectations^ These worthy moves seem to depend on harness­
ing the natural scientific optimism of academic researchers in the 
service of their societal concerns. At first glance, these qualities 
appear to be natural allies -  the former reigning inside the labora­
tory and the latter outside -  and we might therefore expect them 
to be allied in some way, perhaps even stemming from a com­
mon trait that, if nurtured, would make both flourish equally.
I suspect, however, that on the contrary we may be dealing 
with characteristics that, at least for the large majority of scien­
tists in academe, are inherently antithetical. It is perhaps not an 
accident that scientific optimism is as old as science itself, whereas 
examples of societal concerns on the part of scientists acting 
scientists are much more recent. Another clue is that basic re­
searchers in the physical and biological sciences have only rarely 
looked for their puzzles among the predicaments of society, even 
though it is not difficult to show that the of re/czAWt ycioM- 
ti/ic in such "pure" fields as physics, chemistry, or
biology is among the central causes of almost any major societal 
problems -  whether in nutrition, population, pollution, mental 
health, occupational disease, and so on. (For example, a better 
understanding of the physics, chemistry, and biology of the de­
tailed processes of conception is still fundamental to the formu­
lation of sounder strategies for dealing with overpopulation and 
family planning.)
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On this point, of course, scientists wi!l defend themselves at 
once with some ciarity and much passion. They wiit say the dis­
coverers of the iaws of thermodynamics that aiiowed the design 
of efficient machines, taking over burdens previously carried on 
the backs of men and animals, were not motivated by anguish 
over the lot of humanity, nor would such motivation have likely 
led to the discoveries. It is not a lack of compassion but the na­
ture of science itself that requires us to take the circuitous route 
of research. Sentimentality will lead not to humanitarian advance 
but to bad science.
A great deal of this argument is undoubtedly just. Yet what 
Whitehead called the "celibacy of the intellect" also becomes 
apparent there. Pessimism about the efficacy of societal con­
cerns, rarely tested, has deeper roots in the psychology of scien­
tists-a subject rarely considered when hopes are voiced for 
"science-and-society" links. It seems to me that the best way to 
begin to understand the sources of that pessimism is to look at 
the opposite side of the coin. A comment attributed to Anne Roe 
comes to mind: On looking back at her long and distinguished 
studies on the psychology of scientists, she is said to have com­
mented that the one thing all of these very different people had 
in common was an of optzwiw? concerning
the ultimately successful outcome of their research. Whereas the 
stereotype of the humanists is that of a rear-guard group, gal­
lantly holding up the flag of a civilization that is now being 
destroyed by barbarians, the scientists tend to feel that the most 
glorious period in intellectual history is about to dawn, and r^ey 
will be there to make it happen. As C. P. Snow has said, they 
have the future in their bones. In truth, everyone who has done 
something basic in science treasures these memorable periods of 
individual euphoria when one has found a problem -  one that 
may be tormenting in its subtlety, and all too slow to crack 
open -  but at least one that promises to be delimitable, "analyz- 
able," and therefore worthy of throwing one's whole
being into it.
This hopeful, most absorbing and rewarding aspect of scien­
tific research -  and also another side to which I shall soon turn -  
is, however, precisely in opposition to the demands of an outer- 
directed humanism that, one may assume, is at the base of a
person's societal concerns. Indeed, the psychodynamic vectors 
that propel a scientist into the bright world of solvable problems 
often turn out, on examination, to have components originating 
in the Right from the dark world of anguished compromises and 
makeshift improvisations that commonly characterize the human 
situation. (To a large degree this is undoubtedly true also for 
humanists and other scholars. But that is suspiciously easy to as­
sert, and one therefore hopes that the kind of research results 
I shall summarize for the case of scientists will some day soon be 
done for the other groups.)
The whole dilemma has never been put better than in a pas­
sage in Einstein's writings of which I have long been fondp He 
was considering who these people are who aspire to live in the 
"Temple of Science," and acknowledged Rrst of all that they are 
mostly "rather odd, uncommunicative, solitary fellows, who de­
spite these common characteristics resemble one another really 
less than the host of the banished." And then he asked:
What led them into the Temple? The answer is not easy 
to give, and can certainly not apply uniformly. To begin 
with, I believe with Schopenhauer that one of the 
strongest motives that lead persons to art and science is 
Right from the everyday life, with its painful harshness 
and wretched dreariness, and from the fetters of one's 
own shifting desires. One who is more Rnely tempered 
is driven to escape from personal existence and to the 
world of objective observing and understanding. This 
motive can be compared with the longing that irresistibly 
pulls the town dweller away from his noisy, cramped 
quarters and toward the silent, high mountains, where 
the eye ranges freely through the still, pure air and traces 
the calm contours that seem to be made for eternity.
With this negative motive there goes a positive one.
Man seeks to form for himself, in whatever manner is 
suitable for him, a simpliRed and lucid image of the 
world, and so to overcome the world of experience by 
striving to replace it to some extent by this image. This 
is what the painter does, and the poet, the speculative 
philosopher, the natural scientist, each in his own way.
Into this image and its formation, he places the center of
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gravity of his emotional life, in order to attain the peace 
and serenity that he cannot find within the narrow con­
fines of swirling, personal experience.
What a splendid image: science as self-transcendence, as an 
act of lifting oneself into a purer state of being! Eloquent sup­
port for this view is not difficult to find. James Clark Maxwell 
confessed in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge (1871):
When the action of the mind passes out of the intel­
lectual stage, in which truth and error are the alterna­
tives, into the more violently emotional states of anger 
and passion, malice and envy, fury and madness; the 
student of science, though he is obliged to recognise the 
powerful influence which these wild forces have exer­
cised on mankind, is perhaps in some measure disqualified 
from pursuing the study of this part of human nature.
But then how few of us are capable of deriving profit 
from such studies. We cannot enter into full sympathy 
with these lower phases of our nature without losing 
some of that antipathy to them which is our surest safe­
guard against a reversion to a meaner type, and we 
gladly return to the company of those illustrious men 
[of science] who by aspiring to noble ends, whether 
intellectual or practical, have risen above the region of 
storms into a clearer atmosphere, where there is no mis­
representation of opinion, nor ambiguity of expression, 
but where one mind comes into closest contact with 
another at the point where both approach nearest to the 
truth.
There we have indeed a clarion call to move to the high, pure 
empyrean where one can work undisturbed on what counts for 
science, while at the same time (and, it would seem, as a neces­
sary consequence) withdrawing from the scene of mankind's 
problems and concerns.^
There are, to be sure, also other sources for scientific opti­
mism. One is what Boris Kuznetsov  ^has called "epistemological 
optimism": Most scientists feel there is now no to
be feared, that at least in principle knowledge can be gained in­
definitely, without limits. Even the occasional mountainous ob­
stacle will turn into a monument to a memorable victory. Re-
member the "physics of despair" which, Max Planck confessed, 
drove him to the quantum, or Niels Bohr's allegiance to the 
aphorism that "truth lies in the abyss." When the idea of La­
place's deterministic supreme mind failed, it led not to disaster 
and demoralization, but to Heisenberg's even more fruitful in­
determinism. T/icrc is ignorance one can live with-so unlike 
the "narrow confines of swirling, personal experience," by its 
very nature ever unrequited, unsolved, unconquerable, unyield­
ing to reductionistic subdivision into "simplified and lucid," man­
ageable reconstruction.
Even as the laboratory is a microcosm for harnessing the puz­
zle of phenomena captured within its walls, the uses made of the 
scientific findings by others, unknown and far away, but pre­
sumably for the alleviation of the sorry conditions of human life, 
is the macroscopic equivalent. The one is the scientific impera­
tive, the other the technological imperative. Both are powered 
by the same optimistic dynamism. William James in his lectures 
on pragmatism in 1906 recognized the proper scale of that ambi­
tion when he noted that the division between optwmty (that is, 
the type he also characterized as rationalistic, intellectual, ideal­
istic, and monistic) and to hinge on nothing less than
the most far-reaching matters: "There are unhappy men who 
think the salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doc­
trine known as pessimism. Optimism in turn would be the doc­
trine that thinks the world's salvation inevitable" -  although, one 
must add in the case of the scientist, inevitable not by his direct 
intervention but rather as a by-product, through the working 
out of the consequences of his ideas by others who will follow 
him.
At least until lately it has been taken for granted that science 
and optimism are virtually synonymous throughout modern so­
ciety, that somehow both the doing and the findings of science 
will be for the good of mankind -  for science's own sake, for its 
antimetaphysical and liberating philosophical message, for its 
eventual technological fruits. We know that these beliefs are 
now held far more widely in the "second" and "third" worlds, 
both of which endorse science as a path to a better society, than 
they are held in our own world. The public's ambivalence 
about the beneficence of science and technology is amply docu-
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mented" -  now that the impact of science, medicine, and tech­
nology is larger and more visible than ever before, it also is more 
worrisome and confusing to the wider public.
Of course, not all scientists have been hiding from the swirling 
fortunes of civic involvement and the forums of public discus­
sion. On the time scale of history, social responsibility and other 
social concerns as a topic of active introspection by even a small 
percentage of practicing scientists is a recent notion, largely a 
post-Hiroshima conception; yet there are already some honor­
able institutional inventions and landmarks -  from the founding 
of the Federation of Atomic Scientists and the appeals of Leo 
Szilard and James Franck in to the Asilomar Conference on 
Recombinant DNA Research (197$). Other achievements for 
which research scientists can take a large share of the credit and 
which must at least be mentioned include the Pugwash move­
ment, the Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP) 
of the National Academy of Sciences, the codes of ethics now 
adopted or under discussion among scientific societies, the rele­
vant activities of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) includ­
ing the institutionalization of concern with experimentation on 
human subjects, the A A AS Committee on Ethics and Science, 
and the development within NSF and NEH of programs for the 
study of the ethical and human values impact of science and 
technology. These institutions, and the few real statesmen of 
science we do have now, are evidence of goodwill and -  one 
fervently hopes -  of a reservoir of talent and interest among 
hitherto uncommitted scientists.
But there's the rub. The vast majority of working scientists 
in fact are quite happy to leave the discussion of societal con­
cerns to the small minority. Most in the silent majority and even 
some in the vocal minority, although willing to tolerate such dis­
cussions up to a point, would not go as far as to make such con­
cerns a matter of personal, active participation. I would estimate 
that the fraction of scientists in the U.S. active in such matters 
(e.g., helping to formulate or administer science policy on mat­
ters of explicit societal concerns or even writing or teaching oc­
casionally on the topic) is of the order of 1 percent.
On the assumption that scientists will have to be involved in 
larger numbers, we thus come to the crucial questions: Do the
public's expressions of ambivalence with respect to science, to­
gether with the existence of a core of concerned scientists, con­
stitute harbingers of a substantial increase in the participation of 
scientists on issues where science and societal concerns come to­
gether? Or, on the contrary, could it be that we have already 
gathered up the largest fraction of that small minority of scien­
tists which is susceptible to such considerations -  that from now 
on we shall find it ever harder to add more recruits from the 
ranks of working physical and biological scientists? To use an 
analogy from physics, does there exist some inherent barrier so 
high and wide that the small quantum leakage through it cannot 
be expected to become much larger?
I believe the more pessimistic of these two possibilities is closer 
to the truth. We shall have to face the possibility that for the 
large majority of scientists euphoric personal commitment to 
and pursuit of science forrerenf and
the hoped-for societal concerns needed on the part of profes­
sionals in today's world, are at bottom orthogonal or possibly 
even largely antithetical traits -  antithetical both in terms of the 
psychodynamics of the majority of individual scientists in 
terms of the social structure of science as a profession. A chief 
aim in this chapter will be to scrutinize and juxtapose widely 
scattered data now in the literature, and to see what causal con­
nection may exist among the personal-psychological, institu­
tional, and sociopolitical factors in the scientific profession that 
have fostered the current state. We shall find some evidence 
that the selection, training, and socialization of scientists are 
biased in just the direction where the requirements of a code of 
explicit, personal societal concern are least easy to fulfill.
We may not have to go as far as believing seriously the an­
guished exclamation of Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, who was recently 
quoted to have advised: "If any student comes to me and says 
he wants to be useful to mankind and go into research to allevi­
ate human suffering, I advise him to go into charity instead. Re­
search wants real egotists who seek their own pleasure and satis­
faction, but find it in solving the puzzles of nature."^ However, 
it may be true that, for many, scientific work, as shaped by 
present practices and images and from a very early point in the 
career, is now perceived by the scientists themselves as being lo-
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cated at one end of a seesaw, rising only at the cost of paying 
correspondingiy less attention to practical societal concerns. 
I shall argue that a better understanding of the psychodynamics 
of young scientists and of the institutional pressures on them is 
needed to show us how to bring out more of the socially aware 
side of scientists than we thought was needed in our golden age 
of innocence, so recently past.
Stereotyper %7?d prototypes
Malting due allowance for the fact that the study of personality 
and character structure is not one of the "hard" sciences, the 
way to begin is to look at what data there are concerning the 
raw material, the scientists themselves. How flexible is their 
frame of thought and behavior? How willing are they to strug­
gle with opinions and beliefs that, in the nature of the case, are 
inherently unprovable, or with problems that are inherently re­
sistant to simplification, or even to moderately satisfactory solu­
tions? How able are they to deal with the personal stresses and 
strains that are part of any participation in serious debates on 
such unverifiable and unyielding problems as societal concerns?
There are a few useful published studies on the psychology of 
scientists. Some are retrospective analyses on groups of children 
and young persons who later become scientists; some are on sam­
ples of adult members of the profession; and a very few are in­
dividual psychohistorical case studies of scientists such as New­
ton, Darwin, Einstein, and Fermi. Most of the studies that have 
been made focus a great deal on what may be called the rty/cr 
of creative scientists, the kind of behavior they exhibit fairly 
consistently/ It is easy enough to list the main features that 
define scientific style as commonly understood at present; the 
point to keep in mind is, however, that this common understand­
ing is shared not only among the scientists themselves but also, 
in about the same terms, among the wider public. Thus, on the 
basis of a survey of the existing literature in the field, B. T. Eidu- 
son concluded: "Scientists as a group seem to be caught up in 
the same stereotypes that the public holds about them, 473J, 777 
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1. The scientist typically insists that in written reports of 
work -  from students' laboratory write-ups to the papers we 
referee and the textbooks we write -  the individual traces of the 
personal self be attenuated as far as that can be done. Hence the 
impersonal style of the scientist, for which there are only few 
counterexamples. The aim is to make one's work seem "objec­
tive," repeatable by anyone, or, as Louis Pasteur said,
This is part of the scientist's value of "other-orientation," to use 
Talcott Parsons's term, and at the same time is another way of 
transcending the world of personal experience. Through the 
analyses of Robert K. Merton and others we know that disputes 
and priority fights exist as intense undercurrents. But their im­
portance is generally disavowed by scientists, as are the deep 
thematic presuppositions underlying apparently "neutral" pre­
sentations.
This eradication of individualistic elements from publication 
is of course exceedingly functional insofar as it helps to mini­
mize personal disputes of the unresolvable kind and removes 
interpersonal obstacles to consensus. But it is also seen as re­
sponding to the epistemological demands of science itself. With 
typical succinctness, Einstein summarized this view of reality in 
a manner that shows how the concept of the individual self sinks 
into the shadows: "Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp 
reality as it is thought independently of its being observed. In 
this sense one speaks of 'physical reality.'
2. The second, related commandment of the scientific ethos, 
as commonly understood, is to be logical, not emotional. State­
ments that fall into areas with a large component of not easily 
verifiable or of falsifiable content are frowned upon, and issues 
dealing with ethical conflict, responsibility, or even long-range 
prediction of the technological applications of scientific findings 
are therefore not expected to be raised in scientific meetings. 
Mere opinions, preferences, emotions, and instincts must be re­
pressed, and even the exhilarating flights of intuitive imagination 
must be recast in deductive style to be respectable.
3. Errors or unlikely hypotheses are to be avoided at all cost, 
not least because the scientific community is far less tolerant or 
forgiving on that score than almost any other group. A batting 
average of only, say, 0.300 would not look good at all in this
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league. One is taught to repeat, verify, and repeat again before 
going public, not the least to avoid endangering one's dignity 
and credibility in the experimental field.
4. The desired outcome is the simple, not the complex. One 
aspires to economy of thought and uses Occam's Razor to help 
achieve it. Therefore in most cases, and for most scientists, the 
reductionistic strategy is far safer than a synthesis-seeking one. 
The main charm of work in a physical or biological science is 
that it ideally permits one to formulate statements of simple law­
fulness that is the very opposite of the complexity characterizing 
most social questions and interactions.
$. As with the content of science itself, the setting in which 
one does one's science is ideally as removed from interpersonal 
disputes as possible. (This is a significant point to which we shall 
return.) As the psychologist David C. McClelland put it with 
ample research documentation, "Scientists avoid interpersonal 
contact," and "scientists avoid and are disturbed by complex hu­
man emotions, perhaps particularly interpersonal aggression."^" 
Even recent changes in the self-identification of young scientists 
only reinforce this old theme:
There is evidence, however, that differences in the way 
science is being practiced today are accompanied by 
certain differences in the identifications that scientists 
have with other scientists. An example of this changing 
trend is the researcher's shying away from identification 
with the "great but maladjusted" or "eccentric" scientist. 
Reverence for forefathers whose outstanding minds were 
sometimes housed in very peculiar and odd personalities 
still exists, and yet the newer scientists seem consciously 
to be dissociating themselves from peculiar and difficult 
associates or students, knowing full well that they may 
be thus shutting themselves off from some very creative 
workers in their own laboratory. These men nowadays 
prefer to depend for progress on well-organized, smooth­
running, large-scale operations, whose stability demands 
the minimum of interpersonal relationships, especially 
disturbed ones."
A paradigmatic hero who fits most of these five traits superbly 
and who remains one of the widely admired scientists and role
models is Enrico Fermi-ever "cool" and rational, virtually al­
ways right, generous in sharing his intellectual self, always fo­
cused on the pioneer problems of physics of the day, finding the 
unraveling simplicity in the most surprising yet convincing way 
but also, to very nearly the end of his life, studiously avoiding 
participation in any of the political or science-society questions 
that raged through both history and science in his timed* The 
hero among most scientists is clearly Tzor, say, a Leo Szilard -  as 
"hot" as Fermi was "cool," also a superb scientist but spread­
ing himself over many fields from physics to biology to cyber­
netics, fond of speculative and daring proposals, and above all 
deeply and successfully occupied with the need to make his life 
and influence count in matters concerning the impact of science 
and technology on political (national and international), ethical, 
and social problems. Fermi and Szilard may be seen as prototypes 
that define two extremes of the range of models of scientific be­
havior, one widely accepted, admired, and imitated, the other re­
garded with a certain affection but deeply appreciated by only a 
relative few.
We shall leave them for a time. For the moment we should 
note that the between these or any other scientists
are not accounted for in the public stereotypes of working scien­
tists. The same problem adheres to some of the psychoanalytical 
studies of scientists, for example, that of Lawrence Kubie," who 
held that their work can be coordinated with symptoms of what 
Kubie called "masked neurosis." The psychoanalytical perspec­
tive invites (perhaps all too readily) the construction of parallels 
between the prototypical behavior of scientists (as well as other 
scholars) and that of the obsessive-compulsive personality typeT 
If one believed the parallelism fully, it would raise the insuper­
able puzzle how and why scientists for the most part do in fact 
preserve themselves sufficiently to be as effective as they are, as 
both professionals and human beings. Yet there are perhaps cer­
tain analogous characteristics:
(a) There is narrow, intensely focused attention, almost con­
stant concentration on one area within which the more creative 
persons roam freely. (The powers of concentration in scientists 
such as Gauss were legendary. At moments they have amounted 
to voluntary sensory deprivation-for example, Fermi reported
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that he had faded altogether to hear the blast of the atomic 
bomb at the Alamogordo test because he was working on a 
problem of measuring the intensity of the blast by a simple, im­
provised method.) Attention is diverted and dedicated to the 
high drama and wonderful entertainment going on in one's own 
brain.
(b) One is driven to succeed and therefore keeps away from 
situations that are unlikely to yield success. There is a tense de­
liberateness to clear up puzzles and ambiguities or to remove the 
threat of the unknown, and restless intellectual (or physical) 
activity.
(c) One is preoccupied with control, with the need for order 
and structure that extends from regularity of schedule to ready 
acceptance of authority outside one's own field of expertise.
(d) And finally, there is only a limited need or ability to deal 
with affective experience, hence -  as we have noted -  the avoid­
ance of open battle and other social risks. (One remembers New­
ton's remark that he would be rid of that litigious lady, Natural 
Philosophy, promising in a letter to Oldenburg during the con­
troversy following his early work on optics, "I will resolutely 
bid adieu to it eternally, except what I do for my own private 
satisfaction"; and later: "I desire to decline being involved in 
such troublesome and insignificant disputes.")
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Emile Durkheim warned, "Every time that a social phenomenon 
is explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may
be sure that the explanation is false."^ But one need not demand 
the exclusion of other than psychological causes, or the accept­
ance of the framework of orthodox psychoanalytic theory, or 
the postulation of parallels with obsessive-compulsive types, and 
yet allow the possibility that the scientific-societal polarization 
many scientists seem to experience may well have psychological 
roots. In the absence of one clearly fruitful framework, the safest 
entry point for the time being seems to be through a study of the 
results of the more sociological-psychological investigation.
Despite all the changes in the profession, a major classic of 
this kind is still Anne Roe's TD^wg of % -ScicTMiy;/" pub-
lished over two decades ago. A clinical psychologist, she studied 
the careers of sixty-four leading, male, U.S.-born scientists (in 
the biological, physical, and social sciences), concentrating on 
the most eminent in each held. Separately, her findings within 
this group were checked to some degree against a larger sample 
of more ordinary scientists. Her chief aim was to study the rela­
tion between vocation and personality structure. In an earlier 
study on artists, she had discovered that definite and "very di­
rect relationships [exist] . . . between what and how the man 
painted and what sort of person he was and what sort of prob­
lems he had." As to scientists, she significantly found that "al­
though such relationships pertain among them also, they are 
usually much more obscure and the technique of reporting scien­
tific results serves rather to hide the man than to display him."
Her findings do not add up to a profile of part-time social 
reformers, nor does the total pattern seem altogether unfamiliar 
to the nonspecialist or in drastic conflict with the popular stereo­
type. Not unexpectedly, curiosity about a special area, to the 
exclusion of all else, was the chief characteristic, evidently tran­
scending even the intense devotion to work (that was also found 
among her group of artists) and the willingness to select one 
variable for study, holding the rest constant where possible. 
"There is probably no more important factor in the achieve­
ment of this group of [physical] scientists than the depth of 
their absorption in their work." This trait is of course of high 
utility because, as Roe understands, it is unlikely that one can 
achieve anything of great value if one does not dedicate oneself 
deeply, even passionately to the workT
A whole set of her other findings is naturally correlated. The 
age at marriage was rather late for that group -  twenty-seven 
years on the average. (The divorce rate among physical and bio­
logical scientists was markedly below average, $ percent among 
the physicists and 1$ percent among the biologists in her sam­
ple.) She found her scientists often to be working right through 
a seven-day week and during sleepless nights. Even when they 
engaged in sports, it was preferably individual rather than team 
play. Significantly, only four in her study group of sixty-four 
leading scientists "played any active part in political or civic 
organizations." Most of the physicists and biologists "disliked
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social occasions" and avoided them "as much as possible." Only 
three out of the sixty-four were seriously concerned with orga­
nized religion. Far more than the rest of the population, her 
scientists came from families where "value is placed [on learning] 
z'tr OTT72 . . . not just for economic or social rewards." 
A decisive event in their career choice was early research experi­
ence or, even before that, "the discovery of the possibility of 
finding out things for oneself." One might say that their first 
and most interesting scientific discovery may have been their 
own selvesT
Many of the scientists had "quite specific and fairly strong 
feelings of personal isolation" when they were children. A strik­
ingly low number of theoretical physicists, only three out of 
twelve, reported that they had "good health and normal physical 
development" as children. Loneliness or the existence of very 
few friends was commonly reported by both the physicists and 
biologists. A main hobby during childhood was solitary reading. 
"Many of them [physicists and biologists] were slow to develop 
socially and to go out with girls." Whereas this was painful to 
some, it did not seem "to matter enough to most of them to do 
anything about it." "There is a characteristic pattern of growing 
up among biologists and physical scientists . . . The pattern is 
that of the rather shy boy, sometimes with intense personal in­
terests, usually intellectual or mechanical, who plays with one 
or two like-minded companions rather than with a gang, and 
who does not start dating until well into college years." Even 
then, dating may be a very secondary matter. "This is in great 
contrast to the social scientists . . ."
None of the scientists, particularly the physicists, liked busi­
ness. "The extreme competitiveness, the indifference to fact, the 
difficulty of doing things personally, all were distasteful to 
them." Coming now closer to the finding reported also earlier, 
Roe notes that "the biologists and physicists . . . are strongly 
inclined to keep away from intense emotional situations as much 
as possible." On the basis of the Thematic Apperception Test, 
she reports that "none of these groups is particularly aggressive."
Summing up, she finds that with ail the variety in her sub­
jects, "there are patterns, patterns in their life histories, patterns 
of intellectual abilities, patterns of personality structure, which
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are more characteristic of scientists than they are of people at 
large . . ." The lack of early and continued attention to societal 
concerns is part of that general pattern, both of life history, of 
work, and of personality structured" She contrasts this with the 
ancient stereotype that the "scientist is a completely altruistic 
being, devoting himself selflessly to the pursuit of truth, solely 
in order to contribute to the welfare of humanity." To be sure, 
from World War II on, "scientists are being forced to consider 
the social repercussions of their work," and, she agrees, it is 
"an excellent thing both for them and for society." But the char­
acteristics of early career development and personality forma­
tion show the built-in obstacles to the easy fulfillment of that 
hope.
Roe's study was perhaps the first popularly noted, scientific 
psychological work that bore out by research results the long- 
suspected basic dichotomy implied for many in their choice be­
tween a scientific career and a career that concerns itself with 
the world of personal relations. In later studies, Roe accumu­
lated the evidence for a powerful generalization that has proved 
to be of value for other career-development studies: "Apparently 
one of the earliest differentiations, if not the first one, in the 
orientation of attention is between persons and nonpersons.
This fundamental perception of a thematic antithesis, also 
familiar from other psychological studies, was bolstered and doc­
umented by subsequent research, perhaps most strikingly by the 
study of William W. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes. Their work, 
Predicting D<?vei<7p7//ent of Tonng /Id?dty was a five-year 
follow-up study based on the 1960 Project TALENT Test- 
Inventory of almost a half-million young people in the United 
States, grades 9 through 12P* Cooley and Lohnes quote Roe's 
finding on the earliest differentiation and add, "This observed 
polarization of interest in childhood is built into the [career de­
velopment] tree structure as the first branching, presumably oc­
curring in males round the fifth or sixth grade."^ (Indeed, the 
dichotomy may in part be established much earlier, and a 
genetically determined component is of course also not out of 
the question.) They found that the polarization of general in­
terests, which has also been called the "people-versus-thing" (or 
"pcople-versus-ideas") polarization, is
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the earliest trait for which there is fairly solid research 
evidence . . . The distinction is whether the boy's 
primary orientation is toward people or toward science- 
technology. This orientation first appears in student talk 
about vocations somewhere around fifth or sixth grade, 
when the student passes from the fantasy to the interest 
stage in his career development. In interest inventories 
this basic orientation shows up as interest in the various 
science, technology, mechanical scales vewry interest in 
areas which involve more people contact, business, 
humanistic or cultural concerns. This is the earliest 
variable on which we find we can classify careers, and 
thus in our tree structure this variable defines the two 
branches at the first level of branching.*^
No matter that counterexamples exist among one's colleagues, 
and no matter how skeptical one may be about the methodolo­
gies in some psychometric studies, the solemn warning implied 
in the findings of Cooley and Lohnes seems to me sufficiently 
bolstered by other careful research, such as that of James A. 
Davis,^ and must be taken seriously. The "people" versus "thing" 
potential is undoubtedly connected functionally to differences in 
styles of effective thinking and feeling -  for example, those 
modes, means, and ends that are fundamentally logical, experi­
mental, invariance- and simplicity-seeking, versus those that are 
predominantly affective, intuitive, and ambiguity-tolerating. But 
the danger appears to be that such predominant preferences, 
which can be made to coexist tolerably, are allowed to degenerate 
into polar opponents that tend to become mutually exclusive. 
The "interests" that show up early in these interest inventories 
are, at this time in history, still cast and perhaps nurtured in 
ways that permit a young person all too easily to make the "peo­
ple" versus "thing" choice -  and a whole set of institutions, in 
education, guidance, and peer group support, is designed to help 
make a choice, and to make it comfortable enough to live with 
it. Aforeover, as those of us can attest who have worked hard 
to modify the present institutional context -  for example, by in­
venting and injecting a combination of scientific, humanistic, and 
cultural concerns into the educational system for young people, 
or by trying to bring to the attention of scientists and humanists
alike the ethical and human value implications of science -  such 
efforts must all overcome an immense amount of disbelief, re­
sistance, or hostility. Indeed, the chief obstacles are those profes­
sionals in decision-making positions who have "made it" pre­
cisely by sticking to their early choice between things and 
people on reaching the bifurcation of interests and who are now 
successfully barricaded behind that self-chosen barrier. Here lies 
the crux of the problem of interesting more people in "people- 
%?zJ-thing" subjects such as research on the public policy or the 
ethical impacts of science.^
In a study of seventy-nine eminent scientists, Warren O. 
Hagstrom stressed that a key element of internal social control 
in science is peer recognition.^" It is essential to keep in mind 
that the risk of ostracism or isolation is difficult to bear for scien­
tists, who depend greatly on a somewhat distant and abstract 
form of peer approval. As the scientific community is presently 
constituted, preoccupation with social action invites just such 
risks, at least before one is amply fortified with professional 
honors. Receiving adequate recognition is less likely when tradi­
tional role behavior is violated. One must therefore have a clear 
mandate before one introduces major changes into such a care­
fully structured social entity, for anything that isolates a scientist 
tends to lower his reputation and productivity greatly.
In this roundup of survey studies, let us finally look at statis­
tics gathered specifically on the scientist as a young person, par­
ticularly William W. Cooley's work, published in 1963."^  This 
was an investigation -  again only on males -  over a five year pe­
riod (1938-63) "toward the goal of a better understanding of 
how, when, and why boys enter careers in science and tech- 
nology." The longitudinal study involved 700 persons, in groups 
from grade 3 through Ph.D., in overlapping sets, to find the at­
tributes of boys at different ages who will remain in the "poten­
tial scientists' pool" (PSP), at least in commitment if not in 
performance. Cooley finds the PSPs to be high on many good 
qualities but markedly low on social interest, AVL (Allport- 
Vernon-Lindzey Scale), welfare interests, and political interests 
or interest in "power over others."
This finding invites a comment on the obvious fact that more 
than a few good scientists have nevertheless chosen to go into
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positions of political prominence and power and that a few have 
even done a very good job of it by any standard. This fact how­
ever does not cancel the pervasive declarations of disapproval or 
even contempt among scientists (though not without ambiva­
lence) when the suggestion comes up of participating in affairs 
having to do with public policy or political power.^ Evidence 
of the dismay many scientists have experienced in participating 
in or merely watching the essential business of rendering scien­
tific advice on politically sensitive matters is not difficult to find. 
Case studies in the weekly "News and Comments" section of the 
magazine Bciewc or in J. Primack and F. von Hippel, /Mvice 
and Philip Boffey, of
contain enough "horrors" to discourage precisely some of the 
most sensitive and creative scientists from participation. Of 
course this is not the intent of the authors of these important 
publications, and they would be the first to urge that it would 
be entirely counterproductive to turn the battle over to the 
hardened politicos and bishops -  to be found among scientists as 
in any other academic group -  who are ever willing to shoulder 
the necessary tasks all by themselves.
In looking for a theoretical basis for distinguishing between 
the careers of scientists and nonscientists, Cooley comes on a 
significant point: "Outside of the emphasis upon the superior 
abilities of scientists, introversion^* is perhaps the most frequently 
cited 'personal characteristic of scientists.' " Cooley hastens to 
reassure us that "although scientists are far less interested in 
dealing with people in their day-to-day work, their concern for 
humanity and human rights appears to be no different from that 
of the other groups studied."^ Cooley's remark on the scientist's 
"concern" is not presented as a research finding, and I would like 
to think of it as a hopeful perception of a trait to be nurtured, 
even if it starts out as something of an abstraction. In the ex­
treme case it reminds one again of the scientist who remains one 
of the best role models, not the least for his ability of frank self- 
assessment. Einstein wrote:
My passionate sense of social justice and social responsi­
bility has always contrasted oddly with my pronounced 
lack of need for direct contact with human beings and 
human communities. I am truly a "lone traveler" and
have never belonged to my country, my home, my 
friends, or even my immediate family, with my whoie 
heart; in the face of ail these ties, I have never lost a 
sense of distance and need for solitude -  feelings which 
increase with the years. One becomes sharply aware, but 
without regret, of the limits of mutual understanding and 
consonance with other people. No doubt, such a person 
loses some of his innocence and unconcern; on the other 
hand, he is largely independent of the opinions, habits, 
and judgments of his fellows and avoids the temptation 
to build his inner equilibrium upon such insecure 
foundations.^
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Still other studies could be discussed here if space allowed, and 
we would find again and again confirmation of the general pic­
ture that we have obtained here concerning the interaction be­
tween the research scientists' cognitive characteristics, develop­
mental and background characteristics, and personality patterns. 
By way of summary, some conclusions and caveats:
1. Optimism and human goodwill are well-known personality 
characteristics of scientists. But the optimism about the role and 
eventual success of science is quite possibly correlated with a 
pessimism or skepticism about the chance of doing much per­
sonally to guide human affairs. As a rule, a scientist's goodwill 
seems to be held abstractly (and is expected by others so to be 
held in their stereotypical image of scientists), rather than being 
acted out operationally in the sphere of social interactions -  ex­
cept, it should always be emphasized, in the area of collaboration 
among scientists themselves (in laboratories, teams, student- 
teacher exchanges, and so on), which is generally as humane as 
one is apt to find anywhere else.
2. The coherence of a scientist's identity, as presently consti­
tuted and reinforced by social role models and by educational 
and other institutions, may well depend on this antithetical cast­
ing of scientific optimism and wider social concerns.
3. Whether it is psychologically or socially imposed, an early 
choice seems to be made between people and things as antitheti-
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cal entities when young people reach certain branching points 
in the career tree. The stereotypes associated with these choices 
are shared by scientists and nonscientists alike and are thereby 
reinforced. The system is "in resonance," with personality traits 
and institutional settings supporting one another. If it errs, it is 
on the conservative side. Thus Cooley^ shows that the norms 
now used for guidance in high school are out of date even with 
respect to recent changes in the content and institutions of sci­
ence itself.
4. We must remember Thoreau's remark: "Winter, with its 
ice and snow, is not an evil to be cured." My intention has not 
been to deplore or castigate or moralize. Nor do I think lecturing 
at scientists about social responsibility, ethics, and morals will 
do much to shift the mean value of the response curve of scien­
tists toward more societal concerns. A head-on attack of trying 
to increase the average score on some "social interest" scales is 
surely doomed to failure.'^ Rather, I want to fasten on an essen­
tial fact that is often not stressed sufficiently: that there is here, 
as in all natural populations, a a normal or quasi-Gaussian-
type distribution.
Imagine a bell-shaped curve in a plane where the horizontal 
axis indicates the present degree of responsiveness of physical and 
biological scientists to societal concerns. The highest vertical 
point on the curve indicates the most probable value for this 
population. (From all we have heard so far, this peak is likely 
to occur to the left, at fairly low values along the horizontal 
scale, compared with the curve for others -  nonscientists, for 
example.) Educational systems, professional societies, and other 
social institutions tend to be designed so as to "resonate" with 
the mean or most probable value of a characteristic on which 
the institution depends. Normally, it is feedback from the peak 
value that stabilizes a system.
Different scientists are of course located on different parts of 
the bell-shaped curve; a Fermi would presumably appear near 
the low, left end, and a Leo Szilard or a Linus Pauling on the 
other wing, near the high end. This perception suggests some 
strategies for change. One is to increase the amount of feedback 
coupling of the system at the "Szilard end" -  for example, most 
simply by beginning to make teachers, guidance counselors, and
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scientists at their more accessibie moments (e.g., during atten­
dance at professional scientific meetings) more aware of the mere 
eaTtewe of the right wing of the curve, the historical existence 
of successful scientists who, in their very lives, exhibited the pos­
sibility of combining people and
things. The public "image" of scientists often needs correction; 
thus Madame Curie's reported remark "Science deals with 
things, not people" has to be supplemented by her own dedi­
cated participation in groups such as the League of Nations Com­
mittee on Intellectual Cooperation. Another strategy is structur­
ing opportunities so that participation is possible or choices are 
confronted within the setting of a professional society. The for­
mation of the Forum on Physics and Society within the Amer­
ican Physical Society is a relevant example of such an institu­
tional development. The availability of mid-career opportunities 
(such as fellowships or seminars) also needs to be enlarged 
greatly for scientists who are ready for and interested in the 
interactions between science and the world of human affairs.
y This is not the place for a detailed discussion of strategies 
to bring about major changes by changes in the classroom, or 
even to summarize all the likely "first-aid" tactics, but some 
points are so clear that they must at least be mentioned. Particu­
larly at the precollege level we need more large-scale curriculum 
innovations opposing the pervasive dichotomy that Cooley and 
Lohnes (among many others) quite rightly identified as interest 
in the various sciences versus interest in areas which involve hu­
manistic and cultural concerns. One way is to put at least an 
effective modicum of history of science, epistemology, and dis­
cussion of the social impact of science and technology right into 
the educational material used in the science classes. This was a 
chief motivation for those of us who have worked on one such 
program.3" Other educational experiments along these lines, dif­
ficult though they may be to execute in detail, include more 
positive and more aggressive college-level programs designed to 
encourage actively what has been called "double literacy.'^? 
I have no fear that such arrangements will scare off from a sci­
ence career those who, for good reasons of their own, must do 
science as their flight to the pure empyrean. I do expect that the 
mere visibility of the option, properly presented, can attract to
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science a latent population, including socially concerned persons 
who, given the current self-image of the scientist, would nor­
mally not think of science as their proper career held. Scientists 
(and nonscientists) now surely need also more exposure to sub­
stantial discussions of the ethical and human value impacts of 
science and technology. The flight of most members of a pro­
fession to the high empyrean, where they can work peacefully 
on purely scientific problems, isolated from the turmoil of real 
life, was perhaps quite appropriate at an earlier stage of science; 
but in today's world it is a luxury we cannot afford.
It may, of course, turn out that we must settle for the "see­
saw" for many if not most of the productive research scientists. 
High scientific (or any scholarly) performance is often obtained 
at the cost of low social involvement, and the very identity for­
mation of the scientist may depend on his carving out a man­
ageable portion of the world for himself and reducing, therefore, 
his ties with the rest. This is the classic model, and, so far, edu­
cators not only have not resisted it but have built it into their 
assumptions. We clearly can no longer do this, and we must try 
to do something about it. As an educator and optimist, I have 
a professional affirmation that education will find in the "Szilard" 
tail of the curve, not Szilards -  because that would be too much 
to hope for -  but at least people who have enough of the Szilard 
component to meliorate the stern demands of science. 1 place 
much hope in finding incentives that will influence students to 
do excellent science and yet to be interested actively in societal 
concerns, or at the very least to be able to work together and 
sympathize with those who do.
6. A further strategy is this: Since it is not likely that the 
mean value of the distribution can be shifted by converting 
those now on the low, left wing of the curve, we must try to 
add to the population of the right, high wing of the curve by 
increased visibility and effectiveness, in addition to increased re­
cruitment. By a kind of affirmative-action process, the members 
at that end of the spectrum should be given more than their usual 
low share in matters such as filling leadership positions in profes­
sional societies (as the American Chemical Society did a few 
years ago in electing Alan C. Nixon as its president, the American
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Physical Society in electing V. Weisskopf and W. Panofsky, and 
Adargaret Alead's eiection to the presidency of the AAAS).
y. I believe it is reasonable to hope that the scientists' fear of 
the intractibility and seamless quality of societal problems-  
which has made the flight to simpler models of the world func­
tional and reasonable -  can be shown, in sufficiently many in­
teresting instances, not to be borne out by the facts. Except in 
biomedical areas, we have had few pioneers willing to map out 
plausible routes to the kernel of scientific ignorance at the center 
of complex societal difficulties.^ Nor has there been adequate 
financial support for work that is unlikely to give early results. 
Hence the attitude of the profession may be a self-fulfilling fear. 
But once even a few scientists have dared to identify and suc­
cessfully worked on such essential questions, the bridge will be­
come progressively more firm, more visible, more traveled, and 
more plausible. Eventually, the fear of unavoidable failure should 
be deprived of its rational component. Aluch is at stake here, and 
much depends on the generation of a few prototypical successes.
8. Finally, we need more research on this whole topic. In 
this period of rapid change we need to know far more up-to- 
date facts, and not only because outdated stereotypes are still 
being encouraged. Adost data available are pre-1968, and there is 
evidence that the imagination of young people today interested 
in becoming scientists is more flexible and more ready to risk 
people-%7?d-things thinking than used to be the case.^ The 
methodology of research has also been much improved since the 
days when many of the data still used today were obtained.
There have been a host of other significant changes as well. 
Consider the situation with respect to women in science. As was 
evident from my summaries, most of the available data on scien­
tists are on males in the United States; there has been an out­
standing lack of research and useful results on women scientists.**" 
Cooley and Lohnes had to confide: *** "If we ever hoped to de­
velop a theory of careers that would apply to both sexes, the 
experience of wrestling with the follow-up data has disabused us 
of that notion . . . We have done very little with the problem 
of female career development, either empirically or theoretically. 
The Project TALENT girls, in their development toward
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womanhood, are a chaHenge we haven't really met." And again: 
"We subscribe to the suggestion of Roe and of Super that the 
career process for women needs to be conceptualized differently 
and researched differently than for men. The process is probably 
more complex and difficult to study for women . . ."
In the meantime, there are straws in the wind that the career 
goals and self-identification of young women with respect to 
science may be shifting rapidly in the United States. For exam­
ple, Poll No. iot of the Purdue Opinion Panel'" shows in a 
national poll that y percent of the girls in high school in spring 
1975 indicated a preference for the job family "engineering, 
physical science, mathematics, and architecture," by a factor 
of 2% from the results for the poll of 1972. Moreover the old 
stereotypical discrimination against women with respect to scien­
tific ability and mathematical interest may be fading fast: "The 
results of this study indicated that high school students hold 
positive attitudes toward science career roles for females, with 
nearly unanimous consensus on this issue. High school students 
as a whole believe that females are equivalent to males in scientific 
ability and interest in mathematics." '^ It is a testable hypothesis 
that the new influx of young women into science who are com­
ing from outside the older, stereotypical population may yield 
more representatives from the right, high wing of the bell-shaped 
curve referred to earlier -  at least if they find role models and 
other support to encourage the trend.
It is evident that a whole spectrum of interesting research 
problems suggests itself in the still very obscure area called the 
psychology of scientists. How is it really possible that such a 
human enterprise as science, in the hands of such a diversity of 
people, does in fact yield relatively invariant information? How 
do the various and perhaps contradictory elements in the psyche 
of the scientist somehow function together to produce a body of 
work that transcends the individual's limitations? More under­
standing of matters of this kind will help us in the task of fusing 
native scientific optimism and mature societal concerns among 
scientists.


Lewis Mumford on science, technology, and life
8
For nearly a half-century, Lewis Mumford has been writing on 
one of the chief questions of our time: how technology can be 
directed to meet the needs of society. Starting with a book on 
utopias in 1922, he has developed his message in nearly two 
dozen books, including the influential TecAmcr 
(1934), T/je of Ahw (1944), and 7Tc City m 7/b-
tory (1961). This message has reached a kind of climax in 
Mumford's 7Te /MytT? of t&e //.' T7?e of
Potrcr (1970).*
Its chief theme, announced on the opening page, is the 
"wholesale miscarriage" of technology in its present form -  
"megatechnics." Mumford wishes to show us how and why this 
happened, how it undermines "our capacity to live full and 
spiritually satisfying lives," and what can be done about it. 
Though the volume is somewhat unwieldly and repetitious, 
Mumford's style is as fresh and passionate, his prose as persua­
sive as ever. Moreover, the current of the time has caught up 
with him. He is now reaching a far greater circle of readers than 
ever before. Perhaps to his surprise, Mumford now finds him­
self in the front line of a popular parade that may adopt his mes­
sage as a battle flag. This success, together with what it implies 
for the relation between science, technology, and the citizen, 
seems to me in many ways the most significant -  and disturbing 
-  aspect of the book.
First, a summary of its contents-as far as possible using 
Mumford's own words. In broad strokes, with rarely more than 
anecdotal backing for his points, he sketches the history of the 
"myth of the machine," which he finds has obsessed Western
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society and misdirected our energies. Technology before the 
eighteenth century, far from being negligible, had a beneficent 
form that Mumford calls "polytechnics"-variegated, based on 
handicraft, small in scale and slow in pace of production and 
consumption, but just for that reason held in check from being 
rampant and dominant. We are told the pace allowed for chat­
ting* and singing, for leisure within work, for time to converse, 
to ruminate, to contemplate the meaning of life.
But increasingly this stability was undermined by new prin­
ciples and incentives of capitalist finance and the imperious de­
mands of militarism for weapons. The resulting standardization 
and mass production subverted the earlier conceptions of diver­
sification, self-control, and voluntary censorship of inventions, 
as practiced for example by Leonardo da Vinci. Somehow the 
rise, first in science in the sixteenth century, of what Mumford 
identifies as the mechanical world picture, gave all these dis­
parate efforts the subjective unity needed to ensure their event­
ual dominance. It turned out to be an ideology that gave abso­
lute cosmic authority to the machine itself, as against human 
concerns. That, in short, is the myth of the machine.
Mumford sees this sequence of events as a replay of a similar 
disaster, discussed in some detail in the previous volume in this 
series (7T<? Afyr/i of r/i<? /.* Tec/imcr H2/77M72 Dc-
wfop772C77r), which overtook mankind in the Pyramid Age of 
antiquity. For while there may have been other reasons for the 
mechanization of the world picture -  for instance, the ritualistic 
routines and careful accountancy of time and money in the 
monastic orders, or even a profound fault in Christian theology 
by which God was thought to have given man, as the only 
creature with a soul, the earth and all nature for his unlimited 
use and enjoyment -  the most ominous influence on man's 
organization-seeking mind was Copernicus's paradigmatic model 
of the sun-centered universe. Its eventual acceptance somehow, 
unexpectedly, brought to the fore the other brutal habits of 
mind of the Sun God worshipers of the Pyramid Age: a belief 
in the strictest sort of determination, and hence in an absolute 
order, political, social, and industrial. Analogous to the large- 
scale use of slave labor to build monuments in Egypt, there en­
sued a similar regimentation of factory or labor systems which
provided the major impetus for the industrial revolution that 
followed.
There is now a dubious alliance, Mumford continues, between 
scientific determinism and authoritarian controi which menaces 
human existence. Unlike Aristotle, who is praised for having 
taught that living organisms are endowed with autonomy and 
purpose in mind, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton are 
particularly singled out for condemnation of their methodology. 
The Sun God dazzled and blinded them, we are told, and made 
them forget the artist, the subjective side of life, and the very 
presence of man, even the phenomenon of life itself.
We may thank these men and their followers to this day for 
the exchange of a Christian's universe, focused on man's exis­
tence and his ultimate salvation, for a purely impersonal universe, 
without a god except the blazing sun itself. Only rarely, as in 
the America of Emerson, Thoreau, Audubon, and Melville, 
could the romantic and utilitarian personality live side by side, 
not merely coexisting but prospering together. Today, Mum- 
ford explains, only a handful of heretics, mostly poets and 
artists, dares to hold out against the machine-conditioned utopia; 
he also mourns the vanished pleasures of physical work. Human 
evolution is said to have been arrested in favor of a closed and 
completely unified system, with an unchecked tempo of me­
chanical and scientific development in a few selected directions. 
The all-pervasive technological imperative has brought with it 
a brutal conquest of land and nature, and "the effecting of all 
things possible," in the phrase of Francis Bacon. As the great 
cities grow, the vices, perversions, corruptions, parasitisms and 
lapses of function increase disproportionately, and finally must 
terminate in Necropolis, the City of the Dead. (Here, and in 
many other places throughout the book, we hear Mumford in 
the role of Isaiah, who thundered: "Woe unto them that go 
down to Egypt," and "how is the faithful city become a harlot! 
She that was full of justice? Righteousness lodged in her, but 
now murderers.")
The most ominous development was the fairly recent consoli­
dation of the various forces, interests, and motives into a system 
Mumford variously identifies as the megamachine, the power 
complex, or the Pentagon of Power (the subtitle of the book).
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The main components of the system are these five: potccr in the 
sense of the use of energy, but particuiariy atomic energy that 
has given the state a weapon of pharaonic dimensions;
backed by weapons; pfo&zctwny for the sake of propr,* 
and p^MciYy or propaganda by which the elite obtains authority 
and credibiiity. The chief purpose of this system is the aggran­
dizement of the power complex for its own sake, and it is this 
purpose that masquerades under the name "progress." The 
denial of aesthetic impulses or the unchecked exhaust of pol­
lutants are merely by-products of the workings of the power 
complex: Mumford brings up to date the old saying "haste 
makes waste" to read now "haste and waste make money."
Serving this coalition of political absolutism, military regimen­
tation, and mechanical invention, Afumford holds, are not only 
the government office, the bank, and the laboratory, but also the 
school, the church, the factory, the art museum; they are play­
ing the same power theme, marching to the same beat, saluting 
the same flag, the new leaders of a parade first marshaled by the 
kings, the conquistadors, and the financiers of the Renaissance.
It was from about 1940 on that the megamachine really came 
into its own in modern form, assembled by the military-industrial- 
scientific establishment that is cut off from inspectional controls 
by the rest of the community. It was the perfection of nuclear 
absolute weapons that gave science and technology the chance 
to back infantile ambitions and psychotic hallucinations, with 
industry and the academies as willing accomplices in the whole 
totalitarian process. (I am still summarizing Alumford's book 
largely in his own language.) In this respect the United States 
and the Soviet Union are symmetrical mirror images of each 
other, and the cold war has served both to pursue the chief goal 
of the megamachine: the development of means of total exter­
mination. War is the body and soul of the megamachine, whose 
worship demands wholesale human sacrifice. Mumford ends 
this portion of the apocalyptic vision by closing the circle: 
". . . the cult of the Sun God turns out, in its final scientific 
celebration, to be no less savage and irrational than that of the 
Aztecs, though infinitely more deadly." We are captives in an 
empire ruled over by desiccated and sterilized minds to which, 
thanks to the scientists, are dedicated the immense energies that
modem technics has made available. We are denied a better life 
that, Mumford writes, cherishes love and sex and art and what 
he calls the pullulating dream world. This, he concludes, is 
where we have been brought today by the likes of Copernicus, 
Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Fermi, B. F. Skinner, 
Herman Kahn, Buckminster Fuller, AlcLuhan, the Rand Corpo­
ration, Arthur Clarke, the bureaucrats, the technicians, and, 
above all, and again and again, "the scientists."
What, then, does he think can be done about it? First of all, 
Alumford urges that we hush the cry of "forward" until we 
know where technology is taking us -  he wryly recalls that the 
official slogan of the Century of Progress Exposition in 1933 in 
Chicago was "Science Finds -  Industry Applies -  Alan Con­
forms!"-and that somehow we dismantle the military mega­
machine. To reinstate the list of ultimate realities of life (birth 
and death, sex and love, family devotion and mutual aid, sacri­
fice and transcendence, human pride and cosmic awe) there 
now is needed some religious conversion, a transformation on 
the large scale that cannot occur by rational thinking and edu­
cational indoctrination. The God that will save us will rise in 
the human soul.
The most palpable evidence that there are already cracks in 
the megamachine is, in Alumford's opinion, the youth move­
ment. Indeed -  and here Alumford is at his most eloquent -  
some of the young people prefer to live as if the nuclear catas­
trophe had already occurred: among ruins without permanent 
shelter, without regular supply of food, without customs or 
habits except those improvised from day to day, without books 
or academic credentials, vocations or careers, or any source of 
knowledge except the inexperience of their own peers. They 
mass together and touch each other, and only in this way have 
any sense of security and continuity. The arts, too, mirror the 
derangement which the megamachine has produced in the hu­
man spirit, and thereby may help to awaken man sufficiently to 
his actual plight.
This great religious transformation, Alumford urges, is within 
our grasp if we adopt a new world view, one based on the 
biological study of living organisms in the nineteenth century. 
The name for this new vision is ecology, and it will lift the
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burden of the myth of the machine from us. Its hero is Charles 
Darwin, who, Mumford believes, lacked mechanical interest, 
who refused to buy a compound microscope, and who in 
moving outside the mechanical world picture is supposed to have 
been aided gently by an ineptitude for mathematics.
With an earth-centered organic and human model before us, 
mere quantitative production will give way to increased variety 
and "plenitude," not to speak of balance, wholeness, and com­
pleteness. This will be a time of reclaiming the planet for life 
through mutual aid, loving association, and biotechnic cultivation. 
The power system will be transformed into a beneficent organic 
complex. Lifetime concentration upon a single occupation or 
task will give way to a varied existence, for example, a few 
hours of desk work followed by some gardening or carpentry.
If the chances for this program seem unlikely, Mumford asks 
that we think of how small the chances were for Christianity at 
the time of the Romans. Indeed, this is an auspicious moment; 
the human support of the power system was never more frail. 
It will not be long before the center surrenders or blows up. 
Once the myth of the machine is thrown off by individual souls, 
the gates of the technocratic prison will open automatically, 
despite their rusty ancient hinges, as soon as we choose to walk 
out. And with these phrases, the closest the book comes to 
giving a prescription of just how to end our enslavement, the 
volume ends.
Turning now to an assessment of the book and its messages, 
there are many things to praise. The chief concern of Mumford 
is itself eminently worthy. At the very least, technology is 
clearly in need of rescue from its chief exploiters -  primarily 
large-scale industry with a vision of its social purpose far too 
narrow to match its enormous power, and the military with its 
seemingly uncontrollable appetite and its success in avoiding 
democratic accountability.
Mumford is undoubtedly right in warning of the shortening 
of the time interval between scientific achievement and tech­
nological exploitation, with the difficulties this creates in obtaining 
the necessary assessment, and the consideration of those who 
will have to live with the innovation. Mumford is right, too, in 
drawing more attention to the emergence of new styles based on
individualization, diversification, intimate relationships, and the 
development of personal choices and initiatives -  in styles of 
education no less than in styles of dress.
I was also delighted with Mumford's all-too-brief acknowl­
edgment that there is a subjective and qualitative side to the 
doing of science which scientists hardly ever talk about, the 
"intellectual playfulness and aesthetic delight" in scientific work 
which can be an enormously important component of scientific 
choice and motivation. Historians of science and other scholars 
are only now beginning to dig at the edges of this field. The 
book also contains marvelously perceptive glimpses and imagina­
tive passages, scintillating wit and sarcasm and, in some chapters, 
a playful, albeit Dionysian atmosphere.
But the most important good to come from the work, it seems 
to me, may not be one that Mumford would expect: It is the 
awakening of those in the scientific establishment who sup­
posedly have been concerned with science education. The pre­
ponderance of their time, thought and money has gone into the 
training of more professional scientists and technologists, and 
precious little has been left over for serving the vastly larger 
audience: the Mumfords and their readers. This book, and its 
success, are exhibits of the failure of educational institutions in 
the period of rapid increase of scientific knowledge. We have 
no one to blame but ourselves for the fact that the image Mum- 
ford paints of science and technology is so monstrously dis­
torted, and may be so widely believed.
If one looks beyond the seductive style and passionate exhor­
tation one finds that the arguments are built on soft ground. For 
example, the account of the dramatic fight between the two 
great world systems -  the entrenched mechanical one that has 
the stage all to itself for so long, and the newly emerging, 
organic one -  is to a large degree a stage device, not backed up 
by proof or reference. In truth, there has existed in science in 
almost every period since Thales and Pythagoras a set of parallel, 
antithetical systems or attitudes, one reductionist and the other 
holistic, one mechanistic and the other vitalistic, one positivistic 
and the other teleological. In addition, there has always existed 
another set of antitheses or polarities, namely, between the 
Galilean (or more properly Archimedean) attempt at precision
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and measurement which purged pubhc, "objective" science of 
those qualitative elements that interfere with the attainment of 
reasonable agreement among fellow investigators, and, on the 
other hand, the intuitions, guesses, daydreams and thematic com­
mitments that enter into half the world of science in the form of 
a personal, private, "subjective" activity.
Science in its full sense has always been propelled by both 
these forces -  using, as it were, both steam and sail. It is, there­
fore, simply a mistake to dismiss Kepler's notion that the brain 
is a specialized organ peculiarly adapted to handling mathe­
matical information as "baseless." It was most excellently based 
in Kepler's -  and Galileo's -  neo-Platonism, which deeply in­
fluenced his science. Similarly, to admit that Galileo was after 
all "an open-minded naturalistic humanist" does not make up for 
or explain the many pages of abuse heaped on him earlier. And 
the world system of Newton was no cold machine, but rather 
an exquisite structure that swam in nothing less than God's own 
sensorium; as Koyre has shown, it was just this conception of 
God's presence and continued action which formed the intel­
lectual basis of the eighteenth-century world, with its character­
istic linking of science and the humanities. As to Mumford's 
imaginative attempt to turn the work of Copernicus, canon of 
Frauenberg Cathedral and doctor of medicine, into a virus which 
infected the modern age with an Egyptian Sun-God-cum- 
machine obsession -  for that there is also no solid support.
More curiously still, the book fails to distinguish between 
healthy and sick science or between healthy and sick technol­
ogy. All four are mixed together. It also fails to show clearly 
just where the dangers of misguided technology now lie. Mum- 
ford can be forgiven for saying little or nothing about the fact 
that technology has after all both raised crushing burdens from 
the backs of mankind and provided tools that opened our eyes 
to whole new worlds, both animate and inanimate. But his 
rhetoric carries him far in the other direction. Thus he holds 
that if one could get into the center of the power system today 
and "tear(s) aside the curtain," one will find there "the latest 
model IBM computer, zealously programmed by Dr. Strange- 
love and his associates"; for the Sun God has now taken on the 
guise of a central omnicomputer, ready to handle only what is 
"quantitatively measured and objectively observed."
Here the Sun God fantasy can be badly misleading. The 
danger the computer poses for democratic decisions and civil 
liberties does not arise from its capacity for quantitative storage 
or its objective output, but from the storage and fast distribution 
of false or private information, furnished and used by the kinds 
of people who have furnished and used it even in the good old 
days. The computer must not be used as a lightning rod for this 
ancient problem, amply described by humanists from Euripides 
to Dostoevsky to Beckett. The stereotype of the mad science- 
fiction "scientist" must not divert us from the ordinary human 
potential for evil.
Among the misunderstandings of the operations of science, I 
must mention one more because it impinges crucially upon 
Mumford's discussion of the promised rise of the new world 
view. He repeatedly expresses the hope that science as a whole 
will reorganize its basic conceptions, regard the living organism 
as endowed with autonomy and purpose, in one embrace deal 
with all the phenomena of nature, including man himself, and 
abandon the classic scientific style of thinking, whereby the 
parts are "deliberately isolated, carefully prepared, precisely 
measured, in order to intepret the whole." We are told that in 
such a new science there would also be a home for the "theolo­
gian, the mystic, the lover, and the poet"; moreover, it is said to 
be close to Darwin's "complementary ecological approach," 
where the reveals the nature, function, and purpose of the
parts.
But history speaks against the realistic likelihood of success of 
this program as stated and speaks strongly for the likelihood of 
its failure. The Aristotelian method of doing science did come 
to a halt; and Darwin, far from avoiding deliberately isolated 
parts and precise measurements, was brought in large measure 
to the formulation of his doctrine by his detailed observation of 
small portions of the ecology, indeed of the precise shapes of 
the beaks of finches. As to theologians and poets, it is not so 
long ago that they vied with each other, at times, to find in 
science imaginative support. The much-copied model of the 
Royal Society was designed to bring together all men interested 
in knowledge of a sharable kind; thus the diarist Samuel Pepys 
appears as the president of the Royal Society on the 2777^2*2777222222* 
on the title page of Newton's P2*272^ 2pM.
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To say, as Mumford does, that the everyday world of "blue 
and yellow, bitter and sweet, beauty, delight, and sorrow" can­
not be handled by the sciences based on seventeenth-century 
methods is of course not altogether untrue, although psycho­
physics and psychology have something interesting to say about 
it. What is so wrong is to harp on it without listing the rest of 
the "everyday world" on which the sciences have shed a light 
and some compassion: the world of animals and plants, matter 
and radiation, sickness and health, overpopulation and under­
nourishment, individual and group life in society. Before anyone 
dismisses science as the bad habits of inhuman robots rather than 
seeing it as a successful method -  within its limits -  for under­
standing the world we live in, including our minds, bodies and 
societies, he had better realize that at the center of every major 
problem upsetting us these days there sits, among other ignor­
ances, also ignorances of scientific facts. Thus, to cite only one 
example, while more knowledge than we now have about the 
way palatable food plants may be grown with little fertilizer will 
by itself not stop worldwide malnutrition, all measures to com­
bat it in the of such much-needed knowledge will be
badly handicapped and probably unsuccessful.
This brings us to the deepest daw of the book and of its mes­
sage. From Mumford's utopia, rationality and clear thinking, 
even if balanced by passionate commitment, seem largely 
banned -  and, with it, one-half of man's potential capacities and 
faculties. Understanding, even that of the phenomenon of life 
itself, is nowhere given an important place. That place appears 
to be reserved for "man's subjective impulses and fantasies," 
"doating imagery," "bodily impulses," and "spontaneous in­
tangibles." For this reason, too, Mumford does not hope for 
much from "continued studies in the schools and the university."
Now one does not have to be blind to the many dedciencies 
of our academic institutions or to the impotence of much that 
passes for intellectual work. But there is simply no way of 
avoiding the enormous task of trying to bring about a better 
coalescence of man's complementary capacities, by an intel­
lectual understanding of the processes of mind, life, society, and 
cosmos, joined with "capacities for growth, exuberant expres­
sion, and transcendence."
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If this task is too large for any one person, something may be 
hoped for from collaboration among thinkers from all Helds 
who respect one another despite their differences. It is precisely 
here that Mumford's effect may be most destructive. The major­
ity of his readers, whether he likes it or not, will read this book 
as a diatribe against science and scientists. The words "mechani­
cal," "scientiHc," and "dehumanized" appear together in tiresome 
repetition. "ScientiHc" is followed by "deadly," "scientiHc 
progress" by "human regression," with meaningful asides reg­
ularly (such as that Hitler operated "in a scientiHcally advanced 
country"). Ironically, Mumford does not touch, let alone name 
and expose, those who are responsible for many of the excesses 
of uncontrolled technology. Instead -  and this is a harbinger of 
consequences to come from the book -  Mumford falls into his 
own trap and turns on those with whom he should forge an 
alliance against common enemies.
There is a revealing example of it when Mumford discusses 
the American geneticist Hermann Muller, a scientist who for all 
his human faults could never be accused of having been uncon­
cerned with the social responsibility of science. Mumford Hrst 
quotes Muller's serious manifesto and heartfelt warning in 
Muller's own words:
Man as a whole must rise to become worthy of his best 
achievement. Unless the average man can understand the 
world that the scientists have discovered, unless he can 
learn to comprehend the techniques he now uses, and their 
remote and larger effects, unless he can enter into the 
thrill of being a conscious participant in the great human 
enterprise and Hnd genuine fulHHment in playing a con­
structive part in it, he will fall into the position of an 
ever less important cog in a vast machine. In this situation, 
his own powers of determining his fate and his very will 
to do so will dwindle, and the minority who rule over him 
will eventually Hnd ways of doing without him.
Then Mumford proceeds to miss the point disastrously. Not 
seeing that Muller pleads Mumford's own cause, and having 
already made up his mind that Muller and his fellow scientists 
belong to that "minority who rule over" the average man, 
Mumford pounces upon Muller:
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"Find ways of doing without him" . . . Would it not 
have been more honest to say "do away with him"?
Already these faithful servants of the megamachine have 
taken for granted that there is only one acceptable view 
of the world, that which they stand for: only one kind 
of knowledge, only one type of human enterprise has 
value -  their own, or that which derived directly from 
their own. Ultimately they mean that only one kind of 
personality can be considered desirable -  that established 
as such by the military-industrial-scientific elite which 
will operate the megamachine . . . [and will] if nec­
essary "do without" those who may challenge their 
methods or deny the validity of their ends.
Muller is further berated, and linked with Eichmann and his 
colleagues who ordered the Jews into the gas chambers because 
they too were thought to be unfit to participate in Hitler's enter­
prise and failed to "find genuine fulfillment in playing a con­
structive part in it." Now one might dismiss such self-hypnosis 
if it were not sad to see how such prejudices interfere with 
simple understanding and, indeed colleagueship. The danger is 
that the same false rejection of a Muller by Mumford, despite 
his occasional disclaimers to the contrary, will cause among his 
readers large numbers of potential allies to turn away from one 
another.^
The book will not and does not claim to be able to influence 
quickly for the better any of the urgent problems of the day: It 
will not change one vote when the next step in the weapons race 
is taken: it will not keep one acre of wilderness from being 
turned into a Disneyland or a stripmine; it will not halt the decay 
of a single city block, or of a single family hurt by racial preju­
dice or left hungry or ill-housed in the midst of plenty; it will 
not lift the spirit of a single talented student in a crowded, 
neglected school. What the book can do immediately is to aggra­
vate a split which Mumford himself deplores, that is, the conflict 
between the "abstract-mathematical-technical sphere" versus the 
"concrete, the organic, and the human" -  at precisely the time 
when thinkers of all styles should close ranks against the com­
mon anti-intellectual wave, when they should join the groups -  
in which scientists have taken the lead -  which are now in the
forefront of the struggle for better-ordered priorities and against 
the excesses of technology.
Indeed, the time may have come for a new, naturalistic 
humanism, as Mumford beiieves. There aiso may be hope for the 
achievement of Mumford's iaudabie goais: the better integration 
of rationai and emotional capacities; the confidence of the quan­
titative and qualitative views of man in nature rather than man 
against nature; and the loosening of the hold of the military 
machine in most major countries. But if it further splits groups 
of intellectuals who are potential allies by malting them quarrel 
over false issues, the final irony of the book would be to have 
hindered rather than helped achieve these goals.
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Frank E. Manuel's Isaac Newton
When Isaac Newton died in 1727 at the age of eighty-five, his 
scientific writings were considered the highest achievements of 
the Age of Reason, the basic text upon which the Age of En­
lightenment would build. From the platform of his successes in 
physics and astronomy in the and the Opfic^y, he
would rule the imagination for over a century. It was symbolic 
that the young Voltaire arrived for a visit to England just in time 
to attend Newton's impressive state funeral. To the slteptic 
rationalist Voltaire, whose subsequent popularization of Newton's 
works spread the power and fame of the new science beyond the 
shores of England, Newton was the happy exemplar he needed: 
Newton, he said, had the "peculiar felicity, not only to be born 
in a country of liberty, but in an age when all scholastic imperti­
nences were banished from the world. Reason alone was culti­
vated, and mankind could only be his pupil . . ."
Until a few decades ago, this is chiefly how Newton continued 
to be seen. Even his explicit references to the deity in the 
General Scholium in the second edition of the PrwcfpM (pub­
lished in :713s when Newton was seventy-one) and in the 
Queries added to the later editions of the could be ac­
commodated; in any case, such references were relatively rare, 
and although puzzling, their import had somehow been blunted 
by familiarity over the two centuries or more. Occasionally, to 
be sure, there was discussion of the "other Newton" who had in 
fact prepared a CAroTzoIogy of /TzcieMt Kmg&wzy for
publication, and who privately and secretly was caught up much 
more in religious writings, chronologies, alchemical study, com­
mentaries on biblical prophecies, and the like, than befits the
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rational scientist. But these intimations passed, and often were 
put down to bouts of piety, madness, or senility. Newton had 
kept his guard up, motivated by his fear of controversy, partic­
ularly on religious matters. He did let out some hints that he was 
not spending all his creative energy on physics -  for example, in 
a letter of 1679 to Robert Hooke, in which Newton casually 
remarked he was doing scientific work only "perhaps at idle 
hours, sometimes for a diversion" -  were easy to neglect. The 
pile of manuscripts on religion from Newton's pen is now 
known to amount to more than a million words. But only some 
thirty pages on theological material had been published by New­
ton himself in his lifetime.
The turning point to the more modern and complex view of 
Newton came with three events, all falling within about a decade. 
The first was the sale in 1936 at Sotheby's of the many bundles 
of Newton's private papers and theological and alchemical manu­
scripts that had been kept until then in the Portsmouth family. 
The papers began to reveal a Newton diametrically opposite 
from the one so well known from the textbooks. For example, 
one of the purchasers, the economist John Maynard Keynes, 
wrote a rather sensational essay on "Newton the Man" for the 
Newton Tercentenary. He painted Newton as the last of the 
Magi.
While the popular eye was seeking a new focus, scholarly 
attention in intellectual history was also being subjected to a 
reevaluation of the place of the "scientific revolution" that 
culminated in Newton. Thus, Herbert Butterfield introduced his 
influential TT<? On'yim <?f MoJcryz Science (1949) with the 
famous remark that the scientific revolution "outshines every­
thing since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance 
and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes . . ."
The third ingredient was the rise of sound scholarship in the 
history of science over the past three decades. A set of well- 
trained scholars has grown up who concern themselves with the 
innumerable facets of Newton's life and work. One can speak of 
an international scholarly industry, and its fruits are in such 
major contributions as the recent and ongoing publications of 
Newton's correspondence, his mathematical papers, the intro­
duction to and new edition of the Pn'yzcipM, and many more. The
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greater the number and variety of people joining in, and the 
further they dig, the more fascinating and limitless the emerging 
picture of Newton becomes.
Frank E. Manuel's latest book, 7Te Re/zgzozz of /.M%c Nctctozz 
(1974) is the most recent find-and it is a jewel that deserves 
careful study.* Manuel, professor of history at New York Uni­
versity, came to Newton precisely from the "other side," not 
primarily through the study of the scientific papers. He first 
wrote on Newton in a chapter of his book Ezg^ teezzR) 
Cezztzzry Cozzfrozztr GozA (1979). In 1963 he published 
VcTctozz, Hz'ytorMZZ. By that time, chiefly through the writings 
of the philosopher-historian Alexandre Koyre, there had culmi­
nated a trend of modern analyses of Newton's metaphysics that 
had its beginning with Richard Bentley, Samuel Clarke, and 
Voltaire. To this, Manuel juxtaposed a Newton who saw himself 
as a scholar whose interests comprised "an interpreta­
tion of mythology, a theory of Egyptian hieroglyphs, a radical 
revision of ancient chronology founded on astronomical proof, 
an independent reading of the sense of the Bible, and circum­
stantial demonstrations of the fulfillment of prophecy in the 
historical world."
The next step was Manuel's H Portrait of /raac Newtozz 
(1968) -  like all Manuel's work, both lively and profound, cal­
culated to arouse debate in the more stuffy seminars. "The pot 
of Newtonian studies is bubbling vigorously," he noted with 
satisfaction, even as he was stirring it up more by adding a new 
ingredient: psychohistorical analysis. Calling himself a "fellow 
traveller" of Erik Erikson, whose discussions and work had 
"deeply moved" Manuel, he focused on long-neglected materials 
such as the private notebooks Newton had kept as a boy and 
young man. It is a record of psychic terror not explained only 
by the repressive upbringing of the time. These notes and self- 
imposed exercises are a record of Newton's anxiety, confessions, 
loneliness, repression of instinctual desires, shame, fantasies of 
bringing death to his stepfather, mother, and himself -  and the 
dread of punishment for all these.
In Manuel's view, Newton had only two refuges: "One was 
the bible literally interpreted as historical fact, de-allegorized, 
de-mythicized of everything vague and poetic, reduced to the
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concrete; the other was mathematical proof . . . The discovery 
of his mathematical genius was his salvation; that the world 
obeyed mathematical law was his security." Escape from con­
fusion and sin was in subordinating oneself to the task of building 
systems of order, adhering to ascetic behavior enforced by power 
of one's will, and submitting to the will of the Lord -  the severe, 
austere Old Testament God, not the metaphysical abstraction 
but the personal, dominating reality. Thus, Newton held, it is 
our duty to study the scripture as objective historic record.
On the other hand, the study of natural philosophy also had 
much to say about God, knowable through the objective historic 
existence of observable phenomena. Although the study of the 
causes of natural phenomena, Newton admitted, does not bring 
one directly to the First Cause and Creator, it does get one as 
close as one can hope to come in this mortal life. Hence it is our 
duty to pursue this study also. Science is not some idle pursuit 
to satisfy one's curiosity. Rather, it has missionary force. Newton 
said that when Natural Philosophy at length shall be perfected 
by his method, "the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will also be 
enlarged" (OpEcG, Q.31).
Manuel confessed in H Portrait: "I steered my way between 
the Scylla of historians of science and the Charybdis of psycho­
analysts." It was a tom* Je force, and as the reviewer in Lit ob­
served accurately, "he has covered his Hanks so admirably that it 
will drive some readers to distraction. Historians of science may 
never forgive him." Tracing Newton's life, Manuel had emerged 
with a coherent picture. Prematurely born on Christmas Day 
1642 as the son of an unlettered yeoman who had died some two 
or three months earlier, Newton appeared to have come to re­
gard the very circumstances of his birth and survival as a sign 
that he had been chosen by God for some special task. Manuel 
showed the effect on Newton's development as a person, on his 
world outlook, and on his style of life. From his early orphaned 
state (his mother, Hannah, a strong woman whom Manuel re­
gards as the central figure in Newton's life, left him in the care 
of the maternal grandmother from the third to the eleventh year 
of his life, having gone to follow her second husband), he be­
came a Cambridge recluse, a psychologically disturbed man in 
middle age, the authoritarian Master of the Mint, and finally the
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dictatorial President of the Roya! Society-the "autocrat of 
science."
In Manuel's new booh, some of these earlier findings are as­
sumed, and others are expanded upon. What Manuel calls "my 
third,, and I hope final, attempt to grapple with the personality 
and non-scientific thought of Isaac Newton" was triggered by 
Manuel's analysis of Newton's manuscripts now on deposit in 
the Jerusalem National and University Library. The manu­
scripts, part of the Sotheby's sale, had been rescued for scholar­
ship by the well-beloved orientalist of Yale, A. S. Yahuda. In 
!940 Yahuda consulted his friend Albert Einstein about them, 
and Einstein replied with his usual perception that they gave fine 
insight into Newton's "geistige Werkstatt." The relevant manu­
scripts are reproduced in the appendix of the four chapters of 
Manuel's slim book (Appendix A, fragments from a treatise on 
The Revelation according to Daniel -  typical of the fusion of 
Newton's religious and natural-philosophical concerns -  and Ap­
pendix B, "Of the Day of Judgment and World to Come").
What, Newton asks, is the design behind the obscure pro­
phecies in the Apocalypse if not "for the use of the Church to 
guide and direct her in the right way? . . .  If it cannot be 
understood, then why did God give it? Does he trifle?" Not only 
must one try to understand, and so obtain the blessings promised 
for it, but conversely one risks the wrath of God for not trying 
to understand if one was meant to do so. Therefore Newton sets 
out to construct rules for interpreting these writings -  rules for 
ordering and simplifying the meaning of images such as "the 
three froggs, the head or horn of any Beast, the whore of Baby­
lon, the woman Jezabel," to see, for example, whether these 
images may stand for identifiable kingdoms or sects or peoples. 
Thus Newton analyzes Daniel's "vision of the four Beasts": the 
fourth being the fiercest of them, it cannot stand, Newton 
explained, for the kingdom of Antiochus Epiphanes, as some 
witless earlier scholar seems to have asserted, for that regime 
was less fierce than the three before it.
A typical rule that Newton announces for dealing with ob­
scure passages is
to choose those constructions which without straining 
reduce things to greatest simplicity . . . Truth is ever 
to be found in simplicity, and not in the multiplicity
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and confusion of things. As the worid, which to the 
naked eye exhibits the greatest variety of objects, appears 
very simple in its internal constitution when surveyed by 
a philosophical understanding, and so much the simpler 
by how much the better it is understood; so it is in these 
Visions. It is the perfection of God's work that they are 
done with the greatest simplicity. He is the God of order 
and not of confusion.
Applying this methodology of maximum simplicity, which 
worked so well for him in physics, to theology, Newton believed 
he could reduce mysterious and chaotic passages to confident 
clarity. Thus his survey of Old Testament prophecies and the 
Relevation of John led Newton to find proof that the earth will 
continue to be inhabited by mortals after the Day of Judgment, 
for ever and ever. On the day of his Coming, Christ will judge 
not only the dead but also the quick; hence the dimensions and 
cubic footage of the New Jerusalem will have to be big enough 
to accommodate the crowd of those who are chosen. In fact its 
length in each of the three dimensions, Newton finds from his 
analysis, will be "the cube root of 12,000 furlongs." (Even for 
the short run, some predictions can be derived from such study: 
The reign of the Popes, Newton announced, could last at most 
another sixty years.) Manuel concludes, "In whatever direction 
he turned, he was searching for a unifying structure. He tried to 
force everything in the heavens and on earth into a grandiose 
but tight frame from which the most miniscule detail could not 
escape."
It must be noted that these manuscripts do not come from the 
period of Newton's dotage. On the contrary, they may be dated 
in the 1670s and 1680s, when he was in his prime. It is that much 
more amazing that Newton's God appears explicitly only once 
in the first edition of the Pn'MCz'pM (^87) (the General Scholium 
was not added until the second edition, twenty-six years later). 
This single reference occurred almost casually, in Book III, 
where Newton argues that God must have placed the planets at 
different distances from the sun for some purpose. Even that, 
Newton regretted, and he removed the passage from his own 
interleaved and annotated copy of the first edition, as I. B. Cohen 
has recently pointed out.
But if God did not appear in the pages of the PrmHpM more
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dearly until the later editions, Newton himself had no illusion 
that the phenomena themselves could be purely mechanical. For 
one thing, far too much remained unexplained (and therefore not 
discussed in the PrmdpM at all). To give one example: To 
David Gregory, astronomer and mathematician, who was close 
to Newton at the time, Newton is recorded to have said that "a 
continual miracle is needed to prevent the sun and the fixed stars 
from rushing together through gravity." (Physicists, inciden­
tally, are still struggling with this problem; Julian Schwinger, in 
a paper on "Sources and Gravitation" a few years ago, speculated 
on the possibility of a "dynamical equilibrium," and he ended 
his paper with the proposal that "the gravitational attraction of 
two atoms across the universe is balanced by the quantum kinetic 
energy demanded by localization within the universe. Does the 
quantum stabilize the cosmos?")
But beyond all the puzzles that seemed to be explainable only 
by invoking the deity and hence proving the necessity of his 
existence (as in Newton's letters of 1692 to Richard Bentley), 
the properties of and necessity for God are built into Newton's 
very physics, into his conceptions of absolute space, time, the 
ether, gravitation, and sense perception. To Newton, his work 
was only the beginning of a grander synthesis that eluded him, 
one by which he hoped to understand both nature and its creator.
It is a miracle how Newton's psyche, caught in this high 
service, held together as well as it did. More than once, Newton 
used the phrase RmcM/y mmy as an anagram for Isaacus
Neuutonus. Behind the melancholy countenance, we now can 
guess, there must have been a great flux of exaltation and terror. 
For where others saw Newton's unmatched skills, he must have 
been most aware of how inadequate all these were for the awe­
some task that had somehow fallen on the shoulders of the lad 
from Lincolnshire.
10
Ronald Clark and Albert Einstein
Today, more than two decades after his death at the age of 
seventy-six, Albert Einstein is remarkably alive in contemporary 
science. I am not speaking about his "practical" influence, those 
parts of his theories that came to be incorporated into modern 
gadgets, from TV sets to nuclear-power reactors. Rather, as a 
quick look as current research journals or at the Science Citation 
Index can show, his work is still the acknowledged base of new 
research results in an astonishing variety of problems in physics, 
cosmology, and to some extent also in chemistry.
Because science grows cumulatively and moves fast, scientists 
usually do not cite work done more than a few years ago and are 
even less apt to look back for reasons of sentimentality or hero 
worship. So, when they keep referring to and using Einstein's 
results, it is for good reasons. Indeed, during the past decade it 
has turned out that some of the most exciting frontiers lie exactly 
in that branch where Einstein, with few followers but with the 
obstinacy of a prophet, did his work in his last decades, namely, 
in general relativity theory.
A rapidly growing number of historians of science, too, now 
work on Einstein and his influence. Today's theory of knowl­
edge also carries his fingerprints, partly because his early publica­
tions on relativity and quantum physics helped shape the modern 
style of doing science -  moving ahead with daring, free imagina­
tion, but keeping one's rope anchored in a few places to the 
granite of basic principle.
In short, from this point of view Einstein's chief importance 
today lies in the fact that his legacy still provides much of the 
power and direction for modern science and epistemology. But
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a very different image arises out of the recent Einstein biography 
by Ronaid W. Clark/ a correspondent during World War II 
who since then has written several biographies of British scien­
tists (J. B. S. Haldane, the Huxleys, Sir Henry Tizard). At first 
glance he seems to be dealing with an entirely different person, 
"a man," he tells us, "who can, without exaggeration, be called 
one of the great tragic figures of our time," not least for having 
become a scientific "museum piece" (quoting one of Einstein's 
typically self-derogatory remarks).
The paradox is not due to any lack of diligence. Clark has 
evidently read and digested scores of other biographical works 
and looked at documents in many archives. On the way to his 
conclusion, he passes in considerable detail through the chapters 
of the now rather familiar story: Einstein as the rebellious boy in 
southern Germany; the student in Switzerland; the patent- 
office employee writing magnificent scientific papers; the pacifist 
and academician, who, after moving back to Germany, becomes 
charismatic overnight on November 7, 1919, when a prediction 
within his general relativity theory is borne out by measurements 
of British scientists. Then, the rise of the Nazis; Einstein as 
refugee, settling in the United States and reaching the status of 
scientist-philosopher and World Conscience who helped launch 
the Pugwash movement of scientists working toward arms 
control.
Throughout, Clark also intersperses his text with anecdotes 
illustrating Einstein's lively wit and independence. There is a 
cast of thousands, kings and commoners who happened to inter­
act with Einstein and who shared with him the elations and 
horrors of the first half of this century.
There is also a special chapter on Einstein's role in alerting 
Roosevelt in August 1939 to the possibility-realistically per­
ceived, as it turned out -  that the Germans would combine their 
scientific headstart on nuclear-fission work with their access to 
uranium ore and their ambitions for world conquest and so 
would be tempted to make a nuclear weapon that, on scientific 
principles, was generally known to be a possibility. Clark cor­
rectly points out that the effect of Einstein's letter is by no means 
clear even now. Referring to research in the United States and 
Britain, Vannevar Bush noted previous progress: "This show had
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been going on tong before Einstein's letter," and A. H. Compton 
held that the intervention may have slowed the work down.
At any rate, as Clark says, the world was going into a nuclear 
age whether or not Einstein had signed the letter to Roosevelt. 
Ironically, after December Einstein was carefully kept
insulated from research on the A-bomb -  "in view of the attitude 
of people here in Washington who have studied his whole 
history," as Bush reported with regret. Einstein got wind of what 
went on, enough to worry greatly about a postwar weapons race. 
His plan was to inform and rally scientists in the major countries 
to press for the internationalization of military power. Niels 
Bohr himself hurried to Princeton to swear Einstein to silence in 
order not to "complicate the delicate task of the statesmen."
There is a good deal more of this throughout the book, illus­
trating defeats of the public and political Einstein. But there is a 
curious quality of these defeats which earned him the description 
"naive" or "tragic." Whereas the "statesmen" of our time have 
largely failed because they so often implemented fundamentally 
bad ideas, Einstein failed in this area because there seemed to be 
no realistic way of implementing his fundamentally good ones.
One should add that Clark's account is on the whole vivid and 
readable. His encyclopedic approach and spotty use of scholarly 
advisers have caused him to include some dubious material, to give 
some poor translations for the German originals, to get inter­
views mixed up and to err in factual matters such as birth or 
death dates for Einstein's wife, sister, and son. Flaws at this level 
could easily be remedied, and they do not explain the paradox 
between Clark's tragic Einstein as seen from the outside -  which 
is the chief novelty of this biography -  and the towering, creative 
figure of Einstein seen from the inside of science and history of 
science.
Understanding the deeper reasons for the paradox will tell a 
great deal about both the book and Einstein. One might start 
with Einstein's own profound and declared disinterest in the 
very thing that animates any biography: the whirlpool of tran­
sient detail. On a very few occasions, autobiographical fragments 
were squeezed out of him.
One occasion came on receiving the Nobel Prize in 1922, 
when he had to furnish an autobiographical essay for ofhcial
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publication. His was embarrassingly short -  only fourteen lines. 
In 1946 he was persuaded to write his famous "Autobiograph­
ical Notes" -  and devoted virtually all his space to his conceptual 
development in science and epistemology. Therefore, it is an 
autobiography containing the names of intellectual ancestors 
such as Hume, Kant, and Mach, Newton, Faraday, and Maxwell 
-  but not of any of his family relatives.
Nor could he bring himself to read through the many biog­
raphies published about him, unless they were so patently out­
rageous and scurrilous that he was persuaded, in one or two 
cases, to try to prevent their publication. There is good evidence 
that he read little, if anything, even of the work of three biog­
raphers he respected -  Anton Reiser (the pseudonym for his son- 
in-law, Rudolf Kayser), Carl Seelig, and his successor to his 
chair in Prague, Philipp Frank, whose book was the most sensi­
tive and reliable of the many biographies available.
Einstein's distaste for the "merely personal" was not just a 
peculiarity. Like other extraordinary men, he felt that the 
personal, moment-to-moment existence, dominated by ever- 
changing wishes, hopes, and primitive feelings, is a chain that one 
should try to cast off in order to free one for the contemplation 
of the world "that stands before us like a great, eternal riddle." 
In the simplified but lucid image of the world that can thereby 
be gained, he once said, a person could hope to "place the center 
of gravity of his emotional life, in order to attain the peace and 
security that one cannot find within the narrow confines of 
swirling personal experience."
Even when he was eventually heaped with praise, he felt "the 
only way to escape the personal corruption of praise is to go 
on working . . . Work. There is nothing else." That is where 
his integrity lies and hence is the focus of his autobiography. And 
when asked what he had to say about his favorite composer, 
Bach, he replied in the same vein: "Listen to his work, play it, 
love it, honor it . . . and otherwise shut up about it."
Now it is only fair that a biographer must not be limited 
by his subject's view on biography. And in principle, an "out­
sider's" view of a scientist can only be welcomed. But once one 
has chosen him as one's subject, Einstein obliges his biographer 
to put his science not too far from the center of the work. Philipp 
Frank's book shows that such a task can be adequately handled
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for nonscientihc readers without becoming a textbook. Even 
though Einstein's science is proverbially difficult, the essence of 
Einstein's discoveries is in fact accessible without much mathe­
matics. As Clark reports him to have said about himself, "My 
power, my particular ability, lies in visualizing the effects, conse­
quences, and possibilities . . .  I grasp things in a broad way 
easily. I cannot do mathematical calculations easily. I do them 
not willingly and not readily."
Clark's book does not give a particularly skillful or accurate 
presentation of Einstein's chief scientific contributions, even 
qualitatively. Nor are matters much helped by evaluations of 
this kind: "Einstein's new idea appeared to have slipped a disc in 
the backbone of the universe." Under the circumstances it comes 
close to writing a in which the Prince of Denmark is
not only absent but is replaced by King Lear.
There is a second reason for the paradox. To any external 
observer, Einstein's character was full of ambiguities, tensions, 
and polarities which sometimes produced results that now make 
amusing reading. But if one digs deeper, one will find that these 
polarities are essentially connected to his scientific genius. Ein­
stein's disinterest in making sure he would not turn up incor­
rectly dressed for some formal occasion was not unrelated to his 
ability to adopt an unconventional point of view when it was 
needed to expose the key fault in some hoary old problem of 
science.
The polarities in Einstein's style of life and thought, of which 
one does catch glimpses in Clark's book, are quite extraordi­
nary, as even a brief list will show. There is of course the 
folkloric image itself -  that of the wisest of old men, who even 
looked as if he had witnessed Creation itself, but who at the same 
time also was the almost childlike person. As Einstein himself 
once said, he succeeded in good part because he kept asking him­
self questions concerning space and time which only children 
wonder about. Then there is the legendary, iron ability to con­
centrate, often for years, on a single basic problem, regardless of 
contemporary schools or fashion; and, opposite to that, is his 
ever-ready openness to deal, after all, with the barrage of re­
quests for help and personal involvements that appealed to his 
fundamental humanity and vulnerability to pity.
Einstein is the apostle of rationality, characterized by clarity
R o 73%M CAw^ E iw t c m  279
280 Py/Nic MM of rcicMce
of logical construction; and, on the other hand, there is his un­
compromising beiief in his own aesthetic sense in science, his 
advocacy of not looking in vain for "logical bridges" from ex­
perience to theory, but of making the great "leap" to basic 
principles, guided only by an intuition that rests on a sympa­
thetic understanding of experience. His personal philosophy of 
liberal agnosticism and his withering contempt for established 
religious authority of any sort are well known -  and, at the same 
time, he has also a clear personal religiosity. As he says in one of 
his letters: "1 am a deeply religious unbeliever."
And what is most significant, such polarities also go straight 
through his scientific work. There is the well-known contradic­
tion between his devotion to the fundamental thema of con­
tinuum, as expressed in the field concept, and on the other hand, 
his brilliant contribution to physics, based on the thema precisely 
opposite to the continuum, namely, the discrete quantum. In his 
very first paper on relativity theory in 190$, one can find just 
such a polarity; the positivism of the operational variety, which 
Einstein used for defining the concepts, coexists with a rational 
realism inherent in putting the two basic principles of relativity 
a priori at the base of the paper.
To be able to see and use such polar opposites lies close to the 
very meaning of genius. The seemingly ambivalent style of 
thinking, acting, and living is therefore not merely good "copy," 
but needs to be considered as one aspect of his unusual ability to 
deal with the ambiguities inherent in the chief unresolved prob­
lems of science. The key to his genius may well lie in the mutual 
correspondence between his style in thought and act on one side 
and the chief unresolved puzzles of contemporary science on the 
other.
Another such correspondence exists between his life style 
and his search for the great simplifications in science by which 
he sought, and usually found, connections between previously 
separate concepts such as matter and energy, space and time, 
mechanics and electrodynamics, and gravitation and electromag­
netic fields. This instinctive desire to remove any unnecessary 
asymmetry or excess pervaded his behavior no less than his sci­
ence. At stake was nothing less than finding the most economical, 
simple, formal principles, the barest bones of nature's frame,
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cleansed of everything that is ad hoc and redundant. To one of 
his assistants, Einstein said: "What ready interests me is whether 
God had any choice in the creation of the worid."
In fact, sensitivity to previously unperceived formal asym­
metries or to incongruities of a predominantly aesthetic kind 
(rather than, for example, a puzzle posed by unexplained experi­
mental facts) -  that is the way each of Einstein's three basic 
papers of :(?o$ begin. In all these cases the asymmetries are re­
moved by showing them to be unnecessary, the result of too 
specialized a point of view. Complexities which do not appear 
to be inherent in the phenomena should be cast out. Nature does 
not need them.
And Einstein does not need them. In his own personal life, the 
legendary simplicity of the man was an integral part of this 
reaching for the barest minimum on which the world rests. Even 
people who knew nothing else about Einstein knew that he pre­
ferred the simplest possible clothing and that he hated nothing 
more than artificial restraints of all kinds.
Other connections of this kind may he found, but only the 
raw material is in the biography. For example, there is constant 
reference to Einstein's religious feelings. The author indicates 
they developed in prewar Berlin when, as Clark puts it, "the fact 
of his Jewishness was brought home" to him. We are told that he 
is "the most famous Jew in modern history," that he had "the 
deep respect for learning which the Jew shares with the Celt," 
and so forth. When Einstein writes to Hans Muhsam, we are 
told -  for no particular reason -  that he is writing to "an old 
Jewish friend." Einstein's interest in Judaism and his strong 
support of Zionism are amply discussed. But Clark misses the re­
lationship between Einstein's religiosity and his physics.
The biblical God of Law, whom Einstein constantly invoked 
in his letters, if only in a self-mocking manner, was not funda­
mentally different from the rational God of causal laws, who 
does not play dice with the world. Quantum mechanics in its 
later form, in which chance reigned supreme, Riled him with a 
visceral repugnance that is understood best when one remembers 
he referred to it as a (false) "religion." To see at first hand the 
coherence with which Einstein lived and thought, both as a 
scientist fighting for a causal physics and as a person preoccupied
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with questions of politics and morality, one must turn to the 
account in the excellent book, 77?c Porzz-Ewrrcm Letters, with 
commentaries by Max Born.
Einstein's pacifism also comes in for a great deal of attention 
in Clark's biography. The author's position is announced in the 
first paragraph: In his view, Einstein "passionately indulged in 
pacifism, and as passionately indulged out when Hitler began to 
show that he really meant what he said about the Jews and the 
master-race." It was not so simple as that; Einstein's position 
has been carefully examined and documented in EwrtezM ow 
Peace, by Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden. More curious still 
is Clark's repeated accusation that a "near paranoia" affected 
Einstein concerning the Germans -  something the author, with 
considerable inaccuracy and insensitivity, identifies as "an echo 
of the cry that the only good German is a dead one."
Einstein himself would of course not have been greatly 
bothered. As he said to Born when informed about a misevalua- 
tion of his work, "After all, I do not need to read the thing." But 
now, nearly a century after Einstein's birth, the time has come 
for balanced, sound biography. Such an enterprise will be much 
easier when the extensive archives of Einstein's correspondence 
and manuscripts at Princeton are released for publication, as now 
seems likely to happen at long last. Then we shall see more 
clearly Einstein's tragedies and triumphs -  for example, his failure 
to convert Born and Bohr from their heathen gods of quantum 
mechanics, and the triumph of a glorious two weeks in Holland 
in 1916 in the company of H. A. Lorentz and Paul Ehrenfest, 
fellow physicists whom he truly loved.
Martin Klein, in his recent book P%zJ gives an
account of that visit. Much of the time there seems to have been 
devoted to playing the piano and violin duets, and Einstein was 
most satisfied when he succeeded in weaning Ehrenfest away 
from a preference for Beethoven. (Ehrenfest's notebooks show 
that for several months afterward he gave more time to Bach 
than to physics.) The rest of the visit was full of joy, too. 
Ehrenfest described an evening when Lorentz, in an after-dinner 
conversation, presented a finely polished question concerning 
Einstein's new theory of general relativity:
When Lorentz had finished, Einstein sat bent over the
slip of paper on which Lorentz had written mathematical 
formuias to accompany his words as he spoke. The cigar 
was out, and Einstein pensively twisted his finger in a 
lock of hair over his right ear. Lorentz, however, sat 
smiling at an Einstein completely lost in meditation, 
exactly the way a father looks at a particularly beloved 
son -  full of secure confidence that the youngster will 
crack the nut he has given him, but eager to see how. It 
took quite a while, but suddenly Einstein's head shot up 
joyfully; he "had it." Still a bit of give and take, inter­
rupting one another, a partial disagreement, very quick 
clarification and a complete mutual understanding, and 
then both men with beaming eyes skimming over the 
shining riches of the new theory.^
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On the educational philosophy of 
the Project Physics Course
In late October 1963 the U.S. National Science Foundation 
(NSF) held a meeting in Washington of about two dozen scien­
tists in order to persuade some of them to take new approaches 
to introductory physics teaching^ The Physical Science Study 
Committee's (PSSC) course had been available for some time, 
but the scientists and officials were concerned that the proportion 
of students in the United States taking any introductory course 
in physics, alone among all the sciences, was continuing to de­
crease.
To me the more important argument was that the scientific 
community had a duty to provide not merely ow updated, na­
tional course that might come to be regarded generally as the 
only "modern" way of teaching physical science. Particularly in 
the context of education in the United States, the proper strategy 
is that of pluralism. On this point, Alexis de Tocqueville's great 
work, seems to contain wisdom that
still applies.
For this purpose one must not fasten too much on the well- 
known dispirited conclusion at the end of Tocqueville's book. 
There he expressed the fear that democracy leads inevitably to a 
deterioration of the great social examples imposed from above, 
the models of style and the elevated thought constructs that he 
thought to be characteristic of aristocratic society in all its en­
deavors, including the sciences. In America, he said, "everyone 
is actively in motion," intent on some self-aggrandizement, as is 
guaranteed by the openness of opportunity to all; and thus "there 
prevails amongst those populations a . . . sort of incessant jos­
tling of men, which annoys and disturbs the mind, without ex-
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citing or elevating it." He found the emphasis in science and the 
arts to be on the appiied, not the theoretical -  admittedly some­
times with great success: "These very Americans, who have not 
discovered one of the general laws of mechanics, have introduced 
into navigation an engine which changes the aspect of the 
world." But aside from giving credit to such practical triumphs, 
Tocqueville nostalgically mourned the passing of the aristocratic 
age as he saw the new mediocrity sweep over everything: 
"When I survey this countless multitude of beings, shaped in 
each other's likeness, amidst whom nothing rises and nothing 
falls, the sight of such universal uniformity saddens and chills 
me, and I am tempted to regret the state of society which has 
ceased to be."
This attitude is still the ideological heart of many plans and 
programs that attempt to impose a monolithic solution, found 
by a specific elite group, upon a large fraction of the nation. 
Occasionally, a large crash program seems the only sensible solu­
tion (although in retrospect many of these, from the Manhattan 
Project on, do not stand as unalloyed blessings). But we must 
remember the chief reason why Tocqueville's lugubrious predic­
tion turned out to be wrong, why this nation, far from having 
sunk into some all-pervading mediocrity, has in most of its ef­
forts in our time been setting standards of excellence in science 
and scholarship which no monolithic or aristocratically oriented 
society could have hoped to achieve.
The reason follows from a fact that Tocqueville himself 
identified: that in place of aristocratic excellence -  models im­
posed by small groups upon the large mass -  the peculiarly 
American genius is for pluralistic enterprises. In the pursuit of 
science, art, or commerce, we have reached our place not by 
following the hierarchical model, a system where everything 
radiates from the one Ecole Normale and Ecole Polytechnique 
or the Big Company, but by encouraging excellence wherever 
and whenever it appears. By warding off monopolistic and mono­
lithic practice, we have usually managed to keep the social units 
of action JTTMl/ enough to give the exemplars of excellence in 
each unit a chance to assert themselves against the background 
noise of indifferent mediocrity. The prototype of action is still 
that of town meeting government rather than of a one-way flow
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of directions from a single central Rome or Paris, from one 
National Ministry of Science or of Education, from one single 
source that grants funding or prestige. If our commercial and 
political activities have too often abandoned that peculiar Ameri­
can strength in the recent past, at least the educational enterprises 
function in this way still and are characterized by a large measure 
of local control, the exercise of individual authority over manage­
ably large groups, and hence the exercise of choice. Choice 
among alternatives must be preserved, in educational curricula as 
in all other aspects of life in a democracy.
Tocqueville was in fact fascinated by the peculiarly American 
form of small-scale government and authority as embodied in 
the town meeting. His discussion of the American system of 
townships stands near the beginning of the whole work. The 
small unit of government seemed to him both to embody and to 
explain the effectiveness of American life, in contrast to the 
typically European, large units of government which he saw to 
be the model for life abroad. This "argument from scale" for 
the governance of education seems to have certain evident im­
plications.
To others at the 1963 meeting the more urgent and more 
practical problem was, however, the relative decrease in science 
enrollments in schools, even though the causes and hence the 
remedies were (and still are) by no means clear. The proportion 
of students opting to take physics in the last years of high school 
in the United States had been dropping ever since 1900, as the 
base of students going to school was expanding. By 1960, fewer 
than 20 percent of last-year students in high schools were choos­
ing any physics course. In 1963 it seemed that this trend would 
continue and, indeed, by 1971 the fraction was down to 16 per­
cent.  ^ Moreover, between 1960-70 only about 4 percent (less 
than 100,000 out of 2.3 million) of our high school seniors per 
year were enrolling in the only modernized high school course 
in physics then available. As Figure 11.1 shows, during that 
decade there was a marked drop in the share of the students 
taking any physics course -  from about nine-tenths of the share 
we had in 1948-49, down to less than seven-tenths in 1970.
The reasons for this pattern are still not understood, the more 
so as similar trends have been noted in other countries, including
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Figure [!.!. "Fractional enroliment in certain high schooi science courses 
relative to the fractional enrollment in those courses in 1949. Note that 
the drop in physics and the )ower slope in biology and chemistry took 
place during the decade foHowing the introduction of the new high- 
powered curricula. Source: The National Science Foundation." Iilustra- 
tion and caption from the National Academy of Sciences, Physics it! 
Perspective ("Bromley Report") (Washington, D.C., 1973), vol. 2, p. 1164.
the USSR. In the United States the increasing difficulty in find­
ing adequate scientific careers and the discontinuation of federal 
funds for teacher training in new curricula are undoubtedly 
factors that add to those present in the early 1960s. Other, cul­
tural trends may also play a role, including the rise of antira­
tionalist or "Dionysian" thinking (as discussed in Chapter 3).
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As it turned out, no one in the 1963 meeting in Washington was 
foolhardy enough to agree to begin another national program in 
physics for schools and colleges, except a small group consisting 
of F. James Rutherford, Fletcher G. Watson, and myself. This 
was the beginning of Project Physics. The three of us had in 
fact begun to collaborate on writing a book; this head start and 
pleasant collaboration, together with the October 1963 mandate, 
gave us the courage to expand our plans considerably, from a 
textbook to a national curriculum effort. We were also interested 
in putting into educational practice some of the conceptions of 
science discussed in this volume, as well as attempting to build 
a pluralistic model of teaching and learning into the curriculum 
materials themselves.
As a result, a large number of people was assembled at Harvard 
University, starting July 1, 1964, to design, test, and then re­
design the Project Physics Course for schools and colleges.  ^
While the basic outline and conceptual structure of the course 
shows the influence of the book that caught the attention of 
Rutherford's class initially, one consequence of this history was 
that the course materials had to pass at the same time the require­
ments set by three people with different constituencies -  a sci­
entist, a teacher, and a professor of education.
New editions were prepared every year between 1964 and 
1968 and tested in trial classes. A total of 180 professional people 
-  physicists, college and high school teachers, historians and phi­
losophers of science, psychologists, reading specialists, designers, 
filmmakers, and so on -  collaborated to produce the successive 
versions of text, anthologies (Rejderr), dims, laboratory equip­
ment, transparencies, the test program, and the rest of the course 
materials, distributed free to the participating trial schools.  ^ In 
addition, the project involved the teachers and students in trial 
schools, and about a dozen Ph.D. students who based their doc­
torate theses in education on the evaluation program.^
From 1968 to 1970 the three original directors of the project 
reworked the whole set of materials in the light of the results of 
the final tests made on 20,000 students. It was no simple under­
taking. At last, shortly before Christmas 1970, the final version
of all course components became available through the publisher. 
What had begun in a rather casual way eight years earlier left us, 
as I recall, too exhausted to celebrate properly on that day. I am 
not confident we would have responded politely if someone had 
reminded us then that another revision effort, for the second 
edition of 1975, had to begin not long afterward.
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It is fair to say the course now nourishes. The publisher estimates 
that a large fraction of students taking physics in schools and 
colleges in the United States are using the texts and at least sub­
stantial parts of the rest of the course materials. Although it 
would be difficult to say whether the course was responsible for 
at least a leveling off of the precipitous drop of students noted 
up to 1971, it is a pleasant fact that thousands of teachers have 
undertaken to be trained in modern methods using these mate­
rials, and have been able to exercise a choice between alternative 
courses and choices between materials for different students in 
the same course, over a large range of types of classrooms. The 
independent test results obtained by the Educational Testing 
Service (ETS) of Princeton, New Jersey, on how much physics 
these students actually learn, show that on the average the Proj­
ect Physics students do just as well on the ETS tests as do all 
students nationally in any of the new or old physics courses. 
Thus it is not to be feared that students are going to be helpless 
even when given the unmodified national tests. On the contrary, 
they may well have benefited more from the alternative materials 
put into the course, not to speak of having a more integrated 
view of what is important about physics.
One of the significant aspects of the project is the growth of 
many %d%pt%tio77t of the course for schools and universities 
around the world. From the beginning, we have insisted that we 
do not wish merely to "export" slavish translations of the U.S. 
materials. We hoped to provide a model both of % tty/e of gomg 
%Pottt 777%U73g % OMr?*UzJM773 Jeve/ofwzeTtt (e.g., involving scien­
tists, teachers, and historians of science from the beginning, doing 
careful evaluation of pilot editions, and so on) and of %72 Jp- 
pro%oP to tPe tzzPfcot 777%tter. The latter -  a humanistic concep-
tion of science -  is really the heart of the program, rather than 
any particular piece of equipment, text chapter, topic sequence, 
use of films or other media, and the like.
Adaptations exist or are in preparation in Australia and New 
Zealand, India, Israel, Japan, Jordan, and other countries. For 
Spanish-language and Portuguese-language countries, there are 
also adaptation teams at work. In Canada, too, we insisted on a 
thorough adaptation to the local culture and educational context: 
Hence Canadian groups made two separate adaptations, one in 
French (published in Quebec) and the other in English (pub­
lished in Toronto). A great deal of pure and applied science is 
of course entirely international; yet a student should not be de­
prived of also seeing the historical connections and present ap­
plications of physical science in his or her own country.
Such considerations stem from a concern that has been as im­
portant as any in designing the Project Physics Course: the in­
fluence of the materials on the total attitude of the student to 
science itself. Whether or not they will become scientists, it is 
essential that students have a chance to see the full vision of 
science and thereby be protected from narrow blinkers or naive 
euphoria just as much as from the false and hostile ideas about 
science and scientists which have been spreading in the past three 
decades, particularly in industrialized countries. The symptoms 
are well known, but it has been shown that changes are possible. 
Thus, on the basis of extensive educational research, Ahlgren and 
WalbergC have published a comparison of the way different 
physics courses bring to the foreground of the student's con­
sciousness the mathematical and "factual" base, and also the 
historical and philosophical perspectives, the social context, the 
humanitarian values, and the artistic aspects. This is a point 
where a chief aim of introductory physics programs in the 
United States and in most other countries meet and joint. Wher­
ever knowledge and industry are hoped to be twin pillars of 
social strength, the base for science is dangerously weak if the 
vision concerning the place and scope of science is narrow.
We must continue to try to reach a larger proportion of 
students than would otherwise be taking the initiative to enroll 
in physics courses as part of their total education. We have 
found that a humanistic approach to science can enlarge the pool
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of prospective students. Thus the proportion of young women 
enrolled in the Project Physics Course is nationally about twice 
as large as in the traditional physics course. This is an example 
of a group of students who, for one reason or another, tradition­
ally have tended to avoid any physics course where they did not 
have this option available to them. (We have always insisted 
the Project Physics Course should, whenever possible, be 072<? 
option, not the only one. Teachers were not taken into the trial 
program unless they agreed to continue any PSSC sections they 
might already be teaching.)
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A problem common to most countries is how to deal effectively 
with those who do not necessarily have the motivation or prepa­
ration to do very well in the classical, narrowly conceived phys­
ics course. A simple but useful way of looking at this problem 
is given in Figure 11.2. It represents a plane, one axis indicating 
the students' increasing academic ability, the other their increas­
ing scientific interest. The plane is not populated with equal 
density; but we know that the student who will become a pro­
fessional physicist is likely to be in the top right corner. In the 
United States only about 1,000 students a year become Ph.D.'s in 
physics, out of an age cohort of 3 million young people. That 
is a very small yield -  about 0.03 percent. But our ideas on how 
to educate in physics come too often from serving that small 
group -  and from having belonged to it ourselves. In fact, the 
fraction of the population that took any kind of physics course 
in U.S. schools was, by and large, concentrated in that top right 
corner. We do not have to struggle too hard with that audience; 
the best students will probably survive almost any method used 
in designing the course, although good teaching will not be 
wasted and can be very rewarding indeed.
By contrast, one tends easily to dismiss the group in the op­
posite quadrant. Roughly 20 to 30 percent of each age group is 
in that group, some perhaps for temporary or spurious reasons. 
It is a difficult, expensive, and very imporant area -  a research 
subject for entirely different projects.
The rest of the population -  the 30 percent or so in the middle,
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Figure 11.2. A "plane" indicating the two-dimensional gradation of 
students by academic ability and scientific interest. Adapted from 
F. Watson, "Why Do We Need More Physics Courses?" T 
Tcac&cr $ (May 1967): H4. The entire issue of that journal is largely 
devoted to a report on the Project Physics Course at that stage of its 
development.
together with the 20 percent at the top right corner-is the 
group of students from which we have been trying to draw our 
audience. This pian resuits in difficulties of two kinds. First, we 
must make a pcdagogicai decision, one based on a philosophy of 
education different from the philosophy applicable to the smaller 
percent in the top right corner, where there is a rather homo­
geneous group of people, intellectually and cognitively. The 
large majority of our intended audience present us with a mix­
ture of very different kinds.
Some are interested in social science, in humanities and the arts, 
in technology, in "nothing yet in particular," in verbal rather 
than mathematical learning, and so forth. Some may enjoy work­
ing in the laboratory but are poor in verbalizing and writing 
things down clearly. In aggregate, they are like a gas made up 
of molecules from the whole periodic table, whereas up there, in 
the top right corner, we have mainly the Rare Earths. Perhaps
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the chief trait most students wilt have in common across the 
range wi)i be their interest in having the course make explicit 
what the committed prephysicist usuaHy assumes tacitiy: that 
science has an impact on iife and thought outside the waits of 
the iaboratory, that science is a cultural force with vast, trans­
forming potential. (I should hasten to add that some of the most 
thoughtful physicists do believe that this humanistic approach to 
science education is really just as necessary for future scientists 
themselves -  that those in fact need the humanistic and societal 
elements in a science course more than anyone else - for reasons 
discussed in Chapter 7 -  because the narrowing spirit of gradu­
ate school will descend on them all too quickly.)
If one wishes to engage a great variety of individuals, with 
all these different "chemical" properties, one must have a course 
that will be meaningful in a variety of ways, each of which is 
actually rewarded. Some students will excel in the mathematical 
or laboratory part, others in the more verbal reports, perhaps 
connected with their interest in social science or history. Hence 
the assigned work, and of course the tertr, must allow some 
choices or options, to permit different kinds of excellence to 
show up.
f/pdatitzg tMc^mg
The second, related consequence of pedagogic importance is 
that the instructor should not be afraid to experiment with dif­
ferent styles of teaching. After all, the culture of the young and 
the body of doctrine in education have both moved very fast in 
the last decade, and we must be ready to update pedagogic ideas 
as we do scientific ones.
Let me cite one stimulating example. Some schools have in­
homogeneous groups of forty or more students in a single class­
room. A suitable style for these was developed, called a "modified 
contract method."? The first part of the innovation was to make 
the whole set of course materials, including the apparatus and 
instructor's resource book or teacher guide (except of course 
the model tests and their answers), accessible to the students, 
who are working in groups of three or four, and to make with 
them a "contract" that they will take a test on the contents of 
one four-chapter unit at the end of a fixed period (three to six
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weeks). The instructor was available as "consultant" to each of 
these groups or individuals in class on demand, for example, for 
short lectures. The students frequently decided to split or share 
the work according to individual skills and interests, for instance, 
one student being in charge of much of the mathematical work, 
another of the laboratory work, another taking leadership in 
working with the him loops or historical essays in the R<?% jerr.
But the reason this kind of group work was successful was 
the addition of one more rule: The grade each student receives 
after taking the unit test is the %wr%ge of all the scores obtained 
by the members of his own group. Thereby one breaks with the 
usual classroom behavior, in which good students look out only 
for themselves and let the others fall by the wayside. In this case 
the good students must be teachers of the less ingenious members 
of their group; otherwise, in the final examination, the latter will 
drag down the average. In short, what happens is that by this 
method we introduce into the teaching process the M73Ct3<?77y %7!<f 
opening for rcrc^rcp ?g%777r, where everybody 
in the team shares the credit and the blame equally. In this way, 
the well-tested and effective ethos of the research laboratory is 
imported into the classroom.
I propose this not as way Project Physics or any course 
should be taught; rather it is an example of changes in pedagogy 
that become appropriate when we teach classes different from 
those we attended in our own student days.
C<?77te77t %77(f rtrMctz/re
These pedagogic considerations lead us to the question of con­
tent and structured AH too often, the selection principle for 
dealing with the unmanageable total content of physics in an 
introductory course is that we concentrate on fragments thought 
to be relatively easy to teach. A great deal more is included sim­
ply by habit. Such attitudes are inadequate for a course intended 
to provide a vision of science at its best. It was decided, there­
fore, to filter out whatever did not fit into a developing story 
line that aims to show how the basic parts of physics grew and 
came together. We hoped, thereby, to develop a sequence of 
organically related ideas whose pursuit takes a student to an
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ever higher vantage point, a more encompassing view of the 
working nature, of the styie of iife of the scientist, and of the 
power of the human mind.
The traditional way we teach and have been taught is indi­
cated in Figure : One rationally reconstructed subject (kine­
matics) is followed by the next (dynamics, waves, etc.); so one 
pearl after another is put together to set forth physics as it is 
now known, in a logical way, and rarely with more than a nod 
in the direction of other fields. Other instructors do the same 
thing in chemistry, biology, or mathematics. The method has its 
uses and rewards, though chiefly for the committed specialist.
Our method had to be rather different, since we wanted to 
illustrate how physical science actually developed as well as the 
humanistic and societal impact of science -  those aspects that are 
particularly meaningful to students in the large middle group of 
our audience. We therefore adopted what I prefer to call a oott- 
Mfctive %pp7*<MtT. Traditionally, one sees the separate academic 
subjects arrayed next to one another-mathematics, astronomy, 
physics, chemistry, engineering, biology, and on to the less 
and less mathematical fields such as economics, political science,
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Figure A specific advance in physics is linked to earlier and later 
achievements, not only in physics but in other fields as well.
philosophy, theology, literature, and the arts. Instructors of 
physics traditionally expect to attend only to a narrow vertical 
column of items. Yet, historically, almost any of the basic find­
ings or laws in science did develop both vertically hori­
zontally -  not linearly, but as part of a constellation, an interdis­
ciplinary network (as indicated in Figure 11.4). This recognition 
allows us to present a much more meaningful story for our wider 
audience.
In the first unit of the Project Physics Course we deal with 
kinematics and dynamics, also noting that the ideas of Galileo 
and his contemporaries were much influenced by debates (A in 
Figure 11.4) that go way back in time and over into philosophy. 
The conceptions of the Greek philosophers certainly played a 
great role in the fight over the very nature of physical knowl­
edge, a fight that shaped our present ideas of science. Conversely, 
the success of seventeenth-century physics had a very striking 
impact on later philosophy (B in Figure 11.4). For example, the 
conceptions of the separation into primary and secondary quali­
ties and the mathematization of reality, which haunt philosophy 
to this day, began there, and are links that reach over from
physics. I should stress that aH such indications should be treated 
in a serious (not anecdotal) way, but need not be carried to 
enormous lengths; on the order of 10 percent of class time is 
enough to legitimize the approach, enough to interest students 
and to lead them to further research with existing materials.
The next unit is on Newton's synthesis of the mechanics of 
the earth and of the solar system. There we have a fine oppor­
tunity to show that the mathematics Newton used is to a large 
extent the mathematics of the Greeks (C in Figure n.4) and 
that Newton repaid this debt to mathematics by enriching the 
held with the development of his calculus (D). There are also 
links with philosophy and theology, for Newton did not take 
his ideas about space and time out of thin air. Conversely, Vol­
taire was deeply influenced by Newton's physics, and his anti- 
metaphysical interpretation of it was a strong current in philos­
ophy and theology (F). John Dalton confessed that he had 
found support for his ideas on atomistic chemistry (1808) in 
Newton's Pn'wipM (G), although it appears he based his ideas 
on a mistaken analogy (offering the teacher a good occasion to 
demythify and correct popular notions concerning "the scien­
tific method").
Turning to political science, we can find explicit acknowledg­
ment of the debt to Newtonian science and to the Newtonian 
approach to natural philosophy (H), for example, in the balance- 
of-power imagery used in Revolutionary America. Other con­
nections (e.g., to literature and the arts) can also be shown easily, 
and naturally throughout the course there are occasions for men­
tioning the historic links between the topics and stages of physics 
itself as it developed.
There are many other such examples." In the unit on energy 
and thermodynamics, we can and should speak of the industrial 
revolution and the effects of scientific advance on society. Simi­
larly, in the unit on the nucleus we can talk about the discus­
sions among some scientists concerning responsibility for the 
ethical and human values impacts of the technological aspects of 
their work. This discussion connects to an area of strong pre­
occupation concerning science among some of our students and, 
in any case, is an obligation for a course that wishes to set science 
in its fuller cultural context.
Project 2py
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With such an approach, one ends up not with a string of sepa­
rate pearis, all within one Reid, but with a tapestry of cross con­
nections among many fieids. And that seems to me the essential 
task of education, in contrast to that of mere training. Training 
is achieved by imparting the most efficient skiH for a scientific 
purpose. Education is achieved by imparting a point of view that 
allows generalization and application in a wide variety of cir­
cumstances in one's later life. This difference explains why the 
older, linear kind of science course, though perhaps easier to 
teach, is not appropriate for classes that contain students inter­
ested in the power and meaning of science, but who do not all 
necessarily think themselves ready to be trained as future physi­
cists.
Teachers and scientists, being members of a group that plays 
a key role in the total cultural life of a nation, should be proud 
of the existence of this tapestry of interlinking ideas, the more 
so as their field, physics, has a central place in this total organic 
structure of intellectual history. It is altogether appropriate that 
they share this vision of science with their students. In the pro­
cess of teaching good science, they can also convey a proper 
sense of the dignity of scientific work as well as of the serious 
civic responsibilities that are the consequences of its benefits and 
power.
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0 H. Kruglak, "Another Look at the Pasco-Millikan Oil Drop 
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" . . .  I just wanted to make the point that there is a similarity 
between Millikan and Ehrenhaft. They both found anomalous 
charges for their smallest particles, and in both cases their anoma­
lous charge was about % e. One cannot suppose that quarks would 
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spheres of mass 7 X io*s grams. Although in layout the experi­
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experiment. See Arthur F. Hebard, "Search for Fractional Charges 
Using Low Temperature Techniques," Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford 
University Physics Department, December 1970, and Gloria B. 
Lubkin, "Stanford Group Shows Apparent Evidence for Quarks," 
PEyricj- To&ry 30 (1977): 17-20.
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R. M. McCormmach. Felix Exner of the University of Vienna, 
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applied science. In 1908 Wilhelm Ostwald added a chapter on 
colloid chemistry to the new edition of his influential textbook, 
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rcBrift fn'r CBenn'e ztncf fndMttrie der Coiioizfe from 1907, published 
two texts on colloid chemistry. And Einstein thought it worth 
trying to reach readers outside "pure" physics, by rendering his 
work on the Brownian movement of small particles in two articles 
(1907, 1908) in the ZeitrcBrift fztr Eie^trocBe7nie.
14 Biographies of Millikan include the BiograpE'cai Afe777oirr of tbe 
Nationai c^azfe77zy of Sciences by L. A. DuBridge and Paul S. 
Epstein (op. cit., n. 3); the article on Millikan in 7 Te Dictionary of 
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1969), pp. [7-22; H. V. Neher, "Millikan-Teacher and Friend," 
Hmer. /. PByr. 32 (1967).): 868-77; and Millikan's own ^MtoBiogra- 
pEy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1930) (hereafter cited as Tttto- 
f?iograpEy).
13 There are ninety-nine file boxes, well arranged and indexed by 
Alfred F. Gunns and Judith R. Goodstein, with the assistance of 
Daniel J. Kevles and with partial funding from the Center for the 
History of Physics of the American Institute of Physics. For a 
description and listings see A. F. Gunns and J. R. Goodstein, Gnide 
to tBe E. T  AfifBEan Collection at tBe California fnrtitMte of Tech­
nology (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1973), Publica­
tion No. R-269.
16 Hntohiography, pp. 38-60.
^06
17 In the Tt/toHograp^y, p. 67, Millikan noted that he was "just begin­
ning to get some good leads in 1908" on the "evaluation of the charge 
of the electron." A remark in TEe Electro??, pp. 54-55, puts the 
beginning date two years earlier: "In 1906, being dissatisfied with 
the variabitity of these results [pubiished by H. A. Wiison in ^03 
on e as determined by observations on failing ciouds of charged 
drops], the author repeated Wilson's experiment without obtaining 
any greater consistency . . . the results were not considered worth 
publishing."
t8 This information comes from an unpublished autobiographical 
account of his early years. Partly because of the forced flight from 
his homeland and World War II, many of Ehrenhaft's documents 
are apparently lost. Some of F. Ehrenhaft's correspondence is in 
Archives of the American Institute of Physics, the California Insti­
tute of Technology, and the Burndy Library.
19 P. Frank, Efmtef??.' / / ft Life awcf Twtet (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1947), p. 175. This book was translated by George Rosen 
and edited and revised by Shuichi Kusaka. It is always best to go 
back to Frank's original, German version, published as Ernttelw,
EHeK M?ztf ref??e Zeit (Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1949). This 
is the case here also (q.v. p. 289).
20 A report on Ehrenhaft's lectures in Austria in 1947 has been pre­
pared by Paul K. Feyerabend, who was present as a student at the 
time ("Ehrenhaft in Post-War Vienna," mimeo, 1967).
2: This topic has been explored by Brush, Buchdahl, Hiebert, Laudan, 
Scott, Brock and Knight, and others. See particularly Mary Jo Nye, 
Mo/ecMl%r Reality (New York: American Elsevier Publishing 
Co., !972).
22 TMtoHogrgp^y, p. 99. Millikan reports "most of us had viewed 
[them] for the first time with amazement and thrill at the Dundee 
meeting [19:2]."
25 A. Lampa, Ermt MacA (Prague: Verlag Deutscher Arbeit, t9t8), 
pp. 40-4:, see also p. 28. (As in all cases where foreign-language 
originals are cited, the translation is my own.) Another source on 
the same point, closely overlapping, is a later essay by the positivis­
tic philosopher of science Moritz Schlick, presented in June 1926 
on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Mach's death: "Ernst 
Mach, der Philosoph," Nette Ereie Prerre (Supplement), Vienna, 
12 June 1926. I have translated a portion of Schlick's essay on p. 222 
of TEewatic Orfgwr of Sciewti/to TEoMg^t; Kep/er to Efmtef?? 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975) (hereafter 
cited as TEewatic O rights'), as part of an essay on the relation 
between Mach and Einstein.
24 A good indication can be found in J. T. Blackmore, Er7?rt Mach, 
HE Life, IForh, awcf Izz/fMcwcc (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1972), chs. [5 and 19. Mach has recently been the subject of
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a number of interesting works. See especially Stephen G. Brusch, 
TPe Kwtf of Afotiow We Call Neat, Eol. 7 ; P/^yrfer a7t<7 t7:e 
Htowzirtr (New York: North Holland Publishing Company, 1976), 
ch. 8 ("Mach"), pp. 274-99, reprinted with additional notes and 
minor changes from S. G. Brusch in AyMt^ere [8 ([968).
27 E. Mach, "Die Leitgedanken meiner naturwissenschaftlichen Er- 
kenntnislehre und ihre Aufnahme durch die Zeitgenossen," PEyr. Zr. 
ti (19:0): $99-606; M. Planck, "Zur Machschen Theorie der 
physikalischen Erkenntnis," PAyt. Z.f. tt (19:0): 1186-90. The 
Mach-Planck controversy has been analyzed by Blackmore, op. cit. 
(n. 24), ch. 14. For an English-language translation of the Planck 
and Mach essays, together with an analysis, see S. Toulmin, ed., 
FFyrfcal Reality (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
26 Frank, EiMtteiK, rem LePeM, op. cit. (n. 19), p. 135. When Lampa 
died in January 1938, Ehrenhaft stressed in an obituary that Lampa 
had just been about to deliver an address commemorating the tooth 
anniversary of Mach's birth: "Anton Lampa," IVeMC Freie Prerre, 
Vienna, 29 January 1938, p. 6. On Lampa, see also Andreas 
Kleinert, "Anton Lampa und Albert Einstein," GerwerMt 32 (197$): 
284-92.
27 Other aspects of the effect of Mach on the selection of the candi­
date via Lampa and Pick are discussed in Blackmore, op. cit. 
(n. 24), ch. 17. The Lampa-Mach correspondence from which I 
quote is located in the Ernst Mach Archives, Freiburg, Germany.
28 Lampa wrote to Mach on May 1, 1910: "I believe that Relativity 
Theory is the opening of a phenomenological epoch of physics" 
(Mach Archives, Freiburg, Germany). See also "Mach, Einstein 
and the Search for Reality," in Holton, TPe772atlc Orlgi'/M', pp. 
229-59.
29 Ibid., p. 227. The letter is dated August 17, 1909.
30 When Einstein left Prague a year later for Zurich, his successor 
was Philipp Frank, whose candidacy was again supported by Mach, 
Lampa, and Pick, as well as by Einstein.
31 In his formal writings, Millikan does not always make it clear how 
strongly he opposes the earlier convention that the term "electron" 
should be reserved for the quantity of charge, regardless of the 
mass and other properties of the particle carrying the charge. He 
does state in his essay, "New Proofs of the Kinetic Theory 
of Matter and the Atomic Theory of Electricity," PopK/ar 
ScieMtipc MowtNy 80 (1912): 417-40, that his electron has charge, 
mass, and a discrete, small volume ("probably the smallest thing in 
existence," p. 434). An early draft of a manuscript in the Millikan 
Archives, California Institute of Technology, File Folder 4.11, 
carrying the notation "Probably 1921 or prior. H. H. 1/27/54," is 
almost certainly a draft of at least part of that 1912 paper; it was 
very probably written in late tpn or early t9!2.
3 0 7
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32 Tz/to^iogr/ypBy, pp. 80 and 82. Emphases in origina).
33 Evidence is provided by the marginal notes on the various drafts 
of the Tt/tof/iogr/i'pBy,' see File Boxes 65-67.
34 R. A. Millikan, "The Electron and the Light-quant from the Ex­
perimental Point of View" (May 25, [924), Noi/ei Eectt/rey- 
PByyicy, 7977-/3)4/ (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1965), 
pp. 58-59. There is a slight difference between the two versions: 
None of the words is printed in capital letters in the Nobel 
lecture.
35 ^MtotwgrapA'y, p. 83.
36 Ibid.
37 In File Box 67, particularly 67.3 and 67.4; but see also boxes 65, 66, 
and 68. Folder 67.3 begins with "Scientific Recollections of 
R. A. Millikan. Personal Recollection of R. A. M. on Rise of 
American Science." On the file folder is a note that this is a first 
draft of the ^Mto^iograpBy, written on board ship while en route 
to India in 1939 (Millikan Archives, California Institute of Tech­
nology).
38 Still earlier writings support the same point of view. For example, 
"Saw it here . . . pick up two negatives" (Millikan, "The Isolation 
of an Ion, a Precision Measurement of Its Charge, and the Correc­
tion of Stokes' Law," Sciewce 32, n.s. [1910]: 439); also see his 
article in PopT/fgr Bcie?!tipc Afo7!tNy, op. cit., n. 31.
39 The ideas of Rom Harre on the role of iconic models and the rela­
tion between visual and conceptual thinking seem useful here if one 
wishes to carry the analysis further. See the discussion in E. Mac­
Kinnon, "A Reinterpretation of Harre's Copernican Revolution," 
PM. Sc/. 42 ([975): 67-97.
40 "Lord Rutherford of Nelson," 7 Te To/eric/m PBiioyopBicai Society 
Tear Boo^, 73)3# (Philadelphia, 1939), p. 387.
4: Nye, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 65. I have analyzed the role of visualization 
in the GeTmA'e?/ experiments of Einstein, in Holton, TBe7?Mtic 
Origi?!y, pp. 353-80.
42 Ht/to^z'ograpBy, pp. 58-59.
43 J. S. Townsend, Electricity Garey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
[9:5), pp. 52-53, calls Millikan's results "interesting" and "the most 
reliable." On the other hand, when Townsend discusses Millikan's 
well-developed oil drop method, he treats it merely as one of the 
improvements of the art, as part of his Chapter 7, "The Formation 
of Clouds and the Determination of the Atomic Charge."
44 v4 MtoM?gr<ipBy, p. 63.
45 Ibid., p. 69.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 72.
49 TBe Electro?/, p. 15. Millikan was always interested in the history
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of science, and a useful review of "Early Views of Electricity" 
forms the first chapter of his book.
30 Apparently first quoted by Millikan in the draft of his 1912 article, 
op. cit., n. 31, and again often, for example, in TBe Electro?!, p. ty, 
in the Nobel Prize talk, op. cit. (n. 34), p. 54, and in his TMtoH- 
ograpBy, pp. 69-70. Franklin's actual wording is slightly different: 
"The electrical matter consists of particles extremely subtile, since 
it can permeate common matter, even the densest metals, with such 
ease and freedom as not to receive any perceptible resistance." The 
sentence is at the beginning of an essay, "Opinions and Conjectures, 
concerning the Properties and Effects of the Electrical Matter, 
Arising from Experiments and Observations, Made at Philadelphia, 
; 749." See I. B. Cohen, Bewpwz;'?! EwtHitz'r Erperi??!c?zty (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, t94t), pp. 2t2-t3. After 
the publication of Cohen's book, Millikan referred to it and quoted 
Franklin's sentence correctly-except in his TtttoE'cgrapEy. For 
sources of Franklin's atomism, see f. B. Cohen, Era?zHi?? a??d 
Nctcto?! (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1936), 
chs. 6-to.
3: Millikan, op. cit., n. 3:, and with slight changes often later, 
for example, TBe Electro??, p. n .
32 TBe Electro??, p. 24.
33 Millikan, "Franklin's Discovery of the Electron," T??ter. /. PByt. 
t6 (1948): 3:9.
34 R. A. Millikan and John Mills, T -SEort U/z/'ceriity CoMrre 1?! 
Electricity, Sctt?!d, %7!d EigBt (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1908), 
pp. 6-8. Having written this textbook, Millikan noted in his zfttto- 
HogntpEy, p. 69, that he then turned intensively to his work on e. 
In an earlier textbook, written with H. G. Gale, he had declared 
there was "much direct experimental evidence for the existence" 
of electrons (Millikan and Gale, H Eirtt Coztrre i?! PByricr [Boston: 
Ginn and Company, 1906], p. 244).
33 E. Rutherford, "The Modern Theories of Electricity and Their 
Relation to the Franklinian Theory," in TEe Record of tBc Cele- 
^ratio?! of tBe Ttco EfztttdrcdtB T????iver.Mry of tBc BirtB of Be?zja- 
???i?z Era??Mi?? (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 
1906), pp. 123-37, particularly p. 136. Millikan seems to have dis­
covered this address rather late; his first reference appears to be in 
his obituary for Rutherford in 1938, op. cit., n. 40.
36 Lord Kelvin, "Aepinus Atomized," PE'l. Mag. 3 ( !902): 237-83. 
Rutherford, op. cit., n. 33, cracked that its title should be changed 
to "Franklin and Aepinus Kelvinized." Kelvin wrote: "My sugges­
tion is that the Aepinus' fluid [of electricity] consists of exceedingly 
minute equal and similar atoms, which I call electrions [tic], much 
smaller than the atoms of ponderable matter . . ." (p. 237).
37 Maxwell, Electricity a??d Mag??ctM?7! ([873), 1: 373 If.
3io
38 A. Schuster, 7 Te Progrerr of PIzyn'cr JMnwg 33 Eearr ( i#73-190#) 
(Cambridge University Press, 1911; New York: Arno Press, 1973), 
p. 39.
39 Kelvin, "Contact Eiectricity and Eiectroiysis According to Father 
Boscovich," Nature 36 (t897): 84-83.
60 There are numerous resources for the history of the theories of 
eiectricity. A good annotated guide is David L. Anderson, "Re­
source Letter (ECAN-:) on the Electronic Charge and Avogadro's 
Number," ^wier. /. PAyy. 34 (1966): 1-7. The same author has 
published a useful introductory book, The DEcovery of the E/ec- 
trow (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963.); Chapter 4 has 
a good explanation of Millikan's method of measurement. Among 
the more recent articles, see A. Pais, "The Early History of the 
Theory of the Electron, :897-t947" in Trpectr of QziawfMWz 
Theory, A. Salam and E. P. Wigner, eds. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1971), pp. 79-93, and A. 1 . Miller, "A Study of Henri 
Poincare's 'Sur la Dynamique de l'Electron," Trchz've for Hiytory 
of Exact Sciczzccy to ([973): 107-328, secs. 1-4.
61 ^zitoMography, p. 73.
61 See Townsend, op. cit. (n. 43), ch. 7. Research on clouds con­
densed out on ions was still a young science; it was largely a by­
product of the intense interest in ionization of gases, discovered by 
J. Elster and H. Geitel in 1894, and was vastly propelled by the 
discovery of the ionizing radiations, x-rays, and radioactivity.
63 Millikan's determination of e from the observation of charged 
clouds (which we call his Method 1 ) was based on the following: 
J. J. Thomson, "On the Charge of Electricity Carried by a Gaseous 
Ion," PM. Mag. 3 (1903): 346-33; J. J. Thomson, "On the Masses 
of the Ions in Gases at Low Pressures," PM. Mag. 48 (1899): 
347-67; and H. A. Wilson, "Determination of the Charge on the 
Ions Produced in Air by Rontgen Rays," PM. Mag. 3 (1903): 
419-40.
First one observes a layer of cloud droplets, each presumed to be 
of mass wi, radius a, and density g, falling at speed iq under their 
weight wig. Then one observes a similarly formed layer of cloud 
droplets, falling at Vo in a superposed electric held E, that now 
acts on the charge <7 of each droplet.
Hence
7?lg _  th / ,)
wig + E<? Vo
Assuming Stokes's law holds without modification for the droplets 
falling in air (viscosity 9.),
^frict =  6 zr/iatq — wig (in equilibrium) = g ( 1 )
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Therefore,
Solving for <7:
( 3 )
(4 )
77Zg
^ "  E
V^ — V, 
Vl
4
— 2T3
Assuming <y is an integra) muitipie of the unitary charge e,
e =  ^  (where M =  1, 2, 3 . . . )
64 R. A. Millikan and L. Begeman, "On the Charge Carried by the 
Negative Ion of an Ionized Gas," PPyt. Rev. 26 (1908): 197-98. 
Despite the tide, "the charge" was an average of the charges on 
the dropiet in the top layer of the fading cioud. Since this pa­
per was deiivered around the beginning of January 1908 and pub- 
iished in February 1908, the work cannot have been performed 
during the summer of 1908, as Miiiikan states in 7 Te EfectroM, 
P- 5 3 -
63 E. Rutherford and H. Geiger, "The Charge and the Nature of the 
a-Particle,"Proceecf;'Mgrof tPe Royal Society (London) 81 (1908): 
168-7:. Rutherford siightiy misquoted Millikan's mean value as 
4.06 X io*"i" instead of 4.03 x io"i°-and  everyone then followed 
Rutherford's example, including Millikan himself ( 7 Te Electro?;, 
P- 66).
Millikan's and Begeman's paper was also referred to in what 
turned out to be the last flower of the Thomson-Townsend- 
Wilson cloud method, an article by R. F. Lattey, "The Ionization 
of Electrolytic Oxygen," PM. Mag. 18 (1909): 26-3:. Lattey re­
ported that "Millikan's" value was "not so accurate" when com­
pared with Rutherford's and Lattey's own.
66 John L. Heilbron and Thomas S. Kuhn, "The Genesis of the Bohr 
Atom," PPEt. StM<P. PPyt. Sci. 1 (1969): 251.
67 See 7 Te Electro??, p. 33, and v^MtoivograpPy, p. 72.
68 7 Te Electro??, p. 36: "The first determination which was made 
upon the charges carried by individual droplets was carried out in 
the Spring of 1909." Tz/toPzograpEy, p. 73: "I finished the fore­
going measurements just prior to . . . September 1909." See also 
Millikan, "The Existence of a Subelectron?" PEyr. Rev. 8 (19:6): 
69<S-
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69 ^MtoAfogrnpAy, p. 72; italics in original.
70 Ibid., p. 73; italics in original.
7: The method for calculating <? was now as foilows: In the "balanced 
droplet" method, which I call Millikan's Method II, equation (3) 
of note 63 applies, except Vg is now zero.
72 TAe Electro?!, p. 63.
73 As he described it later, one starts with a drop that is a bit too 
heavy to be held by the electric field, and which therefore falls. 
But before it is out of the view field, evaporation causes it to be­
come light enough to stop falling, and finally it rises as it becomes 
too light. In the middle there is thus a period of some ten to fifteen 
seconds during which the droplet appears to be essentially station­
ary. See Millikan, op. cit. (n. 6), pp. 2:7-18. Millikan also discussed 
continuing sources of error in this method such as the short time 
of fall (five to six seconds at most) for determining tq.
74 ^MtoA/'ograpAy, p. 74; emphasis in original. Similar confidence is 
expressed in 7 'Ac E/ectroH, p. 70: "In no case have I ever found 
one [an ion] the charge of which, when tested as above, did not 
have either exactly the value of the smallest charge ever captured 
or else a very small multiple of that value." See also Millikan, in 
Science op. cit. (n. 38), p. 440. Strictly speaking, his experiments 
showed not that the elementary charge of electricity itself had to 
be atomic but only (as he was aware) that the transfer of charges 
to and from small material bodies occurred in integral multiples 
of c.
73 The discovery of an experiment has apparently not been treated in 
the philosophy of science. There are evident differences between 
the discovery and the design of experiments, but there is also at 
least this similarity: that both design and discovery generally occur 
within the framework of a more or less explicit, prior problem. 
Thus we can accept Ernest Nagel's description of this experiment 
if we change the word "devised" to "discovered": "It is unlikely 
that Millikan (or anyone else) would have devised the oil-drop 
experiment if some atomistic theory of electricity had not first 
suggested a question that seemed important in the light of the 
theory and that the experiment was intended to settle." E. Nagel, 
TAe StrKctMrc of Eciewce (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1961), 
p. 90.
76 Ehrenhaft's early progress can be followed through these selected 
articles:
(a) "Uber Colloidale Metalle," Twzez'ger tier A. TAadewfe <7 er 
ITEMMtcA f^tew (Efcwwa), :8 (1902): 241-243.
(b) "Das optische Verhalten der Metallkolloide und deren Teil-
chengrosse," SitzMMgrAcwAte 7 er AfatAc7?7 t^EcA-NatMrTrEye!ztcAaftf. 
Efatrc tier A. <7 <?r (Vienna), 11a, :i2
(1903): 181-209; also/IwMfc!!tfcrPAyt:'A4(i903),Band :::489-3i4-
Nofey ko p.
(c) "Die diffuse Zerstreuung des Lichtes an kieinen Kugeln,"
kEBr. (Vienna) (1903): 213-14; a!so SitzHMgr^cr. 
kEBr., 7G. (Vienna) H4 (:903):
(d) "Die Brownsche Molekularbewegung in Gasen," zlwz. zlA'aJ. 
kEBr., (Vienna) 5 (1907): 72-73.
(e) "Uber eine der Brownschen Molekularbewegung (etc.),"
S;'tzM7?gy^ e?*. kEBr., A/. (Vienna) n6 (^07):
1139-3.9; dated July n , 1907.
(f) "Uber kolloidales Quecksilber," 4^ wz. zIA'^. kEBr. (Vienna) 
M (1908): 313-14.
(g) "Eine Methode zur Messung der elektrischen Ladung kleiner
Teilchen zur Bestimmung des elektrischen Elementarquantums," 
v4 wz. kEw. (Vienna) 7 (:909): 72; dated March 4, 1909.
(h) "Eine Methode zur Bestimmung des elektrischen Elementar­
quantums, I," &'tzMwgr^cr. v4 A?<f. kEw., A/.
(Vienna), 118 (1909): 321-30; dated March 18, 1909, nominally 
appeared May i, 1909.
(i) Same title, PByy. Zr. 10 (1909), 308-10; paper received April 
10, 1909, nominally appeared May :, 1909. (The next publication 
was a year later-see n. 108.)
It is unlikely that Millikan had easy access to these papers, partly 
because publication may have been delayed. Millikan hinted at this 
once, in passing (op. cit. [n. 68], p. 398): Referring to a paper in 
the SitzMMgrf'c?-. zlk'aT MW., ADtB.-NatMrw. A/. (Vienna), dated 
May 12, 19m, he adds, "but this publication does not seem to have 
appeared till December 19 m, at least it is not noted in WatMtae 
Novitafer' before that date." Notices in the Twzcz'ger publication 
of the SitZMwgrf?cr. 4^ a^<f. MW., AfatE-NafMrtu. A/. (EicM?M) 
volumes bear out Millikan's observation concerning such delays.
77 Ibid., (g).
78 Ibid., (h).
79 Ibid., (g), (h), and (i).
80 Ibid., (h), p. 330; ibid., (i), p. 3:0.
The whole volume 118 of the BftZMMgr^ grfcBte is a good indicator 
of the type and intensity of research in Austria circa 1909 and of 
the intellectual relations among individual researchers involved 
in this case. P. Frank writes an excellent pedagogic exposition of 
relativity, based on Einstein and Minkowski. A. Lampa writes on 
the effect of colloidal gold suspensions on light, drawing heavily 
on Hasenohr! (1902) and Ehrenhaft (1903). Przibram, in a paper 
immediately following Ehrenhaft's, studies the mobility of ions 
of a great number of vapors, and parenthetically adopts the value 
g =  4.63 X lo-io esu. Overlapping with this work, the longstand­
ing interest of the Austrian physicists concerning "atmospheric 
electricity" yields five more lengthy Bgifragg on the subject, for 
example, no. 30, by K. W. F. Kohlrausch, and no. 31, by
3*4 N otat to pp. ^ - y o
E. von Schweidler. Many others at that time were involved in the 
commission-sponsored, communai work -  inciuding Victor Hess. 
I intend to demonstrate, in a iater contribution, the role that this 
rather pedestrian-appearing enterprise had in the unexpected dis­
covery of cosmic rays within the following two years.
8t Or even into the report of the meeting, pubiished by B.A.A.S. in
tpto.
82 A letter from R. A. MiHikan to his wife Greta conveys something 
of the meeting, and of the man (MiHikan Archives, Caiifornia 
Institute of Technology):
Monday, August 30, 1909
Dearest Greta
It is now 3.30 PM and I have been attending meetings alt 
day. Had a fine letter waiting for me here when I came from 
the meeting hah to the official post office of the association.
Crew had asked me to take dinner with him tonight at six 
o'clock at the Hotel Royal Aiexandra so I shall have but a 
minute to tell you how much I love you, for the hotel is at 
least 13 minutes from here by the St. car. If we get through 
with our sessions I shall leave here tomorrow at 3.30 and be 
home Wednesday at [0.30 PM. It is barely possible however 
that I shall not be able to get away before the next night.
This is staying away longer than I thought to do isn't it 
honey, but I am finding this meeting quite profitable. I haven't 
presented my results as yet and don't know that I shall do so, 
but if they want them tomorrow I am ready to give them.
I made some lantern slides this AM so that they can be 
presented in short time. Goodnight honey I'll be back soon.
Kiss the kiddies, and take a dozen of them for yourself.
Your own 
Robert
83 Report of tBe Sevewty-wfwtB Meetiwg of tBe BritBB TrtocMtioTZ 
for tBe ^ItfwweeweMt of Science, kEiwmpeg, /909 (London: John 
Murray, 19:0).
84 Ibid., pp. 374-83. Rutherford's article was quickly republished in 
the PByy. Zr. io (1909): 762-7:, under the title "Die neuesten Fort- 
schritte der Atomistik." Millikan was probably in the audience to 
hear the paper, and he refers to it in his descriptions of the meeting, 
in T/ie Electron, p. 73.
83 Rutherford, op. cit., n. 33.
86 Rutherford, op. cit. (n. 84), pp. 373, 38:, and 383 (italics sup­
plied).
87 Ibid., p. 376.
88 Ibid., pp. 379, 380.
89 Ibid., p. 381.
90 Ibid.
9: Tz:toBiogr%pBy, p. 73.
92 One of Larmor's students soon published a result. See E. Cunning­
ham, Proceec&zgy of tAe Roya/ Society (London) 83 (19:0): 133. 
Millikan's new results are referred to twice.
93 Millikan reports this in the ^MoNograpAy, p. 75. A rather different 
account of the origin of the idea of using oil or mercury instead 
of water and alcohol was later given by Millikan's student Harvey 
Fletcher. See "Harvey Fletcher, Autobiographical Notes," corre­
spondence with Fletcher, and a transcript (sixty-nine pages) of an 
interview conducted by Vern Knudsen, May 13, 1964, in the 
Center for History of Physics, American Institute of Physics, New 
York.
94 Millikan, "A New Modification of the Cloud Method of Measuring 
the Elementary Electrical Charge, and the Most Probable Value of 
That Charge," P^yr. Rev. 29 (1909): 360-6:; abstract of a paper 
given October 23, 1909, at the Princeton meeting of the American 
Physical Society.
93 Millikan, op. cit., n. 6.
96 Ibid., p. 227.
97 Ibid.
98 Ehrenhaft, op. cit., n. 76 (i); also, Millikan, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 226. 
Millikan's objections were: (a) In Ehrenhaft's method, Stokes's 
law is applied without modification to very small particles of 
doubtful sphericity; (b) the important velocity measurements are 
not made on one and the same particle but are mean values of 
observations on particles having speeds that can differ widely; 
(c) the radii are determined in a dubious way; (d) no provision was 
made for the possibility that multiple charges may be carried by 
some of the particles.
As the controversy heated up, additional and even more serious 
reservations came into view, such as the difficulty of knowing the 
density of the metal particles, and the role of Brownian movement 
in making measurements difficult. See H. Fletcher, "A Verification 
of the Theory of Brownian Movements and a Direct Determination 
of the Value of Ne for Gaseous Ionization," PPyr. Rev. 33 (19:1): 
107-10; Millikan and Fletcher, "Ursachen der scheinbaren Un- 
stimmigkeiten zwischen neuren Arbeiten fiber c," PAyy. Zr. :2 
(19:1): 161-63; Millikan, "The Isolation of an Ion, a Precision 
Measurement of Its Charge, and the Correction of Stokes's Law," 
PEyy. Rev. 32 (:9 t:): 392-96; and Millikan, op. cit. (n. 68), 
pp. 393-623, largely repeated as ch. 8 of ?Te E/cctroM.
Ehrenhaft vigorously rebutted these and all other critics in num­
erous and extensive publications, for example, "Uber die Quanten 
der Elektrizitat," N'tzMMgrA'r. T^atf. IFfyy., MatP.-Nawtr. K7 . 
( Eicwwa) :23 (19:4): 33-132. There were usually new results 
to report, even in his last lengthy paper on the subject, "The 
Microcoulomb Experiment," PM. Sc:. 8 ([94:): 403-37.
99 Millikan, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 220.
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too Ibid.
tot Ibid.
t02 Ibid., p. 2 ip.
103 Ibid., p. 224. Millikan did continue to be concerned about this 
point, and he improved the Stokes's law calculations over the next 
years-for example, in his next paper (op. cit., n. 38), and in his 
1912 report at the B.A.A.S meeting in Dundee.
Here is evidently a point where one would like to have access to 
Millikan's laboratory notebooks of 1909 with the data of his work 
of that period, for they might help us to see how his belief structure 
concerning the nature of electric charge aided him in deciding 
which observations were grounded in the nature of the phenome­
non and which were not.
104 Ibid.
103 Heilbron and Kuhn, op. cit. (n. 66), p. 266. In Bohr's "On the 
Constitution of Atoms and Molecules," pt. 2, PM. Mag. 26 (1913): 
3, Bohr abandoned Rutherford's and Geiger's (1908) value of 
e =  4.63 X  to**" esu and "adopts Millikan's value for e. . . ." 
It was a factor in improving Bohr's calculation of Rydberg's con­
stant, bringing it from within 7 percent of the spectroscopic value, 
as in his previous work, to within : percent. Bohr actually writes 
e =  4.7 X  10*10 esu, without source; but it is equivalent to Milli­
kan's value of 4.69 X  to* 10 esu, given in his PEyr. Rev. (1909) and 
PM. THg. (:9m) papers (op. cit., n. 3 and n. 6, respectively).
Millikan's value of e changed as he continued his work. In 
ScMtre, 1910, it became 4.9016 X  to*io, "to less than H % . "  By 
191:, it was 4.89: X  to"io esu, and in the grand PEyr. Rev. paper 
of 1913, it is 4.774 X  to "io esu-a value on which Millikan can 
finally rest, even to the 1924 reedition of his book, TPe Electron, 
p. t20. In 1912-13 Bohr evidently knew which value to keep his 
eye on.
106 Cf. H. Fletcher, "Einige Beitrage zur Theorie der Brownschen 
Bewegung mit experimentellen Anwendungen," PEyr. Zr. 12 
(1911): 202-8; Fletcher, op. cit. (n. 98), pp. 81-no. Space limita­
tions forbid going into this field here, a necessity made more palat­
able by the fact that Millikan seems not to have been deeply in­
volved in Fletcher's research.
[07 A one-page abstract of Millikan's lecture of April 23, 1910 was 
published in July, "The Isolation of an Ion and a Precision 
Measurement of Its Charge," PEyr. Rev. 31 (tpto): p. 92. A lengthy 
"abridgment" of the paper was published on September 30, :9m 
(op. cit., n. 38), pp. 436-48; it was republished in December in 
German, "Das Isolieren eines Ions, eine genaue Messung der daran 
gebundenen Elektrizitatsmenge und die Korrektion des Stokesschen 
Gesetzes," PEyr. Zr. n  (tpto): 1097-09, and in French, "Obten- 
tion d'un ion isole, mesure precise de sa charge; correction a la loi
Nofcy fo pp. y6-y^ 3i7
de Stokes," Le AatfzMt:: 7 (:p:o): 55.5-50 (abridged). There, Milli- 
kan writes that Fletcher and he "studied in this way between 
December [1909] and May [1910] from one to two hundred drops 
which had initial charges varying between the limits t to :yo." 
Falling and rising oil drops are used; the values of e are now com­
puted for each drop and for each run separately; the maximum 
electric field strength is now twice as large. But only one of the 
eleven drops for which actual data are given shows a unitary 
charge.
108 Ehrenhaft, "Uber die kleinsten messbaren Elektrizitatsmengen. 
Zweite vorlaufige Mitteilung der Methode zur Bestimmung des 
elektrischen Elementarquantums," zf?zx. zfPtzT ITz'ff. ( Fzezzzza), 
no. to (April 21, 1910): 1:8-19.
A week later, in the ^Mzez'gcr, no. n  (April 28, 19:0): 175-76, 
Ehrenhaft's younger colleague K. Przibram reports briefly and 
mostly qualitatively about having repeated Millikan's experiment 
with water droplets. Fie acknowledges obtaining much the same 
results; but he adds a final, tortured sentence: "The few smaller 
values observed so far, i.e., smaller than e [which he takes to be 
about 5.5 X to*io esu]  ^appear, in view of the certainty of measure­
ment, to support the conclusion of Ehrenhaft that the deviation 
from the mean values, namely from 5 X :o*io downwards, is 
considerably larger than the experimental error" (p. 176).
109 Ibid.
110 Ehrenhaft, "Uber die Messung von Elektrizitatsmengen, die die 
Ladung des einwertigen WasserstofHons oder Elektrons zu unter- 
schreiten scheinen. Zweite vorlaufige Mitteilung seiner Methode 
zur Bestimmung des elektrischen Elementarquantums," Twz. zf A'aT 
HTtf. ( FLwza), no. 15 (May 12, 1910): 2:5. A full paper appeared 
in the May t2, 1910, issue of Nzzzzzzg.f/zcz*. TEttf. ITi.fi., ALtE- 
iVatMrtr. A/. (Fb'emzc) 119 (19m): 8:5-66, under the title "Uber 
die Messung von Elektrizitatsmengen, die kleiner zu sein scheinen 
als die Ladung des einwertigen WasserstofHons oder Elektrons und 
von dessen Vielfachen abweichen." Nearly the same material ap­
peared in "Uber eine neue Methode zur Messung von Elektrizitats­
mengen an Einzelteilchen, deren Ladungen die Ladung des Elek­
trons erheblich unterschreiten und auch von dessen Vielfachen 
abzuweichen scheinen," PEyy. Zf. :: (:9m): 6:9-50 (received 
May 25, :9m). See iMpra, note 76, for Millikan's opinion on the 
date of actual publication.
: : :  This assumption was probably off by an order of magnitude: see 
FT Fletcher, op. cit. (n. 98), p. :o8, and other arguments in the 
article.
::2 See Ehrenhaft, SftzMMgyfzcn'cFtc, op. cit. (n. ::o), p. 866, and 
PEyr. Zr., op. cit. (n. ::o), p. 650. See also Ehrenhaft, "Uber eine 
neue Methode zur Messung von Elektrizitatsmengen, die kleiner zu
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sein scheinen als die Ladung des einwertigen Wasserstofhons oder 
Elektrons und von dessen Vielfachen abweichen," P/tyy. Zy. ! i 
(19:0): 940-52 (where Ehrenhaft announces he will repiace 
Stokes's law "entirely by empiricai formulas"), and articles of 
K. Przibram beginning in 1910, in the Twzez'ger, 
and PAyy. Zy.
1:3 &'tZM27gyPen'c^te, op. cit., n. tzo. Ehrenhaft showed that Millikan's 
method of treating data led to paradoxical situations. A drop with 
<y =  15.59 X 10*10 esu had been placed among those assumed to be 
carrying three electrons, while another with charge =  15.33 X 
10*10 g$u among the drops assumed to be carrying four 
electrons.
114 Figure from Ehrenhaft, op. cit. (n. no), Table 1 .
115 When such testimonies began to come in shortly afterward, they
tended to favor Millikan's view. E. Regener, "Uber Ladungsbestim- 
mungen an Nebelteilchen. (Zur Frage nach der Grosse des elek- 
trischen Elementarquanturns)," PAyy. Zy. 12 (1911): ^5-4:; 
R. Pohl, "Bericht tiber die Methoden zur Bestimmung des elektri- 
schen Elementarquantums," Jcr
8 (19!i): 406; A. Joffe, "Zu den Abhandlungen von 
F. Ehrenhaft: 'Uber die Frage nach der atomistischen Konstitution 
der Elektrizitat,'" P^yy. Zy. 12 (t9 ti): 268; L. M. McKeehan, 
"Die Endegeschwindigkeit des Falles kleiner Kugeln in Luft bei 
verminderten Druck," PPyy. Zy. !2 (19:1): 707-21.
Major support for Millikan's view concerning the quantum of 
charge came at the Solvay Congress of 19:1. (P. Langevin and 
M. de Broglie, eds., L% TMcn'e RftyoH?/t",wgMt ct icy Q/M/zt-t 
[Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 19:2], especially pp. t49, 150, 233-37, 25!, 
252.) Warburg, Rubens, Wien, Einstein, and especially Perrin 
spoke favorably of Millikan's results. Perrin took these views to a 
large public in his book Ley Ttcwtey (Paris, 1913, and later edi­
tions ).
On the other hand, Ehrenhaft's supporters came chiefly from 
the circle of his students and collaborators in Vienna, for example,
D. Konstantinowsky, F. Zerner, G. Laski, 1 . Parankiewicz. 
K. Przibram (cf. n. 108) was caught in a difficult position. A good 
researcher, he found his data used sometimes by one side, sometimes 
by the other. At the Solvay Congress in tqt 1 (Langevin and de 
Broglie, op. cit., p. 252), Hasenohrl reported that Przibram was not 
joining in Ehrenhaft's conclusion regarding e; similarly, letters in 
the Caltech Archives from Przibram to Millikan (November 5, 
19:2, December 10, 19:2) show he was then prepared to accept 
Millikan's results and method, and ended with "It is very gratifying 
to me that my researches on the subject, commenced with such a 
grievous mistake, are at last in fair agreement with your standard 
work."
tt6 Prior to publication, Millikan discussed his work on May 24, 19:0,
319
at a Sigma Xi meeting in Chicago. An articie "Substance of Ad­
dress," which reads like a transcript of Millikan's remarks, was 
published by 7 Tc Daily Afatoc'/z of the University of Chicago, 
May 25, 1910, under the heading, "Millikan Makes Great Scientific 
Discovery. Associate Professor in Physics Department Succeeds in 
Isolating Individual Ion. Holds It Under Observation. Proves Truth 
of Kinetic Theory of Matter -  Result of Four Years of Research." 
Other newspapers also carried condensations of the talk: "Electric 
Secrets Located at Last. Prof. Millikan of Chicago University 
Proves Old Theories Long Advanced Will Be of Much Worth . . ." 
(Chicago Daily TrzTwtc, 2$ May 19m); "Electricity Is Defined. 
Problem of Centuries Solved . . ." (Chicago Record-Heraid, 25 
May 19:0); "Proves the Theory of Electric Ions . . . Kinetic 
Theory Is Upheld . . (TTe Nctv To?T Timey, 25 May '9m);
"Electrical Men Say They Give Credit to Milliken [ric], Think 
That the Study of Single Ion Will Do Much for the Advance of 
Science" (Chicago /wtcr Occaw, 26 May 1910). The last of these 
quoted "electrical experts" as being unable to foresee practical 
applications: ". . . an expert on electricity said: 'I can't see that 
the discovery of the ion will have any effect on the use of the 
electricity . . .' L. T. Robinson of Schenectady, head of one of 
the largest electrical concerns in the world, says he is acquainted 
with Professor Milliken, and that if Milliken says he has discovered 
the ion he believes him. He thinks, however, that the discovery is 
of benefit only to science."
Millikan discussed his developing ideas on the oil drop method in 
"The Unit Charge in Gaseous Ionization," in Tramactiow of 
^wen'ca?! E/ectroc^ewicai Society 18 (1910): 283-88. See also 
Millikan's unpublished lecture notes for summer 1910, in Folder 
i.tj, Millikan Archives, California Institute of Technology.
17 Millikan, op. cit., n. toy.
t8 This and the next quotations are from Millikan, op. cit. (n. 6), 
p. 436. Italics supplied.
19 Ibid., p. 440; italics in original.
20 In Millikan's more extensive report of the same work (op. cit., n. 98),
he adds: "Before we eliminated dust [in the viewing chamber] we 
found many drops showing these lower values of ^  (p. 376).
2t In the 19n  version (op. cit., n. 98), Millikan omits only eight of 
the additional drops rather than ten, but with the same explanation 
(p. 382). See also Millikan and Fletcher, op. cit. (n. 98), pp. [61-63.
22 Millikan, "On the Elementary Electrical Charge and the Avogadro 
Constant," PAyr. Rev. 2 (19:3): 109-43, completed June 2, [913. 
In 7 Tc E/ectrcM, p. :o6, he refers to the same results as having been 
"first presented before the Deutsche physikalische Gesellschaft in 
June 19:2, and again before the British Association at Dundee, in 
September, 1912."
23 Ibid. (P/iyr. Rev. 2 [1913]), p. 139. The uncertainty in e claimed
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at the end of the paper is "2 parts in tooo," with e =  4.774 ±
O.O0QX!O"l"eSU.
A summary of the catcuiationai path to c, using terms Millikan 
also empioyed, runs as fohows:
v, is the constant speed of descent of the drop under the force of 
gravity (wg) equilibrated by the viscous force given by the (un­
modified) Stokes's iaw expression (67r^f]).
fa is the constant speed of ascent as the drop, with frictionai charge 
(<7), rises in the eiectric field E.
Therefore,
Similarly, compute the charge picked from ions between succes­
sive ascents:
To take into account the breakdown of Stokes's law for small ob­
served speeds tq, assume
So obtain e by plotting ^2/3 versus f/% for many runs, and read 
off the intercept, that is, e^ / 3  when //a =  o.
124 Or more precisely, deviates from the straight line on the graph of
(Vi +
Replacing <;3 from Stokes's law gives
Thus if 4! is quantized, e^ict =  <?/%, or
or
fi _ 2ga^
(f+Tl/g) 9 p.
But since e oc tq3 /2 , the "true" value of e is
?r (as "observed")
(1 + 24//a)3/2
fo pp. 6^-72 32:
^2/3 against / /^ or i/pti, where f =  mean free path,  ^ =  radius of 
droplet, p =  pressure in chamber.
123 TBeE/ectrow, p. 106.
126 These protocols are in the Millikan Archives (Foiders 3.3, 3.4 with 
"Oii Drop Experiments, R. A. MiHikan," written on the covers).
127 This is foHowed by an entry made iater, a second determination 
"by L. J. Lassaiie, 10/3 t /n ."  MiHikan frequently credited his 
students with participating in experiments, and in the laboratory 
notebooks not all the notations are in MiHikan's handwriting.
128 Another example of this sort, based on the analysis by R. Bar,
to (1922): 344-43, shows how crucial it was 
to discover when the measurement of potential differences was 
being vitiated by changing voltages in the battery, changing cali­
bration, and so on. Thus the ratio of successive charges on a drop­
let, will be given by the inverse ratio of the corresponding
potential differences needed to suspend it against the pull of 
gravity, ( :/E ]  : i/Eg). Thus M^ Mg — Eg/Ei- For example, if by 
experiment Ei =  47.3 volts, and Eg =  71.: volts, then 7^ :Mg: :7t-': 
47.3, or (to about two parts in one thousand) 3:2. Such a result 
would strongly support the hypothesis that droplets are charged 
in whole multitudes of one basic charge. But if errors produce a 
difference in the measurement of the relative value of or Eg of 
only t percent, the case looks very different. Thus if E, were 
thought to be 47.0 volts, the ratio of ^  and Mg would be 71.1:47.0, 
or, to the nearest integers, 7! 1:470-b y  no means a convincing 
proof of the quantization of charge, and conversely evidence for 
unit charges much smaller than the charge of electron.
129 Despite the evident differences, I am using this phrase somewhat 
in the sense in which Coleridge, in Biography# EBerarM (1817), 
applied it to the operation of the literary imagination. See also the 
letters of John Keats, December 28, [8:7, and March t9, :8t9.
For an example of the literature of the place of "belief" in 
scientific work, see Max Born, Natural PMoropBy of Ca%re a??d 
CBaHoe (Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 123, 290.
130 K. Popper, "Autobiography," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., TBe PMoropBy 
of Karl Popper (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court Publ. Co., 1974), p. 29. 
Among challenges to the falsification theory, see, for example,
E. Nagel, "What Is True and False in Science?" EMOOMMter 29 
(September 1967): 68-70.
131 In the presentation of the Nobel Prize for physics for 1923, MiHi­
kan's measurement of elementary charge was mentioned in con­
siderable detail, whereas the investigation of the photoelectric 
effect was relegated to the last paragraph. However, as the chair­
man of the Nobel Prize Committee for Physics revealed, that work 
had helped to make not one but three decisions: "Without going 
into details I will only state that, if these researches of MiHikan had
Nof&t fo pp. 72-7^3 2 2
given a different resuit, the iaw of Einstein wouid have been with­
out value, and the theory of Bohr without support. After Millikan's 
results, both were awarded the Nobei Prize for physics last year" 
(E. Guiistrand, NoAef EectMrcy.* PAyyfcy 7922-794/ [Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Publishing Co., 196$], p. $3).
132 R. A. Miliikan, "A Direct Photoelectric Determination of Pianck's 
'h ,'" PAyy. Rev. 7 (19:6): 384. A good, brief discussion of this 
episode is given in Roger H. Stuewer, TAe Co777p?o77 Eject.' PttrM- 
/77g Poiwtr 777 PAyyiry (New York: Science History Publications, 
1973), pp. 72-77. For interesting materia! on the attitude of Milli- 
kan and others in the United States toward the quantum theory, 
see K. R. Sopka, "Quantum Physics in America, [920-7933" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1976).
133 MiHikan, op. cit. (n. 34), pp. 6:-62. As late as 1920, MiHikan was 
still not convinced: "The emission of e!ectromagnetic radiation 
may or may not take place quantum-wise" (Sciewcc 3: [7920]: 
303). In an address in December 1912, in which he declared that 
"the atomistic conception of matter has silenced the last of its 
enemies," he was struggling for some compromise that would avoid 
the photon. "That we shall ever return to a corpuscular theory of 
radiation I hold to be quite unthinkable." Similarly with the ether: 
"To deny the existence of this vehicle . . .  is a bit of sophis­
try . . ." (MiHikan, "Atomic Theories of Radiation," Science 37 
[[913]: 133). MiHikan was evidently able to adopt antithetical 
themata in different parts of his research, and he could overcome a 
deeply held thematic hypothesis when the experimental material 
would not coordinate with it.
134 F. Ehrenhaft, "Uber eine ncue Methode zur Messung von Elektrizi- 
tatsmengen, die kleiner zu sein scheinen als die Ladung des ein- 
wertigen WasserstofHons oder Elektrons und von dessen Vielfachen 
abweichen," PAyy. Zy. n  (7910): 940-32. The paper contains a 
transcript of a discussion on the paper, with questions raised by 
various physicists.
From April 19m to March [97:, Ehrenhaft and Przibram turned 
out the following publications, albeit there was considerable overlap 
in each case.
F. Ehrenhaft: 4^ wz. zfAaJ. fUAt. (EiewM), no. 10 (April 2:, 
[9:0), op. cit., n. 108; 7^7Z. fE/yy. (Ez'ewTM), no. [3 (May [2,
19m), op. cit., n. no; .Sitz?777g.sAer. TAgJ. fEiyy. ( E/'w/za) 219 
(:9m), op. cit., n. no; PAyy. Zy. 11 (1910), op. cit., n. no; PAyy. 
Zy. n  ([910): 940-932; PAyy. Zy. 12 (i9 n ): 94-104; PAyy. Zy. 12 
(:9n): 26t-68.
K. Przibram: yf/zz. TA/rd. lUiyy. (Eie?27M), no. n  (April 28, 19m), 
op. cit., n. to8; v4 ??z. fE/'yy. (Eiew77<t), no. 17 (June 30, 19m):
262; SitZMMgrAer. zf Attd. fP/'yy. ( 1 1 9  ([9:0): 869-933;PAyy.
f o  p p . 3^3
Zy. :; (] 9 f o): 630-32; S:tZM72gyf'C?'. /ff-ayf. ITfyy. (Efe7277a) up 
(tpio): iytp-^3;PAyy. Zy. 12 ( ip n ): 260-6].
135 Ibid., first reference.
136 This is not to imply by any means that Millikan was sioppy or 
careless. On the contrary, he insisted on precision, where it counted. 
For example, he knew that it was crucial that accurate potential 
differences could be measured. See R. Bar, op. cit. (n. 128), 
pp. 344-43.
137 MiHikan, op. cit. (n. 34), pp. 37-38.
138 Ehrenhaft, op. cit., n. 76(i).
13P Ehrenhaft, op. cit., n. 108.
140 Ehrenhaft, op. cit., n. ito.
14] Ibid. (<S;'tzM72gyf;<?wf7tepaper).
142 Ibid. (PAyy. Zy. paper), p. 6tp.
143 Ehrenhaft, op. cit. (n. 134), p. P46.
144 Ehrenhaft, op. cit., n. p8 (SitZMy/gy&w/jte paper).
143 Ibid., p. 33.
146 Bar, op. cit., n. 128.
147 Schlick, op. cit., n. 23.
148 F. Ehrenhaft, "Ernst Mach's Stellung im wissenschaftlichen Leben," 
NcMe Freie Preyy? (Vienna), Supplement, 12 June 1926, p. 12.
149 Ehrenhaft and his remaining followers occasionally revived the 
discussion, and then put the matter in a similarly ominous way. 
As late as 1934, Alfred Stein, tfozewt at the University in Vienna, 
reviewed the case, together with yet another set of Ehrenhaft's 
experiments, under the heading "Das Ende des Atomismus?" and 
the subheading "Ehrenhaft erschiittert den Aufbau der Welt." He 
concluded: "At any rate, the fight over the charge of the electron 
is still not decided -  that war with heavy consequence, on whose 
outcome depends the existence of today's physics . . ." Wiewer 
ZcitMMg, Beilage, 19 August 1934, p. 3.
130 Ehrenhaft, op. cit. (n. 108 and n. no).
131 Letter of Lampa to Mach, in the Ernst Mach Archives, Freiburg.
132 The reference is to M. Planck, Eor/erM72ge7! t&wctiycAe 
PAyyif* (Leipzig, 1910).
133 The appointment process continued to drag on. In PAyr. Zy. 11 
(June 13, 19:0): 332, there appeared a note that Einstein had been 
proposed to fill the vacancy at Prague.
134 The "Monists," in particular, were jubilant about Perrin's work; 
thus Jacques Loeb linked his famous essay, "The Mechanistic Con­
ception of Life" (19:]), explicitly with Perrin's proof of the exis­
tence of molecules as the final vindication of the mechanistic 
philosophy.
133 Lampa also undertook to describe Ehrenhaft's work in the popular 
semimonthly, Day HVyycM fz/r TP<? 1: (]pn ): 43-47.
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1 Some psychodynamic reasons why scientists would tend to avoid 
such debates in any case are discussed in Chapter 7 of this book.
2 Don K. Price, "Purists and Politicians," Science 163, no. 3862, 
(1969): 25-31; the address was delivered on December 28, 1968. It 
is surely significant that Price was speaking as the first social scien­
tist in many decades to be AAAS president.
3 One aspect of the cosmopolitan nature of the undercurrent of 
reaction against science, at least in the developed countries, was 
symbolized for me by a "Questionnaire on Science and Society," 
distributed by the editorial board of the Soviet journal LifergfMrwya 
GazefM to Soviet as well as foreign scholars at an international 
congress in Moscow in the summer of [971. Among the questions, 
in Russian and English, were these:
(a) Could, in your opinion, rapid development of science lead to 
some undesirable consequences?
(b) Do you think that some fields of scientific research may be 
"taboo" from the moral point of view? If so, which? Why?
(c) May there be any reasons for stopping a successful line of 
research? If so, what are they?
(d) Does scientific research by itself foster high moral qualities 
in men?
(e) Does it not seem to you that after a period of extreme popu­
larity of the exact sciences among youths, a cooling off may set in?
4 Price, op. cit. (n. t), p. 25.
5 Ibid., p. 31.
6 On aspects of Lewis Mumford's position, see Chapter 8 of this 
book.
7 The terms "new Dionysians" and "new Apollonians" are based not 
directly on the characteristic identifications with Greek mythologi­
cal figures, but on the related usage given in Nietzsche's Birtb of 
Tragedy. A. Szent-Gyorgyi, in Science [76 (1973): 966, has re­
cently proposed the revival of the Nictzschean usage of Dionysian 
and Apollonian characteristics within science; he identifies the 
Dionysian elements with intuition, and the Apollonian element with 
the logical-rational. (Another useful discussion is in Y. Elkana, 
"The Problem of Knowledge in Historical Perspective," E/iemTe 
TnfAropirti^e EtdireM 14 [Athens, 1973]: 200-201.) Both these 
characteristic opposites have generally been credited with doing 
useful work within science; however, this does not apply to the 
neze Dionysians and the netc Apollonians as here defined, both of 
which are active outside science.
I should stress that I do not include among the new Dionysians 
the vastly larger and less sophisticated "public," which indeed pro-
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vides the biggest popular following for and readership of the new 
Dionysian authors. That group may contain the iargest share of the 
32 million adults in the United States-more than one out of hve- 
who said yes to the Gad up poll question "Do you believe in astrol­
ogy?" (Gallup poll, released October t8, 1973); but it is also 
characterized by a set of favorable and sometimes even very posi­
tive beliefs about sciences and scientists that interlace with folklore, 
superstition, and so on, in a complex way. See Amitai Etzioni and 
Clyde Nunn, "The Public Appreciation of Science in Contempo­
rary America," in Gerald Holton and William A. Blanpied, eds., 
Science At T/jc Cfxwgiwg Re/aficwHp (Boston:
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976).
8 See for example the essays by George Basalla, Etzioni and Nunn, 
John A. Moore, Dorothy Nclkin, and Theodore Roszak, in Holton 
and Blanpied, op. cit., n. 7.
9 T. Roszak, fETere t/jc ITa.ftc/awzi (New York: Doubleday,
1972), p. xxx.
to T. Roszak, "Some Thoughts on the Other Side of This Life," T/je 
New Tor^ Tt'wer, t2 April 1973, p. 43.
it Charles Reich, T/.if GreeMtwg of T/Mcrica (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1970), pp. 241-42 (hereafter cited as Greernwg).
t2 Philipp Frank, LAtte/'w, Ht'y Life a?zd Twter, trans. George Rose, 
ed. and rev. Suichi Kusuka (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, [947), 
p. 213. Frank was using these words to report on a characterization 
of Einstein's views in [929.
13 A. Einstein, in an unpublished fragment apparently intended as an 
additional critical reply to one of the essays in P. A. Schilpp, ed., 
yd/^ert EiwtetK.' PMorop^er-SeiewtLt (Evanston, III.: Library of 
Living Philosophers, t949).
t4 A. Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," in Schilpp, op. cit., n. 13. 
See also his essay "Motiv des Forschens" (1918), reprinted in an 
English translation as "Principles of Research," in Sonja Bargmann, 
trans. and rev., Meat awtf Opz'772'cw Ay vf/Pert Liwitcht (New York: 
Crown Publishers, Inc., [934), pp. 224-27 (hereafter Bargmann's 
translation is cited as Meat ayza! OpzM/WM). (I have used a revised 
translation of key passages here, however.) The differences between 
Reich's rather comfortable self to which he seems to repair gladly 
and Einstein's more pessimistic perception of the self are striking.
[3 Meat awai OpAzcw, pp. 38-39.
:6 Greemwg, p. 23].
17 Ibid., p. 266.
z8 Ibid., pp. 279-80.
19 Ibid., p. 284.
20 Ibid., p. 283.
21 Ibid., p. 426.
22 See n. 14.
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23 Mear ztMzf Opwz'oHy, p. 226.
24 At least in its maturer form, readied from about the time of early 
genera! relativity theory. In Essay 9 ("Mach, Einstein, and the 
Search for Reality") of Holton, TAr/zMZz'c On'gzwr of SczeMtzpc 
TAtOMg^ r (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), I 
have treated the epistemological development of Einstein, from 
sensationism and empiricism to rational reaiism.
23 Letter from Einstein to Maurice Sotovine, May 7, 1932, in A. Ein­
stein, Lettrey a ALzMnce So/owM (Paris: Gauthier-Viilard, 1936),
p. 120.
26 A. Einstein, Ow Method of Theoretical Phyn'cr (Oxford, [933) 
(The Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford, June to, 1933). 
Reprinted in Meat Opz'wz'owy, pp. 270-76.
27 In Schiipp, op. cit. (n. 13), p. 673.
28 Ibid., pp. 21-23. AH quotations in the next paragraphs are from 
that source unless otherwise indicated.
29 Einstein, Letter to M. Soiovine, op. cit., n. 23.
30 This case is of considerable importance in throwing tight on the 
actual working epistemology of Einstein, even at that early stage. 
It has been described in more detail in Holton, op. cit. (n. 24), 
pp. 189-190, 234-233.
It is interesting to note that in Karl Popper's "Autobiography" 
(in P. A. Schiipp, ed., The PMcwphy of KaW Popper, The Library 
of Living Philosophers, [La Salle, 111.: Open Court Publishing Co., 
1974], vol. 14 bk. :, pp. 28-29), Popper indicates that at its origin, 
his own falsifiability criterion owed much to what he perceived to 
be Einstein's example. He writes that, in 1919 (when Popper was 
seventeen years old and at about the time of the widely noted, 
successful test of the general relativity theory predictions by the 
eclipse expeditions), "t learned about Einstein; and this became a 
dominant influence on my thinking -  in the long run perhaps the 
most important of all -  Einstein gave a lecture in Vienna, to which 
I went; but I remember only that I was dazed." Popper explains 
that Mach's Sczewce of MecfwMcy had contained an indication that 
a non-Newtonian theory was possible. But Mach "thought that 
before we could start on it we would have to await new experi­
ences, which might come, perhaps, from new physical or astro­
nomical knowledge about regions of space containing faster and 
more complex movements than could be found in our own solar 
system . . . Yet in spite of all this, Einstein had managed to pro­
duce a real alternative and, it appeared, a better theory, without 
waiting for new experiences . . .
"But what impressed me most was Einstein's own clear statement 
that he would regard his theory as untenable if it should fail in 
certain tests. Thus he wrote, for example: 'If the redshift of spectral 
lines due to the gravitational potential should not exist, then the
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general theory of relativity will be untenable' [A. Einstein, E<?/a- 
twfty.* TAe Specie/ ztM<7 rBe General Theory, PopMfar EarporitioM 
(London: Methuen and Co., 1920), p. 132. Popper explains he has 
slightly improved upon the translation. In Austria, young Popper 
would have used the original edition of 1917.]
"Here was an attitude utterly different from the dogmatic attitude 
of Marx, Freud, Adler, and even more so that of their followers. 
Einstein was looking for crucial experiments whose agreement with 
his predictions would by no means establish his theory; while a 
disagreement, as he was the first to stress, would show his theory 
to be untenable.
"This, I felt, was the true scientific attitude. It was utterly differ­
ent from the dogmatic attitude which constantly claimed to find 
'verifications' for its favourite theories.
"Thus I arrived, by the end of 1919, at the conclusion that the 
scientific attitude was the critical attitude, which did not look for 
verifications but for crucial tests; tests which could refzzte the theory 
tested, though they could never establish it."
31 Albert Einstein, "Induktion und Deduktion in der Phvsik," Ber/izier 
Tcgef'/att, 23 December 1919.
32 Greem'wg, p. 93.
33 As Reich puts it, "Consciousness III is deeply suspicious of logic, 
rationality, analysis, and of principle. Nothing is so outrageous to 
the Consciousness II intellectual as the seeming rejection of reason 
itself. But Consciousness III has been exposed to some rather bad 
examples of reason, including the intellectual justification of the 
Cold War and the Vietnam war. At any rate, Consciousness III 
believes it is essential to get free of what is now accepted as rational 
thought. It believes that 'reason' tends to leave out too many factors 
and values" (Ibid., p. 278).
34 Ibid., p. 4^.
33 Ibid., p. 394.
36 C. Frankel, "The Nature and Sources of Irrationalism," ScicMce 
180 (<973): 930.
37 One's mind travels back to Johannes Kepler. Writing from Linz 
in October :626 to Guldin, he tells what life was like when the 
peasants laid siege to the town. As luck would have it, Kepler (who 
was the local ofhcial mathematician) had been given an apartment 
in the County Hall, located in the city wall, with a fine view of 
the outskirts. Consequently, when the war reached the town "a 
whole company [of soldiers] descended on our house. Constantly 
the ear was attacked by gunfire, the nose by foul smoke, the eye 
by the flash of firing. All doors had to be kept open for the soldiers, 
who through their going back and forth ruined the sleep by night 
and my studies by day." Precisely in these terrible circumstances, 
Kepler concludes, he raised his eyes above the battle to the astro-
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nomica! heavens and settled down to work. (See a!so Chapter 7 
of this book for psychoiogica! studies of motivations for scientific 
work.)
38 Bertrand RusseH, "A Free Man's Worship" (1903), Afyrtfc/.w? uwd 
Logic (London: Longmans, Green, tptp), pp. 47-48.
39 The basic difference has been put we!! in an article, entitled "On 
Reading Einstein," by Charles Mauron, which T. S. E!iot himself 
took the trouble to translate in 1930 for publication in his journal, 
Critcr/'ow. Mauron compares the two basically antithetical epistemo­
logical approaches.
"The first holds that any profound knowledge of any reality 
implies an intimate fusion of the mind with that reality: We only 
understand a thing in becoming it, in living it. In this way Saint 
Theresa believed that she knew God; in this same way the Bcrgso- 
nian believes that he knows at the same time his self and his world. 
The second type of opinion, on the contrary, holds that this 
mystical knowledge is meaningless, that to try to reach a reality in 
itself is vain, inasmuch as our mind can conceive clearly nothing 
but relations and systems of relations." (TLe CriteWcM 10 [1930]: 
p. 24).
40 K. R. Popper, "Normal Science and Its Dangers," in 1. Lakatos and 
A. Musgrave, eds., Cn'ficwM tLe Growth of f^Motcfcdge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 36.
4: Ibid., p. 37.
42 Ibid., pp. 37-38. For another discussion of what he dismissed as the 
"subjectivist" approach, see K. R. Popper, Objective 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ^74), p. !'4  (hereafter cited as O^fcc- 
tiw XwtHeJge).
43 K. R. Popper, TLe Logic of Scz'ewtipc Discovery ([934) (New 
York: Harper, 1963), p. 3!.
44 See n. 30. When Popper and philosophers of that school do allow
themselves remarks about the way the scientific imagination func­
tions, one finds categorical but unsupported statements such as this 
one, on "the one really important difference between the method 
of Einstein and that of the amoeba": Einstein's "consciously critical 
attitude toward his own ideas" made it "possible for Einstein to 
reject, gMz'cHy, of as inadequate before ex­
amining one or another hypothesis more carefully, if it appeared to 
be able to stand up to more serious criticism" (Objective EworU- 
cifgc, n. 42, p. 247). Emphasis supplied.
43 OEpctme /Cwn'/cdge, p. 179. However, in the last sentence of the 
same chapter a certain ambiguity emerges as to how seriously 
Popper took his proposal; he writes that his aim was to delineate 
"a theory of understanding which aims at combining an intuitive 
understanding of reality with the objectivity of rational criticism" 
(p. tpo).
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46 1. Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Re­
search Programmes," in Lakatos and Musgrave, op. cit. (n. 40), 
p. 138 (hereafter cited as "Methodoiogy"). Italics in originai. See 
also 1 . Lakatos, "History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruc­
tion," in R. C. Buck and R. S. Cohen, eds., Bottom StMdier iw tAe 
PABoropAy of Science (Boston: D. Reidei, 1971), 8: 91-146, 
174-82.
47 Lakatos, in Lakatos and Musgrave, op cit., p. [46.
48 A footnote at this point laconically adds: "This is a rational recon­
struction. As a matter of fact, Bohr accepted this idea only in his 
[paper of] 1926."
49 The example has been analyzed by T. S. Kuhn, ibid., pp. 236-239, 
and by Y. Eikana, in "Boltzmann's Scientific Research Programme 
and Its Alternatives," in Y. Eikana, ed., So7?ze Typeoty of tAe /zzter- 
RctioM Aettrcczz .Sc/'cMcc PABoyopAy (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1973). See also Brian Easlea, Lz'AeraBow awB the /IMy of 
Science (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973).
There is no space here to go further into the distorting effects of 
the rational reconstructionist's view of the progress of science. One 
or two short examples must suffice. Lakatos assures us that a theory 
must undergo "progressive problem shifts" to remain scientific. If 
the advance is made with the use of ad hoc proposals, the "pro­
gressiveness" is spoiled and such programs become "degenerating," 
so that one must "reject" them as "pseudoscientific." Since, how­
ever, ad hoc proposals frequently do figure in actual cases of what 
is widely acknowledged to be successful scientific work, he and 
his followers are forced into making the attempt to rescue Lorentz's 
ad-hoc-prone work from any possible charge that it might not be 
a single theory constantly undergoing "progressive problem shifts." 
To do this requires, however, new definitions of "ad hoc," "novel 
fact," and so on, which are patently ad hoc themselves; moreover, 
they, in turn, entail a number of distortions of well-known histori­
cal facts. For a definitive analysis of these failures in the work of 
Lakatos and followers such as E. Zahar, see A. 1. Miller, "On 
Lorentz's Methodology," BrftfyA /cwTMf of 2Ac PABoyopAy of 
Bcfewoe 23 (March 1974): 29-43; also E. E. Harris, "Epicyclic 
Popperism," Brit. /. PM. Sci. 23 ([972): 33-67; R. V. Jones, 
"Methodologies and Myths," Natzzre 264 (1976): t2]-]23; and 
recent articles by S. Toulmin.
30 For example, see I. B. Cohen, "History and the Philosophy of 
Science," in F. Suppe, ed., TAc BtrMctMtc of BczML/ic TAcory 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 308-49, and his 
comments, pp. 331 ff.
3! "Methodology," p .t 14.
32 Ibid., p. ft6: emphases in original.
33 Objective KwoMMge, p. 90. A strenuous attempt to "rescue"
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Einstein from his own supposed erroneous ways has prompted Gary 
Gutting (in Philosophy of Seiewee 39 [1971]: $t-68) to an attempt 
at an analysis which soiemniy conctudes that "any intuitions Ein­
stein had . . . took their place in a logically coherent argument." 
The evidence from Einstein's own testimony that there were 
occasionally elements that did in fact not yield to conventional, 
logical analysis is dismissed by overamplification: To allow that, 
he holds, would amount to making a case that the discovery of 
relativity theory as a whole "was derived essentially from a private 
intuition."
54 "Methodology," p. 93.
55 Lakatos, "History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions," 
op. cit. (n. 46), p. [33.
56 K. R. Popper, Opew Society a??d Its Twenties (Princeton University 
Press, 1950), p. 4m; 1966 ed., p. 224 of vol. 2. Also see the entire 
Chapter 24, "Oracular Philosophy and the Revolt Against Reason."
$7 K. R. Popper, Cowfeetttres attd AefMt3tio7M (New York: Basic 
Books 1963, :96$) p. 375.
58 "Methodology," p. 178. See Imre Lakatos, "Review of S. Toul- 
min's TYM77M7Z UMderttaytdtMg," Afi7terva 14 (Spring 1976): 128-29, 
for Lakatos's frank announcement that one ambition of his school 
is to "lay down statMte late of rational appraisal," thereby capturing 
the direction of judgments concerning the evaluation and support 
of science.
59 In truth, those scientists who write textbooks all too often make 
matters worse by providing distortions of their own, namely by 
presenting severely rationalized versions of the scientific process -  
just as there implicitly hangs over the desks of all scientists, while 
they write up their research results for publication, the admonition 
attributed to Louis Pasteur: "Make it seem inevitable."
There are reasons why that is the case. But, in this respect, the 
hammer of the new Apollonians finds its most malleable materials 
in those who prepare didactic presentations. Usually, the latter 
provide indeed only "candles of information"; at worst, their pro­
ducts appear to have the character of unchallengeable, closed (and 
therefore essentially totalitarian) tracts. It may well be that the 
anarchic reconstructions of science on the part of the new Diony- 
sians are largely reactions to the view of science that emanates from 
the rationalistic reconstructions of the new Apollonians attd of 
science text writers-for those texts are perhaps all they (or most 
students) ever get to see of "science."
I have expanded some of these ideas and their consequences for 
the educational curriculum in science in Chapter 1t of this book, 
and in the essay "Science, Science Teaching, and Rationality," in 
S. Hook, P. Kurtz, and M. Todorovich, The Philosophy of the 
CztrrtettfMTtt.* The Need for General EdMcatio7t (Buffalo, N.Y.: 
Prometheus Books, 1975), pp. toi-i8.
3 3 i
60 P. B. Medawar, /wdMc^ 'oM a7?7 /KtMitioM (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 1969), p. 46.
6: Ibid., p. 37.
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: I shall presuppose the explanation of the role of themata in scien­
tific work as given in G. Holton, 77j<?77Mt7'c OWgbzi of ScieMti/ic 
Kep/er to Ewrtew (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1973) (hereafter cited as 77a<?7;Mtic On'gwr), particularly 
Chapter i through 4; and in the first chapter of the present book.
I wish to acknowledge useful conversations on aspects of Chapter 4 
with colleagues while a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study 
in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, California. An earlier draft 
was also circulated for discussion by the planners of a thematic 
encyclopedia for Editors EitMMdi (Turin).
2 At least within limits; for, in synthesizing a peptide, for example, 
success with respect to proof of purity, amino-acid analysis, chem­
ical and mass spectrometric evidence, and comparison of natural 
with synthetic material is always open to question and debate.
3 More generally, the word "analysis" in mathematics refers to the 
third and largest part of mathematics, that bordering on algebra 
and arithmetic on the one hand, and on geometry and topology on 
the other, although the boundaries are not sharp. It includes differ­
ential and integral calculus, ordinary and partial differential equa­
tions, and calculus of variations, Fourier series, complex analysis, 
and probability.
A discussion of analysis in modern philosophy can of course be 
found in almost any one of the standard texts. For a short but use­
ful bibliography see also J. Passmore, ^ 4  f/zzzzdrcd Fearr of PMcr- 
opEy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966).
4 The pretensions of "holistic philosophies" were among the favorite 
targets of positivistic philosophers. In a chapter entitled "A Priori 
and the Whole," Richard von Mises wrote: "There is no lack of 
psychologic motives and expedient reasons for the use of the con­
cept of "the whole" in various spheres of knowledge. But we see in 
it a model example of metaphysical postulates: an auxiliary con­
cept, useful in many places, has been elevated to the rank of an 
'absolutely valid idea,' which then is sold as a source of funda­
mental knowledge" (Porz'twwM [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1931], p. 286).
3 The fact that these are two members of a linked couple is tellingly 
indicated by the confusion ensuing upon the introduction of Kant's 
terminology "analytic" and "synthetic," sometimes in the way 
according with the Greek meaning and sometimes also in the
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opposite manner. As a resuit, "analytic" and "synthetic" now are 
not infrequently found associated with deduction and induction 
respectively; but the opposite usage, more true to the original, will 
obtain in what follows, as it does in much of the iiterature. Cf. 
Colin Murray Turbayne, 7 'Pc MytB of Metaphor, rev. ed. (Colum­
bia: University of South Carolina Press, [970), ch. 2.
6 Cf. his letter to Maurice Solovine (May 7, 1952), discussed in 
Chapter 3.
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early modern chemistry, is given in Marie Boas Hall, "The History 
of the Concept of Element," in D. S. L. Cardwell, ed., JoPw 
Da/tow tPc Progrery of Science (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
Inc., 1968).
8 E. A. Burtt, TTe Afetapfryn'cal FoMMcfatiow of AfoJerM P/xyHca/ 
Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927), pp. 236-37.
9 One of the more readable exposes is in K. R. Popper's CoMfectMrer 
aw<f AefMMtioyn (New York: Basic Books, [963, 1963), ch. 13.
to E. O. Wilson, Sociofu'o/ogy.* 7 /j<? TVetu .S'y?7tPew (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973). The discussion to page 134 
is a condensation of my essay in M. Gregory and A. Silvers, eds., 
-S'oc/'oA'o/ogy 7 7 z/tt/aw TVatwe (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
expected 1978).
11 Of the many accounts, I refer to the excellent brief one by Donald 
Fleming, in his introduction to the Harvard University Press re­
issue ([963.) of Jacques Loeb's book TPc CoMceptioM
of Life. See also Everett Mendelsohn, "Revolution and Reduction," 
in Y. Elkana (ed.), TBe Between Bcfcwcc a? ? 7  P/H/or-
opBy (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), pp. 407-26.
t2 Lucretius, Ott tBc TVatMre of TBfwgy, B00P 7 (published by Henry 
Regnery Company for the Great Books Foundation, Chicago, 111., 
1969), pp. 2-3.
13 "Of Atoms, Mountains, and Stars: A Study in Qualitative Physics," 
Science 187 (1973): 603-12.
14 In TPc Z;*7McaMtfco.f of Mexico; A Motferw Alay^ IT^y of Life 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970).
13 Ira R. Buchler, "Review of Hildred Geertz and Clifford Geertz, 
TUKrNpwIMi," Science [9: (January 9, 1976): 74-73.
:6 Wheeler continued: "Matter, charge, electromagnetism, and other 
Helds are only manifestations of the bending of space. Physics is 
geometry" (J. A. Wheeler, Gcowe/.ro7ytM2/H'c;' [New York: Aca­
demic Press, [962], p. 223). In [972 Wheeler revised the priority 
of the structure of space-time and announced that it is not basic 
to an understanding of the structure of elementary particles, but on 
the contrary can only be derived from the latter. This reversal, 
however, leaves untouched Wheeler's commitment to the method 
of monistic postulation. For references and discussion, see Adolf
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Pubiishing Co., 1973), pp. 268-93.
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presented in D. R. Krathwohl, B. S. Bloom, and B. B. Masia, 
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GoaE, HawJboob 7 / (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1956), 
pp. 19^92.
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versity of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 28.
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of Be/ief [Cambridge University Press, 1972], p. 2) suggests that 
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20 For example, see Arthur Pap, E7c7Mcwtr of Twa/ytzca/ PMoropBy 
(New York: Hafner Publishing Co., [949, 1972), ch. 16.
2 [ A. Einstein, "Notes on the Origin of the General Theory of 
Relativity," in Sonja Bargmann, trans. and rev., 7 t7eay awJ Op/7M0 7M' 
of Albert Ei'/Mtebz (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1934), 
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p. 270.
23 In /yfcat aw<7 Opiw'owy, pp. 290-323.
24 In P. A. Schilpp, ed., .Tiber? EwytezM.* PMoyopber-Br/'ewtM? (Evans­
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26 Ibid., p. 674.
27 Ernst Mach, TyM/yyfy of Se7Mafz'o7M (Chicago: The Open Court 
Publishing Co., 1910), p. 3!.
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from Schiller, "TVzyr t7 ;e EEi/e fb'br? zar E/arbez?" ("Only complete­
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of the complementarity point of view. For a discussion of this 
point, see Chapter 4 in TAtwatzc Orz'gbM.
29 Ernst Gombrich, Try aw<7 777zzy7oyy, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Prince­
ton University Press, 1969), p. tot. Going beyond the ontogeny of 
ideas in children, one is tempted to say that the child itself results 
from the repeated dichotomous differentiation of a single original 
cell.
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Mortimer J. Adler, EBe Great /dcay; yf Syz/Mpicow of Great BooBy 
of tBe tVerterw fEorZd (Chicago, IH.: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Inc., 1932).
David Bohm, Era^wer/tatiotz awJ IEho/ewett (New York: Human­
ities Press, 1976).
Ernest Geiiner, EegitiwatzoM of Belief (London: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 1974).
Leroy E. Loemker, Strztgg/e for SywtBcyiy.* Ehe SeveMteewtB Cew- 
tttry Bac^ groMMtf of Lcz'Bwfz'y ByzttBerB of Order awd Freedozzz 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).
Peter B. Medawar, /tzdHetioM %wd lHtM?'t;'o7t (Philadelphia: Ameri­
can Philosophical Society, 1969).
Arthur Pap, E/etttewtr of rlz:a/ytic PBdoyopBy (New York: Hafner 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1949, '972), particularly chs. :6, 17.
D. C. Phillips, /VoZiitic EBoMgBt i?z .Sociai Bcietzce (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1976).
Philip Teitelbaum, "Levels of Integration of the Operant," in 
W. K. Honig and J. E. R. Staddon, eds., EBc EGwdBooB of 
Operawt BeBavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976). 
Colin Murray Turbayne, EBe AfytB of MetapBor, rev. ed. (Colum­
bia: University of South Carolina Press, [970).
UNESCO, Bciewce awd ByMtBerir (New York: Springer Verlag, 
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Chapter y. Fenttfy grottp a*ttd tBe recaptttre 0/
/fa/y'y piace m pByyt'cy
t Quoted by S. C. Chandrasekhar, in Coi/cctcd Papery of Ezzrico 
Eerwi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [96$), 2: 927, and 
by Emilio Segre in Ewrico Eertttf, PByyz'cht (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 80. The former will be abbreviated as 
Collected Papery; the latter, as Enrico Eerrtti. For other sources 
used throughout, see n. 143.
2 Ettrfco Per?;?/', p. 80.
3 Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, "Nachweis der Entstehung 
aktiver Bariumisotope aus Uran . . . ," Die NatarTCMyewycBaftetz 
27, no. 6 (1939).
4 For example, the distinguished physicists in Florence included 
Gilberto Bernardini, Giuseppe Occhialini, Guilio Racah, and Bruno 
Rossi. The organization and contribution of this group merit a 
study of its own. There are analogies with the Fermi case-for 
example, Antonio Garbasso in Florence (physicist, director of the 
Physical Laboratory, senator, and mayor of Florence) was in some 
respects functionally similar to O. M. Corbino. Although the
groups in Rome and Fiorence grew up independently, they were 
linked to each other, primarily through contacts with B. Rossi. See 
also Ewrico Fcrw;', passim, and G. Occhialini, American Institute of 
Physics (AIP) interview, passim (hereafter cited as AIP interview).
5 AIP interview, p. 138.
6 Emilio Segre, biographical introduction to Collected Papery, p. yo.
y Segre, AIP interview, p. 51.
8 Sources for the History of Quantum Physics (SHQP) interview, 
p. 8 (hereafter cited as SHQP interview).
9 In his interview at the AIP, pp. 72-14, and in SHQP interview, 
pp. 20-n.
10 E. Amaldi, AIP interview, pp. ! !-!2.
i! "The Discovery of Fission," P^yy/cy Today 20, no. !i (November 
ip6y): 43.
12 Ewrico Fermi, p. yi; Rasetti, F., in Collected Papery, p. 339.
13 See, for example, the testimony by B. Pontecorvo in "Review of 
the Collected Papery of E. Eer7/d," Neddy a 23 (1969): n .
14 Among Fermi's students, a remarkably large number reached dis­
tinction in their Helds. For example, the list of those who passed 
through Fermi's classes in the United States includes H. Anderson, 
O. Chamberlain, M. Gell-Mann, AL Goldberger, D. Lazarus, 
T. D. Lee, J. Orear, M. N. Rosenbluth, A. H. Rosenfeld, 
W. Selove, J. Steinberger, A. Wattenberg, G. Weil, L. Wolfen- 
stein, C. N. Yang, and others. See Ewrico Pcro/i, p. i6y if.
However, it is also important to see some limits within the 
obvious success of Fermi as physicist, teacher, and leader of groups 
of scientists. In retrospect it was evident that there were opportu­
nities missed, for example, the emission of fission products from 
uranium atoms which had been bombarded by neutrons. There 
were also some simple mistakes made by the group, although the 
conservatism of Fermi's group, perhaps responsible for some of the 
missed opportunities, kept these to a very small number. Segre 
points out: "Because Fermi loathed being in error, and error is 
occasionally unavoidable, he wanted to be in error only for having 
claimed too little" (ibid., p. 103).
13 Project Physics Course film transcripts, p. ti, of TPc IFor/J of 
Ewico f 67*777/, :6 mm black-and-white film, 4y min., distributed 
under number oy3433-o by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New 
York (hereafter cited as Project Physics Fermi film transcripts).
16 See, for example, Laura Fermi, vltcw/y z'w /Ac Etwz/Yy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 2iy.
ty Pontecorvo recounts that Rasetti once criticized an experimental 
apparatus, exclaiming to Fermi, "You do unpardonable things in 
the laboratory. Look at that electrometer. You would smear it with 
'chicken's blood' [slang for a reddish, disgusting-looking paste used 
in the laboratory] if you thought it would help your results. Admit
336
it!" Fermi replied, calmly, "Of course, 1 would dunk all the elec­
trometers in the laboratory in chicken blood if f thought we'd learn 
something essential" (op. cit. [n. 13]). There is evidence that 
Rasetti was considered a very elegant experimentalist, and that 
Fermi tended to exaggerate a little his own stylistic difference.
18 J. Chadwick in Project PAyrfcy CoMrre Reader, 7 Te
Unit 6 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 28; 
reprinted from Proceetf/Mgr of Tenth International Congress of the 
History of Science (Paris: Hermann et al., 1964).
t9 C. Weiner, and Elspeth Hart, eds., Exploring t/ie H/'.story of 
Nttc/ear P/.sy.s/'c.f, American Institute of Physics Conference Pro­
ceedings, no. 7 (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1972), 
p. 18$.
20 See my "The Roots of Complementarity," in G. Holton, T/je7?Mt;'c 
Ort'gz'w of Sr;'c77t;'ftc 7ToMg/3t; AYp/er to E/TMtebt (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. tty ff.
21 Segre, AIP Interview, p. 28. Amaldi similarly reported that Fermi 
delayed consciously introducing hypotheses which were not strictly 
necessary as "harmful if introduced into our mental picture. He 
insisted that one must proceed by reasoning with the observed 
experimental facts. The correct interpretation of the nature of the 
neutron groups would emerge as a necessary consequence of the 
data. He was afraid that a preconceived interpretation, however 
plausible, would sidetrack us from an objective appraisal of the 
phenomena that confronted us." E. Amaldi, in CoPecteJ P/tperr 
1: 808.
22 E. Persico, review of "Enrico Fermi: Collected Papers," in Sc/'c77- 
tific TTMcn'cjw 270, no. 3 (November 1962): 183.
23 "In experimental work, Fermi had a very personal style. His experi­
mental ability did not consist in being able to build complicated 
devices or to perform measurements of high precision. It lay rather 
in the capacity to find out at the right moment which was the most 
important experiment to do, to project it in the simplest and most 
efficient way, and to carry it out with energy and patience without 
wasting time and labor on nonessentials. His experimental work 
was always intimately connected with his theoretical work, and he 
carried both of them through methodically and calmly, with great 
perseverence and an exceptional resistance to mental and physical 
fatigue." Persico, op. cit. (n. 22).
24 E. Segre, "Fermi and Neutron Physics," JUt'/ctc of /Motfcry/ PPyr- 
/Yt 27 (July 1933): 262 (hereafter cited as "Fermi and Neutron 
Physics").
23 One by-product was his textbook on atomic physics, /77trot?Mz;o72C 
Eh'/Y/t zdM77?;'c/? (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1928).
26  E 7 2 WCO Ff7*777/, p. 63.
27 AIP interview, p. 3.
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28 "The work of Rutherford and his school was rather alien to us. 
Thus, the change to nuclear subjects cost us considerate effort, ft 
was not a whim or a desire to foliow a fashion, but the resuits of a 
deliberate pian that Fermi and his friends debated vigorously, even 
heatediy" (ibid.).
29 Rasetti did not want to return to Itaiy after his short stay at 
Coiumbia University, in view of the poiitical developments of the 
time, nameiy, the Ethiopian war and the deterioration of the 
European poiitical situation. Segre was aiso in the United States 
that autumn and had begun to think of emigrating from Itaiy; 
when he did return, it was not to Rome but to Palermo, where he 
stayed until his immigration to the United States in 1938. Ponte- 
corvo had left Italy for France. Only Amaldi and Fermi were then 
left in Rome ("Fermi and Neutron Physics," p. 26t). Rasetti did 
return in 1936, but had to leave Italy again three years later.
30 See E^r/cc Per///;, pp. 63-68, and his introductory note to the 
translation by Fausta Segre of Corbino's speech, "The New Goals 
of Experimental Physics," in Reports and Documents, Afwerva 
9, no. 4 (October 1971): 328-38.
3: Segre, SHQP interview, p .t  3.
32 Corbino, op. cit. (n. 30), p. 332.
33 Ibid., p. 333.
34 Ib^., p. 334.
33 Ibid., p. 334.
36 Ibid., p. 334.
37 Ibid., p. 333.
38 Ibid., p. 333.
39 Ibid., p. 336.
40 Ibid., p. 336.
41 Ernest Rutherford, James Chadwick, and C. D. Ellis, Ra/Faf/owr 
frow Ra/E'oactwe &2py7a/:c<?y (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1930).
42 See the description of this seminar by E. Amaldi, Ea Ezra <? /'Opera
E/tore Afafora/M, 7906-/93# (Rome: Accademia dei Lincei, 
[966).
43 See E. Amaldi, lectures entitled "Recollection of Research," de­
livered at the International School of Physics, Varenna, 37th course, 
Summer 1972, published under the editorship of Charles Weiner, 
EfEtory of TteewEefE CeMtz/ry PEyr/cr (New York: Academic 
Press, 1977), hereafter cited as EarewMa; and Amaldi, A1P inter­
view, p. 9. The transition was more marked in the case of Segre, 
who was working on hypcrhne structure. See Fermi and Segre, 
in CoEecteJ Papery, items 73a and 73b.
44 ". . . what he [Fermi] tried to tackle at first-it's quite clear-he 
tried to go to [the] nucleus. The first thing he did was to try to 
go by hyperfine structure, which was a link to something he knew.
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Then he tried to make gamma-ray spectra, gamma-ray spectros­
copy, find nuciear ieveis . . Segre, SHQP interview, p. t8.
43 Papery, p. 348, comment by F. Rasetti.
46 Segre, SHQP interview, p. t8; ibid., pp. 21-22. Amaldi, in his 
interview in the SHQP, stresses another aspect: "I went to Leipzig 
and I don't remember why. ft was an extremely good ptace. 
Probably, aiso Segre went to Stern because it was an extremeiy 
good ptace. But these trips -  white I wouldn't say they were 
mistakes-were not planned. Fermi was encouraging us to go to 
other places. The group in Rome was so small that we needed to 
go to other places and talk with other people."
47 SHQP interview, p. 12.
48 Collected Papery, t : $38. The conference also dealt to some extent 
with the other major held of current interest in Italy, cosmic rays; 
hence the list included Compton, Millikan, and Rossi.
A description of this conference and others that followed soon 
may be found in Charles Weiner, "Institutional Settings for Scien­
tific Change: Episodes from the History of Nuclear Physics," 
published in A. Thackray and E. Mendelsohn, eds., Science awd 
PfMWMM Fa/Mcy (New York: Humanities Press, '976).
49 CoPecteJ Papery, t : 348, comment by F. Rasetti.
50 Ibid.
3< Amaldi, First Lecture, Eare??Ma, p. 297.
32 SHQP interview, p. 28. See also Collected Papery, item 78.
33 O. R. Frisch, "The Discovery of Fission," P/ryr/cr Today 20 (No­
vember ^67): 44. Rome, however, was in a better position than 
most places with respect to sources.
34 Ibid., p. 43. See the description of a similar state of affairs in 1933 
at the laboratory of Blackett, in the interview of Frisch at the AIP, 
p. 19.
33 SHQP interview, p. 18.
36 A valuable discussion of the state of the theory is to be found in 
Weiner and Hart, op. cit. (n. 19), pp. 121-93.
37 Ibid., p. [7. Rasetti adds: ". . . it must be emphasized that the idea 
of the neutrino had remained up to that time a rather vague hy­
pothesis, while the construction of a formal theory had never been 
attempted . . . Apparently [Fermi] had some difficulty with the 
Dirac-Jordan-Klein method of the second quantization of fields, 
but eventually also mastered that technique and considered a beta- 
decay theory as a good exercise on the use of creation and destruc­
tion operators. He also made use of the isotopic spin formalism, 
recently invented by Heisenberg and later to prove of great use­
fulness in view of the charge independence of the strong inter­
action. The theory that he built on these foundations is remarkable 
for its ability to withstand almost unchanged two and a half decades 
of revolutionary advances in nuclear physics. One might say that
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seldom was physical theory born in such definitive form" (Collected 
Papery, p. 539).
38 Nt/ovo C/'wewto, Supplement to vo). 2, series 10, no. 2 ('935), 
p. 482.
39 "They had known for many months before that atuminum bom­
barded with atpha particies emits positrons, but it had never 
occurred to them that this might be a delayed process. They had 
oniy observed the positrons during bombardment. Lawrence and 
his cyciotron people in Caiifornia had made the same mistake" 
(Frisch, op. cit. [n. 33], p. 43).
60 Project Physics Fermi fiim transcripts, no. n , p. 6.
6t "But when Joiiot found the radioactivity by atpha particles, we 
were ready, in a certain sense, to jump on nuctear physics because 
we had started two years before to play with cloud chambers, to 
make counters, to make everything, so we had really the tech­
niques. We had not yet found any problem to work on . . . Then 
came out the paper of Joiiot, and Fermi immediately started to 
look for the radioactivity. He found it, and then everything started" 
(Amaldi, SHQP interview, p. 28).
62 Amaldi, SHQP interview, p. 26.
63 Radon sources had earlier been provided for Fermi's group by 
Trabacchi for use with the gamma-ray spectrometer. Hence they 
were familiar with the technique of radon preparation. On the 
importance of having good sources, see Occhialini, AIP interview, 
pp. 4-3.
64 Frisch, op. cit. (n. 33), p. 46.
63 Amaldi, SHQP interview, p. 26.
66 Amaldi notes that the leading position was lost partly as result of 
the deterioration of the political situation in Europe in general, and 
in Italy in particular, and partly because the means made available 
to them did not keep pace with their need, so that the -  relatively 
small -  Rome group could not continue to compete with other 
laboratories which had access to accelerators of various types, and 
hence to much better particle sources (F^rew/M, p. 324).
67 For the division of labor see Amaldi, F#fe?2?M, p. 301; Amaldi, 
AIP interview, p. 13; Ewico Eerwi, pp. 78-80; "Fermi and Neutron 
Physics," pp. 238-39: "We organized our activities in this way: 
Fermi [in the spring of 1934] would do a good part of the experi­
ments and calculations. Amaldi would take care of what we would 
now call the electronics, and I would secure the substances to be 
irradiated, the sources, etc. Now, of course, this division of labor 
was by no means rigid, and we all participated in all phases of the 
work, but we had a certain division of responsibility along these 
lines, and we proceeded at great speed. We needed all the help we 
could get, and we even enlisted the help of a younger brother of 
one of our students (probably 12 years old), persuading him that
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neat paper cylinders in which we could irradiate our stuff . .
68 Barbara Buck, in a survey of the Project Physics Fermi film tran­
scripts.
69 Amaldi, A1P interview, pp. 38-40.
70 For insight into the stages in the rise of cosmic-ray and high-energy 
physics research after the war, see Amaldi, EarcwzT!, 3, and his 
article "Italy," PbytictToJay t,no. i (1948): 33-36.
yt Ricerca Sriewt/pta 3, no. t (March 23, 1934): 283;
Papery, t: 639-46.
72 Amaldi, Earew?M, p. 304.
73 Ibid., p. 13.
74 Thus, on April 23, !934, Rutherford wrote Fermi: "Dear Fermi, 
I have to thank you for your kindness in sending me an account of 
your recent experiments in causing temporary radioactivity in a 
number of elements by means of neutrons. Your results are of 
great interest, and no doubt later we shall be able to obtain more 
information as to the actual mechanism of such transformations. It 
is by no means clear that in all cases the process is as simple as 
appears to be the case in the observations of the Joliots.
"I congratulate you on your successful escape from the sphere 
of theoretical physics! You seem to have struck a good line to start 
with . . . Congratulations and best wishes. Yours sincerely, Ruther­
ford" (from copy of original, Cavendish Laboratory).
73 This phrase is used by Segre, in "Fermi and Neutron Physics," p. 238.
76 E. Amaldi, "Production and Slowing Down of Neutrons," in
S. Fliigge, ed., PPyyiP (Berlin: Springer Verlag,
1939), p. 64: "But in all these cases, increase of cross section with 
increase of velocity is mainly due to penetration of the electrostatic 
potential barrier. This is precisely what is absent for neutron bom­
bardment" -  as soon became clear. See also J. A. Wheeler, "Mech­
anism of Fission," Pbyticy To^fay 20, no. n  (November 1967): 49: 
"Every estimate ever made before [Fermi's slow-neutron experi­
ments and the astonishing resonances that he had discovered. G. H.] 
indicated that a particle passing through a nucleus would have an 
extremely small probability of losing its energy by radiation and 
undergoing capture, if the current nuclear model was credible. Yet, 
directly in opposition to the predictions of this model, Fermi's 
[October 1934. G. FI.] experiments displayed huge cross sections 
and resonances that were quite beyond explanation."
77 Ewrz'co F e w ? ! ,  p. 26.
78 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
79  Ibid., p. 10.
80 E. Segre, a talk before the American Physical Society, Washington, 
D.C., April 23, !972, transcript, p. 2.
81 There is evidence in the Fermi film interviews-with Castelnuovo's 
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transcripts, interview with Castelnuovo, no. 3:, p. 4; with Wick, 
no. : p. 4.
82 Cof/ccteJ Papcrq t :: 20, translation quoted in Ewrico Fermi, p. 26.
83 Ibid., p. 26.
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well described by Segre in Enrico Fermi and by Laura Fermi in 
v4 t077M m tFe Family (op. cit., n. 16), as well as in many of the 
interviews, for example, Amaldi, SHQP. An important source is 
the autobiography of O. M. Corbino's brother, Epicarmo Corbino, 
Raceomo <fi Mwa Eita (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1972).
83 Enrico Fermi, p. 30. Several Italian physicists remarked on what 
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Amaldi adds that almost all of the younger generation even thought 
Corbino was sometimes "too much a Sicilian," for example, in the 
sense that in order to obtain a chair for the best possible man, 
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apply to get the chair for a bad candidate" (SHQP interview, p. 11).
86 Ewico Fermi, p. 30.
87 See Laura Fermi, op. cit. (n. 16), pp. 71-73.
88 There is evidence that Corbino managed to divert the chair to 
physics from the general pool for all the sciences, and at the ex­
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turned out differently if biology in Italy had had its Corbino.
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Fermi and Rasetti. See also, Laura Fermi, op. cit. (n. t6), p. 40.
90 E. Segre, introductory note to F. Segre, op. cit. (n. 30), p. 329.
9t Ewrico Fermi, p. 31: Mrs. Fermi confirms this.
92 Corbino, quote from speech, in F. Segre, op. cit. (n. 30), p. 332.
93 Quoted in Ewico Fermi, p. 43.
94 Samuel Goudsmit, Project Physics Fermi film transcripts, no. to, 
p. 3. Others, however, point out that Fermi's capacity was so widely 
recognized that he was bound in any case to have reached a leading 
position in Italian cultural life.
93 Angelo Brofferio, Storio <fef Piernome A?/ /U9 ai MOttri giorw 
(Turin: Fontana, 1849-32), pt. Ill, p. 89; quoted in Barbara Buck, 
dissertation draft, p. 12.
96 Thus it would be natural for Senator Corbino to "take care that the
3 4 2
results [of Fermi's group in 1934 on the production of artificial 
radioactivity by neutron bombardment. G.H.] be properly ad­
vertised at the Italian Accademia dei Lincei in the solemn royal 
session" ("Fermi and Neutron Physics," p. 239).
Many prominent scientists and scholars were made senators, 
which was considered both an academic and a political honor. The 
list includes Blaserna, Cannizzaro, Cremona, Croce, Garbasso, 
Mossotti, Righi, and Volterra.
97 Corbino, quote from speech, in F. Segre, op. cit. (n. 30), p. 336.
98 It is significant that Fermi did not hesitate to make that type of 
appeal himself when he visited the United States. The press release 
prepared by the Department of Public Information of Columbia 
University on August 3, 1936, quoted Fermi as follows: "The most 
obvious application of artificial radioactivity which can be foreseen 
is in the medicinal field. Radium, naturally radioactive, is used for 
the treatment of cancer. The completely new radioactive substances 
created in the laboratory should give medical men new tools, some 
of which may prove more efficient than radium." After the war, 
Fermi stressed the usefulness of nuclear reactors for the preparation 
of radioisotopes needed for medical research and therapy. One 
should add that before the discovery of fission, the medical uses 
of radioactivity were generally considered its most important appli­
cation. Fermi and his collaborators often underlined these uses, 
and the patent taken out in October 1934 refers mainly to the use 
of slow neutrons for producing radioactive isotopes for practical 
applications.
99 Laura Fermi recalls that during their wedding trip in 1928, the 
possibility of being eventually considered for the prize was dis­
cussed by Enrico Fermi; however, he mentioned a list of physicists 
who would have to be given the prize first.
During the period 1901-32, Italy was credited with the following 
Nobel Prizes: a half-share of the prize in physics to Marconi 
(1909), together with F. Braun, for their services to the develop­
ment of wireless telegraphy; the award of 1938 to Fermi, who was 
on his way to the United States as an emigrant; one-half of the 
prize for physiology and medicine for 1906 to Camillo Golgi, the 
other half going to Ramon y Cajal of Madrid; three prizes for 
literature: to Giosue Carducci of Bologna (1906), to Grazia 
Deledda (1926), and to Luigi Pirandello (1934). Also, in 1907, 
Ernesto Teodoro Moneta received the Nobel Prize for peace, with 
Louis Renault of Paris.
This excursion provides an opportune point to mention that the 
phrase "second-rank country, scientifically," used previously and 
often heard, needs of course some further specification. This has 
been attempted, for examples, by J. Ben-David. Insofar as Nobel 
Prizes are an indicator of a nation's productive effort -  and they
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certainty are not a very good indicator -  it may be useful to ex­
amine the figures and the relative standing of Itaiy to obtain a semi- 
quantitative estimate. Using -  essentiaiiy for reasons of convenience -  
the year 1952 as the limit, one finds that Itaiy shares sixth piace 
(with Sweden) in the number of individuals granted any part of a 
Nobel Prize in physics between 1901 and 1952 -  assigned by country 
of nationality of the prize-winner. Considering all three categories 
of science prizes -  physics, chemistry, and physiology and medicine -  
this standing becomes somewhat lower: Italy shares tenth place 
(with Canada). Making the same kind of calculation, but calculat­
ing the ranking by Nobel Prize winners per million of inhabitants, 
one finds that Italy shares sixteenth place with Argentina. Figures 
based on Ernst Meier, Alfred Noi?eI, Nofiei Stiftzmg, Nofieipreire 
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1954).
100 Charles Weiner, "A New Site for the Seminar: The Refugees and 
American Physics in the '30s," in Donald Fleming and Bernard 
Bailyn, eds., TAc InteiiectMui Migration; Europe and America, 
7930-7960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 
pp. 190-234.
lot Ibid., p. 193.
102 Ibid., p. 193. See also Charles Weiner, "Institutional Settings for 
Scientific Change: Episodes from the History of Nuclear Physics," 
in Thackray and Mendelsohn, op. cit., n. 48.
103 A1P interview, p. 20.
104 Fnrico Fermi, p. to.
103 AIP interview, pp. 13-14.
106 Weiner, op. cit. (n. 100), passim.
toy The lack of flexibility in the Italian university system-indeed, for 
most appointments Italian citizenship was required -  and the early 
forms of anti-Semitism on the part of Mussolini and others in 
policy-making positions may help to explain part of this phenome­
non, but not all of it.
108 This is not, however, an attempt to "explain" the success of Fermi's 
group. Not everything is "explicable," least of all a phenomenon 
such as Fermi himself.
109 AIP interview, p. i.
no  Amaldi agrees that Corbino "protected all of us from the criticisms 
of the traditional university environment" ( Farenna, p. 317).
111 SHQP interview, pp. 23-24.
112 Ibid., p. 24.
113 See Joseph Ben-David, Tbe Scientiit'r Foie in Society (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 140; also Daniel Bell, Tbe 
Coming of tlie Port-/nilMrtrMl Society (New York: Basic Books, 
1 9 7 3 ). PP- 3 6 o-5 i-
114 Ben-David, op. cit. (n. 113), p. 136.
113 Frisch, op. cit. (n. 33), p. 43. However, examples can be found-
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the laboratories of Kameriingh Onnes in Holland and R. A. Milli­
kan at the California Institute of Technology -  where analogies 
with aspects of Fermi's group may be discerned.
ti6 Rasetti, SHQP interview, p. it.
: 17 Ibid., p. 13.
118 Segre, SHQP interview, p. 7.
[19 Segre, AIP interview, p. 2.
120 Ibid.
12: See Ezzrz'co Few?;', pp. 7-8, and the appendix containing Fermi's 
early letters to Persico. Persico recalled: "I was supposed to become 
an engineer, and it was probably conversations with Fermi, who 
presented to me the possibility of becoming a professor of physics, 
that changed my direction" (Persico, SHQP interview, p. ro).
122 Ewz'co Ferwzz, p. 40.
123 Laura Fermi, op. cit. (n. [6), p. 42.
124 The word, though used rather casually, appears also in Laura 
Fermi, op. cit. (n. :6), p. 4:. Referring to Amaldi, she writes: 
"He was soon accepted into the expanding family of physicists and 
physicists-to-be." Dr. J. Goodstein informs me that a similar, 
family-like relationship existed among the Italian mathematicians of 
that period.
One must of course guard against using the word "family" in 
more superficial contexts, for example, in describing the relation­
ships in institutions, ranging from other laboratories to business 
enterprises, which are characterized merely by close personal ties 
and zeal.
123 Ezzrz'co Fewzz, p. 8.
126 The "recruitment" of scientists by members of their immediate or 
wider family would make an interesting case study. Examples are 
Einstein's introduction to mathematics and science through his 
uncle; Frisch's account of the influence his aunt, Lise Meitner, had 
on his choice of career; and of course the recruitment of the scien­
tists' children such as Curie, Bohr and Thomson into the same 
or similar fields of study. Many in Fermi's group were influenced 
early by relatives who were scientists. When he was ten years old, 
Segre received a copy of Ganot's Pfzyrzcr from his uncle, a distin­
guished geologist; Amaldi is a mathematician's son, Rasetti the 
nephew of a well-known physiologist; Majorana was the nephew 
of a physicist.
There are negative aspects associated with this mechanism. One 
is discrimination against members of another class, either intellec­
tually or indeed simply by class discrimination, which, in the long 
run, may also handicap the growth of science in a country. See, 
for example, "A Policy for Scientific Research: Proceedings of a 
Study Group Held in Rome, 2 and 3 December, 1961, Under the 
Auspices of the Central OfHce of Cultural Activities of the Christian
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Democratic Party," reprinted in Reports and Documents, Mz'werva 
2, no. 2 (Winter 1963): 210 if. There it is pointed out that "only 6 
per cent of the students [at the university ievei] come from the 
artisan ciass, 9 per cent from the working class, and a further 9 
per cent from the peasantry. The offspring of entrepreneurs and 
persons in the iiberai professions, who together constitute the 8.6 
per cent of the male population, are disproportionately highly 
represented at the universities; they constitute 60 per cent of all 
students registered. On the other hand, offspring of white-collar 
workers are underrepresented" (p. 2[3).
Other negative aspects are indicated in that document, including 
the fragmentation and dispersal of the scientific effort into rela­
tively many quite small enterprises throughout Italy; the apparent 
discrimination of research groups in favor of northern Italy and 
against the south, is indicated by Alessandro Alberigi Quaranta, in 
"Expenditure, Organization, and Policy-Making in Scientific Re­
search," TfwervR 2, no. 2 (Winter 1963): 2:7.
27 See Bruno Pontecorvo, Ferwi c A? FAn'ca (Roma: Editori
Riunti, 1972), p. 30.
28 Rather, there was in the laboratory an informal, lighthearted atmo­
sphere, "a certain playfulness, a naive love of jokes and silly acting 
that they brought into their serious work" (Laura Fermi, op. cit. 
[n. 16], p. 45). See also Amaldi, SHQP interview, p. 27: "This 
was the great difference between the character of Fermi and 
probably of the Germans . . . We were so joking all the time and 
never taking seriously what we were doing . . . People [in Leipzig, 
which Amaldi had visited. G.H.] were extremely serious and had 
a certain style. They were conscious that they were scientists in an 
old tradition . . ."
In the group working at Florence under Garbasso, and possibly 
at other centers, the relationships in the groups were not greatly 
different. Occhialini has stressed the feudal and patriarchal model 
of organization in his AIP interview, adding, "in Rome they have 
a father image of Corbino, and in Florence they have a father image 
of Garbasso" (p. 18).
29 It may not be without significance that Corbino himself came from 
a large, closely knit family, one hierarchically organized in the old 
style, replete with periodic gatherings of the whole clan at their 
original home in Sicily for consultation. See Epicarmo Corbino, 
op. cit. (n. 84), p%r.M772.
30 Some years later, in 1937, Fermi, Amaldi, and Rasetti began work 
on a Cockcroft-W alton type of accelerator, to get increased 
neutron intensity from the reaction. Shortly before Fermi left 
Italy, work began on constructing a i.i  Mev proton accelerator at 
the Istituto Superiore di Sanita, but it was far from operational in 
December 1938.
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131 Segre, AIP interview, p. 8.
132 Ibid., p. to.
133 Similarly, one hears regrets about Fermi's distance and isolation 
with respect to cooperation with industrial enterprises and applied 
research to the possible detriment of Italian industry. On this point 
it would seem that Fermi's involvement with industry -  for example, 
in connection with the construction of the m Mev accelerator-  
was on the rise during the period immediately before his virtually 
enforced departure, and it could well have become stronger if 
history had not prevented it.
134 Angelli Foundation Symposium, Torino, 1973, published in F. 
Cavazza and S. R. Graubard, eds., 7/ Caro /ta/iawo (Milan: Gar- 
zanti, 1974).
133 OECD, Report No. 23.^37 (Paris: OECD, 1969).
136 Ibid., p. 20. Ben-David has confirmed this finding by observing 
that expenditure on research and development in Italy was 0.6 per­
cent of the gross national product-a half or less of most others, 
with only Austria standing at the lower place than Italy (Ben- 
David, op. cit. (n. 113), p. 164.
137 OECD, op. cit., p. 2t.
138 Ibid., p. 46.
139 Ibid., p. 38.
140 Ibid., p. 99.
14: Ibid., p. to6. However, some qualified observers in Italy have 
thought that this statement, and indeed the whole tenor of the 
OECD report, was somewhat more negative than a lengthier study 
would have warranted.
142 Ibid., p. 140.
143 I wish to acknowledge the generous help and support extended to 
me by Dr. Fabio Cavazza of the Agnelli Foundation and his col­
leagues, in arranging archival searches and obtaining documents. 
Much important material was found with their help, and will con­
tinue to be used in work on the same topic, by both myself and my 
students.
A large number of unpublished interviews with scientists and 
others close to Fermi and his colleagues were conducted under my 
general direction by a team headed by John Kemeny and Donald 
Brittain, in connection with making a documentary film on the life 
and work of Enrico Fermi, as part of the Project Physics Course 
development (n. 13). That part of the work was supported by 
funds from the Ford Foundation, and the analysis of those inter­
views was supported by a grant from the Section for the History 
and Philosophy of Science of the National Science Foundation. 
The transcripts of these interviews -  including interviews with 
E. Amaldi, U. Fano, L. Fermi, E. Fubini, F. Rasetti, Bruno Rossi, 
E. Segre, as well as most non-Italian chief collaborators and students
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of F erm i-are in my custody at the Jefferson Physical Laboratory, 
Harvard University, and copies have been deposited at the Center 
for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics (A IP) 
in N ew  York.
Another series of more extensive interviews, conducted chiefly 
by Charles Weiner with Amaldi, Beck, Cockcroft, Frisch, Gold- 
haber, Occhialini, Segre, Wick, and others, is also on deposit at the 
Center for History of Physics at the AIP. They are referred to as 
AIP interviews. A third series of detailed interviews with Amaldi, 
Persico, Rasetti, and Segre, among others, conducted chiefly by 
T. S. Kuhn, are in the archives of Sources for the History of Quan­
tum Physics (referred to as SHQP), at the American Philosophical 
Society in Philadelphia, with copies at the other deposits of the 
SHQP project. The help extended to me by the directors and 
librarians of these archives is gratefully acknowledged -  as is that 
of many of the persons who knew and worked in Fermi's circle.
In this paper I have stressed the information in these largely un­
published but accessible interviews. Where possible I have cited 
them rather than the more widely available books. But the latter 
have of course not been neglected. Foremost among them are, 
naturally, the Co//cctC6? Papery of Ewr/co Fcrtwf (n. i), and the two 
biographies of Fermi, by Emilio Segre (n. i) and Laura Fermi 
(n. 16).
I profited from the three lectures by Edoardo Amaldi on "Rec­
ollection of Research," given at Varenna (n. 43). The basic 
physics of the work discussed in this article is authoritatively dis­
cussed in two publications: One is Franco Rasetti, E/ewcMty of 
N^c/car PEyrzcy (New York: Prentice-Hall 1936), English edition 
of F. Rasetti's /I Nttc/eo Ttcwzico (Bologna: Zanichelli 1936), 
which gives an interesting contemporaneous view. The other, 
more extensive and written from a more recent vantage point, is 
the contribution by E. Amaldi, "Production and Slowing Down of 
Neutrons," in vol. 38, pt. II of the EhmtfEMcE tfer PEyyiE (n. 76).
Another basic resource is the book Exploring the PErfory of 
NMc/tw PEyyirr (n. 36). This is the record of two conferences of 
major participants in nuclear physics. Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
are useful surveys of data, original source materials, and other re­
sources for doing research on the history of nuclear physics. A set 
of essays on the discovery of the neutron and its consequences, 
which I arranged for presentation at the Tenth International Con­
gress of the History of Science at Ithaca, 1962, included the con­
tributions of Emilio Segre, E. M. Purcell, and S. Goudsmit (n. 18).
Use has been made of the archival collection of Enrico Fermi's 
own papers at the University of Chicago; of the archives and 
library of the Institute of Physics at the University of Rome; and 
of the archives of the Accademia dei Lincei.
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In addition to my own visits to archives, I was aiso enormously 
helped by Professor Giorgio Tabarroni of Modena. Through his 
intercession, we obtained valuable documentary material from the 
archives of the Academy of Italy, the Archivio Centrale dello Stato, 
Rome, and other resources; these illuminated not only the work of 
the Fermi group, but also the early history and role of the Societa 
Italiana di Fisica and the Societa Italiana per il Progresso delle 
Scienze in the rise of physics in Italy. This material will continue 
to be of importance in our ongoing work on the history of the 
physical sciences in Italy. My thanks are also due to Dr. Tullio 
Derenzini of the Domus Galilaeana in Pisa, where laboratory note­
books and other documents of the Fermi group are kept and were 
made accessible to me.
Edoardo Amaldi, Laura Fermi, Emilio Scgre, Bruno Rossi, and 
Charles Weiner read a draft of the paper and advised me on it. 
I was also helped by discussions with Barbara Buck, David J. 
Taylor, and Kenneth Swartz.
<L C%72 Pc y/yctm/rcJ?
: Scz'cMce P/d/'caMn' / <772; Report of tPc Nat/'otM/ Science Board 
73774 (Washington, D.C.: National Science Board [NSB], National 
Science Foundation [NSF], [973) (hereafter cited as 5 d. 7.2). 
Obtainable from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402; Stock Number 
3800-00146. The report was the fifth in a series of annual reports to 
the President and to Congress, as mandated by Congress in its tp68 
amendment of the National Science Foundation Statute (Public 
Law 90-407).
The congressional charge to the board was that the report focus 
on "the status and health of science and its various disciplines 
[including] an assessment of such matters as national scientific re­
sources . . . progress in selected areas of basic scientific research, 
and an indication of those aspects of such progress which might be 
applied to the needs of American society." As quoted by Norman 
Hackerman, Chairman of the NSB, in U.S. Congress, AfM.sMTiMg 
a77d Evg/Mat;*72g tPe RetMftr of Federally SMpported RereareP a??d 
DeveIop7Me77t, Science Output Indicators -  Part I, Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Plan­
ning and Analysis, Committee on Science and Technology, 94th 
Cong., 2nd sess.; House, 19 and 26 May 1976 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 7.
The intention to issue such science indicator reports every second 
year may now be modified by the plan to absorb such information 
in the projected annual science and technology reports of the new 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).
?<? p p .  / p p - 2 0 2 34 9
2 S.7. 7^, p. iii.
3 Scfcwoc 7974: 77cport of the NatioM<tf Science Bojr7
2973* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, ^73) 
(hereafter cited as S.7 . 74). For sate by the Superintendent of Docu­
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402; 
Stock Number 038-000-00233-8.
4 Reiease by the Office of the White House Press Secretary, Febru­
ary 23, [976.
3 S.7 . 7 ,^ p. vii.
6 7 Te IVcto ForZ* 7 'w/ct, !4 March, 1976, front page.
7 Hackerman, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 8.
8 Ibid., p. 19. See also Scfewce 19] (March 12, :973): <033.
9 The NSB has in fact invited such efforts and has, through NSF 
grants, aiready assisted severai studies (e.g., in "limitations to 
scientific iiterature citations, investment in innovation, technology 
transfer, economics of publishing scientific literature, social indi­
cator utilization by executives, international scientific activities, and 
many others") (Roger W. Heyns in the hearing cited in n. 1).
It is also significant that S.7 . 74, p. viii, expresses appreciation for 
the convening of an invitational seminar, cosponsored by the NSF, 
at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at 
Stanford, California, centering on the 3 .7 . 7a volume. The papers 
given there are being published in a book entitled Tottw 7  Metric 
of Science, edited by Y. Elkana, J. Lederberg, R. K. Merton, 
A. Thackray, and H. Zuckerman (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 
scheduled for 1977). The present paper is based on an earlier, 
briefer version given at that meeting; I wish to acknowledge grate­
fully helpful comments by the editors of that volume, by S. D. Ellis, 
C. S. Gillmor, N. J. Smelser, and B. A. Stein, as well as partial 
support for research by a grant from the National Science Founda­
tion.
Among other efforts devoted to the same end is the establishment 
by the Social Science Research Council of a Subcommittee on 
Science Indicators under the Advisory Committee on Social Indica­
tors. Its long-range objectives were announced to be "to advance 
the quantitative description and analysis of science as a social phe­
nomenon and to improve the empirical base for science policy." 
See Social Science ReyearcT? CoMwcii /t<?7w 30, no. i (March 1976): 9.
It is also relevant that even in the original planning in the NSB 
which led to the first Science 7w7 foatory volume, one of the major 
purposes was "to stimulate social scientists' interest" in this area 
(Roger W. Heyns, p. to in the hearing cited in n. 1).
o Albert Einstein, "Ernst Mach," Zcits'cbrift, 17 ([916):
2.
t A recent example is the discussion in population biology concerning 
the relative merits of special "tactical" models with scaled graphs, 
and abstract "strategic" models with scaleless diagrams. Cf. R. M.
t o  p p .  2 0 ^ - 0 ^3 f o
May, "Review of 'The Mathematical Theory of the Dynamics of 
Biological Populations,"' Science 183 (March 22, 1974): ti88-89; 
and R. Mitcheii and R. M. May, Letters to the Editor, Science 184 
(June 14, 1974): 1:31.
12 Lynn White, "Technology Assessment from the Standpoint of a
Medieval Historian," Twericaw Historical Revievc 79 (1974): 3.
13 Harvey Brooks, "The Physicai Sciences: BeHwether of Science 
Policy," in J. A. Shannon, ed., ScieMce a?zzi tAe Evo/MtioM of PtyHic 
Po/icy (New York: Rockefeiier University Press, 1973), p. <23-
14 Based on an idea suggested in private conversation by E. M. Purceii.
13 See, for exampie, H. Inhaber and K. Przednowek, "Quality of
Research and the Nobel Prizes," Social StMdies of -Scz'cwre 6 (1976): 
33-30; and Harriet Zuckerman, Sciettti/ic Elite (New York: The 
Free Press, 1977).
:6 Hackerman, op. cit. (n. t), p. 13. See also S.7 . 7.2, p. 7, which re­
ports that "an effort was made to estimate the relative 'quality' or 
'significance' of the literature" by calculating the average number 
of citations per published article in selected fields for different 
countries. The result was the "upbeat" conclusion that the United 
States ranked first by a large margin in physics and geophysics, 
molecular biology, systematic biology, psychology, engineering, 
and economics; higher than all others except the USSR, by a 
relatively narrow margin, in mathematics; and second only to the 
USSR, by about the same narrow margin, in chemistry and metal- 
lurgy. In S.7 . 74 the results are not very different, except that eco­
nomics was dropped, and the USSR now was first in both mathe­
matics and chemistry.
17 On the last page of S.7 . 74, one member of the NSB, in "Supple­
mentary Comments," spelled out his dissatisfaction on these points. 
He noted that scientists in the USSR have in most fields by far the 
highest self-citation index; that a small-scale, high-quality effort 
such as that in certain fields in France would be swamped in a 
citation index; and that in some countries the editorial and space 
limitations on publications allow little room for citations.
:8 S.7 . 74, p. to6. The innovations themselves "were selected by an 
international panel of experts who rated the innovations based on 
their technological, economic, and social importance" (Hackerman, 
op. cit. [n. :], p. :6).
19 L. J. Anthony et ah, Reports OM Progress zw 7 'Aysics 32 (1969), 
pt. II, pp. 764-63.
20 Cf. Statement of Robert Park at the May 26, 1976, hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Plan­
ning and Analysis, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. 
House of Representatives (cf. n. :).
2t In fact, the baseline for a great deal of "spectroscopy" (data on 
publication, funds, manpower, etc.) for the various subsections of 
fields was available in publications such as Physics w Perspective
N o t M  ?<? p p . 2 0 ^ - 7 2
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science, 1972) and 
F Ay net 2973 (New York: American Institute of Physics,
1973), but they were neither used nor even referred to biblio- 
graphicaHy in S.7 . 7.2, and iittie in S.Z. 74.
22 Y. Elkana, TBe Ditcovety of tPc Co/zjetv t^iozz of Energy (London: 
Hutchinson, 1974).
23 S./. 72, p. iii; emphasis supplied.
24 S/. 73, p. vii.
23 S./. 7a, p. 39.
26 A. C. Nixon, Letter to the Editor, Science 184 (June 7, [974): 
pp. 1028-30.
27 ILorP z*M T/zzericz?, Report of Special Task Lorce to the Secretary 
[Elliot Richardson], Department of Health, Education, and Wel­
fare (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), pp. 133-36.
28 Many other evidences point to a need for more detail in order to 
arrive at an accurate picture of the employment situation for 
scientists, especially in the 1970s. Unfortunately, the support for an 
annual science manpower survey, long provided by NSF, was dis­
continued some years ago just when the job crunch became notable, 
and professional societies had to assume the support to continue the 
enterprise just when many of them were least in a position to do so. 
Thus an American Institute of Physics (AIP) survey of new physi­
cists in the summer of 1972 (American Institute of Physics Publica­
tion No. R-207.3 [New York: American Institute of Physics, 
1972]) showed that of the Ph.D.'s who had graduated the year 
before, 7 to 8 percent were still seeking jobs, and an additional 
small percentage was changing professions. Among more recent 
graduates, :6 percent of the Ph.D.'s and 19 percent of the terminal 
M.A.'s were still seeking employment. Of the 1970-7: B.A. recip­
ients in physics surveyed by AIP in December [97: who did not go 
on to graduate work or into military service, "only 14 percent 
found jobs that make extensive use of the physics training received 
in college" (AIP Publication No. R-2M.3 [New York: American 
Institute of Physics, [972] ).
Similarly, a survey of the American Astronomical Society 
(Editorial, "Current Trends in Ph.D. Production and Employment 
Among Astronomers," BtziietiTt of tBe 7^zzeric3Z! HttroTzoz/zic i^ Soci­
ety 6, no. 2 [1974]: 233-34) made in 1973-74 showed unemploy­
ment was both serious and still rising. In the 1974-73 academic year, 
about 200 newly trained astronomers were vying for about 20 
faculty openings.
29 S.7 . 74 had more details on enrollments, although not on employ­
ment.
30 AIP, FByticr Al^zzporcer 7973 (New York: American Institute of 
Physics, 1973), p. 47. See also Netcrietter of tBe FotMtzz 072 FByricr 
awd Society 4, no. 1 (February 1973), published by AIP.
3: S.7 . 7a, p. vii.
f o  p p .
31 IFor% iw T 727eric^, op. cit. (n. 27), emphasis supptied. The "full 
empioyment" movement is evidently becoming stronger in the 
United States. See, for example, E. Ginzburg, ed., Manpower Goair 
for tiie TyttertMM Dwtvcr^cy, Report of tAe America?! 4^ rremPiy 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, [976).
33 .The "quality of life" of scientists and engineers, including that of 
the younger ones who did find new jobs or held on to makeshift 
arrangements in a distressed employment market, would also have 
been worth some attention. Fine-structure indicators can well be 
developed; for example, the American Institute of Physics Place­
ment Register of jobseeking physicists at the (Spring) American 
Physical Society meetings shows that the ratio of employees to 
registrants present had dropped to 0.07 for 1972, roughly one- 
seventh of what it had been six or seven years earlier.
It is significant that Chapter 6 of the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) report, PAyricr iw Perspective, vol. 1 (Washing­
ton, D.C. NAS-NRC, 1973), is entitled "The Consequences of 
Deteriorating Support" -  with a discussion of the decline of federal 
support for research in Chapters 4, 3, and :o; the effects "on the 
livelihood of highly trained people" is the subject of detailed data 
in chapter t2 (which is devoted to manpower).
I have used many examples from physics, although I am aware 
that this field was in some ways the one hardest hit by the deterior­
ation of science support from the late :960s on. My choice is 
necessitated chiefly by the fact that 1 am far more familiar with 
this field; but I agree with the remark on this point in the NAS 
report: "To a considerable degree, of course, these effects [of de­
teriorating support] apply to any field of scientific research and 
are not unique to physics. Although our discussion is rooted in 
physics, the problems we address have much broader relevance" 
(P^yricr iw Perspective, ibid., p. 432).
34 NSF, "Undergraduate Enrollments in Science and Engineering" 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 3, 
1972), NSF 71-42. More recently, the NSF has published the report, 
"Women and Minorities in Science and Engineering" (Washing­
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), NSF 77-304. 
This report relies largely on data supplied by the NSF's Manpower 
Characteristics System, which was instituted in July 1972 and be­
came fully operable in 1974.
33 B. Henderson, "Unemployment Among Scientists," Geotimer t6 
(September 197:): 16.
36 For the text of Malek's memoranda, see "New Federalism," Record 
of Hearings of Committee on Government Operations, House of 
Representatives, January 29, 1974. Also see 7 T<? Nevr Tor% Timer, 
13 August 1974.
37 A recent report by the National Board on Graduate Education 
pointed out that while the proportion of new Ph.D.'s having no
to pp. 353
specific job prospects rose from 4.5 percent in 1968 to 17.2 percent 
in 1973, the figures for new Ph.D.'s in English who had no job 
increased from 3.9 percent to n.$ percent during that period (TB<? 
New T07T Twter, 21 January 1976).
38 W. Heisenberg, PByricr twd BeyoTtd (New York: Harper & Row, 
1 9 7 1 ), PP- 62-63. In a ietter to this author, elaborating further on 
this account, Heisenberg referred to his Principle of Indeterminacy, 
formulated the year after this exchange with Einstein. Heisenberg 
noted wryly that the principle added a refinement to Einstein's 
dictum, for it tells what one M7372ot observe.
39 Harvey Brooks, "Models for Science Planning," PM /^ic
t7*atio7: Review 32 (May/June 1971): 367-68. According to R. 
Heyn's testimony (see the congressional hearing cited in n. :), the 
NSB had established an internal Committee on Science Indicators 
by 1971.
40 Brooks, op. cit., n. 13.
4: S.7 . 74, p. 7:. The level may be even lower if one uses the correct 
deflator for basic research, one that properly includes the increasing 
complexity of research tools and management. The NSF publication 
"A Price Index for Deflation of Academic R&D Expenditures" 
(NSF 72-3:0) shows that during the decade of 1960-70, the in­
creases in prices of academic research and development were con­
siderably higher than price increases in the economy at large. They 
were as much as twice the rate given by the GNP deflator, even if 
little allowance is made for increases in R&D costs owing to in­
creases in complexity and sophistication of basic equipment.
42 Hackerman, op. cit. (note i),p . 13.
43 Imre Lakatos, "Review of S. Toulmin's HM77M72 Lbzder.s'tfwd/H.g," 
Tf;'72e7"va [4 (Spring 1976): 128-29.
44 Brooks, op. cit. (n. 13), p. t27-
43 This section was dropped in S.7 . 74, although some of the old sub­
sections are included in the new section "Industrial R&D and 
Innovation."
46 Here, too, fine structure is of interest. The American Physical 
Society (APS) and the American Association of Physics Teachers 
are both essential societies with somewhat overlapping memberships 
and mandates; but the latter has for some years been on the verge 
of financial disaster, while the former has enjoyed a handsome 
income (total net income for 1972 was $400,000; for 1973, $244,000; 
the accumulated Income and Reserve Fund of the APS stood at 
$2.38 million at the end of 1973). See "Summary of American 
Physical Society Income and Expense," BMBetm of tBe 
PByricai Society 19, ser. 2 (November 1974): 1069-71.
47 The distinction is suggested by Arnold Thackray, "Measurements 
in the Historiography of Science," paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the AAAS in Boston, February 1976.
48 S.f. 7a, p. 73.
354 M pp. 22^-2^
4 9 ^  ?-72, p. 84.
yoS.7 . 72^.17.
y t The issue of Review 4^7^'tracfr being analyzed here is
voi. 5, no. 1$, August t, 1974. As an aside to citation-index scholars, 
I note that under the masthead is the injunction: "This journal is 
not to be cited."
52 S./. 7 4 , P- 8.
53 S.7 . 7a, pp. ay and 111.
y4 S.7 . 72, p. 26. The field of educational research would also benefit 
from the development of gzM/itative indicators of the research 
being performed.
yy S.7 . 72, p. 8y.
y6 S.7 . 72, p. 88; see also the list of fifteen suggested "currently or 
potentially important graduate educational changes," on p. 93.
y7 S.7 . 72, pp. 97, 98. In S.7 . 74 the results are slightly more positive 
toward science. On the subject of simultaneously held but contrary 
public opinions about science, see the essays by A. Etzioni and 
Clyde Nunn and by Dorothy Nelkin in G. Holton and W. Blan- 
pied, eds., Science aw(4 fry PM^hc: 7 7 .:e CAwg/'wg ReAm'owTu'p 
(Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1976).
y8 S.7 . 72, pp. 88, 90 and 91.
5 9  S-?' 7 ,^ P- 9 2 -
do For example, Natiowa/ HyycrwtcKt of E&tcRtioTMf Progrcyy, .S'c/cwce 
RctM/M (Education Commission of the States, Denver, Colorado, 
1970 and after).
6: Even if all app/?'e<7 research support by NSF is included, the y per­
cent figure rises only to 8'A percent. This and similarly disturbing 
data are in the report %7Z6f Be/Mrwra/ Science Prograwy
:*7! tPe NatfoMaf Science Potwdatiow (Washington, D.C.: NAS- 
NRC, 1976). For example, the report points out that nearly 24 
percent of the nation's scientists are engaged in basic research in 
these fields, but that they receive only about "one-third as much 
support as those in other sciences" (p. [4).
62 For example: Are not the existing divisions of science and of cur­
rent candidates for financing taken too much for granted, so that 
research in agriculture and nutrition, fundamental learning theory, 
or certain aspects of energy research continue to receive less atten­
tion than they need? Should one not try to find indicators of how 
large a fraction of scientific research is being done on small, "safe," 
and relatively unadventurous programs? If this is too large a frac­
tion, as I think would be found, may it not be argued that new 
institutions of funding are needed to encourage the kind of research 
more risky to the researcher's career, more long term and less likely 
to guarantee early results-and yet possibly far more important in 
terms of attending to areas of scientific ignorance perceived to be 
at the base of social problems? At this time, such research would 
have to be called "altruistic."
fo p. 35?
A listing of additional concerns might include the following: 
Were the expectations for more social science research support 
actually fulfilled on an adequate scale? How adequate do scientists 
think the current process is by which intended publications and 
research-support applications are reviewed? Should science indi­
cators be extended to cover also the fields which the NSF does not 
traditionally support? Would it be useful to include such indica­
tions of the general benefits of scientific research as the rapidly 
decreasing U.S. death rates for specific diseases, or the rise in the 
yields of specific crops? Cf. Nestor E. Terleckyj, .State of Seie/tce 
Aeiearc/i.' Some Near 7wt7fcatorr; T C/iart 7?oo  ^.S'Mruey (Wash­
ington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1976); and N. E. 
Terleckyj, 7 Te State of Sc/ewce awef ReicarNi; Some Netc /weh- 
caton* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, in press).
63 An example of the dubious use of support data is the finding in 
Figure 4-14 (S.7 . 74, p. 101) that the share of the "major innova­
tions" in the United States has been by far the lowest, and con­
stantly dropping since 1933, for the group of those companies that 
have 3,000 to 9,999 employees (now down to a mere 3 percent of 
the major innovations), whereas it has been by far the largest, and 
constantly rising, for the group of companies having 10,000 em­
ployees or more (now about 43 percent). However, if one calcu­
lates the ratio of Innovations per Employee (7 /E ), the picture looks 
very different, as indicated by these figures (kindly made available 
to me by Barry Stein):
7/E 7 /E
Employment size of firm (all industry) (manufacturing 
industry only)
1-99 4.3 ( X  t o - 6 ) 21.4 ( X  1 0 * 6 )
IOO-999 10.4 ( X  : o * 6 ) 18.3 ( X  t o - " )
1 ,0 0 0 - 9 ,9 9 9 9.2 ( X  t o * " ) t2 .9 ( X  1 0 * 6 )
>  10,000 9.3 ( X  1 0 - 6 ) n . 8  ( X  t o * 6 )
(Data for Employees (E) from GcMcra/ Report ow /udMitria/ Orga- 
wfzatioMr, 73)^ 7, Part 7, Census Bureau; omits CAOs and support 
[nonproductive activities]. Data for Innovations (7 ) from final re­
port by Gellman Research Associates, Inc., iTttfz'catorr of IwterTM- 
tioMal Tr<???t7f fw Tec/mo/ogicaf iMyzovatiow [Jenkintown, Pa.: Gell­
man Research Assoc., April 1976], cited as the source of the data 
on Innovations in S.7 . 74 itself.) Thus, far from supporting the 
simple but erroneous conclusion one might draw from S.7 . 74 that 
major innovations are correlated with large company size, the data 
when properly presented point to a very different conclusion -  as 
has been previously shown by the work of J. Jewkes, J. Smookler,
3 ? ^
and others. See Barry A. Stein, Size, Efficiency, a??d C<?7W^ mzity 
EntcrprEe (Cambridge, Mass.: Center of Community Economic 
Development, [974), ch. 2, particularly pp. 31-37, and the bibliog­
raphy given by E. Layton, "Conditions of Technological Develop­
ment," in 1. Spiegel-Rosing and D. deS. Price, eds., Science, Tech­
nology Society (London and Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publica­
tions, 1977), esp. pp. 214-2:3. Layton also gives a concise account 
(pp. 206-209) °f the ideological and professional shortcomings that 
doomed Project Hindsight.
C^ %p?er 7. Ow prycPo/ogy of ici'enTiT,
4*77^  tPeir iocidf co/tcer/ty
: This chapter is condensed from an essay entitled "Scientific 
Optimism and Societal Concerns: A Note on the Psychology of 
Scientists," which appeared in Marc Lappe and Robert Morison, 
eds., Ethical and Scientific /t.fMc.: Potcd hy Hnntan Dyer of MolccH- 
iar Gcneticr, vol. 263 of the Tnnalt of the New York Academy of 
Sciences (December 1973). The essay was based on a paper de­
livered at the Conference on Ethical and Scientific Issues Posed by 
Human Uses of Molecular Genetics, organized by the New York 
Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the 
Life Sciences; the latter organization published a version of the 
paper in The Hartingy Center Report (December 1973), 3: 39-47.
I am happy to acknowledge partial support of a National Science 
Foundation grant for research on which this chapter is based, as 
well as helpful comments on an earlier draft by Jonathan Cole, 
David C. McClelland, Anne Roe, and Vivien Shelanski.
2 A. Einstein, "Motiv des Forschens," republished in English transla­
tion in Sonja Bargmann, trans. and rev., Meet and Opinion.: of 
Albert Einttcin (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1934), 
pp. 224-27. The somewhat revised translation used here is from 
G. Holton, The77?atic Origins of Scientific 7 ToMgf:t.* Eepier to 
Einrtei73 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 
pp. 376-78 (hereafter cited as 7Te77Mtic Origins).
3 An implied claim of moral superiority of the scientist engaged in 
pure research without direct commercial applications can be dis­
cerned in other confessions of this sort. Thus, writing about the 
university physicist, a scientist in the :920s said, "Financially his lot 
is not a wealthy one, nor socially is he high . . . [but close] to 
nature and by it closer and closer every day to the Almighty God 
who made him, what matters it to the physicist if the days be dull 
or neighboring man uncouth? His soul is more or less aloof from 
mortal strife" (R. Hamer, Science 6: ^923]: :o9-:o; quoted by 
S. Weart, Natnre 262 [July :, :976]: :3).
3 3 7
 ^ B. Kutznetsov, "Nonclassical Science and the Phiiosophy of Opti­
mism," in R. McCormmach, ed., Hirtoricai StMtiiet in t/ae Pizyticai 
Sciences, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, [97$), 4: 
:pr-23!.
3 For example, G. Hoiton and W. A. Bianpied, eds., Science and itr 
Pniz/ic; 7 7 :;c Changing Re/atienrizip (Boston: D. Reidei Publishing 
Co., 1976); also the Newriettert of the Harvard University Program 
on Public Conceptions of Science (now the Netcrietter on Science, 
Tec/37M/ogy azzd iizzy/zazz FaiMet). Such ambivalence is characteristic 
not oniy of the pubiic. In its Bicentennial issue of Aprii 1973, 
Fortune magazine ran excerpts of an interview with the President 
of the United States in which he was quoted as saying (p. 80): 
"The System [of our government] seemed to be flexible enough 
and viabie enough to meet whatever the probiems were then, and I 
believe that the System is sufficiently adaptable today to meet the 
probiems that we are facing, either domesticaiiy or internationaiiy. 
The one thing that makes us a iittie less confident is the tremendous 
impact of science and technoiogy."
6 A. Szent-Gyorgyi, Hnterican /ozzrnai of Pity tier 43, no. 3 (:97s): 
427. The distinguished editor of the journal Science, Phitip H. 
Abeison, has drawn attention to an ironic consequence that causes 
interference even with the attempt of scientists to communicate 
among tizenzteivet.' "Feeiing their status threatened, and being de­
pendent on the support of others, scientists have increasingly talked 
of the need to increase the public understanding of science. The 
majority cannot even effectively convey scientific information to 
each other. This is true of verbal presentations, in which decade 
after decade most scientists use slides that cannot be read beyond 
the front row of the audience. This illustrates not only techno­
logical incompetence but, more seriously, a blind spot -  a failure to 
take into account the other person's requirements. In general, 
people who cannot or do not customarily analyze and respond to 
the needs of others cannot communicate" ("Communicating with 
the Publics," editorial, Science 194, no. 4263 [1976]: 363).
7 Marshall Bush, in an interesting essay, "Psychoanalysis and Scien­
tific Creativity," abridged and reprinted in Bernice T. Eiduson and 
Linda Beckman, eds., Science as a Career Choice (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), pp. 243-37-the whole book (here­
after cited as Science at a Career Choice) is an excellent source to 
which we shall often refer -  properly reminds us that the notion of 
a single entity called "the creative scientist" and of a "scientific life 
style" is not only suspicious from commonsense arguments but has 
been seriously challenged by research results. Still, he does find 
useful generalizations to hold. See also F. Barron, Creative Perron 
anti Creative Procett (New York: Holt, 1969), ch. 9.
8 B. T. Eiduson, "Psychological Aspects of Career Choice and
Nonas' M pp.
Development in the Research Scientist," in Science at a Career 
Choice, p. i$; italics supplied.
9 A. Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., 4^ /%ert 
Emrteiw.* PMowp^er-SciewtMt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1959) 'P- 8t-
o D. C. McClelland, "On the Psychodynamics of Creative Physical 
Scientists" (1962), reproduced in abridged form in Sciewce at a 
Career Choice, pp. 187-93. The quotations are from pp. 188 and 
189, respectively.
: Eiduson, op. cit. (n. 8), p. 17. In the same volume, Robert K. 
Merton's essay "Behavioral Patterns of Scientists" (1969) (abridged 
and reprinted on pp. 6o :-n ), makes a point that may well parallel 
this change toward less interpersonal conflict: "Among the multi­
tude of multiple discoveries in the history of science, Elinor Barber 
and I have examined a sample of two hundred and sixty-four in 
detail and have found, among other things, that there is a secular 
decline in the frequency with which multiples are an occasion for 
intense priority-conflicts. Of the thirty-six multiples before 1700 
that we have examined, ninety-two percent were strenuously con­
tested; the figure drops to seventy-two percent in the eighteenth 
century; remains at about the same level in the first half of the 
nineteenth century and declines to fifty-nine percent in the second 
half, reaching the lowest level of thirty-three percent in the first 
half of this century. Perhaps the culture of science today is not so 
pathogenic as it once was" (p. 606).
2 The only trait not fully matched in the list given earlier is Fermi's 
"familial" and close personal relations with those who worked with 
him (see Chapter 7). Even with respect to scientists who did not 
belong to this close group of co-workers, the applicability of David 
McClelland's description to this case can be documented.
3 L. S. Kubie, "Some Unresolved Problems of the Scientific Career,"
ScieMfirt 4: (1953): 396-6:3, and 42 (1934): 104-12. See 
also L. S. Kubie, "The Fostering of Creative Scientific Produc­
tivity," Ddeddlm9: (1962): 304 ff.
4 For example, in David Shapiro, Neurotic Sfy/er (New York: Basic 
Books, 1963), as cited in D. J. Taylor, "Enrico Fermi: the Psy­
chology of Scientific Style" (unpublished doctoral thesis, Yale 
University School of Medicine, 1973). Taylor asks the interesting 
question why there have been so few psychoanalytic studies on 
scientists ever since Sigmund Freud's theories of neurosis.
He notes that Freud published studies of many creative persons -  
philosophers, artists, writers-but never of a scientist other than 
himself (though the work on Leonardo perhaps came close); more­
over, the work of those who followed Freud has had largely the 
same bias. It may well be because science, of which Freud thought 
psychoanalysis to be a special example, was considered by Freud
Nofcy ?<? pp. 3?9
to be endowed with "impersonal" objectivity and therefore that 
there was a relative paucity of emotional goals and of fantasies in 
the work of scientists. Oniy in fields would the subjectivity
of the creators show itself sufficiently for them to be interesting 
subjects for scientific (i.e., psychoanalytic) studies.
Ironically, the claims of psychoanalysis to scientific status were 
long denied by other scientists. Einstein, for one, was quite skep­
tical; see his exchanges with Freud, for example, in O. Nathan and 
H. Norden, eds., EiwtZciw ow Peace (New York: Schocken Books, 
i960), pp. 185-88. The reluctance of scientists to this day, by and 
large, to take interest in the psychological study of the scientific 
imagination itself is also relevant.
5 E. Durkheim, 7 Te RMfer <?f Sociological Afet/iotf (Glencoe, 111.: 
The Free Press, 1950; originally 1895), p. 104.
6 Anne Roe, 7 Te AfaHwg of a ScicMift (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Co., 1952).
7 I have discussed the coherence of intellect and character in the case 
of highly achieving scientists in Chapter 10 of 7TiC77Mtic Origin. 
Many of the findings of Roe (n. 16) are of course parallel to others, 
made over the years. Compare, for example, Francis Galton's pas­
sage in Hereditary GewiMt (New York: Macmillan, 1869), p. 33: 
"By natural ability, I mean those qualities of intellect and disposi­
tion, which urge and qualify a man to perform acts that lead to 
reputation. I do not mean capacity without zeal, nor zeal without 
capacity, nor even a combination of both of them, without an ade­
quate power of doing a great deal of very laborious work. But I 
mean a nature which, when left to itself, will, urged by an inherent 
stimulus, climb the path that leads to eminence and has strength to 
reach the summit -  on which, if hindered or thwarted, will fret and 
strive until the hindrance is overcome, and it is again free to follow 
its labouring instinct."
8 Thus Roe (n. 16) notes that, whatever the reason, the people who 
"become physical and biological scientists early found special inter­
est and special satisfactions away from personal relations." It is 
reminiscent of the famous passage in Einstein's z/toipo graphical 
Notcr, concerning his own childhood and early adolescence: "It is 
quite clear to me that the religious paradise of youth, which was 
thus lost [at the age of twelve], was a first attempt to free myself 
from the claims of the 'merely-personal,' from an existence which 
is dominated by wishes, hopes and primitive feelings. Out yonder 
there was this huge world, which exists independently of us human 
beings and which stands before us like a great, eternal riddle, at 
least partially accessible to our inspection and thinking. The con­
templation of this world beckoned like a liberation, and I soon 
noticed that many a man whom I had learned to esteem and to 
admire had found inner freedom and security in devoted occupation
Nofey p. 2 ^^60
with it. The mentai grasp of this extra-personal worid within the 
frame of the given possibiiities swam as highest aim haif consciousiy 
and half unconsciously before my mind's eye" (A. Einstein, in 
Schilpp, op. cit. [n. 9], p. 5).
I have discussed the methodological themes of projection (or ex- 
ternaiization) and retrojection (or internalization) in the essay 
"Thematic and Stylistic Interdependence" (particularly pp. 101- 
12), in T&WMtic Or/'giwy.
19 Additional support was provided later from the Project TALENT 
data bank, computed in 1968. For example, those whose occupa­
tional goals (measured at age twenty-three) were in the sciences 
had shown, when the variable was measured at age eighteen, to test 
markedly low on the measure "desire to serve the public." The 
mean quartile rank (with all scores based on a i to 4 classification, 
where 1 corresponds to the lowest quartile, and 4 to the highest), 
were as follows for selected sciences: physics, 1.69; mathematics, 
2.12; chemistry, 2.09; engineering, 2.17; computer science, 2.06; 
biological sciences, 2.02; medicine, 2.53. By comparison, some scores 
from outside the physical and biological sciences are as follows: 
business administration, 2.48; psychology, 2.76; social sciences, 2.22; 
law, 3.08; arts and humanities, 2.37 (from PPyricr TEwpotwr 196^  
[New York: American Institute of Physics, 1969], p. 4:).
See also M. Bush, in .Science at a Career Choice, pp. 244-43; 
J. A. Chambers, in Science at a Career Choice, p. 330; and M. J. 
Moravcsik, "Motivation of Physicists," P/iyt/'ct ToAty 20 (October 
1 9 7 5 )' 9 - The results of his survey, Moravcsik writes, "can be 
summarized by stating that the Mtertta/ motivations (satisfaction 
from learning, release of curiosity, conversion of talent, and satis­
faction from discovery) play a considerably more important role 
than the external motivations (priority, peer recognition, compe­
tition, prestige, influence, finances, or social service)."
20 Anne Roe, 'FPe PtycPo/ogy of OccMptitiew (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1936), p. 319. See also the research results in Anne 
Roe and Marvin Siegelman, 7 Te Origin of /wteretti, American 
Personnel and Guidance Association Inquiry Study No. 1 (Wash­
ington, D.C.: APGA, 1964), particularly pp. 3-7, 43, 64-67.
21 W. W. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes, PreA'cting Dcce/opwent of 
ToMMg ydAt/ti, Project TALENT, 3-year Follow-up Studies, In­
terim Report 3 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Project TALENT, American 
Institutes for Research, and Pittsburgh: School of Education, Uni­
versity of Pittsburgh, 1968).
Though warning that sharp predictability is seldom obtained, 
that "all predictions of occupational choice are necessarily proba­
bilistic," and that "personality is only one broad factor in the de­
cisions made at any occupational choice point," Roe, in another 
study, found that we are dealing with significant and deep-going
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relations between personality traits and career choices: "The as­
sumption that there are differences in various aspects of personality 
between those following different occupations has been upheld 
whenever it has been subjected to research." See Anne Roe, "Per­
sonality Structure and Occupational Behavior," in H. Borow, ed., 
Af#73 ;'?z a tEorM at ITor^ (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, ^64), 
p. m .
22 Cooley and Lohnes, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 4.23.
23 Cooley and Lohnes, ibid., p. 4.44. The cited passage has further 
references to supporting work, that is, that of Roe and Siegelman, 
op. cit. (n. 20); Cooley, op. cit. (n. 27); and D. E. Super et al., 
The Pryrho/ogy of Careers (New York: Harper & Row, 1937).
A schematic "career development tree" derived by Cooley and 
Lohnes from the Project TALENT data for boys is given on 
p. 4.37 in Cooley and Lohnes. It shows that 36 percent of the male 
children make the initial "thing" (or "science-technology") choice 
by early junior high school. After many other branchings (e.g., 
college versus noncollege) this has led, five years after high school, 
to the following choices: 1.0 percent-biomedical researchers, phy­
sicians; 2.3 percent-dentists, pharmacists, biologists; 0.9 percent-  
research scientists, mathematicians; 7.3 percent-applied scientists, 
engineers; 13.0 per cent-skilled and technical workers; and 9.2 
percent-miscellaneous, and laborers.
Of the 44 percent who made the early "people" choice, the career 
choices five years after high school have yielded the following: 
3.2 percent of the total original sample -  lawyers, social scientists; 
t2.2 percent-counselors, teachers, welfare workers, artists, musi­
cians; 1.4 percent-managers, executives; to.t percent-businessmen, 
auditors; 18.6 percent-accountants, office equipment operators, 
salesmen; 16.6 percent-clerks, office and service workers.
R. B. Cattell and J. E. Drevdahl, in "A Comparison of the Per­
sonality Profile (t6P.F.) of Eminent Researchers with That of 
Eminent Teachers and Administrators, and of the General Popula­
tion" (1933), abridged and reprinted in Science at a Career Choice, 
p. 178, broaden the dichotomy to "things a??(f ideas" versus "people." 
They add, concerning their results of measurements of the psycho­
logical and social operations of personality factors on research 
scientists, "It is easy to see that the schizothymic preoccupation 
with things and ideas, rather than people; the self-sufficiency which 
favors creativity and independence of mind; the dominance which 
gives satisfaction in mastery of nature for its own sake; and the 
emotional instability which permits radical restructuring and 
creativity, would all be vital to the best kind of basic research 
performance -  though perhaps unpleasant in an administrator and 
inapt in a businessman."
24 J. A. Davis, Cw^ergra^Mate Career Deemowr (Chicago: Aldine
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Publishing Co., 1963), especiaMy pp. 10-13, 30*63, 132-39, [32-63. 
See also, for example, Bernice T. Eiduson, Sr/'eMfMtr, T^eir PtycAo- 
/ogicz!/ BEorM (New York: Basic Books, 1962). Her story of forty 
research scientists reports their "chief interest in chitdhood" in 
descending order as foiiows: reading, 33; science, 23; sports, 22; 
artistic, 16; mechanicai, 7; sociai, 4.
Among other publications, the foHowing contain interesting 
work atong similar iines: Robert S. Aibert, "Toward a Behaviorat 
Definition of Genius," Prycbo/ogirt 30 ([973): 140-31
(inciudes a good bibliography); Charles C. GiUispie, "Remarks on 
Social Selection as a Factor in the Progressiveness of Science," 
.Sczewtitt 36 (1968): 439-30; Howard E. Gruber, Glenn 
Terrell, and Michael Wertheimer, eds., CcwtewpOTwy 
to Creative THw^wg (New York: Atherton Press, [962), especially 
the essay by Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert A. Simon, "The 
Processes of Creative Thinking," pp. 63-119; Liam Hudson, Con­
trary /wagiTMtiow (London: Pelican, 1966); Ian 1 . Mitroff, 7 Te 
SM&yective SzWe of Science (Amsterdam: Elsevier, [974); Ian 1 . 
Mitroff and Ralph H. Kilman, "On Evaluating Scientific Research: 
The Contribution of the Psychology of Science," Technological 
Forecasting anti Sociai Change 8 (1973): [63-74; Michael Mulkay, 
"Some Aspects of Cultural Growth in the Natural Sciences," 
Sociai Research 36 ([969): 22-32; and Barry F. Singer, "Toward a 
Psychology of Science," ^nzerican Psychologist 26 ([97^: [0[o-[3 
(includes a good bibliography).
23 At least a brief remark is needed here on the deeper reasons for the 
existence of the "people/thing" split. It seems to me based in the 
Cartesian subject/object split, and may be among the earliest the­
matic antitheses with which the growing child must struggle. This 
is supported also in Freud's evolutionist view of recapitulatory 
development. Possibly influenced by the Comtean tradition, Freud 
saw the evolution of human views of the universe, historically and 
individually, as a three-stage sequence: e.g., in Tote?M awt? Tahoo 
(tp[2): ". . . the phase would correspond to narcissism
both chronologically and in its content; the rc/ig/'cMt phase would 
correspond to the state of object-choice of which the characteristic 
is a child's attachment to his parents; while the tciewtzYic phase 
would have an exact counterpart in the stage at which an individual 
has reached maturity, has renounced the pleasure principle, adjusted 
himself to reality and turned to the external world for the object 
of his desires."
In the development of the future scientist there may thus occur 
a more pronounced externalization, and hence a more pronounced 
Cartesian split, than in the development of nonscientists. Cf. Philip 
Rieff, "Freud and the Authority of the Past," in R. J. Lifton and 
E. Olsen, eds., Exp/oratiow ?'w Pryc^oHytory (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, [973), pp. 8t-82.
26 Cf. W. O. Hagstrom, 7 7 ic Scf<?Mtf/ic C<27/2WMMfty (New York: 
Basic Books, 196$).
27 W. W. Cooley, Career Deve/op7Me77t of SefeTitfitr; Tw Overfappi7!g 
EoTigf^dwaf Stuefy, Cooperative Retearc/j Project No. 436 (Cam­
bridge: Graduate Schooi of Education, Harvard University, 1963).
28 See, for exampie, the discussion in Bernice T. Eiduson, "Scientists 
as Advisors and Consultants in Washington," Scierzce atztf PttNic 
Tffa/'rt, BMPetw of tPe Htowic Sciewtirtr 22 (1966): 26-31. She cites 
a typical reaction of a scientist to the "Washington Experience": 
"I was becoming a government committee figure. I was ready big 
business. I found myseif doing unpleasant things with peopie I de­
spised and even before I knew it, f was finding myseif trying to 
rival them. Then I realized I was ready seding out my soui to them; 
and that if I were going to do this, I might as wed go into the 
Hollywood business, or do something else that would be more 
interesting and profitable.
"This attitude came to me one day when, at a committee meet­
ing . . .  a man leaned over the table, and said to me, 'Is this what 
we went to college for?' I felt nauseous, and almost had a blackout, 
and decided to get out right then and there . . . It's an emotionally 
revolting and emotionally draining experience, and I've done my 
duty."
29 J. Primack and F. von Hippel, Tdvice a777  DAfeTz; (New York: 
Basic Books, 1974).
30 Philip Boffey, TTe Pram /Hup of H77zer;'ca (New York: McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 1973).
31 The term "introversion" may be confusing; for Freud, for example, 
the introvert is on the way to neurosis "if he does not find other 
outlets for his pent-up libido" (Freud, GeTieraf /MtrocfMCtioM to 
PrycPcwM/ytM; 1920). As H. J. Eysenck uses the term, for example, 
in TPc .S'true Mire of Httwaw Periowa/ity (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1933), the conception of introversion-extraversion is a dimen­
sion considered to be orthogonal to one called neuroticism. Cooley 
finds the lower scores on the PSPs on "persuasive interests" signifi­
cant of introversion; the low scores on "social interests" are not 
thought to be so significant by Cooley.
Cooley and Lohnes, op. cit. (n. 11), p. 2.7, note that "science- 
oriented scholasticism" (a function combining the motives of scho­
lastic interest, science interest, mathematical ability, and verbal 
knowledge which they hold to be "the major explanatory and 
predictive personality function in our theory of the antecedents of 
adult development") is positively correlated with the motive-domain 
factor "introspection" (rather than introversion)-although more 
for boys than girls -  and negatively with "sociability" -  though 
more for girls than for boys. See also pp. 2.4 and 4.74.
32 Cooley, op. cit. (n. 27), p. 108.
33 Albert Einstein, in Meat a7?J OpmfoTZt (n. 2), p. 9.
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34 Cooley, op. cit. (n. 27), pp. ^3-14.
33 The only proper "test" wiM always be wise and compassionate 
actions rather than the score on some "ethics readiness" test. One 
cannot, for example, shake off the suspicion that the persons in 
Nixon's White House who brought this nation to the brink of 
disaster, with their pubtic relations, iaw, and other such back­
grounds, would have scored quite weii on tests concerned with 
"sociabiiity," "extraversion," and others on which scientists as a 
group do poorly. Conversety, in their eariy years, a Leo Szilard, a 
James Franck, or a Nieis Bohr wouid quite possibly have produced 
a iow score on such a test.
36 See the discussion of the program in Chapter tt. One of the studies 
showing that a conscious attempt to change erroneous, negative 
notions held about science by students can be built into a sound 
science program is in the discussion by A. Ahlgren and H. J. Wal- 
berg, "Changing Attitudes Toward Science Among Adolescents," 
Nature 243 ([973): [87-90. They conducted a survey of students 
in three different types of science courses that had been separately 
found to produce about the same final level of understanding of the 
conceptual scientific content. The courses differed markedly, how­
ever, in their attitudes to the epistemological, social, and other 
contexts of science in general and physics in particular. They found 
that the content and context of the science course "can have a 
marked effect on the student's view" of science, and that "on the 
basis of the test data on student attitudes" one can indeed hope to 
have "succeeded in restoring the social, humanitarian, and artistic 
aspects that had been lost" in other curricula (p. 189).
37 This is closely allied with Elting Morison's identification of a chief 
need for our educational efforts today, the "rational coordination 
of impulses and thought"; see E. Morison, fro7?z XMOtu-botc to 
Notchcrc.* 7 Te Det'c/opwewt of Twcricaw Technology (New 
York: Basic Books, 1974), particularly chs. i and 9.
38 f have intentionally not been dealing with "applied research" or 
"development," where existing scientific knowledge is put to use. 
The benefits one expects from these efforts is different from what 
one may expect from basic scientific research and researchers who 
are able to go beyond the barriers of current ignorance on funda­
mental matters.
39 See, for example, Dorothy S. Zinberg, "Education Through Science: 
The Early Stages of Career Development in Chemistry," Social 
StMcher of Science 6 (May 1976): 2:3-46. However, of her sample 
of students in a second-tier university in England, less than 10 per­
cent were headed for academic careers.
See also K. J. Gilmartin, D. H. McLaughlin, L. L. Wise, and 
R. J. Rossi, Deoelopwent of Scientific Careers; The High School 
Tearr (Palo Alto, Calif.: American Institutes for Research, '976,
Nofay fo pp.
Report AIR-48200). This is an extensive, TALENT-related study, 
with the intention to increase understanding of career guidance 
factors that affect the deveiopment of high school students' scien­
tific potential. Special attention was paid to women and minorities. 
The findings inciude: (1) More than three times as many female 
high school students in the 1975 sample as in the 1960 TALENT 
sampie were pianning science careers. (2) Students of oriental 
background showed the largest proportion of students planning 
science careers. (3) Only 12 percent of males and 6 percent of 
females who had planned a science career in i960 persisted in this 
plan over the subsequent twelve years. Over half of the women in 
science in 1972 -  twice the proportion for men -  had had nonscience 
career plans in high school in i960.
40 See H. Zuckcrman and J. R. Cole, "Women in American Science," 
Minerva 13 (1973): 82-102; and two useful earlier studies: Roe and 
Siegelman, op. cit., n. 20; and H. S. Astin, TPe fEonian Doctorate 
in Tmerica (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966), particu­
larly pp. 26-27, giving data on rates of marriage and divorce quite 
analogous to those found by Roe for male scientists. It would also 
be instructive to compare data from the United States with that 
from societies in which women in science have had a rather differ­
ent position, for example in France and in the USSR.
41 Cooley and Lohnes, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 1.29, 4.42. See also p. 4.48. 
The bias among high school counselors to define science as a 
"man's job," and the consequent problems raised for female 
students, are discussed in a study presented in FTS [Federation of 
Tmericaw Scientiyty] Profcrriowaf Pziiictiw, no. 2 (October 1 9 7 3 ).
42 Factory /w/iMencin  ^ zLe Science Career Piany of Ffi'gF School 
Sfztdenty (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University, June 1973), 
p. 13.
43 Ibid., p. 19. Revenna Helson, in "Women Mathematicians and the 
Creative Personality" (1971), in Science ay a Career CPoice, 
pp. 363-74, shows that a group of women who matured before the 
current generation of students have evidently faced even more 
intense career-formation problems and psychological barriers than 
those that characterized the men of their days-as one would 
expect. "The traits most characteristic of the creative woman 
would seem to [include] these: rebellious independence, narcissism, 
introversion, and a rejection of outside influence . . . These traits 
have all been ascribed to the creative person, regardless of sex, but 
they appear more clearly in creative women mathematicians than 
they do in creative men mathematicians" (p. 370).
Similar results are given in Louise M. Bachtold and Emmy E. 
Werner, "Personality Profiles of Gifted Women: Psychologists" 
(1970), abridged and reprinted in Science ay % Career Choice, 
pp. 331-63.
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C P % p ^ 7 -  y . /M77772f07*J 077 it'2C72C<?,
^eo^72o/ogy, 2772 <f /iff
: Mumford, TP<? AfytA of tAe AHchwe 7 /; T&e PcTztcgozz of Power 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970; London: 
Seeker and Warburg). This essay appeared as a book review in 
Mweru# 9, October 197:: 568-7$.
2 For another example of Mumford's Bewzwwz response to what 
he regarded as an adversary position, see his letter to the editor, 
TPe New Lor A' Tiwer B00A Review, 10 January 197:.
CP%pM7* p. Frt272p /t-J%7222<?f.t N<?TV7072
1 This chapter appeared in Methotfoiogy #722/ ScieMce 8, no. 2$ 
(July 197$): 68-74, iargeiy as reprinted from TAe New RepMNie 
172, no. 9 (1975): 26-28.
CP%p7^7* 7 0. R 0 7 7 4 M  C/z7rP T777p /J /P e N  F fm f  C277
1 Ronaid W. Clark, EiMtrezM.' TPe Life #77 d Twzer (New York and 
Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1971). This chapter 
is closely based on a review that appeared in 7 'Ae New TorA Tiwer 
B00A Review, vol. 76, September $, 1971.
2 Martin J. Klein, PzizB EPrewfer?, Foi. 7, TBe M#Awg of # TPeo- 
reticai PPyricirt (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 
1970). 303-4-
C p 27p 7e r  7 7 .  O 7 7  t p e  e p 72< ? # 7i o 77# /  p p i i o y o p p y  
of ProfecA FPynLy Coztrye
: This chapter is an expansion of an invited talk at Congreso Nacional 
de EnseAanza de la Fisica, Sociedad Mexicana de Fisica, Mexico 
City, July 17, [97$. When published in its original form in the 
journal PPyrier EdMcatiow :i, no. $ (1976): $30-$$, the address 
carried an introductory, explanatory note by one of the journal's 
editors, John Harris:
"Science teaching at secondary level in the United States 
is quite different from anything in secondary schools in 
Britain. The most common pattern is for biology, chemistry 
and physics to be offered in the last three years ( 10th, : ith, 72th 
grades of high school respectively). Physics is thus an optional 
subject for students (the word 'pupil' has only optical connota­
tions in the U.S.) in their last year of secondary schooling.
And most of these students will not have taken any physics 
before 12th grade.
Professor Holton describes the interests and abilities of the
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students that the Project Physics Course is intended for in this 
article. One must remember that there is less specialization in 
the American schools than in British schools and that the 
students staying at school until :2th grade are from a wider 
ability than 'traditional' British sixth formers.
The Project Physics Course materials include a wide range 
of material: laboratory equipment, 16mm film, 8mm film loops, 
projectable transparencies, etc., as well as printed material for 
students and teachers.
The main course is organized into six (basic) units:
( t ) Concepts of motion, (2) Motion in the heavens, (3) The 
triumph of mechanics, (4) Light and electromagnetism,
(5) Models of the atom, (6) The nucleus."
2 F. G. Watson, "Why Do We Need More Physics Courses?" TAte 
PAiyrfcr Tecc/jer 3 (May [967): 210-12; G. C. Bates, "More on the 
Problem of Physics Enrollments," Sciewce Teacher 42 (October 
1975): 19-30-
3 During the question period, a member of the audience asked to 
know the relation between the Project Physics Course and my 
earlier college texts (/MtroJMCtioM to Cowccptf awe? TAicoricr fw 
PArytic#? ScicMce [Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 
1952, 1 9 7 3 ], and the text PoMW^ atiowr of Mofferw PAryMcal Scfewce, 
with D. H. D. Roller [Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Co., 1958]). The answer was that these texts are, in a sense, the 
grandfathers of the Project Physics Course. This happened in the 
following manner. One day in i960 a high school teacher from 
California came into my office at Harvard. He said he had been 
using my college text, which was first published in 1932, as a text 
for the seniors in his high school class. It worked well except that 
the sentences were often too lengthy for his students. He suggested 
I rewrite the text for that audience, and I in turn urged him to 
write a suitable textbook himself, possibly with a grant from the 
National Science Foundation. His name was James Rutherford.
When the NSF failed to fund that idea, Rutherford, Fletcher 
Watson (supervisor of the Ph.D. thesis Rutherford was then com­
pleting at Harvard), and I decided to undertake the work with a 
modest starter grant from the Carnegie Corporation, beginning in 
1962. All this was in the back of my mind at the October 1963 NSF 
conference, and the start we had already made gave us the courage 
to expand our plans considerably into the Project Physics Course for 
schools and colleges, from 1964 on. Support was provided from the 
U.S. Office of Education, NSF, Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foun­
dation, Sloan Foundation, and the publisher (Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, New York City).
The word Harvard was originally used in the title, since the 
project headquarters were there; but between the development of
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the prototype course and the issuing of the publisher's version 
for national use, the name Project Physics Course was adopted 
(and with it came, inevitably, the use of the abbreviation PPC).
4 The components in the U.S. version are not a// required for each 
student taking a Project Physics Course but were designed to pro­
vide a rich variety of materials from which teachers or students 
Could choose. For example, when studying vectors, most students 
find it very helpful to supplement the discussion printed in a text­
book by other media that use other cognitive channels. Therefore, 
we made a group of film loops about motions and vectors in the 
real world (airplanes going in a wind, boats crossing a river), as 
well as a set of programmed instruction booklets and some labora­
tory activities.
Also, there is much material for students to select if their class 
is run so as to encourage them to read on their own and to do 
special projects. Many teachers treat the passages on history and 
philosophy of science as reading assignments. Others use the 
AMtfcry as resources for technical, historical, and sociological dis­
cussions about science -  not assigned as classroom work that must 
be done, but as material from which to choose a project. In many 
classes, students are invited to choose a special project every few 
months. It can be mathematical, a laboratory project, or a report 
on historical reading. The teacher does not have to become a poly­
math, but can leave the selection of materials open to the students' 
choice, in accord with their own interests. Even if by training and 
inclination the teacher is chiefly interested in the "purely scientific" 
parts only, as long as he or she shows respect for and does not 
downgrade the other cultural elements, the students will find their 
own way.
3 A book-length account of the total evaluation process and results 
has been prepared by F. G. Watson, W. Welch, and H. Walberg. 
In addition, some forty articles have been published in various 
professional journals by members of the evaluation group of the 
project, using the extensive test results. A list of those, and of the 
theses, is obtainable from F. G. Watson, Graduate School of Edu­
cation, Longfellow Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 
02138.
6 A. Ahlgren and H. J. Walberg, "Changing Attitudes Toward 
Science Among Adolescents," Nature 243 (1973): 187-90. For a 
brief summary, see n. 36 in the notes to Chapter 7 of this book.
7 This and two of the other teaching styles often used in Project 
Physics classes are the subject of three of the twenty-one teacher­
briefing Elms obtainable from Holt, Rinehart and Winston, or 
rentable from Modern Talking Picture Service, Inc., in New York 
City. The Elm dealing with the method here described is called
Nof&y to pp. 369
Teacfwzg Sty/er 7 / ([istcd in the Holt catalog of Project Physics 
materials as No. 084020-1).
8 Earlier discussions inciude my essays "Project Physics: A Report 
on Its Aims and Current Status," TTze P^yrz'or Teacher 5 (May 
'967)* 198-21]; "The Relevance of Physics," PTryn'cr Today 23, 
no. ti (November 1970): 40-47; and Chapter 13 in G. Holton, 
T&wzatzc On'gwt of EHcMtz'pc TTwMgT?;.- TGp/er to EwrtczM (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).
9 Actual articles are contained in the seven Readers. Annotated 
bibliographies are given in several "Resource Letters" (contained in 
the students' TdawdTzoo^ ) reprinted from The Twterz'caM /ozmza/ of 
P/ayrzcr. Further bibliographies are in the instructors' ReroMrce 
B00A An extensive bibliography of books and articles in physics, 
history of science, philosophy of science, and so on, directed to the 
same kind of students, is given on pp. 333-70 of G. Holton, /?ztfo- 
dztrtioM to CowcepM a??d T^eon'er :'w Phydca/ Scz'ewce, 2nd ed., 
with S. Brush (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973).
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